OCTOBER TERM, 1995
Syllabus
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS ET AL.
v. ATCHISON,
TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD CO. ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 94-1592. Argued October 30, 1995-Decided January 8,1996
The Hours of Service Act (HSA), 49 U. S. C. §21101
et
seq., limits the number of hours that train crew employees can
remain on duty. At times a train cannot reach a crew change point
within the allotted time, however, so the railroad must stop the
train in order that a new crew can replace the first, or
"outlawed," crew. Transportation of the new crew to the train and
the outlawed crew back to the terminal is called "deadhead
transportation." Under §21103(b)(4), "[t]ime spent in deadhead
transportation to a duty assignment is time on duty, but time spent
in deadhead transportation from a duty assignment to the place of
final release is neither time on duty nor time off duty." The
latter time is commonly termed "limbo time." After the Federal
Railroad Administration, which administers the HSA, announced that
it would follow a Ninth Circuit ruling that the time spent waiting
for deadhead transportation from a duty site is on-duty time,
respondent railroads filed this suit seeking direct review. The
Seventh Circuit, sitting en bane, rejected the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation and held that time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation from a duty site is limbo time.
Held: The HSA's text, structure, and purposes demonstrate
Congress' intent that time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation from a duty site should be limbo time. As a matter
of common usage, § 21103(b)(4)'s phrase "time spent in deadhead
transportation" can be read to include the time spent waiting for
such transportation. That this is so is also established by the
HSA's provisions classifying given periods as on duty or off duty.
When those provisions are considered in light of the HSA's purpose
of promoting train safety, they reveal that on-duty time typically
includes those hours that contribute to an employee's fatigue
during his 12-hour shift. Thus, time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation to a duty site should be classified as on-duty time
because, along with the time spent in the transportation itself, it
contributes to employee fatigue during the work assignment. But
time spent waiting for deadhead transportation away from a duty
site does not cause the fatigue that implicates safety concerns and
so, like the deadhead transportation which follows it, the waiting
time must be deemed limbo time.
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Finally, classification of the time at issue here as on-duty
time would impose on railroads the very scheduling problems that
Congress sought to avoid when it created limbo time as a compromise
during the 1969 HSA amendment process. Petitioner unions' attempts
to treat the time at issue as on-duty time under §§ 21103(b)(5),
21103(b)(1), and 21103(b)(3) are unpersuasive, as are the cases
that they cite, all of which were decided before the 1969
amendments. Pp. 156-162.
44 F.3d
437, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Lawrence M. Mann argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were
Harold A. Ross and
Clinton
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the federal respondents.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant
Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard
Schaitman, John F. Daly, Paul M. Geier, and Daniel Carey Smith.
Ronald M. Johnson argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondents Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company et al.
*
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted
certiorari to resolve a division between two Courts of Appeals
regarding the correct statutory classification, under the Hours of
Service Act, 49 U. S. C. § 21101
et seq., of the time that
train employees spend waiting for transportation at the end of
their shift.
I
Congress enacted the Hours of Service Act (HSA) in 1907.
Hours of Service Act, ch. 2939, § 1, 34 Stat. 1415. The HSA's
purpose is to promote railroad safety by limiting the number of
hours a train crew may remain on duty and by requiring
*John H. Broadley, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Robert W Blanchette,
and James C. Schultz filed a brief for the Association of American
Railroads as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
154
railroads to provide crew members with a certain number of
off-duty hours for rest between shifts.
Ibid.; Chicago
& Alton R. Co. v.
United States, 247 U. S. 197, 199
(1918). In particular, the HSA provides that train employees may
not remain on duty for more than 12 consecutive hours, and, having
worked for that period, must be given at least 10 consecutive hours
off duty. 49 U. S. C. § 21103(a).
To comply with the HSA, railroads must schedule operations and
crew assignments with some precision, for if operations require the
crew to be on duty for more than 12 hours, the railroads may incur
substantial penalties. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
administers the HSA, and it is authorized to impose a fine of
between $500 and $10,000 for each violation of the statute. §
21303(a)(2). For each crew member on duty longer than the statutory
maximum there is a separate violation.
