OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
SPRIETSMA, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF SPRIETSMA, DECEASED
v. MERCURY MARINE, A DIVISION OF BRUNSWICK CORP.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
No. 01-706. Argued October 15, 2002-Decided December 3, 2002
Petitioner's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was
struck by the propeller of an outboard motor manufactured by
respondent, Mercury Marine, a division of Brunswick Corporation
(Brunswick). In his subsequent common-law tort action in Illinois
state court, petitioner claimed that Brunswick's motor was
unreasonably dangerous because, among other things, it was not
protected by a propeller guard. The trial court dismissed the
complaint, and the intermediate court affirmed, finding the action
expressly pre-empted by the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA
or Act). The Illinois Supreme Court rejected that rationale, but
affirmed on implied pre-emption grounds.
Held: The FBSA does not pre-empt state common-law claims
such as petitioner's. Pp. 56-70.
(a) The FBSA was enacted to improve boating safety, to authorize
the establishment of national construction and performance
standards for boats and associated equipment, and to encourage
greater uniformity of boating laws and regulations as among the
States and the Federal Government. The Secretary of Transportation
has delegated the authority to promulgate regulations establishing
minimum safety standards for recreational vessels and associated
equipment to the Coast Guard, which must,
inter alia,
consult with a special National Boating Safety Advisory Council
before exercising that authority. The Coast Guard may issue
exemptions from its regulations if boating safety will not be
adversely affected. Section 10 of the Act sets forth an express
pre-emption clause, and § 40's saving clause provides that
compliance with the Act or standards, regulations, or orders
prescribed under the Act does not relieve a person from liability
at common law or under state law. When the Coast Guard issued its
first regulations in 1972, the Secretary exempted from pre-emption
state laws that regulate matters not covered by the federal
regulations. The Coast Guard has since promulgated a host of
detailed regulations, but it determined in 1990, after an 18-month
inquiry by an Advisory Council subcommittee, that available data
did not support adoption of a regulation requiring propel-
52
Syllabus
ler guards. In 2001, the Advisory Council recommended specific
propeller guard regulations, but no regulations regarding their use
on recreational boats such as the one in this case are currently
pending. Pp.56-62.
(b) The FBSA does not expressly pre-empt petitioner's common-law
tort claims. Section 10's express pre-emption clause-which applies
to "a [state or local] law or regulation"-is most naturally read as
not encompassing common-law claims for two reasons. First, the
article "a" implies a discreteness that is not present in common
law. Second, because "a word is known by the company it keeps,"
Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co.,
513 U. S. 561, 575, the
terms "law" and "regulation" used together indicate that Congress
only pre-empted positive enactments. The Act's saving clause
buttresses this conclusion. It assumes that there are some
significant number of common-law liability cases to save, and §
1O's language permits a narrow reading excluding common-law
actions. See
Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.,
529 U. S. 861,
868. And the contrast between its general reference to "liability
at common law" and § 1O's more specific and detailed description of
what is pre-emptedincluding an exception for state regulations
addressing "uniquely hazardous conditions"-indicates that § 10 was
drafted to pre-empt performance standards and equipment
requirements imposed by statute or regulation. This interpretation
does not produce anomalous results. It would have been perfectly
rational for Congress not to pre-empt common-law claims, which
necessarily perform an important remedial role in compensating
accident victims. pp. 62-64.
(c) The Coast Guard's 1990 decision not to regulate propeller
guards also does not pre-empt petitioner's claims. That decision
left applicable propeller guard law exactly the same as it had been
before the subcommittee began its investigation. A Coast Guard
decision not to regulate a particular aspect of boating safety is
fully consistent with an intent to preserve state regulatory
authority pending adoption of specific federal standards. The Coast
Guard's explanation for its propeller guard decision reveals only
that the available data did not meet the FBSA's stringent criteria
for federal regulation. The Coast Guard did not take the further
step of deciding that, as a matter of policy, the States and their
political subdivisions should not impose some version of propeller
guard regulation, and it did not reject propeller guards as unsafe.
Although undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, the 1990
decision does not convey an authoritative message of a federal
policy against propeller guards, and nothing in the Coast Guard's
recent regulatory activities alters this conclusion.
Geier
v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861,
distinguished. pp. 64-68.
