OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
RUFO, SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, ET AL.
v.
INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST
CIRCUIT
No. 90-954. Argued October 9, 1991-Decided January 15, 1992*
Years after the District Court held that conditions at the
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, jail were constitutionally
deficient, petitioner officials and respondent inmates entered into
a consent decree providing for construction of a new jail that,
among other things, would provide single occupancy cells for
pretrial detainees. Work on the jail was delayed and, in the
interim, the inmate population outpaced projections. While
construction was still underway, petitioner sheriff moved to modify
the decree to allow double bunking in a certain number of cells,
thereby raising the jail's capacity. Relying on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)-which provides,
inter alia, that "upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a
... judgment ... for the following reasons: ... (5) ... it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
operation"-the sheriff argued that modification was required by a
change in law, this Court's postdecree decision in
Bell v.
Wolfish, 441
U. S. 520, and a change in fact, the increase in pretrial
detainees. The District Court denied relief, holding that Rule
60(b)(5) codified the standard of
United States v.
Swift &
Co., 286 U. S. 106,
119-"Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions should lead ... to [a] change [in]
what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all
concerned"and that a case for modification under this standard had
not been made. The court also rejected the argument that
Bell required modification of the decree; found that the
increased pretrial detainee population was "neither new nor
unforeseen"; declared that relief would be inappropriate even under
a more flexible modification standard because separate cells for
detainees were "perhaps the most important" element of the relief
sought; and held that, even if the sheriff's double celling
proposal met constitutional standards, allowing modification on
that basis would undermine and discourage settlement of
institutional cases. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
*Together with No. 90-1004, Rapone, Commissioner of Correction
of Massachusetts v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail et al., also on
certiorari to the same court.
368
Held:
1. The
Swift "grievous wrong" standard does not apply to
requests to modify consent decrees stemming from institutional
reform litigation. That standard was formulated in the context of
facts demonstrating that no genuine changes had occurred requiring
modification of the decree in question, see
id., at 115-116,
and the
Swift Court recognized that decrees involving the
supervision of changing conduct or conditions may be revised if
necessary to adapt to future events, id., at 114-115. Moreover,
subsequent decisions have emphasized the need for flexibility to
modify a decree if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, have
changed or new ones have arisen. Thus, it cannot be concluded that
Rule 60(b)(5) misread
Swift and intended that decree
modifications were in all cases to be governed by the "grievous
wrong" standard. A less stringent standard is made all the more
important by the recent upsurge in institutional reform litigation,
where the extended life of decrees increases the likelihood that
significant changes will occur. Furthermore, the experience of
federal courts in implementing and modifying such decrees
demonstrates that a flexible approach is often essential to
achieving the goals of reform litigation, particularly the public's
interest in the sound and efficient operations of its institutions.
The contention that any rule other than the
Swift standard
would deter parties to such litigation from negotiating settlements
and hence destroy the utility of consent decrees is unpersuasive.
Obviously that would not be the case with respect to government
officials. Moreover, plaintiffs will still wish to settle such
cases, since, even if they litigate to conclusion and win, the
resulting judgment may give them less than they hoped for, whereas
settlement will avoid further litigation, will perhaps obtain more
than would have been ordered without the local government's
consent, and will eliminate the possibility of losing; and since
the prospective effect of a judgment obtained after litigation will
still be open to modification where deemed equitable under Rule
60(b). pp. 378-383.
2. Under the flexible standard adopted today, a party seeking
modification of an institutional reform consent decree bears the
burden of establishing that a significant change in facts or law
warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification
is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances. Pp. 383-393.
(a) Modification may be warranted when changed factual
conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more
onerous, when the decree proves to be unworkable because of
unforeseen obstacles, or when enforcement of the decree without
modification would be detrimental to the public interest. Where a
party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time
it entered into a decree, modifica-
369
tion should be granted only if the party satisfies the heavy
burden of convincing the court that it agreed to the decree in good
faith, made a reasonable effort to comply, and should be relieved
of the undertaking under Rule 60(b). Accordingly, on remand the
District Court should consider whether the upsurge in inmate
population was foreseen by petitioners. Despite that court's
statement that it was, the decree itself and aspects of the record
indicate that the increase may have been unanticipated. To relieve
petitioners from the promise to provide single cells for pretrial
detainees based on the increased jail population does not
necessarily violate the decree's basic purpose of providing a
remedy for what had been found-based on a variety of factors,
including double celling-to be unconstitutional conditions in the
old jail. The rule cannot be that modifications of one of a
decree's terms defeats its purpose, since modification would then
be all but impossible. Thus, the District Court erred in holding
that, even under a standard more flexible than
Swift's,
modification of the single cell requirement was necessarily
forbidden. Pp. 383-387.
(b) A decree must be modified if one or more of the obligations
placed upon the parties later becomes impermissible under federal
law, and may be modified when the statutory or decisional law has
changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent. The
Bell holding, which made clear that double celling is not in
all cases unconstitutional, was not, in and of itself, a change in
law requiring modification of the decree at issue. Since that
holding did not cast doubt on the legality of single celling, the
possibility that such a holding would be issued must be viewed as
having been immaterial to petitioners when they signed the decree;
i.
e., they preferred even in the event of such a holding to
agree to a decree which called for providing single cells in the
new jail. To hold that a clarification in the law automatically
opens the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected
decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and could
serve as a disincentive to settle institutional reform litigation.
Nevertheless, a decision that merely clarifies the law could
constitute a change supporting modification if the parties had
based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law.
The decree at issue declares that it "sets forth a program which is
both constitutionally adequate and constitutionally
required" (emphasis added), and if petitioners can establish
on remand that the parties believed that single celling was
constitutionally mandated, this misunderstanding could form a basis
for modification. Pp. 387-390.
(c) Once a moving party has established a change in fact or in
law warranting modification of a consent decree, the district court
should determine whether a proposed modification is suitably
tailored to the
370
changed circumstances. A modification must not perpetuate or
create a constitutional violation. Thus, if respondents are correct
that
Bell is factually distinguishable and that double
celling at the new jail would violate pretrial detainees'
constitutional rights, modification should not be granted. Because
a consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only to
the extent that equity requires, a proposed modification should not
strive to rewrite the decree so that it conforms to the
constitutional floor, but should merely resolve the problems
created by the change. Within these constraints, the public
interest and considerations of comity require that the district
court defer to local government administrators to resolve the
intricacies of implementing a modification. Although financial
constraints may not be used to justify constitutional violations,
they are a legitimate concern of government defendants in
institutional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately
considered in tailoring a modification. Pp. 390-393.
915 F.2d
1557, vacated and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 393. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BLACKMUN, J., joined,
post, p. 399. THOMAS, J., took
no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
Chester A. Janiak argued the cause for petitioners in No.
90-954. With him on the briefs were
Thomas D. Burns, Peter
J.
Schneider, Ann E. Merryfield, and
Robert C.
Rufo, pro se. John T. Montgomery, First Assistant Attorney
General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for petitioner in No.
90-1004. With him on the briefs were
Scott Harshbarger,
Attorney General, and
Jon Laramore, Thomas A. Barnico, and
Douglas H. Wilkins, Assistant Attorneys General.
Max D. Stern argued the cause for respondents in both
cases. With him on the brief were
Lynn Weissberg and
Alan
B. Morrison.t
tBriefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of New York by
Robert Abrams, Attorney General,
Q Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General,
Lawrence S.
Kahn, Deputy Solicitor General, and
Barbara B.
Butler, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Tennessee
et al. by
Charles W Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee,
Michael W Catalano, Deputy Attorney General,
Joel I.
Klein, Paul M. Smith, and
Richard G.
371
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In these cases, the District Court denied a motion of the
sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, to modify a consent
Taranto, Charles Cole, Attorney General of Alaska,
Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona,
Winston
Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas,
Dan Lungren,
Attorney General of California,
Gale Norton, Attorney
General of Colorado,
Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General
of Delaware,
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of
Florida,
Michael J.
Bowers, Attorney General of
Georgia,
Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson, Attorney General of
Guam,
Warren Price III, Attorney General of Hawaii,
Larry
EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho,
Roland W Burris,
Attorney General of Illinois,
Linley E. Pearson, Attorney
General of Indiana,
Bonnie Campbell, Attorney General of
Iowa,
Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas,
Fred
Cowan, Attorney General of Kentucky,
William J.
Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana,
Michael E.
Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, J.
Joseph Curran,
Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,
Frank J.
Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan,
Hubert H. Humphrey
III, Attorney General of Minnesota,
Mike Moore, Attorney
General of Mississippi,
William L. Webster, Attorney General
of Missouri,
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of
Nevada,
John P. Arnold, Attorney General of New Hampshire,
Robert J.
Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey,
Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico,
Lacy H.
Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina,
Nicholas
Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota,
Lee Fisher,
Attorney General of Ohio,
Robert H. Henry, Attorney General
of Oklahoma,
Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon,
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania,
Hector Rivera-Cruz, Attorney General of Puerto Rico,
James E. O'Neil, Attorney General of Rhode Island,
T.
Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina,
Mark
"Barney" Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota,
Paul Van
Dam, Attorney General of Utah,
Jeffrey L. Amestoy,
Attorney General of Vermont,
Rosalie Ballentine, Acting
Attorney General of the Virgin Islands,
Mary Sue Terry,
Attorney General of Virginia,
Ken Eikenberry, Attorney
General of Washington,
Mario Palumbo, Attorney General of
West Virginia, and
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of
Wyoming; for the City of New York by
Victor A. Kovner,
Leonard J.
Koerner, Fay Leoussis, and
Timothy J.
O'Shaughnessy; for the International City Management
Association et al. by
Richard Ruda, Zachary D. Fasman, and
Mark L. Gerchick; and for Michael J. Ashe, Jr., Sheriff of
Hampden County, et al. by
Edward J.
McDonough,
Jr.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by
John A. Powell,
Steven R. Shapiro, John
372
decree entered to correct unconstitutional conditions at the
Suffolk County Jail. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue
before us is whether the courts below applied the correct standard
in denying the motion. We hold that they did not and remand these
cases for further proceedings.
I
This litigation began in 1971 when inmates sued the Suffolk
County sheriff, the Commissioner of Correction for the State of
Massachusetts, the mayor of Boston, and nine city councilors,
claiming that inmates not yet convicted of the crimes charged
against them were being held under unconstitutional conditions at
what was then the Suffolk County Jail. The facility, known as the
Charles Street Jail, had been constructed in 1848 with large tiers
of barred cells. The numerous deficiencies of the jail, which had
been treated with what a state court described as "malignant
neglect,"
Attorney General v.
Sheriff of Suffolk
County, 394 Mass. 624, 625, 477 N. E. 2d 361, 362 (1985), are
documented in the decision of the District Court. See
Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676,
679-684 (Mass. 1973). The court held that conditions at the jail
were constitutionally deficient:
"As a facility for the pretrial detention of presumptively
innocent citizens, Charles Street Jail unnecessarily and
unreasonably infringes upon their most basic liberties, among them
the rights to reasonable freedom of
Reinstein, Elizabeth Alexander, Alexa P. Freeman, and
Alvin J.
Bronstein; for the Center for Dispute
Settlement by C.
Lani Guinier; for the Inmates of the Lorton
Central Facility by
Peter J.
Nickles, Bruce N Kuhlik,
and
Alan A. Pemberton; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law of the Boston Bar Association by
John C.
Englander; and for Allen F. Breed et al. by
Sheldon
Krantz.
Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson,
Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, Harriet S. Shapiro, Robert E.
Kopp, and Thomas M. Bondy filed a brief for the United States as
amicus curiae.
373
motion, personal cleanliness, and personal privacy. The court
finds and rules that the quality of incarceration at Charles Street
is 'punishment' of such a nature and degree that it cannot be
justified by the state's interest in holding defendants for trial;
and therefore it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id., at 686.1
The court permanently enjoined the government defendants: "(a)
from housing at the Charles Street Jail after November 30, 1973 in
a cell with another inmate, any inmate who is awaiting trial and
(b) from housing at the Charles Street Jail after June 30, 1976 any
inmate who is awaiting trial."
Id., at 691. The defendants
did not appeaI.2
In 1977, with the problems of the Charles Street Jail still
unresolved, the District Court ordered defendants, including the
Boston City Council, to take such steps and expend the funds
reasonably necessary to renovate another existing facility as a
substitute detention center.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail
v.
Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (Mass.,
1 The court was of the view that cases dealing with pretrial
detention are more appropriately analyzed under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, but thought that
conditions at the Charles Street Jail were also vulnerable under
the Eighth Amendment.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp., at 688.
2 However, within five months, Suffolk County officials advised
the court that they could not comply with the November 30 deadline
for ending double ceIling at the Charles Street Jail. The District
Court ordered the commissioner to transfer inmates to other
institutions, and the commissioner appealed, claiming that the
court lacked the power to order him to make the transfers. The
First Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court, finding
that the commissioner had "major statutory responsibilities" over
county jails and that he had failed to appeal the District Court's
decision holding that he was a proper party to the lawsuit.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt,
494 F.2d
1196, cert. denied, 419 U. S. 977 (1974).
374
June 30, 1977), App. 22. The Court of Appeals agreed that
immediate action was required:
"It is now just short of five years since the district court's
opinion was issued. For all of that time the plaintiff class has
been confined under the conditions repugnant to the constitution.
For all of that time defendants have been aware of that fact.
"Given the present state of the record and the unconscionable
delay that plaintiffs have already endured in securing their
constitutional rights, we have no alternative but to affirm the
district court's order to prohibit the incarceration of pretrial
detainees at the Charles St. Jail." Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail v. Kearney, 573 F. 2d 98, 99-100 (CAl1978).
The Court of Appeals ordered that the Charles Street Jail be
closed on October 2, 1978, unless a plan was presented to create a
constitutionally adequate facility for pretrial detainees in
Suffolk County.
Four days before the deadline, the plan that formed the basis
for the consent decree now before this Court was submitted to the
District Court. Although plans for the new jail were not complete,
the District Court observed that "the critical features of
confinement, such as single cells of 80 sq. ft. for inmates, are
fixed and safety, security, medical, recreational, kitchen,
laundry, educational, religious and visiting provisions, are
included. There are unequivocal commitments to conditions of
confinement which will meet constitutional standards."
Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, Civ. Action No.
71-162-G (Mass., Oct. 2, 1978), App. 51, 55. The court therefore
allowed Suffolk County to continue housing its pretrial detainees
at the Charles Street Jail.
Seven months later, the court entered a formal consent decree in
which the government defendants expressed their "desire ... to
provide, maintain and operate as applicable a
375
suitable and constitutional jail for Suffolk County pretrial
detainees."
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (Mass., May 7, 1979), App.
to Pet. for Cert. in No. 90-954, p. 15a. The decree specifically
incorporated the provisions of the Suffolk County Detention Center,
Charles Street Facility, Architectural Program, whichin the words
of the consent decree-"sets forth a program which is both
constitutionally adequate and constitutionally required."
Id., at 16a.
Under the terms of the architectural program, the new jail was
designed to include a total of 309 "[s]ingle occupancy rooms" of 70
square feet, App. 73, 76,3 arranged in modular units that included
a kitchenette and recreation area, inmate laundry room, education
units, and indoor and outdoor exercise areas. See,
e. g.,
id., at 249. The size of the jail was based on a projected decline
in inmate population, from 245 male prisoners in 1979 to 226 at
present.
Id., at 69.
Although the architectural program projected that construction
of the new jail would be completed by 1983, ibid., work on the new
facility had not been started by 1984. During the intervening
years, the inmate population outpaced population projections.
Litigation in the state courts ensued, and defendants were ordered
to build a larger jail. At
torney General v.
Sheriff of
Suffolk County, 394 Mass. 624,
3 The size of the cells was reduced from the September plan. The
architectural program noted that:
"The single occupancy rooms have been sized to meet the minimum
standards as devised by the following standard setting agencies.
The Massachusetts Department of Correction's
Code of Human
Services Regulations, Chapter IX-Standards for County
Correctional Facilities, Standard 972.3 calls for a minimum of 70
square feet for all new cell design. The
Manual of Standards for
Adult Local Detention Facilities, Standard 5103, as sponsored
by the American Correctional Association requires at least 70 sq.
ft. of floor space when confinement exceeds 10 hours per day." App.
77-78.
See also id., at 63-66 (listing state and national standards
consulted in preparation of the architectural program).