Missouri, K., &
T. R. Co. of Tex. v.
United States, 231 U. S. 112, 118-119
(1913); 48 CFR pt. 228, App. A, p. 244 (1994). The statute provides
certain exceptions to the rules in cases of emergency. 49 U. S. C.
§ 21103(c).
At times, of course, a train cannot reach the scheduled crew
change point, or even a convenient change point, within the 12
hours. To avoid violating the HSA, the railroad must stop the train
so that a new crew can replace the first crew, now called the
"outlawed crew." Transportation of the new crew to the train and
the outlawed crew back to the terminal is called "deadhead
transportation." The HSA provides different treatment for the time
spent in deadhead transportation, depending on whether the
transportation is taking a replacement crew to the train or taking
the outlawed crew from the train. The statute provides that time
spent in deadhead transportation to a duty assignment is time on
duty, while time spent in deadhead transportation from a duty
assignment to the place of final release is neither time on duty
nor time off duty. § 21103(b)(4). Time that is neither on duty nor
off duty is referred to in the industry as
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"limbo time." At oral argument, the Court was advised that train
employees are paid for limbo time.
We thus know how to treat the time the employee spends in the
deadhead vehicle. The issue is how to classify the time the
outlawed crew spends waiting for the deadhead transportation to
arrive. Petitioners, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
the United Transportation Union, claim the waiting time is on-duty
time that counts against the 12-hour limit. Save for a short-lived
period when it changed its policy to acquiesce in a decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that we shall recount, the
FRA for many years has taken the contrary position. In its view, so
long as crew members are not required to perform duties for the
railroad while they wait, time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation from a duty site is to be treated in the same way as
the time in the deadhead transportation itself-that is, as limbo
time. 58 Fed. Reg. 18163, 18164 (1993). The railroads, who are
respondents along with the Secretary of Transportation, agree with
the FRA's position.
In 1990 petitioners brought suit in California and Oregon,
challenging the FRA's position. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation from a duty site is time on duty. The court
concluded that the time was so defined before Congress amended the
HSA in 1969 and that the 1969 amendments disclose no intent to
change that result.
United Transportation Union v.
Skinner, 975 F.2d
1421, 1426-1428 (1992).
For the sake of uniformity, the FRA decided to apply the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the HSA on a nationwide basis. It
announced the policy change in an October 28, 1992, letter to
Robert W. Blanchette, Vice President of the Association of American
Railroads, App. 73, and later published notice in the Federal
Register, 58 Fed. Reg. 18163 (1993). In response, nine major
railroads instituted the
156
present action, seeking direct review in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of the FRA's order changing its
interpretation. A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the FRA's order, see
Atchison, T. & S.
F. R.
Co. v.
Pena, 29 F.3d
324 (1994), but that opinion was superseded when the Seventh
Circuit took the case en banc,
44 F.3d
437 (1994). The en banc court rejected the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation and held that time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation is limbo time.
Because of the importance of uniform nationwide application of
the HSA's regulatory scheme, we granted certiorari. 515 U. S. 1141
(1995).
II
In determining how time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation should be classified, we begin with the text and
design of the statute. As first enacted, the HSA divided all time
into two categories-on duty and off duty-but it did not define
either term. Congress amended the HSA in 1969, reducing the number
of permissible on-duty hours and providing some specific rules for
determining if a given period of time should be considered on duty
or off duty. These statutory provisions are the controlling guide
in the case before us, and are as follows:
"(1) Time on duty begins when the employee reports for duty and
ends when the employee is finally released from duty.
"(2) Time the employee is engaged in or connected with the
movement of a train is time on duty.
"(3) Time spent performing any other service for the railroad
carrier during a 24-hour period in which the employee is engaged in
or connected with the movement of a train is time on duty.
"(4) Time spent in deadhead transportation to a duty assignment
is time on duty, but time spent in deadhead
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transportation from a duty assignment to the place of final
release is neither time on duty nor time off duty. "(5) An interim
period available for rest at a place other than a designated
terminal is time on duty.
"(6) An interim period available for less than 4 hours rest at a
designated terminal is time on duty.