53
(d) Nor does the FBSA's statutory scheme implicitly pre-empt
petitioner's claims. The Act does not require the Coast Guard to
promulgate comprehensive regulations covering every aspect of
recreational boat safety and design; nor must the Coast Guard
certify the acceptability of every recreational boat subject to its
jurisdiction.
Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, and
United States v.
Locke, 529 U. S. 89,
distinguished. Even if the FBSA could be interpreted as expressly
occupying the field of safety regulation of recreational boats with
respect to state positive laws and regulations, it does not convey
a clear and manifest intent to completely occupy the field so as to
foreclose state common-law remedies. This Court's conclusion that
the Act's express pre-emption clause does not cover common-law
claims suggests the opposite intent. An unembellished statement in
a House Report on the Act does not establish an intent to pre-empt
common-law remedies. And the FBSA's goal of fostering uniformity in
manufacturing regulations, on which respondent ultimately relies
for its pre-emption argument, is an important but not unyielding
interest, as is demonstrated by the Coast Guard's early grants of
broad exemptions for state regulations and by its position in this
litigation. Pp. 68-70.
197 Ill. 2d 112, 757 N. E. 2d 75, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Leslie A. Brueckner argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs were Arthur H. Bryant, Joseph A. Power,
Jr., and Todd A. Smith.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy
Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Michael E. Robinson,
Kirk K. Van Tine, Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, Peter J. Plocki,
Robert F. Duncan, and G. Alex Weller.
Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Steffen N. Johnson, Michael W
McConnell, Kenneth S. Geller, Timothy S. Bishop, and Daniel J.
Connolly. *
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Missouri et al. by
Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon,
Attorney General of Missouri,
James R. Layton, State
Solicitor, and
Charles W Hatfield, and by the
54
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a state common-law tort action
seeking damages from the manufacturer of an outboard motor is
pre-empted either by the enactment of the Federal Boat Safety Act
of 1971, 46 U. S. C. §§ 4301-4311 (FBSA, 1971 Act, or Act), or by
the decision of the Coast Guard in 1990 not to promulgate a
regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats.
I
On July 10, 1995, petitioner's wife, Jeanne Sprietsma, died as a
result of a boating accident on an inland lake that spans the
Kentucky-Tennessee border. She was riding in an 18foot ski boat
equipped with a 115-horsepower outboard motor manufactured by
respondent, Mercury Marine, which is a division of the Brunswick
Corporation (Brunswick). Apparently when the boat turned, she fell
overboard and was struck by the propeller, suffering fatal
injuries.
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Mark Pryor of Arkansas,
Bill Lockyer of California,
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut,
Robert A.
Butterworth of Florida,
Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii,
Steve Carter of Indiana, J.
Joseph Curran, Jr., of
Maryland,
Mike McGrath of Montana,
Frankie Sue Del
Papa of Nevada,
Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire,
Patricia Madrid of New Mexico,
Roy Cooper of North
Carolina,
Hardy Myers of Oregon,
Mark L. Shurtleff of
Utah,
Christine O.
Gregoire of Washington, and
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; and for the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America by
Ross Diamond III
and
Jeffrey Robert White.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by
John G.
Roberts, Jr., Catherine E. Stetson, and
Robin S.
Conrad; for the Maritime Law Association of
the United States by
Joshua S.
Force, Raymond P. Hayden,
William R. Dorsey III, and
James Patrick Cooney; for the
National Association of Manufacturers et al. by
Kenneth W Starr,
Robert R. Gasaway, Richard A. Cordray, Ashley C.
Parrish,
Jan S.
Amundson, and
Quentin Riegel; and for the
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by
Alan
Untereiner.
55
Petitioner filed a nine-count complaint in an Illinois court 1
seeking damages from Brunswick on state-law theories. Each count
alleged that Brunswick had manufactured an unreasonably dangerous
product because, among other things, the motor was not protected by
a propeller guard.2 The trial court granted respondent's motion to
dismiss, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed on the
ground that the action was expressly pre-empted by the FBSA. 312
Ill. App. 3d 1040, 729 N. E. 2d 45 (2000). Relying on our
intervening decision in
Geier v.