376
477 N. E. 2d 361 (1985). Thereupon, plaintiff prisoners, with
the support of the sheriff, moved the District Court to modify the
decree to provide a facility with 435 cells. Citing "the
unanticipated increase in jail population and the delay in
completing the jail," the District Court modified the decree to
permit the capacity of the new jail to be increased in any amount,
provided that:
"(a) single-cell occupancy is maintained under the design for
the facility;
"(b) under the standards and specifications of the Architectural
Program, as modified, the relative proportion of cell space to
support services will remain the same as it was in the
Architectural Program;
"(c) any modifications are incorporated into new architectural
plans;
"(d) defendants act without delay and take all steps reasonably
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Consent Decree
according to the authorized schedule." Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail v. Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (Mass., Apr.
11, 1985), App. 110, 111.
The number of cells was later increased to 453. Construction
started in 1987.
In July 1989, while the new jail was still under construction,
the sheriff moved to modify the consent decree to allow the double
bunking of male detainees in 197 cells, thereby raising the
capacity of the new jail to 610 male detainees. The sheriff argued
that changes in law and in fact required the modification. The
asserted change in law was this Court's 1979 decision in
Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
handed down one week after the consent decree was approved by the
District Court. The asserted change in fact was the increase in the
population of pretrial detainees.
The District Court refused to grant the requested modification,
holding that the sheriff had failed to meet the standard of
United States v.
Swift &
Co., 286 U. S. 106, 119
(1932):
377
"Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was
decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all
concerned."
The court rejected the argument that
Bell required
modification of the decree because the decision "did not directly
overrule any legal interpretation on which the 1979 consent decree
was based, and in these circumstances it is inappropriate to invoke
Rule 60(b)(5) to modify a consent decree."
Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v.
Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 564 (Mass.
1990). The court refused to order modification because of the
increased pretrial detainee population, finding that the problem
was "neither new nor unforeseen."
Ibid.
The District Court briefly stated that, even under the flexible
modification standard adopted by other Courts of Appeals,4 the
sheriff would not be entitled to relief because "[a] separate cell
for each detainee has always been an important element of the
relief sought in this litigation-perhaps even the most important
element."
Id., at 565. Finally, the court rejected the
argument that the decree should be modified because the proposal
complied with constitutional standards, reasoning that such a rule
"would undermine and discourage settlement efforts in institutional
cases."
Ibid. The District Court never decided whether the
sheriff's proposal for double celling at the new jail would be
constitutionally permissible.
The new Suffolk County Jail opened shortly thereafter. The Court
of Appeals affirmed, stating: "[W]e are in agreement with the
well-reasoned opinion of the district court and see no reason to
elaborate further."
Inmates of
4 See, e. g., New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc.
v. Carey,
706 F.2d
956 (CA2) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 915 (1983);
Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organization v. Shapp,
602 F.2d
1114 (CA3 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1026 (1980); Plyler v.
Evatt,
846 F.2d
208 (CA4), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 897 (1988); Heath v. De
Courcy,
888 F.2d
1105 (CA6 1989); Newman v. Graddick,
740
F.2d 1513 (CAll 1984).
378
Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, No. 90-1440 (CA1,
Sept. 20, 1990), judgt. order reported at
915
F.2d 1557, App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 90-954, p. 2a.5 We
granted certiorari. 498 U. S. 1081 (1991).
II
In moving for modification of the decree, the sheriff relied on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which in relevant part
provides:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment .... "
There is no suggestion in these cases that a consent decree is
not subject to Rule 60(b). A consent decree no doubt embodies an
agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual
in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and
expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial
decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other
judgments and decrees.
Railway Employes v.
Wright,
364 U. S. 642,
650-651 (1961). The District Court recognized as much but held that
Rule 60(b)(5) codified the "grievous wrong" standard of
United
States v.
Swift &
Co., supra, that a case for
modification under this standard
5 Because of the overcrowding at the new Suffolk County Jail,
the sheriff refused to transfer female prisoners to the new
facility. He did not request modification of the decree. The
District Court subsequently ordered the sheriff to house female
inmates at the new jail. The sheriff appealed, and the First
Circuit affirmed.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, 928 F.2d
33 (1991). That decision is not before this Court.
379
had not been made, and that resort to Rule 60(b)(6) was also
unavailing. This construction of Rule 60(b) was error.
Swift was the product of a prolonged antitrust battle
between the Government and the meat-packing industry. In 1920, the
defendants agreed to a consent decree that enjoined them from
manipulating the meat-packing industry and banned them from
engaging in the manufacture, sale, or transportation of other
foodstuffs. 286 U. S., at 111. In 1930, several meat-packers
petitioned for modification of the decree, arguing that conditions
in the meat-packing and grocery industries had changed.
Id.,
at 113. The Court rejected their claim, finding that the
meat-packers were positioned to manipulate transportation costs and
fix grocery prices in 1930, just as they had been in 1920.
Id., at 115-116. It was in this context that Justice
Cardozo, for the Court, set forth the much-quoted
Swift
standard, requiring "[n]othing less than a clear showing of
grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions" ... as a
predicate to modification of the meat-packers' consent decree.
Id., at 119.
Read out of context, this language suggests a "hardening" of the
traditional flexible standard for modification of consent decrees.
New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Carey, 706 F.2d
956, 968 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 915 (1983). But that
conclusion does not follow when the standard is read in context.
See
United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
391 U. S. 244,
248 (1968). The
Swift opinion pointedly distinguished the
facts of that case from one in which genuine changes required
modification of a consent decree, stating:
"The distinction is between restraints that give protection to
rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be
substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the
supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus
provisional and tentative .... The consent is to be read as
directed toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment
of the
380
right to exact revision in the future, if revision should become
necessary in adaptation to events to be." 286 U. S., at
114-115.
Our decisions since
Swift reinforce the conclusion that
the "grievous wrong" language of
Swift was not intended to
take on a talismanic quality, warding off virtually all efforts to
modify consent decrees.
Railway Employes emphasized the need
for flexibility in administering consent decrees, stating: "There
is ... no dispute but that a sound judicial discretion may call for
the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the
circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its
issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen." 364 U. S.,
at 647.
The same theme was repeated in our decision last Term in
Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v.
Dowell, 498 U.
S. 237, 246-248 (1991), in which we rejected the rigid use of
the
Swift "grievous wrong" language as a barrier to a motion
to dissolve a desegregation decree.
There is thus little basis for concluding that Rule 60(b)
misread the
Swift opinion and intended that modifications of
consent decrees in all cases were to be governed by the standard
actually applied in
Swift. That Rule, in providing that, on
such terms as are just, a party may be relieved from a final
judgment or decree where it is no longer equitable that the
judgment have prospective application, permits a less stringent,
more flexible standard.
The upsurge in institutional reform litigation since
Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), has
made the ability of a district court to modify a decree in response
to changed circumstances all the more important. Because such
decrees often remain in place for extended periods of time, the
likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the
decree is increased. See,
e. g., Philadelphia Welfare Rights
Organization v.
Shapp, 602 F.2d
1114, 11191121 (CA3 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1026 (1980),
in which modification of a consent decree was allowed in light
of
381
changes in circumstances that were beyond the defendants'
control and were not contemplated by the court or the parties when
the decree was entered.
The experience of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals in
implementing and modifying such decrees has demonstrated that a
flexible approach is often essential to achieving the goals of
reform litigation. See,
e. g., New York State Assn. for Retarded
Children, Inc. v.
Carey, supra.6 The Courts of Appeals
have also observed that the public interest is a particularly
significant reason for applying a flexible modification standard in
institutional reform litigation because such decrees "reach beyond
the parties involved directly in the suit and impact on the
public's right to the sound and efficient operation of its
institutions."
Heath v.
De Courcy, 888 F.2d
1105, 1109 (CA6 1989). Accord,
New York State Assn. for
Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Carey, supra, at 969.
6 In
Carey, the state defendants sought modification of a
consent decree designed to empty a state school for the mentally
retarded that had housed over 6,000 people in squalid conditions.
The consent judgment contemplated transfer of residents to
community placements of 15 or fewer beds. 706 F. 2d, at 959.
Defendants urged that revising the decree to allow placement of
some residents in larger community residences would both expedite
their transfer from the state school and allow for a higher quality
of care. Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, allowed
the modification:
"Here, as in
Swift, the modification is proposed by the
defendants. But it is not, as in
Swift, in derogation of the
primary objective of the decree, namely, to empty such a mammoth
institution ... ; indeed defendants offered substantial evidence
that, again in contrast to
Swift, the modification was
essential to attaining that goal at any reasonably early date. To
be sure, the change does run counter to another objective of the
decree, namely, to place the occupants ... in small facilities
bearing some resemblance to a normal home, but any modification
will perforce alter some aspect of the decree."