"(7) An interim period available for at least 4 hours rest at a
place with suitable facilities for food and lodging is not time on
duty when the employee is prevented from getting to the employee's
designated terminal by any of the following:
"(A) a casualty
"(B) a track obstruction "(C) an act of God
"(D) a derailment or major equipment failure resulting from a
cause that was unknown and unforeseeable to the railroad carrier or
its officer or agent in charge of that employee when that employee
left the designated terminal." 49 U. S. C. § 21103(b).
Although these provisions do not specify time spent waiting for
deadhead transportation as a separate category, § 21103(b)(4) does
classify the "time spent in deadhead transportation." That phrase,
as a matter of common usage, can be read to include the time spent
waiting for the deadhead transportation, but we need not confine
our examination to those words alone. When we consider the question
in light of the purpose of the HSA and all the quoted provisions,
we conclude that the time spent waiting for deadhead transportation
is of the same character as the time spent in the deadhead
transportation itself.
The purpose of the HSA is to promote the safe operation of
trains, and the statutory classification must be understood in
accord with that objective. The statute, in effect, makes the
determination that a train employee who remains on duty for more
than 12 consecutive hours will be too fatigued to operate a train
in a safe manner. In consequence, the
158
provisions delineate as on-duty time those hours which will
contribute to an employee's fatigue during his or her work
assignment. In some instances, the relationship between the time at
issue and the employee's fatigue is apparent, for example, the
command of § 21103(b)(2) that the "[t]ime the employee is engaged
in or connected with the movement of a train is time on duty."
The classification of other time periods is not quite as
straightforward, but we think still apparent from the statutory
design. What if a train employee is permitted to take a lengthy
break between periods of work? If the train employee is not working
at all during this time, is it time off duty? The statute answers
the question by reference to the likelihood of employee fatigue in
the ensuing period of work without the mandated rest interval. The
statute specifies that an "interim period available for less than 4
hours rest at a designated terminal," § 21103(b)(6), and an
"interim period available for rest at a place other than a
designated terminal," § 21103(b)(5), are to be considered on-duty
hours. It follows from the statutory scheme that these rest periods
are not sufficient to alleviate fatigue.
The treatment of deadhead transportation follows the same
scheme. Section 21103(b)(4) provides that "[t]ime spent in deadhead
transportation to a duty assignment is time on duty, but time spent
in deadhead transportation from a duty assignment to the place of
final release is neither time on duty nor time off duty." The
distinction between transportation to a duty assignment and
transportation from a duty assignment makes perfect sense, given
the statute's purpose of promoting train safety. Time spent
deadheading to a duty site contributes to the fatigue that a train
employee is likely to have during the 12-hour shift. By defining
the time spent deadheading to a duty assignment as on-duty time,
Congress ensured that an employee will not operate a train more
than 12 hours after reporting for duty. The time employees spend
deadheading from the duty site does not
159
give rise to these safety concerns, for no matter how much time
the employees must spend deadheading away from the duty site, they
will still receive the requisite off-duty rest time once they reach
the terminal and before beginning a new shift involving train
operations.
The same reasoning applies to the time spent waiting for
deadhead transportation. Time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation to a duty site should be classified as on-duty time
because, along with the time spent in the transportation itself, it
contributes to employee fatigue during the work assignment. Time
spent waiting for deadhead transportation away from a duty site
does not cause the fatigue that implicates these safety concerns
and so, like the deadhead transportation which the wait precedes,
the waiting time must be deemed limbo time to effect the statutory
design.
It is common ground, moreover, that at the beginning of a shift,
the wait for transportation and the transportation itself are
treated alike; that is, the time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation after reporting for duty at the required hour and
the time spent in the deadhead transportation itself are both
on-duty time. A consistent interpretation of the statute requires
that the parallelism between the wait and the transportation when
the shift begins carry over to the wait and the transportation when
it ends.
Finally, the concerns that surfaced during the 1969 amendment
process lend additional support to our conclusion. As noted, before
the 1969 amendments time under the HSA fell into one of two
categories-on duty or off duty. The binary scheme created a
problem, however. The hours spent deadheading from the duty site to
the terminal counted as offduty rest time, see
United States
v.
Great Northern R. Co., 285 F.1d
2, 153 (CA9 1922), and, as a consequence, employees often spent
much of their off-duty time not resting, but deadheading to the
terminal. S. Rep. No. 91-604, p. 7 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-469,
p. 7 (1969). The railroad unions responded to the problem during
the amendment process by
160
advocating that all time spent deadheading be classified as time
on duty, and the original bill proposed in the House so provided.