American Honda Motor
Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
the appellate court's express pre-emption rationale, but affirmed
on implied pre-emption grounds. 197 Ill. 2d 112, 757 N. E. 2d 75
(2001). The court's decision added to a split of authority on this
precise issue arising from lawsuits against, among a few others,
this particular respondent and its corporate subsidiaries.3
We granted certiorari, 534 U. S. 1112 (2002), to decide whether
the FBSA pre-empts state common-law claims of
1 The complaint alleges that the Sprietsmas and the owners of
the boat were residents of Illinois and that the boat had been
purchased in Illinois. App. 101.
2Id., at 100-122.
3 Compare
Lewis v.
Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d
1494 (CAll) (finding implied pre-emption under the FBSA), cert.
granted, 522 U. S. 978 (1997), cert. dismissed, 523 U. S. 1113
(1998);
Carstensen v.
Brunswick Corp., 49 F. 3d 430
(CA8) (finding express pre-emption under the FBSA), cert. denied,
516 U. S. 866 (1995); and
Ryan v.
Brunswick Corp.,
454 Mich. 20, 557 N. W. 2d 541 (1997) (finding express pre-emption
under the FBSA), with
Moore v.
Brunswick Bowling
&
Billiards Corp., 889 S. W. 2d 246 (Tex.) (holding that
federal law did not pre-empt state law in this context), cert.
denied
sub nom. Vivian Industrial Plastics, Inc. v.
Moore, 513 U. S. 1057 (1994). See also
Lady v.
Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d
598 (CA5 2000) (holding that common-law claims based on
the manufacturer's failure to provide a propeller guard were
impliedly pre-empted by the FBSA; Outboard Marine, the successor to
Neal Glaser Marine, declared bankruptcy shortly after the petition
for certiorari was filed), cert. denied
sub nom. Lady v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 532 U. S. 941 (2001).
56
this character.4 Because the pre-emption defense raises a
threshold issue, we have no occasion to consider the merits of
petitioner's claims, or even whether the claims are viable as a
matter of Illinois law. We must, however, evaluate three distinct
theories that may support the pre-emption defense: (1) that the
1971 Act expressly pre-empts common-law claims; (2) that the Coast
Guard's decision not to regulate propeller guards pre-empts the
claims; and (3) that the potential conflict between diverse state
rules and the federal interest in a uniform system of regulation
impliedly preempts such claims. Before considering each of these
theories, we review the history of federal regulation in this
area.
II
The 1971 Act is the most recent and most comprehensive of the
several statutes that Congress has enacted to improve the safe
operation of recreational boats. A 1910 enactment required three
classes of motorboats to carry certain lights, sound signals, life
preservers, and fire extinguishers. Act of June 9, 1910, 36 Stat.
462. In 1918, Congress passed a law that required the numbering of
motorboats over 16 feet long, Act of June 7, 1918, ch. 93, 40 Stat.
602, and in 1940, it reenacted the above requirements, provided a
system of federal inspection, and authorized penalties for the
reckless operation of motorboats, Act of Apr. 25, 1940, ch. 155, 54
Stat. 163. In 1958, Congress enacted additional numbering
requirements to be administered by the States and directed the
States to compile and transmit boating accident statistics to the
Secretary of the Treasury. Federal Boating Act of 1958, 72 Stat.
1754. Section 9 of the 1958 Act expressed a policy of encouraging
uniformity of boating laws insofar as practicable.
The accident statistics compiled by the States presumably were
instrumental in persuading the 1971 Congress that ad-
4 Brunswick has asserted that federal maritime law governs this
case.
Because this argument was not raised below, it is waived.
57
ditional federal legislation was necessary.5 In its statement of
purposes, the FBSA recites that it was enacted "to improve boating
safety," to authorize "the establishment of national construction
and performance standards for boats and associated equipment," and
to encourage greater "uniformity of boating laws and regulations as
among the several States and the Federal Government." Pub. L.
92-75, § 2, 85 Stat. 213-214. Three of the provisions implementing
these goals are particularly relevant to this case.
Section 5 of the FBSA, as amended and codified in 46 U. S. C. §
4302, authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue
regulations establishing "minimum safety standards for recreational
vessels and associated equipment," and requiring the installation
or use of such equipment.6 The Secretary has delegated this
authority to the Coast Guard. See 49 CFR § 1.46(n)(1) (1997).
