OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
v. MORGAN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 00-1614. Argued January 9, 2002-Decided June 10,2002
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff
"shall" file an employment discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days
after an "alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U. S.
C. §2000e-5(e)(1). Respondent Morgan, a black male, filed a charge
of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC against petitioner
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and cross-filed
with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. He
alleged that he had been subjected to discrete discriminatory and
retaliatory acts and had experienced a racially hostile work
environment throughout his employment. The EEOC issued a "Notice of
Right to Sue," and Morgan filed this lawsuit. While some of the
allegedly discriminatory acts occurred within 300 days of the time
that Morgan filed his EEOC charge, many took place prior to that
time period. The District Court granted Amtrak summary judgment in
part, holding that the company could not be liable for conduct
occurring outside of the 300-day filing period. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that a plaintiff may sue on claims that would
ordinarily be time barred so long as they either are "sufficiently
related" to incidents that fall within the statutory period or are
part of a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that took
place, at least in part, within the period.
Held: A Title VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete
discriminatory or retaliatory acts must file his charge within the
appropriate 180- or 300-day period, but a charge alleging a hostile
work environment will not be time barred if all acts constituting
the claim are part of the same unlawful practice and at least one
act falls within the filing period; in neither instance is a court
precluded from applying equitable doctrines that may toll or limit
the time period. Pp. 108-122.
(a) Strict adherence to Title VII's timely filing requirements
is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.
M
ohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 826. In a
State having an entity authorized to grant or seek relief with
respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an employee who initially
files a grievance with that agency must file the charge with the
EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice;
102
102 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
Syllabus
in all other States, the charge must be filed within 180 days. §
2000e5(e)(1). The operative statutory terms of § 2000e-5(e)(1), the
charge filing provision, are "shall," "after ... occurred," and
"unlawful employment practice." "[S]hall" makes the act of filing a
charge within the specified time period mandatory. "[O]ccurred"
means that the practice took place or happened in the past. The
requirement, therefore, that the charge be filed "after" the
practice "occurred" means that a litigant has up to 180 or 300 days
after the unlawful practice happened to file with the EEOC.
The critical questions for both discrete discriminatory acts and
hostile work environment claims are: What constitutes an "unlawful
employment practice" and when has that practice "occurred"? The
answer varies with the practice. Pp. 108-110.
(b) A party must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of
the date that a discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act
"occurred" or lose the ability to recover for it. Morgan asserts
that the term "practice" provides a statutory basis for the Ninth
Circuit's continuing violation doctrine because it connotes an
ongoing violation that can endure or recur over a period of time.
This argument is unavailing, however, given that § 2000e-2 explains
in great detail the sorts of actions that qualify as "[u]nlawful
employment practices," including among them numerous discrete acts,
without indicating in any way that the term "practice" converts
related discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for timely
filing purposes. And the Court has repeatedly interpreted the term
"practice" to apply to a discrete act of single "occurence," even
where it has a connection to other acts. Several principles may be
derived from
Electrical Workers v.
Robbins &
Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229, 234-235;
United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 558; and
Delaware State College v.
Ricks, 449 U. S. 250, 257.
First, discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time
barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed
charges. Because each discrete act starts a new clock for filing
charges alleging that act, the charge must be filed within the 180-
or 300-day period after the act occurred. The existence of past
acts and the employee's prior knowledge of their occurrence,
however, does not bar employees from filing charges about related
discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory
and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor
does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as
background evidence to support a timely claim. In addition, the
time period for filing a charge remains subject to application of
equitable doctrines such as waiver, estoppel, and tolling. See
Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393. While
Morgan alleged that he suffered from numerous discriminatory and
retaliatory acts from the date he was hired through the date he was
fired, only those acts that occurred within the applicable 300-day
filing period are actionable.
103
All prior discrete discriminatory acts are untimely filed and no
longer actionable. Pp. 110-115.
(c) Hostile work environment claims are different in kind from
discrete acts. Because their very nature involves repeated conduct,
the "unlawful employment practice," § 2000e-5(e)(1), cannot be said
to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or
perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single
act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. See
Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21.
Determining whether an actionable hostile environment claim exists
requires an examination of all the circumstances, including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.
Id., at 23. The question
whether a court may, for purposes of determining liability, review
all such conduct, including those acts that occur outside the
filing period, turns on the statutory requirement that a charge be
filed within a certain number of days "after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred." Because such a claim is composed of
a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one
"unlawful employment practice," it does not matter that some of the
component acts fall outside the statutory time period. Provided
that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing
period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be
considered for the purposes of determining liability. That act need
not be the last act. Subsequent events may still be part of the one
claim, and a charge may be filed at a later date and still
encompass the whole. Therefore, a court's task is to determine
whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the
same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so,
whether any act falls within the statutory time period. To support
his hostile environment claim, Morgan presented evidence that
managers made racial jokes, performed racially derogatory acts, and
used various racial epithets. Although many of these acts occurred
outside the 300day filing period, it cannot be said that they are
not part of the same actionable hostile environment claim. Pp.
115-121.
