OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
UNITED STATES ET AL.
v. BEAN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
No. 01-704. Argued October 16, 2002-Decided December 10,2002
Because of respondent's felony conviction, he was prohibited by
18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) from possessing, distributing, or receiving
firearms or ammunition. Relying on § 925(c), he applied to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his
firearms disabilities. ATF returned the application unprocessed,
explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from
expending any funds to investigate or act upon such applications.
Invoking § 925(c)'s judicial review provision, he filed suit,
asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his
fitness to possess a gun and to issue a judicial order granting
relief. The court granted the requested relief, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.
Held: The absence of an actual denial by ATF of a felon's
petition precludes judicial review under § 925(c). The Secretary of
the Treasury is authorized to grant relief from a firearms
disability if certain preconditions are met, and an applicant may
seek federal-court review if the Secretary denies his application.
Ibid. Since 1992, however, the appropriations bar has
prevented ATF, to which the Secretary has delegated this authority,
from using appropriated funds to investigate or act upon the
applications. Section 925(c)'s text and the procedure it lays out
for seeking relief make clear that an actual decision by ATF on an
application is a prerequisite for judicial review, and that mere
inaction by ATF does not invest a district court with independent
jurisdiction. Grammatically, the phrase "denied by the Secretary"
references the Secretary's decision on whether an applicant "will
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety," and
whether "the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the
public interest." Such determination can hardly be construed as
anything but a decision actually denying the application. Under §
925(c)'s procedure for those seeking relief, the Secretary, i.
e., ATF, has broad authority to grant or deny relief, even
when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied. This procedure
shows that judicial review cannot occur without a dispositive
decision by ATF. First, in the absence of a statutorily defined
standard of review for action under § 925(c), the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) supplies the applicable standard. 5 U. S. C. §§
701(a), 706(2)(A). The APA's "arbitrary and capricious" test, by
its nature, contemplates review of some
72
action by another entity. Second, both parts of § 925(c)'s
standard for granting relief-whether an applicant is "likely to act
in a manner dangerous to public safety" and whether the relief is
in the "public interest"-are policy-based determinations and,
hence, point to ATF as the primary decisionmaker. Third, § 925(c)
allows the admission of additional evidence in district court
proceedings only in exceptional circumstances. Congressional
assignment of such a circumscribed role to a district court shows
that the statute contemplates that a court's determination will
heavily rely on the record and the ATF's decision. Indeed, the very
use in § 925(c) of the word "review" to describe a court's
responsibility in this statutory scheme signifies that it cannot
grant relief on its own, absent an antecedent actual denial by ATF.
Pp. 74-78.
253 F.3d
234, reversed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson,
Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Irving L. Gornstein, Mark B.
Stern, and Thomas M. Bondy.
Thomas C.
Goldstein argued the cause for
respondent.
With him on the brief were
Larry C.
Hunter and
Amy Howe. *
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider in this case whether, despite appropriation
provisions barring the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF) from acting on applications for relief from firearms
disabilities of persons convicted of a felony, a federal district
court has authority under 18 U. s. C. § 925(c) to grant such
relief.
I
After attending a gun show in Laredo, Texas, respondent, Thomas
Lamar Bean, a gun dealer, and his associates drove
*Craig Goldblatt and
Mathew S.
Nosanchuk
filed a brief for the Violence Policy Center as
amicus
curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc., by
Richard E.
Gardiner; and for the Second Amendment Foundation by
William
M. Gustavson.
73
respondent's vehicle to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, for dinner.
Bean v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
253 F.3d
234, 236 (CA5 2001). When Mexican officials stopped the vehicle
at the border, they found in the back, in plain view, approximately
200 rounds of ammunition.
Ibid. According to respondent, he
had instructed his associates to remove any firearms and ammunition
from his vehicle, but inexplicably one box remained.
Ibid.
Respondent was convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition
into Mexico and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.
Because of his felony conviction, respondent was prohibited by
18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) from possessing, distributing, or receiving
firearms or ammunition. Relying on § 925(c), respondent applied to
ATF for relief from his firearms disabilities. ATF returned the
application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations
law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon
applications such as respondent's.
Respondent then filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas. Relying on the judicial review
provision in § 925(c), respondent asked the District Court to
conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun, and to
issue a judicial order granting relief from his firearms
disabilities. Respondent attached various affidavits from persons
attesting to his fitness to possess firearms. After conducting a
hearing, the court entered judgment granting respondent the
requested relief. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, concluding that congressional refusal to provide funding
to ATF for reviewing applications such as respondent's "is not the
requisite direct and definite suspension or repeal of the subject
rights." 253 F. 3d, at 239. The Fifth Circuit then proceeded to
hold that the District Court had jurisdiction to review ATF's
(in)action. We granted certiorari. 534 U. S. 1112 (2002).
74
II
Under federal law, a person who is convicted of a felony is
prohibited from possessing firearms. See § 922(g)(1). The Secretary
of the Treasury is authorized to grant relief from that prohibition
if it is established to his satisfaction that certain preconditions
are met. See § 925(c).1 An applicant may seek judicial review from
a "United States district court" if his application "is denied by
the Secretary."
Ibid.
Since 1992, however, the appropriations bar has prevented ATF,
to which the Secretary has delegated authority to act on § 925(c)
applications,2 from using "funds appropriated
1 Title 18 U. S. C. § 925(c) provides:
"A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping,
transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition may make
application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities
imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt,
transfer, shipment, transportation, or possession of firearms, and
the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to his
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, and
the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant
will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety
and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the
public interest. Any person whose application for relief from
disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a petition with
the United States district court for the district in which he
resides for a judicial review of such denial. The court may in its
discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would
result in a miscarriage of justice. A licensed importer, licensed
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector conducting
operations under this chapter, who makes application for relief
from the disabilities incurred under this chapter, shall not be
barred by such disability from further operations under his license
pending final action on an application for relief filed pursuant to
this section. Whenever the Secretary grants relief to any person
pursuant to this section he shall promptly publish in the Federal
Register notice of such action, together with the reasons
therefor."