Before exercising that authority,
5 The Senate Report on the 1971 Act observed that approximately
40 million Americans engaged in recreational boating activities
every year, and that nearly 7,000 persons had died in boating
accidents during the preceding 5-year period. S. Rep. No. 92-248,
pp. 6-7 (1971) (hereinafter S. Rep.). The Report added: "It seems
apparent that the annual loss of life is of sufficiently alarming
proportion that the Federal Government should require products
involved to be built to standards of safety commensurate with the
risks associated with their use. Similar federal legislation exists
with regard to other products, including aircraft and motor
vehicles. Also, safety standards and requirements for certain
categories of larger commercial vessels have existed for many
years."
Id., at 13.
6 Title 46 U. S. C. § 4302 provides:
"(a) The Secretary may prescribe regulations-
"(1) establishing minimum safety standards for recreational
vessels and associated equipment, and establishing procedures and
tests required to measure conformance with those standards, with
each standard-
"(A) meeting the need for recreational vessel safety; and
"(E) being stated, insofar as practicable, in terms of
performance;
"(2) requiring the installation, carrying, or use of associated
equipment ... on recreational vessels and classes of recreational
vessels subject to this chapter, and prohibiting the installation,
carrying, or use of associated equipment that does not conform with
safety standards established under this section .... "
58
the Coast Guard must consider certain factors, such as the
extent to which the proposed regulation will contribute to boating
safety, and must consult with a special National Boating Safety
Advisory Council appointed pursuant to § 33 of the Act, 46 U. S. C.
§ 13110.7 The Advisory Council consists of 21 members, 7
representatives from each of three different groups: (1) "State
officials responsible for State boating safety programs," (2) boat
and equipment manufacturers, and (3) "national recreational boating
organizations and ... the general public." § 13110(b). The Coast
Guard may also issue exemptions from its regulations if it
determines that boating safety "will not be adversely affected."
§4305.
Section 10 of the Act, as codified in 46 U. S. C. § 4306, sets
forth the Act's pre-emption clause and thus provides the basis for
respondent's express pre-emption argument. It states in full:
"Unless permitted by the Secretary under section 4305 of this
title, a State or political subdivision of a State may not
establish, continue in effect, or enforce
7 "In prescribing regulations under this section, the Secretary
shall, among other things-
"(1) consider the need for and the extent to which the
regulations will contribute to recreational vessel safety;
"(2) consider relevant available recreational vessel safety
standards, statistics, and data, including public and private
research, development, testing, and evaluation;
"(3) not compel substantial alteration of a recreational vessel
or item of associated equipment that is in existence, or the
construction or manufacture of which is begun before the effective
date of the regulation, but subject to that limitation may require
compliance or performance, to avoid a substantial risk of personal
injury to the public, that the Secretary considers appropriate in
relation to the degree of hazard that the compliance will correct;
and
"(4) consult with the National Boating Safety Advisory Council
established under section 13110 of this title about the
considerations referred to in clauses (1)-(3) of this
subsection."
59
a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or
associated equipment performance or other safety standard or
imposing a requirement for associated equipment (except insofar as
the State or political subdivision may, in the absence of the
Secretary's disapproval, regulate the carrying or use of marine
safety articles to meet uniquely hazardous conditions or
circumstances within the State) that is not identical to a
regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title."
Section 40, 46 U. S. C. § 4311, sets forth the penalties that
may be assessed against persons who violate the Act. At the end of
that section, Congress included the following saving clause:
"Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or
orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from
liability at common law or under State law." § 4311(g).
Federal Regulation Under the FBSA
The day after the President signed the FBSA into law, the
Secretary of Transportation took action that was based on the
assumption that § 10 would pre-empt existing state regulation that
"is not identical to a regulation prescribed" under § 5 of the Act,
even if no such federal regulation had been promulgated. On August
11, 1971, the Secretary issued a statement exempting all
then-existing state laws from preemption under the Act. 36 Fed.
Reg. 15764-15765. He explained that boating safety would "not be
adversely affected by continuing in effect those existing laws and
regulations of the various States and political subdivisions" until
new federal regulations could be issued.
Id., at 15765.
One year later, on August 4, 1972, the Coast Guard issued its
first regulations under § 5 of the Act. See 37 Fed. Reg.
