OPINION OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES V. FLORES-MONTANO
541 U. S. ____ (2004)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 02-1794
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v. MANUEL
FLORES-MONTANO
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 30, 2004]
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court.
Customs officials seized 37
kilograms—a little more than 81 pounds—of marijuana from respondent
Manuel Flores-Montano’s gas tank at the international border. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on an earlier
decision by a divided panel of that court,
United States
v.
Molina-Tarazon, 279 F. 3d 709 (2002), held that
the Fourth Amendment forbade the fuel tank search absent reasonable
suspicion. No. 02–50306, 2003 WL 22410705 (Mar. 14, 2003). We hold
that the search in question did not require reasonable
suspicion.
Respondent, driving a 1987 Ford Taurus station
wagon, attempted to enter the United States at the Otay Mesa Port
of Entry in southern California. A customs inspector conducted an
inspection of the station wagon, and requested respondent to leave
the vehicle. The vehicle was then taken to a secondary inspection
station.
At the secondary station, a second customs
inspector inspected the gas tank by tapping it, and noted that the
tank sounded solid. Subsequently, the inspector requested a
mechanic under contract with Customs to come to the border station
to remove the tank. Within 20 to 30 minutes, the mechanic arrived.
He raised the car on a hydraulic lift, loosened the straps and
unscrewed the bolts holding the gas tank to the undercarriage of
the vehicle, and then disconnected some hoses and electrical
connections. After the gas tank was removed, the inspector hammered
off bondo (a putty-like hardening substance that is used to seal
openings) from the top of the gas tank. The inspector opened an
access plate underneath the bondo and found 37 kilograms of
marijuana bricks. The process took 15 to 25 minutes.
A grand jury for the Southern District of
California indicted respondent on one count of unlawfully importing
marijuana, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §952, and one count of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of
§841(a)(1). Relying on
Molina-Tarazon, respondent filed a
motion to suppress the marijuana recovered from the gas tank. In
Molina-Tarazon, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals
held,
inter alia, that removal of a gas tank requires
reasonable suspicion in order to be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. 279 F. 3d, at 717.
The Government advised the District Court that
it was not relying on reasonable suspicion as a basis for denying
respondent’s suppression motion, but that it believed
Molina-Tarazon was wrongly decided. The District Court,
relying on
Molina-Tarazon, held that reasonable suspicion
was required to justify the search and, accordingly, granted
respondent’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals, citing
Molina-Tarazon, summarily affirmed the District Court’s
judgment. No. 02–50306, 2003 WL 22410705 (CA9, Mar. 14, 2003). We
granted certiorari, 540 U. S. ___ (2003), and now reverse.
In
Molina-Tarazon, the Court of
Appeals decided a case presenting similar facts to the one at bar.
It asked “whether [the removal and dismantling of the defendant’s
fuel tank] is a ‘routine’ border search for which no suspicion
whatsoever is required.” 279 F. 3d, at 711. The Court of
Appeals stated that “[i]n order to conduct a search that goes
beyond the routine, an inspector must have reasonable suspicion,”
and the “critical factor” in determining whether a search is
“routine” is the “degree of intrusiveness.”
Id., at
712–713.
The Court of Appeals seized on language from
our opinion in
United States v.
Montoya de
Hernandez,
473
U. S. 531 (1985), in which we used the word “routine” as a
descriptive term in discussing border searches.
Id., at
538 (“Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are
not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable
cause, or warrant”);
id., at 541, n. 4 (“Because the
issues are not presented today we suggest no view on what level of
suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches such
as strip, body-cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches”). The Court
of Appeals took the term “routine,” fashioned a new balancing test,
and extended it to searches of vehicles. But the reasons that might
support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of
highly intrusive searches of the person—dignity and privacy
interests of the person being searched—simply do not carry over to
vehicles. Complex balancing tests to determine what is a “routine”
search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more “intrusive” search of a
person, have no place in border searches of vehicles.
The Government’s interest in preventing the
entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the
international border. Time and again, we have stated that “searches
made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the
sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and
property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”
United
States v.
Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, 616 (1977). Congress,
since the beginning of our Government, “has granted the Executive
plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the
border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate
the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of
contraband into this country.”
Montoya de Hernandez,
supra, at 537 (citing
Ramsey,
supra, at
616–617 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29)). The
modern statute that authorized the search in this case, 46 Stat.
747, 19 U. S. C. §1581(a),[
Footnote 1] derived from a statute passed by the First
Congress, the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §31, 1 Stat. 164, see
United States v.