Id., at
969.
In so ruling, the court recognized that "[t]he power of a court
of equity to modify a decree of injunctive relief is
long-established, broad, and flexible."
Id., at 967.
382
Petitioner Rufo urges that these factors are present in the
cases before us and support modification of the decree. He asserts
that modification would actually improve conditions for some
pretrial detainees, who now cannot be housed in the Suffolk County
Jail and therefore are transferred to other facilities, farther
from family members and legal counsel. In these transfer
facilities, petitioners assert that detainees may be double celled
under less desirable conditions than those that would exist if
double celling were allowed at the new Suffolk County Jail.
Petitioner Rufo also contends that the public interest is
implicated here because crowding at the new facility has
necessitated the release of some pretrial detainees and the
transfer of others to halfway houses, from which many escape.
For the District Court, these points were insufficient reason to
modify under Rule 60(b)(5) because its "authority [was] limited by
the established legal requirements for modification .... " 734 F.
Supp., at 566. The District Court, as noted above, also held that
the suggested modification would not be proper even under the more
flexible standard that is followed in some other Circuits. None of
the changed circumstances warranted modification because it would
violate one of the primary purposes of the decree, which was to
provide for "[a] separate cell for each detainee [which] has always
been an important element of the relief sought in this
litigation-perhaps even the most important element."
Id., at
565. For reasons appearing later in this opinion, this was not an
adequate basis for denying the requested modification. The District
Court also held that Rule 60(b)(6) provided no more basis for
relief. The District Court, and the Court of Appeals as well,
failed to recognize that such rigidity is neither required by
Swift nor appropriate in the context of institutional reform
litigation.
It is urged that any rule other than the
Swift "grievous
wrong" standard would deter parties to litigation such as this from
negotiating settlements and hence destroy the util-
383
ity of consent decrees. Obviously that would not be the case
insofar as the state or local government officials are concerned.
As for the plaintiffs in such cases, they know that if they
litigate to conclusion and win, the resulting judgment or decree
will give them what is constitutionally adequate at that time but
perhaps less than they hoped for. They also know that the
prospective effect of such a judgment or decree will be open to
modification where deemed equitable under Rule 60(b). Whether or
not they bargain for more than what they might get after trial,
they will be in no worse position if they settle and have the
consent decree entered. At least they will avoid further litigation
and perhaps will negotiate a decree providing more than what would
have been ordered without the local government's consent. And, of
course, if they litigate, they may lose.
III
Although we hold that a district court should exercise
flexibility in considering requests for modification of an
institutional reform consent decree, it does not follow that a
modification will be warranted in all circumstances. Rule 60(b)(5)
provides that a party may obtain relief from a court order when "it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application," not when it is no longer convenient to live with the
terms of a consent decree. Accordingly, a party seeking
modification of a consent decree bears the burden of establishing
that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the
decree. If the moving party meets this standard, the court should
consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to
the changed circumstance.7
7 The standard we set forth applies when a party seeks
modification of a term of a consent decree that arguably relates to
the vindication of a constitutional right. Such a showing is not
necessary to implement minor changes in extraneous details that may
have been included in a decree (e. g., paint color or design of a
building's facade) but are unrelated to
384
A
A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its
initial burden by showing a significant change either in factual
conditions or in law.
1
Modification of a consent decree may be warranted when changed
factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially
more onerous. Such a modification was approved by the District
Court in this litigation in 1985 when it became apparent that plans
for the new jail did not provide sufficient cell space.
Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, Civ. Action No.
71-162-G (Mass., Apr. 11, 1985), App. 110.8 Modification is also
appropriate when a decree proves to be unworkable because of
unforeseen obstacles,
New York State Assn. for Retarded
Children, Inc. v.
Carey, 706 F. 2d, at 969 (modification
allowed where State could not find appropriate housing facilities
for transfer patients);
Philadelphia Welfare Rights
Organization v.
Shapp, 602 F. 2d, at 1120-1121
(modification allowed where State could not find sufficient clients
to meet decree targets); or when enforcement of the decree without
modification would be detrimental to the public interest,
Duran v.
Elrod, 760 F.2d
756,
remedying the underlying constitutional violation. Ordinarily,
the parties should consent to modifying a decree to allow such
changes. If a party refuses to consent and the moving party has a
reasonable basis for its request, the court should modify the
decree. In these cases the entire architectural program became part
of the decree binding on the local authorities. Hence, any change
in the program technically required a change in the decree, absent
a provision in the program exempting certain changes. Such a
provision was furnished by the 1985 modification of the decree. Of
course, the necessity of changing a decree to allow insignificant
changes could be avoided by not entering an overly detailed
decree.
S This modification was entered over the opposition of the
Boston city councilors, who were parties to the litigation in the
District Court.
385
759-761 (CA7 1985) (modification allowed to avoid pretrial
release of accused violent felons).
Respondents urge that modification should be allowed only when a
change in facts is both "unforeseen and unforeseeable." Brief for
Respondents 35. Such a standard would provide even less flexibility
than the exacting
Swift test; we decline to adopt it.
Litigants are not required to anticipate every exigency that could
conceivably arise during the life of a consent decree.
Ordinarily, however, modification should not be granted where a
party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time
it entered into a decree. See
Twelve John Does v.
District of Columbia, 274 U. S. App. D. C. 62, 65-66,
861 F.2d
295, 298-299 (1988);
Ruiz v.
Lynaugh, 811 F.2d
856, 862-863 (CA5 1987). If it is clear that a party
anticipated changing conditions that would make performance of the
decree more onerous but nevertheless agreed to the decree, that
party would have to satisfy a heavy burden to convince a court that
it agreed to the decree in good faith, made a reasonable effort to
comply with the decree, and should be relieved of the undertaking
under Rule 60(b).
Accordingly, on remand the District Court should consider
whether the upsurge in the Suffolk County inmate population was
foreseen by petitioners. The District Court touched on this issue
in April 1990, when, in the course of denying the modification
requested in this litigation, the court stated that "the
overcrowding problem faced by the Sheriff is neither new nor
unforeseen. It has been an ongoing problem during the course of
this litigation, before and after entry of the consent decree." 734
F. Supp., at 564. However, the architectural program incorporated
in the decree in 1979 specifically set forth projections that the
jail
386
population would decrease in subsequent years.9 Significantly,
when the District Court modified the consent decree in 1985, the
court found that the "modifications are necessary to meet the
unanticipated increase in jail population and the delay in
completing the jail."
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (Mass., Apr. 11, 1985),
App. 110 (emphasis added). Petitioners assert that it was only in
July 1988, 10 months after construction began, that the number of
pretrial detainees exceeded 400 and began to approach the number of
cells in the new jail. Brief for Petitioner Rufo in No. 90-954, p.
9.
It strikes us as somewhat strange, if a rapidly increasing jail
population had been contemplated, that respondents would have
settled for a new jail that would not have been adequate to house
pretrial detainees.1o There is no doubt
| 9 The architectural program included
the following projections: |
| Year |
Population Projections |
| 1979 |
245 |
| 1980 |
243 |
| 1981 |
241 |
| 1982 |
239 |
| 1983 |
238 |
| 1984 |
236 |
| 1985-1989 |
232 |
| 1990-1994 |
226 |
| 1995-1999 |
216 |
App.69.
10 Respondents and the District Court have been provided with
daily prison population data during this litigation. See Tr. 82
(Mar. 30, 1990). The fact that none of the parties showed alarm
over fluctuations in these data undermines the dissent's argument
that the ongoing population increase was "reasonably foreseeable."
See
post, at 406.
We note that the dissent's "reasonably foreseeable" standard
differs significantly from that adopted by the Court today. By
invoking this standard and focusing exclusively on developments
following modification of the decree in 1985, see
post, at
405, the dissent jumps to the conclusion that petitioners assumed
full responsibility for responding to any increase in detainee
numbers by increasing the capacity of the jail, potentially
infinitely. But we do not think that, in the absence of a clear
agreement and
387
that the decree, as originally issued and modified, called for a
facility with single cells.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail
v.
Kearney, Civ. Action No. 71-162-G (Mass., Apr. 11, 1985),
App. 110.11 It is apparent, however, that the decree itself nowhere
expressly orders or reflects an agreement by petitioners to provide
jail facilities having single cells sufficient to accommodate all
future pretrial detainees, however large the number of such
detainees might be. Petitioners' agreement and the decree appear to
have bound them only to provide the specified number of single
cells. If petitioners were to build a second new facility providing
double cells that would meet constitutional standards, it is
doubtful that they would have violated the consent decree.