15777-15785. Those regulations included boat performance and safety
standards such as requirements for hull identifi-
60
cation numbers, maximum capacity and warnings of such capacity,
and minimum boat flotation. They did not include any propeller
guard requirement. After those federal regulations became
effective, the Secretary limited the scope of his original blanket
exemption to pre-empt those "State statutes and regulations" that
concerned requirements covered by the 1972 regulations. See 38 Fed.
Reg. 6914-6915 (1973). Existing state laws that regulated matters
not covered by the federal regulations continued to be exempted
from preemption.
Ibid.
In the years since, the Coast Guard has promulgated a host of
detailed regulations. Some prescribe the use of specified
equipment, such as personal flotation devices and visual distress
signals, 33 CFR pts. 175(B), (C) (2001), and certain procedures,
such as compliance labeling by manufacturers and prompt accident
reporting by operators, pts. 181(B), 173(C). See generally pts.
173-181. Other regulations impose precise standards governing the
design and manufacture of boats themselves and of associated
equipment, such as electrical and fuel systems, ventilation, and
"start-in-gear protection" devices. Pt. 183; cf.
Chao v.
Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U. S. 235, 242 (2002)
("Congress has assigned a broad and important mission to the Coast
Guard .... [T]he Coast Guard possesses authority to promulgate and
enforce regulations promoting the safety of vessels ... ").
Coast Guard Consideration of Propeller Guard Regulation
In May 1988, the Coast Guard decided that the number of
recreational boating accidents in which persons in the water were
struck by propellers merited a special study.8 Acting
8 Between 1976 and 1990, the Coast Guard officially reported
about 100 propeller-strike injuries in the United States per year.
App. in
Lewis v.
Brunswick, O. T. 1997, No. 97-288,
p. 170. A 1992 study by members of the Johns Hopkins University
Injury Prevention Center and the Institute for Injury Reduction
concluded that, when adjusted for underreporting,
61
at the request of the Coast Guard, the National Boating Safety
Advisory Council appointed a special Propeller Guard Subcommittee.
The subcommittee was directed to review "the available data on the
prevention of propeller-strike accidents" and to study the "various
methods of shrouding propellers to prevent contact with [a] person
in the water." App.43.
After 18 months of study, the subcommittee recommended that the
Coast Guard "should take no regulatory action to require propeller
guards."
Id., at 40. Its recommendation rested upon findings
that, given current technology, feasible propeller guards might
prevent penetrating injuries but increase the potential for blunt
trauma caused by collision with the guard, which enlarges the
boat's underwater profile; feasible models would cause power and
speed loss at higher speeds; and it would be "prohibitive[ly]"
expensive to retrofit all existing boats with propeller guards
because "[n]o simple universal design suitable for all boats and
motors in existence" had been proved feasible.
Id., at
36-38.
The Advisory Council endorsed the subcommittee's recommendation,
as did the Coast Guard. In a 1990 letter to the Council, the Chief
of the Coast Guard's Office of Navigation Safety and Waterway
Services agreed that the available accident data did not support
the adoption of a regulation requiring propeller guards on
motorboats, but stated that the Coast Guard would continue to
review information "regarding development and testing of new
propeller guarding devices or other information on the state of the
art."
Id., at 81. In 1995, 1996, and 1997, the Coast Guard
invited public comment on various proposals to reduce the number of
injuries involving propeller strikes.
In April 2001, the Advisory Council recommended that the Coast
Guard develop four specific regulations. See 66 Fed.
"the true number of propeller injuries and fatalities may be
closer to ... 2,000-3,000 per year."
Id., at 199.
62
Reg. 63645, 63647.9 In response, in December 2001, the Coast
Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking addressing one of
the recommendations. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require
an owner of a nonplaning houseboat for rent to equip her vessel
with either a propeller guard or "a combination of three propeller
injury avoidance measures."
Ibid. The Advisory Council also
recommended that the Coast Guard require "manufacturers and
importers of new planing vessels 12 feet to 26 feet in length with
propellers aft of the transom to select and install one of several
factory installed propeller injury avoidance methods."
Ibid.