Ibid. The railroad industry opposed the change, however,
particularly with respect to time spent deadheading from the duty
site because of the operating difficulties that would result.
Hearings on H. R. 8449, H. R. 84, and H. R. 9515 before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 134-135 (1969). If time spent deadheading from a duty site
were to be on-duty time, railroads would have to calculate the
approximate deadheading time and stop the train early enough to
take account of that interval. Any miscalculation would lead to a
violation of the HSA.
The enacted statute reflects a compromise in the treatment of
deadhead transportation: on-duty time at the shift's beginning,
limbo time at its end. The creation of limbo time solved the
problem of the employee who was forced to spend much of his or her
off-duty rest time in deadhead transportation, but it did so
without imposing scheduling difficulties on the railroads. If we
were now to classify the waiting time as on-duty, as petitioners
request, we would impose on railroads the same scheduling problems
that Congress sought to avoid.
Petitioners try to escape the force of the argument by
attempting to fit the time at issue here within other HSA
provisions. For instance, because an "interim period available for
rest at a place other than a designated terminal is time on duty,"
49 U. S. C. § 21103(b)(5), petitioners reason that all waiting time
at a place other than a designated terminal must be time on duty.
But, as we have said, interim periods available for rest occur, by
definition, between periods of service for the railroad. Because
the employee must return to work immediately after an interim rest
period, Congress had to determine whether such a rest period would
be sufficient to alleviate fatigue. Its conclusions on that score
have no bearing when the time spent waiting for deadhead trans-
161
portation is followed not by renewed service but by the
statutory off-duty rest time. Petitioners next argue that because
the HSA provides that "[t]ime on duty begins when the employee
reports for duty and ends when the employee is finally released
from duty," § 21103(b)(1), time on duty must always continue until
the employee reaches his designated terminal. But that cannot be,
for the HSA is express in providing that deadhead transportation
from a duty site is limbo time, § 21103(b)(4).
Petitioners also point to § 21103(b)(3), which classifies as on
duty any "[t]ime spent performing any other service for the
railroad carrier during the 24-hour period in which the employee is
engaged in or connected with the movement of a train." They say
that because employees may be required to perform services for the
railroad while they wait for the deadhead transportation to arrive,
waiting time must be considered time on duty pursuant to §
21103(b)(3). Petitioners' argument begs the question, however. If
employees are required to perform services covered by §
21103(b)(3), the time is on-duty time by definition. The question
presented here, however, is how to treat the time spent waiting for
deadhead transportation when no additional services are required,
and § 21103(b)(3) cannot answer that question.
Petitioners, like the Ninth Circuit in
United Transportation
Union v.
Skinner, 975 F. 2d, at 1426, point to numerous
cases, most of them decided during the early part of this century,
that they believe support their interpretation of the statute. See
Missouri, K., &
T. R. Co. of Tex. v.
United
States, 231 U. S.
112 (1913);
Northern Pacific R. Co. v.
United
States, 220 F.1d
8 (CA9 1915);
United States v.
Southern Pacific
Co., 245 F.7d
2 (CA9 1917);
United States v.
Pennsylvania R.
Co., 275 F. Supp. 345 (WD Pa. 1967);
United States v.
Chicago, M. &
P. S.
R. Co., 195 F.7d
3 (WD Wash. 1912). We need not determine whether the Ninth
Circuit's reading of these cases was the correct one, cf.
Atchison, T. & S.
F. R. Co. v.
Pena,
44 F.3d
437, 444 (CA7 1994) (opinion below)
162
(distinguishing the above cases because they addressed "the
categorization of time spent by a railroad crew waiting for repairs
to be made or for some other delay before resuming its duties of
operating the train"), because they were all decided before
Congress amended the HSA. Thus, even if the time at issue here had
been treated as on-duty time before 1969, that conclusion would
have no bearing on how the time should now be defined because the
1969 amendments addressed this question.
For these reasons, we reject petitioners' construction of the
HSA. The text, structure, and purposes of the statute persuade us
that Congress intended that time spent waiting for deadhead
transportation from a duty site should be limbo time. The judgment
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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