Even if the decree is construed as an undertaking by petitioners
to provide single cells for pretrial detainees, to relieve
petitioners from that promise based on changed conditions does not
necessarily violate the basic purpose of the decree. That purpose
was to provide a remedy for what had been found, based on a variety
of factors, including double celling, to be unconstitutional
conditions obtaining in the Charles Street Jail. If modification of
one term of a consent decree defeats the purpose of the decree,
obviously modification would be all but impossible. That cannot be
the rule. The District Court was thus in error in holding that even
under a more flexible standard than its version of
Swift
required, modification of the single cell requirement was
necessarily forbidden.
a fully developed record, this Court should impose that burden
on a local government by assuming that a change in circumstances
was "reasonably foreseeable" and that anticipating and responding
to such a change was the sole responsibility of petitioners.
11 One of the conditions of the modification ordered in 1985 was
that "single-cell occupancy is maintained under the design for the
facility." App.111.
388
This was the case in
Railway Employes v.
Wright,
364 U. S. 642 (1961). A railroad and its unions were sued for
violating the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151
et seq.,
which banned discrimination against nonunion employees, and the
parties entered a consent decree that prohibited such
discrimination. Later, the Railway Labor Act was amended to allow
union shops, and the union sought a modification of the decree.
Although the amendment did not require, but purposely permitted,
union shops, this Court held that the union was entitled to the
modification because the parties had recognized correctly that what
the consent decree prohibited was illegal under the Railway Labor
Act as it then read and because a "court must be free to continue
to further the objectives of thee] Act when its provisions are
amended."
Railway Employes, supra, at 651. See also
Firefighters v.
Stotts, 467 U. S. 561, 576, and
n. 9, 583, n. 17 (1984).
Petitioner Rapone urges that, without more, our 1979 decision in
Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, was a
change in law requiring modification of the decree governing
construction of the Suffolk County Jail. We disagree.
Bell
made clear what the Court had not before announced: that double
celling is not in all cases unconstitutional. But it surely did not
cast doubt on the legality of single celling, and petitioners were
undoubtedly aware that
Bell was pending when they signed the
decree. Thus, the case must be judged on the basis that it was
immaterial to petitioners that double celling might be ruled
constitutional, i.
e., they preferred even in that event to
agree to a decree which called for providing only single cells in
the jail to be built.
389
Neither
Bell nor the Federal Constitution forbade this
course of conduct. Federal courts may not order States or local
governments, over their objection, to undertake a course of conduct
not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has been
adjudicated. See
Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken II),
433 U. S. 267,
281 (1977). But we have no doubt that, to "save themselves the
time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation,"
United
States v.
Armour &
Co., 402 U. S. 673, 681
(1971), petitioners could settle the dispute over the proper remedy
for the constitutional violations that had been found by
undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires
(almost any affirmative decree beyond a directive to obey the
Constitution necessarily does that), but also more than what a
court would have ordered absent the settlement. Accordingly, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in entering the
agreed-upon decree, which clearly was related to the conditions
found to offend the Constitution.
Milliken v.
Bradley
(Milliken I), 418
U. S. 717, 738 (1974). See also
Dowell, 498 U. S., at
246-248. Cf.
Firefighters v.
Cleveland, 478 U. S. 501, 525
(1986).12
To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the
door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent
decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and could
serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in
institutional reform litigation. The position urged by
petitioners
12 Petitioner Rapone contends that the District Court was
required to modify the consent decree because "the constitutional
violation underlying the decree has disappeared and will not recur"
and that "no constitutional violation [is] even alleged" at the new
jail, "so there is no constitutional violation to serve as a
predicate for the federal court's continued exercise of its
equitable power." Brief for Petitioner in No. 90-1004, pp. 36-37.
His argument is not well taken. The District Court did not make
findings on these issues, and even if it had ruled that double
celling at the new jail is constitutional and that the modification
should be granted, we do not have before us the question whether
the entire decree should be vacated.
390
"would necessarily imply that the only legally
enforceable obligation assumed by the state under the consent
decree was that of ultimately achieving minimal constitutional
prison standards .... Substantively, this would do violence to the
obvious intention of the parties that the decretal obligations
assumed by the state were not confined to meeting minimal
constitutional requirements. Procedurally, it would make necessary,
as this case illustrates, a constitutional decision every time an
effort was made either to enforce or modify the decree by judicial
action." Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d
1321, 1327 (CA41991).
While a decision that clarifies the law will not, in and of
itself, provide a basis for modifying a decree, it could constitute
a change in circumstances that would support modification if the
parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the
governing law. For instance, in
Pasadena City Bd. of Ed. v.
Spangler, 427
U. S. 424, 437-438 (1976), we held that a modification should
have been ordered when the parties had interpreted an ambiguous
equitable decree in a manner contrary to the District Court's
ultimate interpretation and the District Court's interpretation was
contrary to intervening decisional law. And in
Nelson v.
Collins, 659 F. 2d 420, 428-429 (1981) (en bane), the Fourth
Circuit vacated an equitable order that was based on the assumption
that double bunking of prisoners was
per se
unconstitutional.
Thus, if the sheriff and commissioner could establish on remand
that the parties to the consent decree believed that single celling
of pretrial detainees was mandated by the Constitution, this
misunderstanding of the law could form a basis for modification. In
this connection, we note again, see
supra, at 375, that the
decree itself recited that it "sets forth a program which is both
constitutionally adequate and constitutionally
required."
(Emphasis added.)
391
B
Once a moving party has met its burden of establishing either a
change in fact or in law warranting modification of a consent
decree, the district court should determine whether the proposed
modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. In
evaluating a proposed modification, three matters should be
clear.
Of course, a modification must not create or perpetuate a
constitutional violation. Petitioners contend that double celling
inmates at the Suffolk County Jail would be constitutional under
Bell. Respondents counter that
Bell is factually
distinguishable and that double celling at the new jail would
violate the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.13 If this
is the case-the District Court did not decide this issue, 734 F.
Supp., at 565-566-modification should not be granted.
A proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent
decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor. Once a
court has determined that changed circumstances warrant a
modification in a consent decree, the focus should be on whether
the proposed modification is tailored to resolve the problems
created by the change in circumstances. A court should do no more,
for a consent decree is a final judgment that may be reopened only
to the extent that equity requires. The court should not "turn
aside to inquire whether some of [the provisions of the decree]
upon separate as distinguished from joint action could have been
opposed
13 In the District Court, respondents introduced the report of
an architectural consultant who claimed that the proposed
modification would violate the standards of the American
Correctional Association and the Massachusetts Division of Capital
Planning and Operations by leaving detainees with inadequate cell,
dayroom, and outdoor exercise space. See App.146-179. See
Bell, 441 U. S., at 544, n. 27 ("[W]hile the recommendations
of these various groups may be instructive in certain cases, they
simply do not establish the constitutional minima").
392
with success if the defendants had offered opposition."
Swift, 286 U. S., at 116-117.
Within these constraints, the public interest and
"[c]onsiderations based on the allocation of powers within our
federal system,"
Dowell, supra, at 248, require that the
district court defer to local government administrators, who have
the "primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving" the problems of institutional reform, to resolve the
intricacies of implementing a decree modification.
Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 299
(1955). See also
Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 50-52
(1990);
Milliken II, 433 U. S., at 281.14 Although state and
local officers in charge of institutional litigation may agree to
do more than that which is minimally required by the Constitution
to settle a case and avoid further litigation, a court should
surely keep the public interest in mind in ruling on a request to
modify based on a change in conditions making it substantially more
onerous to abide by the decree. To refuse modification of a decree
is to bind all future officers of the State, regardless of their
view of the necessity of relief from one or more provisions of a
decree that might not have been entered had the matter been
litigated to its conclusion. The District Court seemed to be of the
view that the problems of the fiscal officers of the State were
only marginally relevant to the request for modification in this
case. 734 F. Supp., at 566. Financial constraints may not be used
to justify the creation or perpetuation of constitutional
violations, but they are a legitimate concern of government
defendants in institu-
14 The concurrence mischaracterizes the nature of the deference
that we would accord local government administrators. As we have
stated, see supra, at 383, the moving party bears the burden of
establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants
modification of a consent decree. No deference is involved in this
threshold inquiry. However, once a court has determined that a
modification is warranted, we think that principles of federalism
and simple common sense require the court to give significant
weight to the views of the local government officials who must
implement any modification.