Although the Coast Guard has indicated that this recommendation,
along with the Advisory Council's other recommendations, will be
addressed in "subsequent regulatory projects,"
ibid., it has
not yet issued any regulation either requiring or prohibiting
propeller guards on recreational planing vessels such as the boat
involved in this case.
III
Because the FBSA contains an express pre-emption clause, our
"task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on
the plain wording of the clause, which nec-
9 "After discussing the alternatives and their cost, the Council
recommended that the Coast Guard ... develop four specific
regulations:
"(1) Require owners of all propeller driven vessels 12 feet in
length and longer with propellers aft of the transom to display
propeller warning labels and to employ an emergency cut-off switch,
where installed;
"(2) Require manufacturers and importers of new planing vessels
12 feet to 26 feet in length with propellers aft of the transom to
select and install one of several factory installed propeller
injury avoidance methods;
"(3) Require manufacturers and importers of new non-planing
vessels 12 feet in length and longer with propellers aft of the
transom to select and install one of several factory installed
propeller injury avoidance methods; and
"(4) Require owners of all non-planing rental boats with
propellers aft of the transom to install either a jet propulsion
system or a propeller guard or all of several propeller injury
avoidance measures." 66 Fed. Reg., at 63647.
63
essarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive
intent."
CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658, 664
(1993). Here, the express pre-emption clause in § 10 applies to "a
[state or local] law or regulation." 46 U. S. C. § 4306. We think
that this language is most naturally read as not encompassing
common-law claims for two reasons. First, the article "a" before
"law or regulation" implies a discreteness-which is embodied in
statutes and regulations-that is not present in the common law.
Second, because "a word is known by the company it keeps,"
Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575
(1995), the terms "law" and "regulation" used together in the
pre-emption clause indicate that Congress pre-empted only positive
enactments. If "law" were read broadly so as to include the common
law, it might also be interpreted to include regulations, which
would render the express reference to "regulation" in the
pre-emption clause superfluous.
The Act's saving clause buttresses this conclusion. See
Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S., at
867-868. It states that "[c]ompliance with this chapter or
standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter
does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under
State law." § 4311(g). As we held in
Geier, the "saving
clause assumes that there are some significant number of commonlaw
liability cases to save [and t]he language of the preemption
provision permits a narrow reading that excludes common-law
actions."
Id., at 868.
The saving clause is also relevant for an independent reason.
The contrast between its general reference to "liability at common
law" and the more specific and detailed description of what is
pre-empted by § 10-including the exception for state regulations
addressing "uniquely hazardous conditions"-indicates that § 10 was
drafted to pre-empt performance standards and equipment
requirements imposed by statute or regulation.
64
Our interpretation of the statute's language does not produce
anomalous results. It would have been perfectly rational for
Congress not to pre-empt common-law claims, which-unlike most
administrative and legislative regulations-necessarily perform an
important remedial role in compensating accident victims. Cf.
Silkwood v.
KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 251
(1984). Indeed, compensation is the manifest object of the saving
clause, which focuses not on state authority to regulate, but on
preserving "liability at common law or under State law." In
context, this phrase surely refers to private damages remedies.10
We thus agree with the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion that
petitioner's common-law tort claims are not expressly preempted by
the FBSA.
IV
Even if § 10 of the FBSA does not expressly pre-empt state
common-law claims, respondent contends that such claims are
implicitly pre-empted by the entire statute, and more specifically
by the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate propeller guards.
Both are viable pre-emption theories:
"We have recognized that a federal statute implicitly overrides
state law either when the scope of a statute indicates that
Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively,
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 78-79
(1990), or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law.
We have found implied conflict preemption where it is 'impossible
for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements,' id., at 79, or where state law 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U. S.
10 The FBSA itself imposes civil money penalties payable to the
United States, as well as imprisonment for willful violations, 46
U. S. C. § 4311, but does not authorize any private damages
remedies for persons injured by noncomplying operators, boats, or
equipment.
65
52, 67 (1941)." Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U. S. 280,
287 (1995).
Moreover, Congress' inclusion of an express pre-emption clause
"does
not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption
principles,"
Geier, 529 U. S., at 869 (emphasis in
original), that find implied pre-emption "where it is impossible
for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."
Freightliner Corp., 514 U. S., at 287 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). We are not persuaded,
however, that the FBSA has any such pre-emptive effect.