(d) The Court's holding does not leave employers defenseless
when a plaintiff unreasonably delays filing a charge. The filing
period is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling when
equity so requires,
Zipes, supra, at 398, and an employer
may raise a laches defense if the plaintiff unreasonably delays in
filing and as a result harms the defendant, see,
e. g.,
Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 424-425.
Pp. 121-122.
232 F.3d
1008, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
104
104 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
v. MORGAN
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, and in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined as
to Part II-A. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined, in which
SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined as to all but Part I, and in which
BREYER, J., joined as to Part I,
post, p. 123.
Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs was
Melissa B. Rogers.
Pamela Y. Price argued the cause for respondent. With her
on the brief were
Howard J. Moore, Jr., and
William McNeill III.
Austin C. Schlick argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy
Solicitor General Clement, Marleigh D. Dover, and John C.
Hoyle.*
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent
Abner Morgan, Jr., sued petitioner National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e
et seq.,
alleging that he had been subjected to discrete discriminatory and
retaliatory acts and had experienced a racially hostile work
environment throughout his employment. Section 2000e-5(e)(1)
requires that a Title
*Katherine Y. K. Cheung, Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Stephen A.
Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad filed a brief for the Equal Employment
Advisory Council et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
Impact Fund et al. by Ellen Lake, Brad Seligman, and Jocelyn D.
Larkin; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by
Robert H. Stroup, Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman
J. Chachkin, James L. Cott, and Eric Schnapper; for the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Thomas
J. Henderson, John A. Payton, Gary T. Johnson, Norman
Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Dennis Courtland Hayes, Marcia D.
Greenberger, Judith L. Lichtman, Marc Stern, and Paula A.
Brantner.
105
VII plaintiff file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days "after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." We consider
whether, and under what circumstances, a Title VII plaintiff may
file suit on events that fall outside this statutory time
period.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that a plaintiff may sue on claims that would ordinarily be time
barred so long as they either are "sufficiently related" to
incidents that fall within the statutory period or are part of a
systematic policy or practice of discrimination that took place, at
least in part, within the limitations period. We reverse in part
and affirm in part. We hold that the statute precludes recovery for
discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside
the statutory time period. We also hold that consideration of the
entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including
behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible
for the purposes of assessing liability, so long as an act
contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the
statutory time period. The application of equitable doctrines,
however, may either limit or toll the time period within which an
employee must file a charge.
I
On February 27, 1995, Abner J. Morgan, Jr., a black male, filed
a charge of discrimination and retaliation against Amtrak with the
EEOC and cross-filed with the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing. Morgan alleged that during the time period
that he worked for Amtrak he was "consistently harassed and
disciplined more harshly than other employees on account of his
race." 1 App. to Pet.
1 Such discrimination, he alleges, began when the company hired
him in August 1990 as an electrician helper, rather than as an
electrician. Subsequent alleged racially motivated discriminatory
acts included a termination for refusing to follow orders, Amtrak's
refusal to allow him to
106
for Cert. 25a. The EEOC issued a "Notice of Right to Sue" on
July 3, 1996, and Morgan filed this lawsuit on October 2, 1996.
While some of the allegedly discriminatory acts about which Morgan
complained occurred within 300 days of the time that he filed his
charge with the EEOC, many took place prior to that time period.
Amtrak filed a motion, arguing, among other things, that it was
entitled to summary judgment on all incidents that occurred more
than 300 days before the filing of Morgan's EEOC charge. The
District Court granted summary judgment in part to Amtrak, holding
that the company could not be liable for conduct occurring before
May 3, 1994, because that conduct fell outside of the 300-day
filing period. The court employed a test established by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Galloway
v.
General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d
1164 (1996): A "plaintiff may not base [the] suit on conduct
that occurred outside the statute of limitations unless it would
have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the
statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which the conduct
could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable harassment only
in the light of events that occurred later, within the period of
the statute of limitations."
Id., at 1167. The District
Court held that "[b]ecause Morgan believed that he was being
discriminated against at the time that all of these acts occurred,
it would not be unreasonable to expect that Morgan should have
filed an EEOC charge on these acts before the limitations period on
these claims ran." App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a.2
Morgan appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, relying on its previous articu-
participate in an apprenticeship program, numerous "written
counselings" for absenteeism, as well as the use of racial epithets
against him by his managers.
2 The District Court denied summary judgment to Amtrak with
respect to those claims it held were timely filed. The remaining
claims then proceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict
in favor of Amtrak.
107
lation of the continuing violation doctrine, which "allows
courts to consider conduct that would ordinarily be time barred 'as
long as the untimely incidents represent an ongoing unlawful
employment practice.'"
232 F.3d
1008, 1014 (2000) (quoting
Anderson v.
Reno,
190 F.3d
930, 936
(CA9 1999)). Contrary to both the Seventh
Circuit's test, used by the District Court, and a similar test
employed by the Fifth Circuit,3 the Ninth Circuit held that its
precedent "precludes such a notice limitation on the continuing
violation doctrine." 232 F. 3d, at 1015.
In the Ninth Circuit's view, a plaintiff can establish a
continuing violation that allows recovery for claims filed outside
of the statutory period in one of two ways. First, a plaintiff may
show "a series of related acts one or more of which are within the
limitations period."