393
tional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately
considered in tailoring a consent decree modification.
IV
To conclude, we hold that the
Swift "grievous wrong"
standard does not apply to requests to modify consent decrees
stemming from institutional reform litigation. Under the flexible
standard we adopt today, a party seeking modification of a consent
decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law
warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification
is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance. We vacate the
decision below and remand the cases for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of
these cases.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
I agree that these cases should be remanded so that the District
Court may reconsider whether to modify the decree. I write
separately to emphasize the limited nature of our review; to
clarify why, despite our limited review, the cases should be
returned to the District Court; and to explain my concerns with
certain portions of the Court's opinion.
I
A court may modify a final judgment, such as the judgment
embodied in the consent decree at issue, where the court finds that
"it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(5).
Determining what is "equitable" is necessarily a task that entails
substantial discretion, particularly in a case like this one, where
the District Court must make complex decisions requiring the
sensitive balancing of a host of fac-
394
tors. As a result, an appellate court should examine primarily
the
method in which the District Court exercises its
discretion, not the substantive outcome the District Court reaches.
If the District Court takes into account the relevant
considerations (all of which are not likely to suggest the same
result) and accommodates them in a reasonable way, then the
District Court's judgment will not be an abuse of its discretion,
regardless of whether an appellate court would have reached the
same outcome in the first instance. Cf.
Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411
U. S. 192, 200 (1973) ("In shaping equity decrees, the trial
court is vested with broad discretionary power; appellate review is
correspondingly narrow").
Our deference to the District Court's exercise of its discretion
is heightened where, as in this litigation, the District Court has
effectively been overseeing a large public institution over a long
period of time. Judge Keeton has been supervising the
implementation of this decree since 1979; he has developed an
understanding of the difficulties involved in constructing and
managing a jail that an appellate court, even with the best
possible briefing, could never hope to match. In reviewing the
District Court's judgment, we accordingly owe substantial deference
to "the trial judge's years of experience with the problem at
hand."
Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 688
(1978).
The Court devotes much of its attention to elaborating a
"standard" for lower courts to apply in cases of this kind.
Ante, at 378-384. I am not certain that the product of this
effort-"A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet
its initial burden by showing a significant change either in
factual conditions or in law,"
ante, at 384-makes matters
any clearer than the equally general language of Rule 60(b)(5). I
think we would offer more guidance to the District Court here, and
to the many other courts burdened with administering complex
decrees like this one, if we would simply review the District
Court's exercise of its dis-
395
cretion and specify any shortcomings we might find in the method
by which the court reached its conclusion.
II
In my view, the District Court took too narrow a view of its own
discretion. The court's reasoning, as expressed in its opinion, was
flawed by three different errors of law, each of which excised a
portion of the range of options available to the court. I believe
the sum of these erroneously selfimposed limits constituted an
abuse of the court's discretion.
First, the court relied on
United States v.
Swift
&
Co., 286 U. S. 106, 119 (1932), to determine that "new
and unforeseen conditions" were a prerequisite to any modification.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, 734 F.
Supp. 561, 563 (Mass. 1990). Because the court found that the
overcrowding at the jail was foreseen, id., at 564, the court
viewed
Swift as barring modification. As the Court explains
today,
ante, at 379-380, the District Court erred in this
respect. That overcrowding was foreseen should not have been a
dispositive factor in the court's decision. Modification could
conceivably still be "equitable" under Rule 60(b)(5) even if the
rise in inmate population had been foreseen; the danger to the
community from the pretrial release of inmates, for example, might
outweigh the petitioners' failure to accommodate even a foreseen
increase in the inmate population.
Second, the District Court concluded that it lacked the
authority to consider the petitioners' budget constraints in
determining whether modification would be equitable. The court
held: "It is not a legally supportable basis for modification of a
consent decree that public officials having fiscal authority have
chosen not to provide adequate resources for the Sheriff to comply
with the terms of the consent decree." 734 F. Supp., at 566. Here
again, I think the court took too narrow a view of its own
authority. State and local governments are responsible for
providing a wide range of services.
396
Public officials often operate within difficult fiscal
constraints; every dollar spent for one purpose is a dollar that
cannot be spent for something else. While the lack of resources can
never excuse a failure to obey constitutional requirements, it
can provide a basis for concluding that continued compliance
with a decree obligation is no longer "equitable," if, for
instance, the obligation turns out to be significantly more
expensive than anyone anticipated.
Third, although the District Court purported to apply the
"flexible standard" proposed by the petitioners, the court denied
modification because "[t]he type of modification sought here would
not comply with the overall purpose of the consent decree; it would
set aside the obligations of that decree."
Id., at 565.
Taken literally, this conclusion deprives the "flexible standard"
of any meaning; every modification, by definition, will alter an
obligation of a decree. The court may have meant no more than that
the plaintiff class would never have agreed to a decree without
single celling, but, taking the court at its word, it held the
petitioners to a standard that would never permit modification of
any decree. This was another instance where the District Court, in
my view, erroneously found that it lacked the authority to grant
the relief requested by the petitioners.
In these three respects, the District Court felt itself bound by
constraints that in fact did not exist. We do not know whether, and
to what extent, the court would have modified the decree had it not
placed these limits on its own authority. I would accordingly
remand these cases so that the District Court may exercise the full
measure of its discretion.
In doing so, however, I would emphasize that we find fault only
with the
method by which the District Court reached its
conclusion. The District Court may well have been justified, for
the reasons suggested by JUSTICE STEVENS, in refusing to modify the
decree, and the court is free, when fully exercising its
discretion, to reach the same result on remand. This is a case with
no satisfactory outcome. The new jail is
397
simply too small. Someone has to suffer, and it is not likely to
be the government officials responsible for underestimating the
inmate population and delaying the construction of the jail.
Instead, it is likely to be either the inmates of Suffolk County,
who will be double celled in an institution designed for single
celling; the inmates in counties not yet subject to court
supervision, who will be double celled with the inmates transferred
from Suffolk County; or members of the public, who may be the
victims of crimes committed by the inmates the county is forced to
release in order to comply with the consent decree. The District
Court has an extraordinarily difficult decision to make. We should
not be inclined to second-guess the court's sound judgment in
deciding who will bear this burden.
III
The Court's opinion today removes what I see as the three
barriers the District Court erroneously placed in its own path.
Ante, at 379-380 (distinguishing
Swift); ante, at
386387 (explaining that the court applied an impossibly strict
version of the petitioners' proposed "flexible standard");
ante, at 392-393 (permitting the court to consider the
petitioners' fiscal constraints). But what the Court removes with
one hand, it replaces with the other. Portions of the Court's
opinion might be read to place new constraints on the District
Court's discretion that are, in my view, just as misplaced as the
ones with which the District Court fettered itself the first
time.
Most significantly, the Court observes that the District Court
recognized single celling as "'the most important element'" of the
decree.
Ante, at 382 (quoting 734 F. Supp., at 565). But the
Court decides that "this was not an adequate basis for denying the
requested modification."
Ante, at 382. This conclusion is
unsupported by any authority. Instead, the Court offers its own
reasoning: "If modification of one term of a consent decree defeats
the purpose of the decree,
398
obviously modification would be all but impossible. That cannot
be the rule."
Ante, at 387.
This sweeping conclusion strikes me as both logically and
legally erroneous. It may be that the modification of one term of a
decree does not
always defeat the purpose of the decree. See
supra, at 396. But it hardly follows that the modification
of a single term can
never defeat the decree's purpose,
especially if that term is "the most important element" of the
decree. If, for instance, the District Court finds that the
respondents would never have consented to the decree (and a decade
of delay in obtaining relief) without a guarantee of single
celling, I should think that the court would not abuse its
discretion were it to conclude that modification to permit double
celling would be inequitable. Similarly, were the court to find
that the jail was constructed with small cells on the assumption
that each cell would hold but one inmate, I doubt that the District
Court would exceed its authority under Rule 60(b)(5) by concluding
that it would be inequitable to double cell the respondents. To the
extent the Court suggests otherwise, it limits the District Court's
discretion in what I think is an unwarranted and ill-advised
fashion.
The same is true of the Court's statement that the District
Court should "defer to local government administrators ... to
resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree modification."
Ante, at 392. To be sure, the courts should defer to prison
administrators in resolving the day-to-day problems in managing a
prison; these problems fall within the expertise of prison
officials. See,
e. g., Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.