We first consider, and reject, respondent's reliance on the
Coast Guard's decision not to adopt a regulation requiring
propeller guards on motorboats. It is quite wrong to view that
decision as the functional equivalent of a regulation prohibiting
all States and their political subdivisions from adopting such a
regulation. The decision in 1990 to accept the subcommittee's
recommendation to "take no regulatory action," App. 80, left the
law applicable to propeller guards exactly the same as it had been
before the subcommittee began its investigation. Of course, if a
state common-law claim directly conflicted with a federal
regulation promulgated under the Act, or if it were impossible to
comply with any such regulation without incurring liability under
state common law, pre-emption would occur. This, however, is not
such a case.
Indeed, history teaches us that a Coast Guard decision not to
regulate a particular aspect of boating safety is fully consistent
with an intent to preserve state regulatory authority pending the
adoption of specific federal standards. That was the course the
Coast Guard followed in 1971 immediately after the Act was passed,
and again when it imposed its first regulations in 1972 and 1973.
The Coast Guard has never taken the position that the litigation of
state common-law
66
claims relating to an area not yet subject to federal regulation
would conflict with "the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."
Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312
U. S. 52, 67 (1941).
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded "that the Coast Guard's
failure to promulgate a propeller guard requirement here equates to
a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate pursuant to the
policy of the FBSA." 197 Ill. 2d, at 128, 757 N. E. 2d, at 85. With
regard to policies defined by Congress, we have recognized that "a
federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an
authoritative federal determination that the area is best left
unregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force
as a decision
to regulate."
Arkansas Elec. Cooperative
Corp. v.
Arkansas Pub. Servo Comm'n, 461 U. S. 375, 384
(1983); see also
Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
New York State
Labor Relations Bd., 330 U. S. 767, 774 (1947)
(state law is pre-empted "where failure of the federal officials
affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the
character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or
approved pursuant to the policy of the statute"). In this instance,
however, the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion does not
accurately reflect the Coast Guard's entire explanation for its
decision:
"The regulatory process is very structured and stringent
regarding justification. Available propeller guard accident data do
not support imposition of a regulation requiring propeller guards
on motorboats. Regulatory action is also limited by the many
questions about whether a universally acceptable propeller guard is
available or technically feasible in all modes of boat operation.
Additionally, the question of retrofitting millions of boats would
certainly be a major economic consideration." App. 80.
This statement reveals only a judgment that the available data
did not meet the FBSA's "stringent" criteria for federal
67
regulation. The Coast Guard did not take the further step of
deciding that, as a matter of policy, the States and their
political subdivisions should not impose some version of propeller
guard regulation, and it most definitely did not reject propeller
guards as unsafe.ll The Coast Guard's apparent focus was on the
lack of any "universally acceptable" propeller guard for "all modes
of boat operation." But nothing in its official explanation would
be inconsistent with a tort verdict premised on a jury's finding
that some type of propeller guard should have been installed on
this particular kind of boat equipped with respondent's particular
type of motor. Thus, although the Coast Guard's decision not to
require propeller guards was undoubtedly intentional and carefully
considered, it does not convey an "authoritative" message of a
federal policy against propeller guards. And nothing in the Coast
Guard's recent regulatory activities alters this conclusion.
The Coast Guard's decision
not to impose a propeller
guard requirement presents a sharp contrast to the decision of the
Secretary of Transportation that was given pre-emptive effect in
Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000). As
the Solicitor General had argued in that case, the promulgation of
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 embodied an
affirmative "policy judgment that safety would best be promoted if
manufacturers installed
alternative protection systems in
their fleets rather than one particular system in every car."
Id., at 881. In finding pre-emption, we expressly placed
"weight upon the DOT's interpretation of FMVSS 208's objectives and
its conclusion, as set forth in the Government's brief, that a tort
suit such as this one would'" 'stan[d] as an obstacle to the
accomplish-
11 Indeed, in response to the Propeller Guard Subcommittee's
recommendation in favor of "educational and awareness campaigns,"
the Coast Guard indicated that it would publish a series of
articles "aimed at avoiding boat/propeller strike accidents," which
could include the topic of "available propeller guards." App.
82-83.