Ibid. Such a "serial violation is
established if the evidence indicates that the alleged acts of
discrimination occurring prior to the limitations period are
sufficiently related to those occurring within the limitations
period."
Ibid. The alleged incidents, however, "cannot be
isolated, sporadic, or discrete."
Ibid. Second, a plaintiff
may establish a continuing violation if he shows "a systematic
policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in part, within
the limitations period-a systemic violation."
Id., at
1015-1016.
To survive summary judgment under this test, Morgan had to
"raise a genuine issue of disputed fact as to (1) the existence of
a continuing violation-be it serial or systemic," and (2) the
continuation of the violation into the limitations period.
Id., at 1016. Because Morgan alleged three types
3 The Fifth Circuit employs a multifactor test, which, among
other things, takes into account: (1) whether the alleged acts
involve the same type of discrimination; (2) whether the incidents
are recurring or independent and isolated events; and (3) whether
the earlier acts have sufficient permanency to trigger the
employee's awareness of and duty to challenge the alleged
violation. See
Berry v.
Board of Supervisors,
715 F.2d
971, 981 (1983).
108
of Title VII claims, namely, discrimination, hostile
environment, and retaliation, the Court of Appeals considered the
allegations with respect to each category of claim separately and
found that the prelimitations conduct was sufficiently related to
the postlimitations conduct to invoke the continuing violation
doctrine for all three. Therefore, "[i]n light of the relatedness
of the incidents, [the Court of Appeals found] that Morgan ha[d]
sufficiently presented a genuine issue of disputed fact as to
whether a continuing violation existed."
Id., at 1017.
Because the District Court should have allowed events occurring in
the prelimitations period to be "presented to the jury not merely
as background information, but also for purposes of liability,"
id., at 1017-1018, the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
We granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 927 (2001), and now reverse in
part and affirm in part.
II
The Courts of Appeals have taken various approaches to the
question whether acts that fall outside of the statutory time
period for filing charges set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e5(e) are
actionable under Title VII. See n. 3,
supra. While the lower
courts have offered reasonable, albeit divergent, solutions, none
are compelled by the text of the statute. In the context of a
request to alter the timely filing requirements of Title VII, this
Court has stated that "strict adherence to the procedural
requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of
evenhanded administration of the law."
Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.
S. 807, 826 (1980). In
Mohasco, the Court rejected
arguments that strict adherence to a similar statutory time
restriction 4 for filing a
4 The Court there considered both the 300-day time limit of 42
U. S. C. §2000e-5(e) and the requirement of §2000e-5(c) that, in
the case of an unlawful employment practice that occurs in a State
that prohibits such practices, no charge may be filed with the EEOC
before the expiration of 60 days after proceedings have been
commenced in the appropriate state agency unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated.
109
charge was "unfair" or that "a less literal reading of the Act
would adequately effectuate the policy of deferring to state
agencies."
Id., at 824-825. Instead, the Court noted that
"[b]y choosing what are obviously quite short deadlines, Congress
clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all charges
of employment discrimination."
Id., at 825. Similarly here,
our most salient source for guidance is the statutory text.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) is a charge filing provision
that "specifies with precision" the prerequisites that a plaintiff
must satisfy before filing suit.
Alexander v.
GardnerDenver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 47 (1974).
An individual must file a charge within the statutory time period
and serve notice upon the person against whom the charge is made.
In a State that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek
relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an employee
who initially files a grievance with that agency must file the
charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice; in
all other States, the charge must be filed within 180 days. A claim
is time barred if it is not filed within these time limits.
For our purposes, the critical sentence of the charge filing
provision is: "A charge under this section
shall be filed
within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred." § 2000e-5(e)(1) (emphasis
added). The operative terms are "shall," "after ... occurred," and
"unlawful employment practice." "[S]hall" makes the act of filing a
charge within the specified time period mandatory. See,
e. g.,
Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, 523 U.
S. 26, 35 (1998) ("[T]he mandatory 'shall,' ... normally
creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion").
"[O]ccurred" means that the practice took place or happened in the
past.5 The require-
5 "In the absence of an indication to the contrary, words in a
statute are assumed to bear their 'ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.'''
Walters v.
Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises,
Inc., 519 U. S.
202, 207
110
ment, therefore, that the charge be filed "after" the practice
"occurred" tells us that a litigant has up to 180 or 300 days
after the unlawful practice happened to file a charge with
the EEOC.
The critical questions, then, are: What constitutes an "unlawful
employment practice" and when has that practice "occurred"? Our
task is to answer these questions for both discrete discriminatory
acts and hostile work environment claims. The answer varies with
the practice.
A
We take the easier question first. A discrete retaliatory or
discriminatory act "occurred" on the day that it "happened." A
party, therefore, must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days
of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.
Morgan argues that the statute does not require the filing of a
charge within 180 or 300 days of each discrete act, but that the
language requires the filing of a charge within the specified
number of days after an "unlawful employment
practice."
"Practice," Morgan contends, connotes an ongoing violation that can
endure or recur over a period of time. See Brief for Respondent
25-26. In Morgan's view, the term "practice" therefore provides a
statutory basis for the Ninth Circuit's continuing violation
doctrine.6 This argu-
(1997) (quoting
Pioneer Investment Services Co. v.
Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U. S. 380, 388 (1993)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1561 (1993) defines "occur" as "to
present itself: come to pass: take place:
HAPPEN." See also Black's Law Dictionary 1080 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "[o]ccur" as "[t]o happen; ... to take place; to
arise").
6 Morgan also argues that the EEOC's discussion of continuing
violations in its Compliance Manual, which provides that certain
serial violations and systemic violations constitute continuing
violations that allow relief for untimely events, as well as the
positions the EEOC has taken in prior briefs, warrant deference
under
Chevron U. S.
A. Inc. v.
Natural
111
ment is unavailing, however, given that 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2
explains in great detail the sorts of actions that qualify as
"[u]nlawful employment practices" and includes among such practices
numerous discrete acts. See,
e. g., § 2000e-2(a) ("It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ... "). There is simply no indication that the term
"practice" converts related discrete acts into a single unlawful
practice for the purposes of timely filing. Cf. § 2000e-6(a)
(providing that the Attorney General may bring a civil action in
"pattern or practice" cases).
We have repeatedly interpreted the term "practice" to apply to a
discrete act or single "occurrence," even when it has a connection
to other acts. For example, in
Electrical Workers v.
Robbins &
Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229, 234
(1976), an employee asserted that his complaint was timely filed
because the date "the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred" was the date after the conclusion of a grievance
arbitration procedure, rather than the earlier date of his
discharge. The discharge, he contended, was "tentative" and
"nonfinal" until the grievance and arbitration procedure ended. Not
so, the Court concluded, because the discriminatory act
occurred on the date of discharge-the date that the parties
understood the termination to be final.
Id., at 234-235.
Similarly, in
Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U. S. 385
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984).
Brief for Respondent 26-32. But we have held that the EEOC's
interpretive guidelines do not receive
Chevron deference.
See
EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257
(1991). Such interpretations are "'entitled to respect' under our
decision in
Skidmore v.
Swift &
Co.,
323 U. S. 134,
140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have
the 'power to persuade.'"
Christensen v.
Harris
County, 529 U. S.
576, 587 (2000).
112
(1986) (per curiam), a pattern-or-practice case,
when considering a discriminatory salary structure, the Court noted
that although the salary discrimination began prior to the date
that the act was actionable under Title VII, "[e]ach week's
paycheck that deliver[ed] less to a black than to a similarly
situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII .... "
Id., at 395.
This Court has also held that discrete acts that fall within the
statutory time period do not make timely acts that fall outside the
time period. In
United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans,
431 U. S. 553
(1977), United forced Evans to resign after she married because of
its policy against married female flight attendants. Although Evans
failed to file a timely charge following her initial separation,
she nonetheless claimed that United was guilty of a present,
continuing violation of Title VII because its seniority system
failed to give her credit for her prior service once she was
rehired. The Court disagreed, concluding that "United was entitled
to treat [Evans' resignation] as lawful after [she] failed to file
a charge of discrimination within the" charge filing period then
allowed by the statute.
Id., at 558. At the same time,
however, the Court noted that "[i]t may constitute relevant
background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a
current practice is at issue."
Ibid. The emphasis, however,
"should not be placed on mere continuity" but on "whether any
present
violation exist[ed]."
Ibid. (emphasis in
original).
In
Delaware State College v.
Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980), the
Court evaluated the timeliness of an EEOC complaint filed by a
professor who argued that he had been denied academic tenure
because of his national origin. Following the decision to deny
tenure, the employer offered him a "'terminal''' contract to teach
an additional year.
Id., at 253. Claiming, in effect, a
"'continuing violation,'" the professor argued that the time period
did not begin to run until his actual termination.
Id., at
257. The Court rejected this argument: "Mere continuity of
employment, without more,
113
is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for
employment discrimination."
Ibid. In order for the time
period to commence with the discharge, "he should have identified
the alleged discriminatory acts that continued until, or occurred
at the time of, the actual termination of his employment."
Ibid. He could not use a termination that fell within the
limitations period to pull in the timebarred discriminatory act.
Nor could a time-barred act justify filing a charge concerning a
termination that was not independently discriminatory.
We derive several principles from these cases. First, discrete
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when
they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each
discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges
alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the
180- or 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act
occurred. The existence of past acts and the employee's prior
knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from
filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are
independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are
themselves timely filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee from
using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely
claim.
As we have held, however, this time period for filing a charge
is subject to equitable doctrines such as tolling or estoppel. See
Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385,
393 (1982) ("We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination
with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in
federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling"). Courts may evaluate whether it would be proper to apply
such doctrines, although they are to be applied sparingly. See
Baldwin County Welcome Center v.
Brown, 466 U. S. 147, 152 (1984)
(per curiam) ("Procedural requirements established by
Congress for gaining access to
114
114 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
v. MORGAN
the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a
vague sympathy for particular litigants").
The Court of Appeals applied the continuing violations doctrine
to what it termed "serial violations," holding that so long as one
act falls within the charge filing period, discriminatory and
retaliatory acts that are plausibly or sufficiently related to that
act may also be considered for the purposes of liability. See 232
F. 3d, at 1015. With respect to this holding, therefore, we
reverse.
Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of
transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of
discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision
constitutes a separate actionable "unlawful employment practice."
Morgan can only file a charge to cover discrete acts that
"occurred" within the appropriate time period.7 While Morgan
alleged that he suffered from numerous discriminatory and
retaliatory acts from the date that he was hired through March 3,
1995, the date that he was fired, only incidents that took place
within the timely filing period are actionable. Because Morgan
first filed his charge with an appropriate state agency, only those
acts that occurred 300 days before February 27, 1995, the day that
Morgan filed his charge, are actionable. During that time period,
Morgan contends that he was wrongfully suspended and charged with a
violation of Amtrak's "Rule L" for insubordination while failing to
complete work assigned to him, denied training, and falsely accused
of threatening a man-
7 Because the Court of Appeals held that the "discrete acts"
were actionable as part of a continuing violation, there was no
need for it to further contemplate when the time period began to
run for each act. The District Court noted that "Morgan believed
that he was being discriminated against at the time that all of
these acts occurred .... " App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. There may be
circumstances where it will be difficult to determine when the time
period should begin to run. One issue that may arise in such
circumstances is whether the time begins to run when the injury
occurs as opposed to when the injury reasonably should have been
discovered. But this case presents no occasion to resolve that
issue.
115
ager.8
Id., at 1013. All prior discrete discriminatory
acts are untimely filed and no longer actionable.9
B
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete
acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct. See 1 B.
Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 348-349
(3d ed. 1996) (hereinafter Lindemann) ("The repeated nature of the
harassment or its intensity constitutes evidence that management
knew or should have known of its existence"). The "unlawful
employment practice" therefore cannot be said to occur on any
particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years
and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of
harassment may not be actionable on its own. See
Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993)
("As we pointed out in
Meritor [Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.
S. 57, 67 (1986),] 'mere utterance of an ... epithet which
engenders offensive feelings in a[n] employee,'
ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted), does not sufficiently affect
the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII"). Such claims
are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.
"We have repeatedly made clear that although [Title VII]
mentions specific employment decisions with immediate consequences,
the scope of the prohibition 'is not limited to "eco-
8 The final alleged discriminatory act, he contends, led to his
termination on March 3, 1995. Morgan alleges that after the manager
reported that Morgan had threatened him, he was ordered into a
supervisor's office. Then, after he asked for union representation
or the presence of a co-worker as a witness, the supervisor denied
both, ordered everyone out of the office, and yelled at Morgan to
get his "black ass" into the office. Morgan refused and went home.
He was subsequently suspended and charged with violations of two
company rules and, following an investigatory hearing,
terminated.
9We have no occasion here to consider the timely filing question
with respect to "pattern-or-practice" claims brought by private
litigants as none are at issue here.
116
nomic" or "tangible" discrimination,'
Harris, [510 U. S.,
at 21] (quoting
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,
[477 U. S.,] at 64), and that it covers more than 'terms' and
'conditions' in the narrow contractual sense."
Faragher v.
Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 786 (1998)
(quoting
Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
523 U. S. 75, 78
(1998)). As the Court stated in
Harris, "[t]he phrase
'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' [of 42 U. S. C. §
2000e-2(a)(1)] evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment, which includes requiring people to work in a
discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment." 510 U. S., at 21
(some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Meritor,
477 U. S., at 64, in turn quoting
Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power v.
Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707, n. 13
(1978)).10 "Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation .... "
Clark County School Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U. S. 268, 270
(2001) (per curiam). Thus, "[w]hen the workplace is
permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,'
that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment,' Title VII is violated."
Harris, 510 U. S., at
21 (citations omitted).
In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment
claim exists, we look to "all the circumstances," including "the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance."
Id., at 23. To assess whether
a court may, for the purposes of determining liability, review all
such conduct, including those acts that occur outside the filing
period, we again look to the
10 Hostile work environment claims based on racial harassment
are reviewed under the same standard as those based on sexual
harassment. See
Faragher v.
Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 786-787,
and n. 1 (1998);
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,
477 U. S. 57,
66-67 (1986).
117
statute. It provides that a charge must be filed within 180 or
300 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred."
A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of
separate acts that collectively constitute one "unlawful employment
practice." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The timely filing provision
only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a
certain number of days after the unlawful practice happened. It
does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the
component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the
statutory time period. Provided that an act contributing to the
claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of
the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the
purposes of determining liability. 11
That act need not, however, be the last act. As long as the
employer has engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable
hostile environment claim, an unlawful employment practice has
"occurred," even if it is still occurring. Subsequent events,
however, may still be part of the one hostile work environment
claim and a charge may be filed at a later date and still encompass
the whole.
It is precisely because the entire hostile work environment
encompasses a single unlawful employment practice that we do not
hold, as have some of the Circuits, that the plaintiff may not base
a suit on individual acts that occurred outside the statute of
limitations unless it would have been unreasonable to expect the
plaintiff to sue before the statute ran
11 Amtrak argues that recovery for conduct taking place outside
the time period for filing a timely charge should be available only
in hostile environment cases where the plaintiff reasonably did not
know such conduct was discriminatory or where the discriminatory
nature of such conduct is recognized as discriminatory only in
light of later events. See Brief for Petitioner 38. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted this approach in
Galloway v.