Villamonte&nbhyph;Marquez, 462 U. S. 579, 584
(1983), and reflects the “impressive historical pedigree” of the
Government’s power and interest,
id., at 585. It is
axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent
authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its
territorial integrity.
That interest in protecting the borders is
illustrated in this case by the evidence that smugglers frequently
attempt to penetrate our borders with contraband secreted in their
automobiles’ fuel tank. Over the past 5
1/2 fiscal years, there have been 18,788
vehicle drug seizures at the southern California ports of entry.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. Of those 18,788, gas tank drug seizures
have accounted for 4,619 of the vehicle drug seizures, or
approximately 25%. Ibid. In addition, instances of persons
smuggled in and around gas tank compartments are discovered at the
ports of entry of San Ysidro and Otay Mesa at a rate averaging 1
approximately every 10 days. Id., at
16a.
Respondent
asserts two main arguments with respect to his Fourth Amendment
interests. First, he urges that he has a privacy interest in his
fuel tank, and that the suspicionless disassembly of his tank is an
invasion of his privacy. But on many occasions, we have noted that
the expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the
interior. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at 538. We have
long recognized that automobiles seeking entry into this country
may be searched. See Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132, 154
(1925) (“Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international
boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come
in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought
in”). It is difficult to imagine how the search of a gas tank,
which should be solely a repository for fuel, could be more of an
invasion of privacy than the search of the automobile’s passenger
compartment.
Second,
respondent argues that the Fourth Amendment “protects property as
well as privacy,” Soldal v. Cook
County, 506
U. S. 56, 62 (1992), and that the disassembly and reassembly of
his gas tank is a significant deprivation of his property interest
because it may damage the vehicle. He does not, and on the record
cannot, truly contend that the procedure of removal, disassembly,
and reassembly of the fuel tank in this case or any other has
resulted in serious damage to, or destruction of, the
property.[Footnote 2] According
to the Government, for example, in fiscal year 2003, 348 gas tank
searches conducted along the southern border were negative
(i.e., no contraband was found), the gas tanks were
reassembled, and the vehicles continued their entry into the United
States without incident. Brief for United States
31.
Respondent
cites not a single accident involving the vehicle or motorist in
the many thousands of gas tank disassemblies that have occurred at
the border. A gas tank search involves a brief procedure that can
be reversed without damaging the safety or operation of the
vehicle. If damage to a vehicle were to occur, the motorist might
be entitled to recovery. See, e.g., 31 U. S. C.
§3723; 19 U. S. C. §1630. While the interference with a
motorist’s possessory interest is not insignificant when the
Government removes, disassembles, and reassembles his gas tank, it
nevertheless is justified by the Government’s paramount interest in
protecting the border.[Footnote
3]
For the
reasons stated, we conclude that the Government’s authority to
conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the
authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel
tank. While it may be true that some searches of property are so
destructive as to require a different result, this was not one of
them. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so
ordered.
Footnote 1
Section
1581(a) provides:
“Any officer
of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle
at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or,
as he may be authorized, within a customs-enforcement area
established under the Anti-Smuggling Act, or at any other
authorized place, without as well as within his district, and
examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine,
inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof
and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end
may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary
force to compel compliance.”
Footnote 2
Respondent’s
reliance on cases involving exploratory drilling searches is
misplaced. See United States v. Rivas, 157
F. 3d 364 (CA5 1998) (drilling into body of trailer required
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Robles,
45 F. 3d 1 (CA1 1995) (drilling into machine part required
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Carreon,
872 F. 2d 1436 (CA10 1989) (drilling into camper required
reasonable suspicion). We have no reason at this time to pass on
the reasonableness of drilling, but simply note the obvious factual
difference that this case involves the procedure of removal,
disassembly, and reassembly of a fuel tank, rather than potentially
destructive drilling. We again leave open the question “whether,
and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed
‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive manner it is
carried out.” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, 618, n. 13
(1977).
Footnote 3
Respondent
also argued that he has some sort of Fourth Amendment right not to
be subject to delay at the international border and that the need
for the use of specialized labor, as well as the hour actual delay
here and the potential for even greater delay for reassembly are an
invasion of that right. Respondent points to no cases indicating
the Fourth Amendment shields entrants from inconvenience or delay
at the international border.
The procedure
in this case took about an hour (including the wait for the
mechanic). At oral argument, the Government advised us that,
depending on the type of car, a search involving the disassembly
and reassembly of a gas tank may take one to two hours. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 10. We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at
international borders are to be expected.
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