68
ment and execution'''' of those objectives .... Congress has
delegated to DOT authority to implement the statute; the subject
matter is technical; and the relevant history and background are
complex and extensive. The agency is likely to have a thorough
understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is
'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely impact of state
requirements."
Id., at 883. In the case before us today, the
Solicitor General, joined by counsel for the Coast Guard, has
informed us that the agency does not view the 1990 refusal to
regulate or any subsequent regulatory actions by the Coast Guard as
having any preemptive effect. Our reasoning in
Geier
therefore provides strong support for petitioner's submission.
v
Even though the refusal to regulate propeller guards in 1990 had
no pre-emptive effect, it is possible that the statutory scheme as
a whole implicitly pre-empted common-law claims such as
petitioner's when it was enacted in 1971. If that were so, the
exemption carried forward by the Secretary in 1973 after the first
federal regulations were adopted might have saved existing state
common-law rules "in effect on the effective date" of the 1971 Act,
so far as those rules relate to propeller guards. 38 Fed. Reg., at
6915. But even if that is not the case, we think it clear that the
FBSA did not so completely occupy the field of safety regulation of
recreational boats as to foreclose state common-law remedies.
In
Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978), we
considered a federal statute that directed the Secretary of
Transportation to determine "which oil tankers are sufficiently
safe to be allowed to proceed in the navigable waters of the United
States," and after inspection to certify "each vessel as
sufficiently safe to protect the marine environment."
Id.,
at 163, 165. We held that this scheme of mandatory federal
regulation implicitly pre-empted the power of the State of
Washington "to exclude from Puget Sound ves-
69
sels certified by the Secretary as having acceptable design
characteristics, unless they satisfy the different and higher
design requirements imposed by state law."
Id., at 165. As
we explained in
United States v.
Locke, 529 U. S. 89 (2000), the
analysis in
Ray was governed by field-preemption rules
because the rules at issue were in a "field reserved for federal
regulation" and "Congress ha[d] left no room for state regulation
of these matters." 529 U. S., at 111. In particular, Title II of
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA)
required
the Secretary to issue "such rules and regulations as may be
necessary with respect to the design, construction, and operation
of the covered vessels." 435 U. S., at 161.
The Illinois Supreme Court relied on both
Ray and
Locke to find petitioner's claims impliedly pre-empted. But
the FBSA, unlike Title II of the PWSA, does not
require the
Coast Guard to promulgate comprehensive regulations covering every
aspect of recreational boat safety and design; nor must the Coast
Guard certify the acceptability of every recreational boat subject
to its jurisdiction. Moreover, neither Title II of the PWSA nor the
holding in either
Ray or
Locke purported to pre-empt
possible common-law claims, whereas the FBSA expressly preserves
such claims.
The FBSA might be interpreted as expressly occupying the field
with respect to state positive laws and regulations but its
structure and framework do not convey a "clear and manifest"
intent,
English v.
General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79 (1990)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), to go even
further and implicitly pre-empt all state common law relating to
boat manufacture. Rather, our conclusion that the Act's express
pre-emption clause does not cover common-law claims suggests the
opposite intent. See Ci
pollone v.
Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U. S.
504, 517 (1992);
id., at 547 (SCALIA, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Nor is a clear and
manifest intent to sweep away state common law established by an
unembellished
70
statement in a House Report that the 1971 Act "preempts the
field on boating standards or regulations." H. R. Rep. No. 92-324,
p. 11 (1971). The statement was made prior to the amendment
containing the saving clause, and nothing in the entire report
suggests that it meant the occupied "field" to include judge-made
common law.
Respondent ultimately relies upon one of the FBSA's main goals:
fostering uniformity in manufacturing regulations. Uniformity is
undoubtedly important to the industry, and the statute's
pre-emption clause was meant to "assur[e] that manufacture for the
domestic trade will not involve compliance with widely varying
local requirements." S. Rep. 20. Yet this interest is not
unyielding, as is demonstrated both by the Coast Guard's early
grants of broad exemptions for state regulations and by the
position it has taken in this litigation. Absent a contrary
decision by the Coast Guard, the concern with uniformity does not
justify the displacement of state common-law remedies that
compensate accident victims and their families and that serve the
Act's more prominent objective, emphasized by its title, of
promoting boating safety.
The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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