General Motors Service Parts Operations,
78 F. 3d 1164 (1996). See
supra, at 106. Although we
reject the test proposed by petitioner, other avenues of relief are
available to employers. See
infra, at 121-122.
118
on such conduct. The statute does not separate individual acts
that are part of the hostile environment claim from the whole for
the purposes of timely filing and liability. And the statute does
not contain a requirement that the employee file a charge prior to
180 or 300 days "after" the single unlawful practice "occurred."
Given, therefore, that the incidents constituting a hostile work
environment are part of one unlawful employment practice, the
employer may be liable for all acts that are part of this single
claim. In order for the charge to be timely, the employee need only
file a charge within 180 or 300 days of any act that is part of the
hostile work environment.
The following scenarios illustrate our point: (1) Acts on days
1-400 create a hostile work environment. The employee files the
charge on day 401. Can the employee recover for that part of the
hostile work environment that occurred in the first 100 days? (2)
Acts contribute to a hostile environment on days 1-100 and on day
401, but there are no acts between days 101-400. Can the act
occurring on day 401 pull the other acts in for the purposes of
liability? In truth, all other things being equal, there is little
difference between the two scenarios as a hostile environment
constitutes one "unlawful employment practice" and it does not
matter whether nothing occurred within the intervening 301 days so
long as each act is part of the whole. Nor, if sufficient activity
occurred by day 100 to make out a claim, does it matter that the
employee knows on that day that an actionable claim happened; on
day 401 all incidents are still part of the same claim. On the
other hand, if an act on day 401 had no relation to the acts
between days 1-100, or for some other reason, such as certain
intervening action by the employer, was no longer part of the same
hostile environment claim, then the employee cannot recover for the
previous acts, at least not by reference to the day 401 act.
Our conclusion with respect to the incidents that may be
considered for the purposes of liability is reinforced by the
119
fact that the statute in no way bars a plaintiff from recovering
damages for that portion of the hostile environment that falls
outside the period for filing a timely charge. Morgan correctly
notes that the timeliness requirement does not dictate the amount
of recoverable damages. It is but one in a series of provisions
requiring that the parties take action within specified time
periods, see,
e. g., §§ 2000e-5(b), (c), (d), none of
which function as specific limitations on damages.
Explicit limitations on damages are found elsewhere in the
statute. Section 1981a(b)(3), for example, details specific
limitations on compensatory and punitive damages. Likewise, §
2000e-5(g)(1) allows for recovery of backpay liability for up to
two years prior to the filing of the charge. If Congress intended
to limit liability to conduct occurring in the period within which
the party must file the charge, it seems unlikely that Congress
would have allowed recovery for two years of backpay. And the fact
that Congress expressly limited the amount of recoverable damages
elsewhere to a particular time period indicates that the timely
filing provision was not meant to serve as a specific limitation
either on damages or the conduct that may be considered for the
purposes of one actionable hostile work environment claim.
It also makes little sense to limit the assessment of liability
in a hostile work environment claim to the conduct that falls
within the 180- or 300-day period given that this time period
varies based on whether the violation occurs in a State or
political subdivision that has an agency with authority to grant or
seek relief. It is important to remember that the statute requires
that a Title VII plaintiff must wait 60 days after proceedings have
commenced under state or local law to file a charge with the EEOC,
unless such proceedings have earlier terminated. § 2000e-5(c). In
such circumstances, however, the charge must still be filed within
300 days of the occurrence. See
Mohasco, 447 U. S., at
825-826. The extended time period for parties who first file
such
120
charges in a State or locality ensures that employees are
neither time barred from later filing their charges with the EEOC
nor dissuaded from first filing with a state agency. See
id., at 821 ("The history identifies only one reason for
treating workers in deferral States differently from workers in
other States: to give state agencies an opportunity to redress the
evil at which the federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid
federal intervention unless its need was demonstrated"). Surely,
therefore, we cannot import such a limiting principle into the
provision where its effect would be to make the reviewable time
period for liability dependent upon whether an employee lives in a
State that has its own remedial scheme.12
Simply put, § 2000e-5(e)(1) is a provision specifying when a
charge is timely filed and only has the consequence of limiting
liability because filing a timely charge is a prerequisite to
having an actionable claim. A court's task is to determine whether
the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same
actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether
any act falls within the statutory time period.
With respect to Morgan's hostile environment claim, the Court of
Appeals concluded that "the pre- and postlimitations period
incidents involve[d] the same type of employment actions, occurred
relatively frequently, and were perpetrated by the same managers."
232 F. 3d, at 1017. To support his claims of a hostile environment,
Morgan presented evidence from a number of other employees that
managers made racial jokes, performed racially derogatory acts,
made negative comments regarding the capacity of blacks to be
supervisors, and used various racial epithets.
Id., at 1013.
Although many of the acts upon which his claim depends occurred
outside the 300 day filing period,
12 The same concern is not implicated with discrete acts given
that, unlike hostile work environment claims, liability there does
not depend upon proof of repeated conduct extending over a period
of time.
121
we cannot say that they are not part of the same actionable
hostile environment claim.13 On this point, we affirm.
C
Our holding does not leave employers defenseless against
employees who bring hostile work environment claims that extend
over long periods of time. Employers have recourse when a plaintiff
unreasonably delays filing a charge. As noted in
Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385 (1982), the
filing period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a
Title VII suit. Rather, it is a requirement subject to waiver,
estoppel, and equitable tolling "when equity so requires."
Id., at 398. These equitable doctrines allow us to honor
Title VII's remedial purpose "without negating the particular
purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the
employer."
Ibid.
This Court previously noted that despite the procedural
protections of the statute "a defendant in a Title VII enforcement
action might still be significantly handicapped in making his
defense because of an inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action
after exhausting its conciliation efforts."
Occidental Life Ins.
Co. ofCal. v.
EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 373
(1977). The same is true when the delay is caused by the employee,
rather than by the EEOC. Cf.
Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.
S. 405, 424 (1975) ("[A] party may not be 'entitled' to relief
if its conduct of the cause has improperly and substantially
prejudiced the other party"). In such cases, the federal courts
have the discretionary power to "to locate 'a just result' in light
of the circumstances peculiar to the case."
Id., at
424-425.
In addition to other equitable defenses, therefore, an employer
may raise a laches defense, which bars a plaintiff from maintaining
a suit if he unreasonably delays in filing a suit and as a result
harms the defendant. This defense "'re-
13 We make no judgment, however, on the merits of Morgan's
claim.
122
quires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom
the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting
the defense.'"
Kansas v.
Colorado, 514 U. S. 673, 687 (1995)
(quoting
Costello v.
United States, 365 U. S. 265, 282,
(1961)). We do not address questions here such as "how-and how
much-prejudice must be shown" or "what consequences follow if
laches is established." 2 Lindemann 1496-1500.14 We observe only
that employers may raise various defenses in the face of
unreasonable and prejudicial delay.
III
We conclude that a Title VII plaintiff raising claims of
discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts must file his charge
within the appropriate time period-180 or 300 days-set forth in 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). A charge alleging a hostile work
environment claim, however, will not be time barred so long as all
acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful
employment practice and at least one act falls within the time
period. Neither holding, however, precludes a court from applying
equitable doctrines that may toll or limit the time period.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals' judgment is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
14 Nor do we have occasion to consider whether the laches
defense may be asserted against the EEOC, even though traditionally
the doctrine may not be applied against the sovereign. We note,
however, that in
Occidental there seemed to be general
agreement that courts can provide relief to defendants against
inordinate delay by the EEOC. See
Occidental Life Ins. Go. of
Gal. v.
EEOG, 432 U. S. 355, 373
(1977). Cf.
id., at 383 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting in part)
("Since here the suit is to recover backpay for an individual that
could have brought her own suit, it is impossible to think that the
EEOC was suing in the sovereign capacity of the United
States").
123
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, with whom
JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE KENNEDY join as to all but Part I, and
with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins as to Part I, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I join Part II-A of the Court's opinion because I agree that
Title VII suits based on discrete discriminatory acts are time
barred when the plaintiff fails to file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the 180- or 300-day
time period designated in the statute. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
I dissent from the remainder of the Court's opinion, however,
because I believe a similar restriction applies to all types of
Title VII suits, including those based on a claim that a plaintiff
has been subjected to a hostile work environment.
I
The Court today holds that, for discrete discriminatory acts, §
2000e-5(e)(1) serves as a form of statute oflimitations, barring
recovery for actions that take place outside the charge-filing
period. The Court acknowledges, however, that this limitations
period may be adjusted by equitable doctrines. See
ante, at
114, n. 7; see also
Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U. S.
385, 393 (1982) ("We hold that filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of
limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling"). Like the Court, I see no need to resolve fully the
application of the discovery rule to claims based on discrete
discriminatory acts. See
ante, at 114, n. 7. I believe,
however, that some version of the discovery rule applies to
discrete-act claims. See 2 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman,
Employment Discrimination Law 1349 (3d ed. 1996) ("Although
[Supreme Court precedents] seem to establish a relatively simple
'notice' rule as to when discrimination 'occurs' (so as to start
the running of the charge-filing period), courts continue to
disagree on what
124
Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.
the notice must be
of" (emphasis in original)). In my
view, therefore, the charge-filing period precludes recovery based
on discrete actions that occurred more than 180 or 300 days after
the employee had, or should have had, notice of the discriminatory
act.
II
Unlike the Court, I would hold that § 2000e-5(e)(1) serves as a
limitations period for all actions brought under Title VII,
including those alleging discrimination by being subjected to a
hostile working environment. Section 2000e5(e)(1) provides that a
plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days
"after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred."* It
draws no distinction between claims based on discrete acts and
claims based on hostile work environments. If a plaintiff fails to
file a charge within that time period, liability may not be
assessed, and damages must not be awarded, for that part of the
hostile environment that occurred outside the charge-filing
period.
The Court's conclusion to the contrary is based on a
characterization of hostile environment discrimination as composing
a single claim based on conduct potentially spanning several years.