2 Respondent contends that congressional denial of funds to ATF
did not eliminate the Secretary's power to act on his application.
In support, respondent notes that § 925(c) refers to the action by
"the Secretary." That claim, however, is waived, as respondent
raised it for the first time in his brief on the merits to this
Court.
Even if considered on the merits, respondent's argument faces
several difficulties. First, it appears that the Secretary
delegated to ATF the
75
herein ... to investigate or act upon applications for relief
from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U. S. c. [§ ]925(c)."
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations
Act, 1993, Pub. L. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1732.3 Accordingly, ATF, upon
receipt of respondent's petition, returned it, explaining that
"[s]ince October 1992, ATF's annual appropriation has prohibited
the expending of any funds to investigate or act upon applications
for relief from Federal firearms disabilities." App. 33-34.
Respondent contends that ATF's failure to act constitutes a
"denial" within the meaning of § 925(c), and that, therefore,
district courts have jurisdiction to review such inaction.
We disagree. Inaction by ATF does not amount to a "denial"
within the meaning of § 925(c). The text of § 925(c) and
exclusive authority to act on petitions brought under § 925(c),
see 27 CFR §§ 178.144(b) and (d) (2002); such delegation is not
unreasonable. Second, even assuming the Secretary has retained the
authority to act on such petitions, it is not clear that respondent
would prevail were he to file a requisite action under 5 U. S. C. §
706(1) (providing for judicial review to "compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed"). Not only does the
Secretary, by the explicit terms of the statute, possess broad
discretion as to whether to grant relief, see
infra, at
76-78, but congressional withholding of funds from ATF would likely
inform his exercise of discretion.
3 In each subsequent year, Congress has retained the bar on the
use of appropriated funds to process applications filed by
individuals. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act,
2002, Pub. L. 107-67, 115 Stat. 519; Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-129; Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. 106-58, 113
Stat. 434; Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act,
1999, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-485; Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. 105-61, 111 Stat.
1277; Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-319;
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations
Act, 1996, Pub. L. 10452, 109 Stat. 471; Treasury, Postal Service
and General Government Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. 103-329,
108 Stat. 2385; Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. 103123, 107 Stat. 1228.
76
the procedure it lays out for seeking relief make clear that an
actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for
judicial review, and that mere inaction by ATF does not invest a
district court with independent jurisdiction to act on an
application.
Grammatically, the phrase "denied by the Secretary" references
the Secretary's decision on whether an applicant "will not be
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety," and whether
"the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public
interest." The determination whether an applicant is "likely to act
in a manner dangerous to public safety" can hardly be construed as
anything but a decision actually denying the application.4 And, in
fact, respondent does not contend that ATF actually passed on his
application, but rather claims that "refusal to grant relief
constitutes a literal, or at least a
constructive, denial of
the application because it has precisely the same impact on [the
applicant] as denial on the merits." Brief for Respondent 35
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The procedure that § 925(c) lays out for those seeking relief
also leads us to conclude that an actual adverse action on the
application by ATF is a prerequisite for judicial review. Section
925(c) requires an applicant, as a first step, to petition the
Secretary and establish to the Secretary's satisfaction that the
applicant is eligible for relief. The Secretary, in his discretion,
may grant or deny the request based on the broad considerations
outlined above. Only then, if the
4 Also counseling against construing failure to act as a denial
for purposes of § 925(c) is the fact that while the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) draws a distinction between a "denial" and a
"failure to act," see 5 U. S. C. § 551(13), an applicant may obtain
judicial review under § 925(c) only if an application is denied.
See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction
§46:06, p. 194 (6th ed. 2000) ("The use of different terms within
related statutes generally implies that different meanings were
intended").
77
Secretary denies relief, may an applicant seek review in a
district court.
This broad authority of the Secretary, i.
e., ATF, to
grant or deny relief, even when the statutory prerequisites are
satisfied, shows that judicial review under § 925(c) cannot occur
without a dispositive decision by ATF. First, in the absence of a
statutorily defined standard of review for action under § 925(c),
the APA supplies the applicable standard. 5 U. S. C. § 701(a).
Under the APA, judicial review is usually limited to determining
whether agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." § 706(2)(A).
Application of the APA standard of review here indicates that
judicial review is predicated upon ATF's dispositive decision: the
"arbitrary and capricious" test in its nature contemplates review
of some action by another entity, rather than initial judgment of
the court itself.
Second, both parts of the standard for granting relief point to
ATF as the primary decisionmaker. Whether an applicant is "likely
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety" presupposes an
inquiry into that applicant's background-a function best performed
by the Executive, which, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped
for conducting a neutral, wide-ranging investigation. Similarly,
the "public interest" standard calls for an inherently policy-based
decision best left in the hands of an agency.
Third, the admission of additional evidence in district court
proceedings is contemplated only in exceptional circumstances. See
18 U. S. C. § 925(c) (allowing, "in [district court's] discretion,"
admission of evidence where "failure to do so would result in a
miscarriage of justice"). Congressional assignment of such a
circumscribed role to a district court shows that the statute
contemplates that a district court's determination will heavily
rely on the record and the decision made by ATF. Indeed, the very
use in § 925(c) of
78
the word "review" to describe a district court's responsibility
in this statutory scheme signifies that a district court cannot
grant relief on its own, absent an antecedent actual denial by
ATF.
Accordingly, we hold that the absence of an actual denial of
respondent's petition by ATF precludes judicial review under §
925(c), and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
It is so ordered.
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