S. 401, 407-408 (1989). But I disagree with the notion that courts
must defer to prison administrators in resolving whether and how to
modify a consent decree. These questions may involve details of
prison management, but at bottom they require a determination of
what is "equitable" to all concerned. Deference to one of the
parties to a lawsuit is usually not the surest path to equity;
deference to these
399
particular petitioners, who do not have a model record of
compliance with previous court orders in this case, is particularly
unlikely to lead to an equitable result. The inmates have as much
claim as the prison officials to an understanding of the equities.
The District Court should be free to take the views of both sides
into account, without being forced to grant more deference to one
side than to the other.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
dissenting.
Today the Court endorses the standard for modification of
consent decrees articulated by Judge Friendly in
New York State
Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Carey, 706 F.2d
956 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 915 (1983). I agree with
that endorsement, but under that standard I believe the findings of
the District Court in this action require affirmance of its order
refusing to modify this consent decree.1
I
When a district court determines, after a contested trial, that
a state institution is guilty of a serious and persistent violation
of the Federal Constitution, it typically fashions a remedy that is
more intrusive than a simple order directing the defendants to
cease and desist from their illegal conduct. See
Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1 (1971). A
district court has a duty to command a remedy that is effective,
and it enjoys the broad equitable authority necessary to fulfill
this obligation. See
id., at 15-16;
Brown v.
Board
of Education, 349
U. S. 294, 300 (1955); see also
Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.
S. 33 (1990).
1 Indeed, in an alternative holding, the District Court
concluded that a modification would not be warranted even under the
"flexible" standard advanced in
Carey. See
Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 565
(Mass. 1990).
400
II
In June 1973, after finding that petitioners' incarceration of
pretrial detainees in the Charles Street Jail violated
constitutional standards, the District Court appropriately entered
an injunction that went "beyond a simple proscription against the
precise conduct previously pursued."
National Society of
Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U. S. 679, 698
(1978). It required petitioners to discontinue (1) the practice of
double celling pretrial detainees after November 30, 1973, and (2)
the use of the Charles Street Jail for pretrial detention after
June 30, 1976.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 691 (Mass. 1973).
Petitioners did not appeal from that injunction. When they found
it difficult to comply with the double-celling prohibition,
however, they asked the District Court to postpone enforcement of
that requirement. The court refused and ordered petitioners to
transfer inmates to other institutions. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d
1196 (CA1), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 977 (1974). When
petitioners found that they could not comply with the second part
of the 1973 injunction, the District Court postponed the closing of
the Charles Street Jail, but set another firm date for compliance.
While petitioners' appeal from that order was pending, the parties
entered into the negotiations that produced the 1979 consent
decree. After the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
order and set yet another firm date for the closing of the Charles
Street Jail,
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, 573 F.2d
98, 101 (CA1 1978), the parties reached agreement on a plan
that was entered by the District Court as a consent decree,
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, Civ.
Action No. 71-162-G (Mass., May 7, 1979), App. to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 90-954, p. 15a.
The facility described in the 1979 decree was never constructed.
Even before the plan was completed, petitioners recognized that a
larger jail was required. In June 1984,
401
the sheriff filed a motion in the District Court for an order
permitting double celling in the Charles Street Jail. The motion
was denied. The parties then negotiated an agreement providing for
a larger new jail and for a modification of the 1979 decree. After
they reached agreement, respondents presented a motion to modify,
which the District Court granted on April 11, 1985. The court found
that modifications were "necessary to meet the unanticipated
increase in jail population and the delay in completing the jail as
originally contemplated." App. 110. The District Court then ordered
that nothing in the 1979 decree should prevent petitioners
"from increasing the capacity of the new facility if the
following conditions are satisfied:
"(a) single-cell occupancy is maintained under the design for
the facility;
"(b) under the standards and specifications of the Architectural
Program, as modified, the relative proportion of cell space to
support services will remain the same as it was in the
Architectural Program .... " Id., at 110-111.
There was no appeal from that modification order. Indeed,
although the Boston City Council objected to the modification, it
appears to have been the product of an agreement between
respondents and petitioners.
In 1990, 19 years after respondents filed suit, the new jail was
completed in substantial compliance with the terms of the consent
decree, as modified in 1985.
III
It is the terms of the 1979 consent decree, as modified and
reaffirmed in 1985, that petitioners now seek to modify. The 1979
decree was negotiated against a background in which certain
important propositions had already been settled. First, the
litigation had established the existence of a serious
402
constitutional violation. Second, for a period of almost five
years after the entry of the 1973 injunction-which was
unquestionably valid and which petitioners had waived any right to
challenge-petitioners were still violating the Constitution as well
as the injunction. See
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, 573 F. 2d, at 99. Third, although respondents had
already prevailed, they were willing to agree to another
postponement of the closing of the Charles Street Jail if
petitioners submitted, and the court approved, an adequate plan for
a new facility.
Obviously any plan would have to satisfy constitutional
standards. It was equally obvious that a number of features of the
plan, such as the site of the new facility or its particular
architectural design, would not be constitutionally mandated. In
order to discharge their duty to provide an adequate facility, and
also to avoid the risk of stern sanctions for years of
noncompliance with an outstanding court order, it would be entirely
appropriate for petitioners to propose a remedy that exceeded the
bare minimum mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, terms such as
"minimum" or "floor" are not particularly helpful in this context.
The remedy is constrained by the requirement that it not perpetuate
a constitutional violation, and in this sense the Constitution does
provide a "floor." Beyond that constraint, however, the remedy's
attempt to give expression to the underlying constitutional value
does not lend itself to quantitative evaluation. In view of the
complexity of the institutions involved and the necessity of
affording effective relief, the remedial decree will often contain
many, highly detailed commands. It might well be that the failure
to fulfill anyone of these specific requirements would not have
constituted an independent constitutional violation, nor would the
absence of anyone element render the decree necessarily
ineffective. The duty of the District Court is not to formulate the
decree with the fewest provisions, but to consider the various
interests involved and, in the sound exercise of its discretion,
to
403
fashion the remedy that it believes to be best.2 Similarly, a
consent decree reflects the parties' understanding of the best
remedy, and, subject to judicial approval, the parties to a consent
decree enjoy at least as broad discretion as the District Court in
formulating the remedial decree. Cf.
Firefighters v.
Cleveland, 478
U. S. 501, 525-526 (1986).
From respondents' point of view, even though they had won their
case, they might reasonably be prepared to surrender some of the
relief to which they were unquestionably entitled-such as enforcing
the deadline on closing the Charles Street Jail-in exchange for
other benefits to be included in an appropriate remedy, even if
each such benefit might not be constitutionally required. For
example, an agreement on an exercise facility, a library, or an
adequate place for worship might be approved by the court in a
consent decree, even if each individual feature were not essential
to the termination of the constitutional violation. In
2 It is the difficulty in determining prospectively which remedy
is best that justifies a flexible standard of modification. This
relationship between the characteristics of a remedial decree in
structural reform litigation and the flexible standard of
modification is explained in the passage that Judge Friendly found
to be the best statement of the applicable legal standard:
"'The judge must search for the "best" remedy, but since his
judgment must incorporate such open-ended considerations as
effectiveness and fairness, and since the threat and constitutional
value that occasions the intervention can never be defined with
great precision, the intervention can never be defended with any
certitude. It must always be open to revision, even without the
strong showing traditionally required for modification of a decree,
namely, that the first choice is causing grievous hardship. A
revision is justified if the remedy is not working effectively or
is unnecessarily burdensome.'''
New York State Assn. for
Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Carey, 706
F.2d 956, 970
(CA2 1983) (quoting Fiss, The Supreme
Court-1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
49 (1979)).
The justification for modifying a consent decree is not that the
decree did "too much," but that in light of later circumstances, a
modified remedy would better achieve the decree's original
goals.
404
fact, in this action it is apparent that the two overriding
purposes that informed both the District Court's interim remedy and
respondents' negotiations were the prohibition against double
celling and the closing of the old jail. The plan that was
ultimately accepted, as well as the terms of the consent decree
entered in 1979, were designed to serve these two purposes.
The consent decree incorporated all the details of the agreed
upon architectural program. A recital in the decree refers to the
program as "both constitutionally adequate and constitutionally
required." 3 That recital, of course, does not indicate that either
the court or the parties thought that every detail of the
settlement-or, indeed, any of its specific provisions-was
"constitutionally required." An adequate remedy was
constitutionally required, and the parties and the court were
satisfied that this program was constitutionally adequate. But that
is not a basis for assuming that the parties believed that any
provision of the decree, including the prohibition against double
celling, was constitutionally required.4
3 The relevant passage reads in full:
"And whereas all parties agree that for the purposes of this
litigation the Suffolk County Detention Center, Charles Street
Facility, Architectural Program which is attached and, as modified
in paragraph 3 below, incorporated in this decree, sets forth a
program which is both constitutionally adequate and
constitutionally required." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 90-954,
p. 16a.