See
ante, at 117. I agree with this characterization. I
disagree, however, with the Court's conclusion that, because of the
cumulative nature of the violation, if any conduct forming part of
the violation occurs within the charge-filing period, liability can
be proved and damages can be collected for the entire hostile
environment. Although a hostile environment claim is, by its
nature, a general atmosphere of discrimination not completely
reducible to particular discriminatory acts, each day the worker is
exposed to the hostile environment may still be treated as a
separate "occurrence," and claims based on some of those
occurrences
*This case provides no occasion to determine whether the
discovery rule operates in the context of hostile work environment
claims.
125
forfeited. In other words, a hostile environment is a form of
discrimination that occurs every day; some of those daily
occurrences may be time barred, while others are not.
The Court's treatment of hostile environment claims as
constituting a single occurrence leads to results that contradict
the policies behind 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Consider an
employee who has been subjected to a hostile work environment for
10 years. Under the Court's approach, such an employee may, subject
only to the uncertain restrictions of equity, see
ante, at
122, sleep on his or her rights for a decade, bringing suit only in
year 11 based in part on actions for which a charge could, and
should, have been filed many years previously in accordance with
the statutory mandate. § 2000e-5(e)(1) ("A charge under this
section shall be filed [within 180 or 300 days] after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred"). Allowing suits based on
such remote actions raises all of the problems that statutes of
limitations and other similar time limitations are designed to
address:
"Statutes of limitation ... promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a
just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them." Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 321
U. S. 342, 348-349 (1944).
Although the statute's 2-year limitation on backpay partially
addresses these concerns, § 2000e-5(g)(1), under the Court's view,
liability may still be assessed and other sorts of damages (such as
damages for pain and suffering) awarded based on long-past
occurrences. An employer asked to defend such stale actions, when a
suit challenging them could have
126
Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.
been brought in a much more timely manner, may rightly complain
of precisely this sort of unjust treatment.
The Court is correct that nothing in § 2000e-5(e)(1) can be read
as imposing a cap on damages. But reading § 2000e5(e)(1) to require
that a plaintiff bring an EEOC charge within 180 or 300 days of the
time individual incidents constituting a hostile work environment
occur or lose the ability to bring suit based on those incidents is
not equivalent to transforming it into a damages cap. The
limitation is one on
liability. The restriction on damages
for occurrences too far in the past follows only as an obvious
consequence.
Nor, as the Court claims, would reading § 2000e-5(e)(1) as
limiting hostile environment claims conflict with Title VII's
allowance of backpay liability for a period of up to two years
prior to a charge's filing. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Because of the
potential adjustments to the charge-filing period based on
equitable doctrines, two years of backpay will sometimes be
available even under my view. For example, two years of backpay may
be available where an employee failed to file a timely charge with
the EEOC because his employer deceived him in order to conceal the
existence of a discrimination claim.
The Court also argues that it makes "little sense" to base
relief on the charge-filing period, since that period varies
depending on whether the State or political subdivision where the
violation occurs has designated an agency to deal with such claims.
See
ante, at 119. The Court concludes that "[sJurely ... we
cannot import such a limiting principle ... where its effect would
be to make the reviewable time period for liability dependent upon
whether an employee lives in a State that has its own remedial
scheme."
Ante, at 120. But this is precisely the principle
the Court has adopted for discrete discriminatory acts-depending on
where a plaintiff lives, the time period changes as to which
discrete discriminatory actions may be reviewed. The justification
for the variation is the same for discrete discrimina-
127
tory acts as it is for claims based on hostile work
environments. The longer time period is intended to give States and
other political subdivisions time to review claims themselves, if
they have a mechanism for doing so. The same rationale applies to
review of the daily occurrences that make up a part of a hostile
environment claim.
My approach is also consistent with that taken by the Court in
other contexts. When describing an ongoing antitrust violation, for
instance, we have stated:
"[E]ach overt act that is part of the violation and that injures
the plaintiff ... starts the statutory [limitations] period running
again, regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of the alleged
illegality at much earlier times .... But the commission of a
separate new overt act generally does not permit the plaintiff to
recover for the injury caused by old overt acts outside the
limitations period." Klehr v. A. O. Smith
Corp., 521 U. S.
179, 189 (1997) (citations omitted).
Similarly, in actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961
et seq.,
concerning a pattern of racketeering activity, we rejected a rule
that would have allowed plaintiffs to recover for all of the acts
that made up the pattern so long as at least one occurred within
the limitations period. In doing so, we endorsed the rule of
several Circuits that, although "commission of a separable, new
predicate act within [the] limitations period permits a plaintiff
to recover for the additional damages caused by that act ... the
plaintiff cannot use an independent, new predicate act as a
bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other earlier predicate
acts that took place outside the limitations period." 521 U. S., at
190; but cf.
Rotella v.
Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 554, n. 2,
557 (2000) (reserving the question of whether the injury discovery
rule applies in civil RICO and, by extension, Clayton Act cases).
The Court today allows precisely this sort of bootstrapping in the
Title
128
Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.
VII context; plaintiffs may recover for exposure to a hostile
environment whose time has long passed simply because the hostile
environment has continued into the charge-filing period.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in its entirety.
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