4 Consider, for example, the following provisions of the
decree:
"(d) The paragraph headed 'A.1.a. Lobby/reception' on page 8 is
changed by increasing the number of visitor lockers to one-hundred
(100) and the tenth sentence in that paragraph is changed to
read:
'Lobby should include public telephones, drinking fountain,
vending machines and bulletin boards.'
"(j) The following paragraph shall be added to page 37:
'Inmate laundry rooms shall be located to permit convenient
access and staff supervision. Room placement and the number of
laundry rooms required shall be resolved during the design phase.
Each inmate laundry
405
IV
The motion to modify that ultimately led to our grant of
certiorari was filed on July 17, 1989. As I view these cases, the
proponents of that motion had the burden of demonstrating that
changed conditions between 1985 and 1989 justified a further
modification of the consent decree. The changes that occurred
between 1979 and 1985 were already reflected in the 1985
modification. Since petitioners acquiesced in that modification,
they cannot now be heard to argue that pre-1985 developments-either
in the law or in the factsprovide a basis for modifying the 1985
order. It is that order that defined petitioners' obligation to
construct and to operate an adequate facility.
Petitioners' reliance on Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U. S. 520 (1979), as
constituting a relevant change in the law is plainly misplaced.
That case was pending in this Court when the consent decree was
entered in 1979. It was the authority on which the sheriff relied
when he sought permission to double cell in 1984, and, of course,
it was well known to all parties when the decree was modified in
1985. It does not qualify as a changed circumstance.5
room shall contain high quality washing and clothes drying
equipment, sink, sorting table, storage and ironing board.' "
I
d., at 17 a, 18a.
5 As the Court agrees that
Bell v.
Wolfish did not
constitute a change in law requiring modification of the decree,
see
ante, at 388, the Court does not define further the kind
of changes in law that may merit modification. In particular, the
Court has no occasion to draw a distinction between the type of
change in law recognized in
Railway Employes v.
Wright,
364 U. S. 642 (1961), and the change in law that petitioners
assert was effected by
Bell. The distinction is nevertheless
significant and deserves mention. In
Railway Employes, the
plaintiffs originally brought suit, alleging that a railroad and
its unions discriminated against nonunion employees, a practice
prohibited by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151
et
seq. The defendants entered into a consent decree, promising to
refrain from such discrimination. When Congress subsequently
amended the Act to permit union shops, the Court concluded that a
modification allowing union shops should be granted so as to
further the statutory purpose. In contrast to the situation
presented in
Railway Employes, it cannot be con-
406
The increase in the average number of pretrial detainees is, of
course, a change of fact. Because the size of that increase had not
been anticipated in 1979, it was appropriate to modify the decree
in 1985.6 But in 1985, the steady progression in the detainee
population surely made it foreseeable that this growth would
continue. The District Court's finding that "the overcrowding
problem faced by the Sheriff is neither new nor unforeseen,"
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Kearney, 734 F.
Supp. 561, 564 (Mass. 1990), is amply supported by the record.
Even if the continuing increase in inmate population had not
actually been foreseen, it was reasonably foreseeable. Mere
foreseeability in the sense that it was an event that "could
conceivably arise" during the life of the consent decree, see
ante, at 385, should not, of course, disqualify an
unanticipated development from justifying a modification. But the
parties should be charged with notice of those events that
reasonably prudent litigants would contemplate when negotiating a
settlement. Given the realities of today's society, it is not
surprising that the District Court found a con-
tended that
Bell expressed a policy preference in favor
of double celling. This distinction is well described by the United
States, appearing as
amicus curiae:
"Bell v.
Wolfish ... , which rejected a challenge
to the constitutionality of double-celling, did not represent a
policy decision
endorsing such housing. In contrast, in
amending the Railway Labor Act, Congress weighed the merits of
various labor policies and specifically endorsed union shops. The
amendment thus conflicted with the consent decree's
prohibition of such clauses.
Bell, in contrast, cast
no doubt on the propriety of the single-cell requirement to which
the parties here had agreed." Brief for United States as
Amicus
Curiae 20, n. 9.
6 It should be noted that the figures cited by the Court,
ante, at 386, n. 9, are drawn from a projection prepared
before 1979. (The projection is published in a report dated January
1, 1979. See App. 61, 69.) By 1982, respondents believed that the
1979 projections underestimated the future inmate population. See
Record, 2 App. 642-648. In 1985, petitioners knew that the average
number of male prisoners detained in 1984 had been 320 instead of
the projected number of 236.
Id., at 642-650.
407
tinued growth in inmate population to be within petitioners'
contemplation.
Other important concerns counsel against modification of this
consent decree. Petitioners' history of noncompliance after the
1973 injunction provides an added reason for insisting that they
honor their most recent commitments. Petitioners' current claims of
fiscal limitation are hardly new. These pleas reflect a
continuation of petitioners' previous reluctance to budget funds
adequate to avoid the initial constitutional violation or to avoid
prolonged noncompliance with the terms of the original decree. The
continued claims of financial constraint should not provide support
for petitioners' modification requests.7
The strong public interest in protecting the finality of court
decrees always counsels against modifications. Cf.
Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.
S. 288, 308-310 (1989) (pluralityopinion);
Mackey v.
United States, 401 U. S. 667, 682-683
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting
in part). In the context of a consent decree, this interest is
reinforced by the policy favoring the settlement of protracted
litigation. To the extent that litigants are allowed to avoid their
solemn commitments, the motivation for particular settlements will
be compromised, and the reliability of the entire process will
suffer.
7 The Court refers to the need to "keep the public interest in
mind" when deciding whether to modify a decree.
Ante, at
392. It is certainly true that when exercising their equitable
powers, courts should properly consider the interests of the
"public." See
Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300
(1955). It must be noted, however, that a remedial decree may well
contain provisions that are unpopular; a requirement of additional
expenditures to improve jail conditions might be an example of such
an unpopular order. Mere unpopularity does not constitute a
sufficient reason for modification. As the Court explained in
Brown: "Courts of equity may properly take into account the
public interest .... But it should go without saying that the
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to
yield simply because of disagreement with them."
Ibid.
408
It is particularly important to apply a strict standard when
considering modification requests that undermine the central
purpose of a consent decree. In his opinion in
New York
State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Carey, 706 F. 2d
956 (CA2 1983), Judge Friendly analyzed the requested modifications
in the light of the central purpose "of transferring the population
of Willowbrook, whose squalid living conditions this court has
already recited, to facilities of more human dimension as quickly
as possible."
Id., at 967. The changes that were approved
were found to be consistent with that central purpose. In this
action, the entire history of the litigation demonstrates that the
prohibition against double celling was a central purpose of the
relief ordered by the District Court in 1973, of the bargain
negotiated in 1979 and embodied in the original consent decree, and
of the order entered in 1985 that petitioners now seek to modify.
Moreover, as the District Court found, during the history of the
litigation, petitioners have been able to resort to various
measures such as "transfers to state prisons, bail reviews by the
Superior Court, and a pretrial controlled release program" to
respond to the overcrowding problem. 734 F. Supp., at 565. The fact
that double celling affords petitioners the easiest and least
expensive method of responding to a reasonably foreseeable problem
is not an adequate justification for compromising a central purpose
of the decree. In this regard, the Court misses the point in its
observation that "[i]f modification of one term of a consent decree
defeats the purpose of the decree, obviously modification would be
all but impossible."
Ante, at 387. It is certainly true that
modification of a consent decree would be impossible if the
modification of
anyone term were deemed to defeat the
purpose of the decree. However, to recognize that
some terms
are so critical that their modification would thwart the central
purpose of the decree does not render the decree immutable, but
rather assures that a modification will frustrate
409
neither the legitimate expectations of the parties nor the core
remedial goals of the decree.
After a judicial finding of constitutional violation,
petitioners were ordered in 1973 to place pretrial detainees in
single cells. In return for certain benefits, petitioners committed
themselves in 1979 to continued compliance with the singlecelling
requirement. They reaffirmed this promise in 1985. It was clearly
not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to require
petitioners to honor this commitment.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment