OCTOBER TERM, 1995
Syllabus
BAILEY
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 94-7448. Argued October 30, 1995-Decided December
6,1995*
Petitioners Bailey and Robinson were each convicted of federal
drug offenses and of violating 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(I), which, in
relevant part, imposes a prison term upon a person who "during and
in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a
firearm." Bailey's § 924(c)(I) conviction was based on a loaded
pistol that the police found inside a bag in his locked car trunk
after they arrested him for possession of cocaine revealed by a
search of the car's passenger compartment. The unloaded, holstered
firearm that provided the basis for Robinson's § 924(c)(I)
conviction was found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet after
she was arrested for a number of drug-related offenses. There was
no evidence in either case that the defendant actively employed the
firearm in any way. In consolidating the cases and affirming the
convictions, the Court of Appeals sitting en banc applied an
"accessibility and proximity" test to determine "use" within §
924(c)(I)'s meaning, holding, in both cases, that the gun was
sufficiently accessible and proximate to the drugs or drug proceeds
that the jury could properly infer that the defendant had placed
the gun in order to further the drug offenses or to protect the
possession of the drugs.
Held:
1. Section 924(c)(I) requires evidence sufficient to show an
active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use
that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the
predicate offense. Evidence of the proximity and accessibility of
the firearm to drugs or drug proceeds is not alone sufficient to
support a conviction for "use" under the statute. Pp. 142-151.
(a) Although the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "use"
must connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who
commits a drug offense, the court's accessibility and proximity
standard renders "use" virtually synonymous with "possession" and
makes any role for the statutory word "carries" superfluous.
Section 924(c)(I)'s language instead indicates that Congress
intended "use" in the active sense of "to avail oneself of."
Smith v.
United States, 508 U. S. 223,228-229.
This reading receives further support from § 924(c)(I)'s context
within
*Together with No. 94-7492,
Robinson v.
United
States, also on certiorari to the same court.
138
the statutory scheme, and neither the section's amendment
history nor
Smith, supra, at 236, is to the contrary. Thus,
to sustain a conviction under the "use" prong of § 924(c)(I), the
Government must show that the defendant actively employed the
firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime. Under this
reading, "use" includes the acts of brandishing, displaying,
bartering, striking with, and firing or attempting to fire a
firearm, as well as the making of a reference to a firearm in a
defendant's possession. It does not include mere placement of a
firearm for protection at or near the site of a drug crime or its
proceeds or paraphernalia, nor the nearby concealment of a gun to
be at the ready for an imminent confrontation. Pp. 142-150.
(b) The evidence was insufficient to support either Bailey's or
Robinson's § 924(c)(I) conviction for "use" under the
active-employment reading of that word. Pp. 150-151.
2. However, because the Court of Appeals did not consider
liability under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(I) as a basis for
upholding these convictions, the cases must be remanded. P.
151.
36 F.3d
106, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Alan E. Untereiner argued the cause for petitioners in
both cases. With him on the briefs were
David B. Smith and
Roy T. Englert, Jr.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United
States in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, James A. Feldman, and John
F. De Pue.t
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. These
consolidated petitions each challenge a conviction under 18 U. S.
C. § 924(c)(1). In relevant part, that section imposes a 5-year
minimum term of imprisonment upon a person who "during and in
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ...
uses or carries a firearm." We are asked to decide whether evidence
of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug
proceeds is alone
tEdward H. Sisson and Daniel A. Rezneck filed a brief for James
Doe as amicus curiae urging reversal.
139
sufficient to support a conviction for "use" of a firearm during
and in relation to a drug trafficking offense under 18 U. s. C. §
924(c)(1).
I
In May 1989, petitioner Roland Bailey was stopped by police
officers after they noticed that his car lacked a front license
plate and an inspection sticker. When Bailey failed to produce a
driver's license, the officers ordered him out of the car. As he
stepped out, the officers saw Bailey push something between the
seat and the front console. A search of the passenger compartment
revealed one round of ammunition and 27 plastic bags containing a
total of 30 grams of cocaine. After arresting Bailey, the officers
searched the trunk of his car where they found, among a number of
items, a large amount of cash and a bag containing a loaded 9-mm.
pistol.
Bailey was charged on several counts, including using and
carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U. s. C. § 924(c)(1). A
prosecution expert testified at trial that drug dealers frequently
carry a firearm to protect their drugs and money as well as
themselves. Bailey was convicted by the jury on all charges, and
his sentence included a consecutive 60-month term of imprisonment
on the § 924(c)(1) conviction.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected Bailey's claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction under § 924(c)(1).
United States v.
Bailey, 995 F.2d
1113 (CADC 1993). The court held that Bailey could be convicted
for "using" a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime if the jury could reasonably infer that the gun facilitated
Bailey's commission of a drug offense.
Id., at 1119. In
Bailey's case, the court explained, the trier of fact could
reasonably infer that Bailey had used the gun in the trunk to
protect his drugs and drug proceeds and to facilitate sales. Judge
Douglas H. Ginsburg, dissenting in part, argued that prior Circuit
precedent required reversal of Bailey's conviction.
140
In June 1991, an undercover officer made a controlled buy of
crack cocaine from petitioner Candisha Robinson. The officer
observed Robinson retrieve the drugs from the bedroom of her
one-bedroom apartment. After a second controlled buy, the police
executed a search warrant of the apartment. Inside a locked trunk
in the bedroom closet, the police found, among other things, an
unloaded, holstered .22-caliber Derringer, papers and a tax return
belonging to Robinson, 10.88 grams of crack cocaine, and a marked
$20 bill from the first controlled buy.
Robinson was indicted on a number of counts, including using or
carrying a firearm in violation of § 924(c)(1). A prosecution
expert testified that the Derringer was a "second gun," i.
e., a type of gun a drug dealer might hide on his or her
person for use until reaching a "real gun." The expert also
testified that drug dealers generally use guns to protect
themselves from other dealers, the police, and their own employees.
Robinson was convicted on all counts, including the § 924(c)(1)
count, for which she received a 60month term of imprisonment. The
District Court denied Robinson's motion for a judgment of acquittal
with respect to the "using or carrying" conviction and ruled that
the evidence was sufficient to establish a violation of §
924(c)(1).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Robinson's
conviction on the § 924(c)(1) count.
United States v.
Robinson, 997 F.2d
884 (CADC 1993). The court determined, "[g]iven the way section
924(c)(1) is drafted, even if an individual intends to use a
firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense, the conduct
of that individual is not reached by the statute unless the
individual actually uses the firearm for that purpose."
Id.,
at 887. The court held that Robinson's possession of an unloaded
.22-caliber Derringer in a locked trunk in a bedroom closet fell
significantly short of the type of evidence the court had
previously held necessary to establish actual use under §
924(c)(1). The mere proximity of the gun to the drugs was held
insufficient to
141
support the conviction. Judge Henderson dissented, arguing,
among other things, that the firearm facilitated Robinson's
distribution of drugs because it protected Robinson and the drugs
during sales.
In order to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in its
decisions applying § 924(c)(1), the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit consolidated the two cases and reheard
them en banco In a divided opinion, a majority of the court held
that the evidence was sufficient to establish that each defendant
had used a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense and
affirmed the § 924(c)(1) conviction in each case.
36 F.3d
106 (CADC 1994) (en banc).
The majority rejected a multifactor weighing approach to
determine sufficiency of the evidence to support a § 924(c)(1)
conviction. The District of Columbia Circuit had previously applied
a nonexclusive set of factors, including: accessibility of the gun,
its proximity to drugs, whether or not it was loaded, what type of
weapon was involved, and whether expert testimony supported the
Government's theory of "use." The majority explained that this
approach invited the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence and
make its own finding with respect to an ultimate fact, a function
properly left to the jury; had produced widely divergent and
contradictory results; and was out of step with the broader
definition of "use" employed by other Circuits.
The court replaced the multifactor test with an "accessibility
and proximity" test. "[WJe hold that one uses a gun, i. e., avails
oneself of a gun, and therefore violates [§ 924(c)(1)], whenever
one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or
one's agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate
a drug crime."
Id., at 115. The court applied this new
standard and affirmed the convictions of both Bailey and Robinson.
In both cases, the court determined that the gun was sufficiently
accessible and proximate to the drugs or drug proceeds that the
jury could properly infer that the defendant had placed the gun in
order to fur-
142
ther the drug offenses or to protect the possession of the
drugs.
Judge Wald, in dissent, argued that the court's previous
multifactor test provided a better standard for appellate review of
§ 924(c)(1) convictions. Judge Williams, joined by Judges Silberman
and Buckley, also dissented. He explained his understanding that
"use" under § 924(c)(1) denoted active employment of the firearm
"rather than possession with a contingent intent to use."
Id., at 121. "[B]y articulating a 'proximity' plus
'accessibility' test, however, the court has in effect diluted
'use' to mean simply possession with a floating intent to use."
Ibid.
As the debate within the District of Columbia Circuit
illustrates, § 924(c)(1) has been the source of much perplexity in
the courts. The Circuits are in conflict both in the standards they
have articulated, compare
United States v.
TorresRodriguez, 930 F.2d
1375, 1385 (CA9 1991) (mere possession sufficient to satisfy §
924(c)), with
United States v.
CastroLara, 970 F.2d
976, 983 (CA1 1992) (mere possession insufficient), cert.
denied
sub nom. Sarraff v.
United States, 508 U. S.
962 (1993); and in the results they have reached, compare
United
States v.
Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d
250, 254 (CA2 1988) (presence of gun in dresser drawer in
apartment with drugs, drug proceeds, and paraphernalia insufficient
to meet § 924(c)(1)), with
United States v.
McFadden,
13 F.3d
463, 465 (CAl1994) (evidence of gun hidden under mattress with
money, near drugs, was sufficient to show "use"), and
United
States v.
Hager, 969 F.2d
883, 889 (CAlO) (gun in boots in living room near drugs was
"used"), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 964 (1992). We granted certiorari
to clarify the meaning of "use" under § 924(c)(1). 514 U. S. 1062
(1995).
II
Section 924(c)(1) requires the imposition of specified penalties
if the defendant, "during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime ... , uses or carries a
143
firearm." Petitioners argue that "use" signifies active
employment of a firearm. The Government opposes that definition and
defends the proximity and accessibility test adopted by the Court
of Appeals. We agree with petitioners, and hold that § 924(c)(1)
requires evidence sufficient to show an
active employment of
the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an
operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.
This action is not the first one in which the Court has grappled
with the proper understanding of "use" in § 924(c)(1). In
Smith, we faced the question whether the barter of a gun for
drugs was a "use," and concluded that it was.
Smith v.
United States, 508 U. S. 223 (1993). As
the debate in
Smith illustrated, the word "use" poses some
interpretational difficulties because of the different meanings
attributable to it. Consider the paradoxical statement: "I
use a gun to protect my house, but I've never had to
use it." "U se" draws meaning from its context, and we will
look not only to the word itself, but also to the statute and the
sentencing scheme, to determine the meaning Congress intended.
We agree with the majority below that "use" must connote more
than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug
offense. See 36 F. 3d, at 109; accord,
United States v.
Castro-Lara, supra, at 983;
United States v.
Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d
587, 597-598 (CA3 1989);
United States v.
Wilson,
884 F.2d
174, 177 (CA5 1989). Had Congress intended possession alone to
trigger liability under § 924(c)(1), it easily could have so
provided. This obvious conclusion is supported by the frequent use
of the term "possess" in the gun-crime statutes to describe
prohibited gunrelated conduct. See,
e. g., §§ 922(g),
922(j), 922(k),
922(0)(1), 930(a), 930(b).
Where the Court of Appeals erred was not in its conclusion that
"use" means more than mere possession, but in its standard for
evaluating whether the involvement of a firearm amounted to
something more than mere possession. Its
144
proximity and accessibility standard provides almost no
limitation on the kind of possession that would be criminalized; in
practice, nearly every possession of a firearm by a person engaged
in drug trafficking would satisfy the standard, "thereby eras[ing]
the line that the statutes, and the courts, have tried to draw."
United States v.
McFadden, supra, at 469 (Breyer, C.
J., dissenting). Rather than requiring actual use, the District of
Columbia Circuit would criminalize "simpl[e] possession with a
floating intent to use." 36 F. 3d, at 121 (Williams, J.,
dissenting). The shortcomings of this test are succinctly explained
in Judge Williams' dissent:
"While the majority attempts to fine-tune the concept of
facilitation (and thereby, use) through its twin guideposts of
proximity and accessibility, the ultimate result is that possession
amounts to 'use' because possession enhances the defendant's
confidence. Had Congress intended that, all it need have mentioned
is possession. In this regard, the majority's test is either so
broad as to assure automatic affirmance of any jury conviction or,
if not so broad, is unlikely to produce a clear guideline."
Id., at 124-125 (citations omitted).
An evidentiary standard for finding "use" that is satisfied in
almost every case by evidence of mere possession does not adhere to
the obvious congressional intent to require more than possession to
trigger the statute's application.
This conclusion-that a conviction for "use" of a firearm under §
924(c)(1) requires more than a showing of mere possession-requires
us to answer a more difficult question. What must the Government
show, beyond mere possession, to establish "use" for the purposes
of the statute? We conclude that the language, context, and history
of § 924(c)(1) indicate that the Government must show active
employment of the firearm.
We start, as we must, with the language of the statute.
See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S.
145
235, 241 (1989). The word "use" in the statute must be given its
"ordinary or natural" meaning, a meaning variously defined as "[t]o
convert to one's service," "to employ," "to avail oneself of," and
"to carry out a purpose or action by means of."
Smith,
supra, at 228-229 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Webster's New International Dictionary of English Language 2806 (2d
ed. 1949) and Black's Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990)). These
various definitions of "use" imply action and implementation. See
also
McFadden, 13 F. 3d, at 467 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting)
("[T]he ordinary meanings of the words 'use and 'carry' ... connote
activity beyond simple possession").
We consider not only the bare meaning of the word but also its
placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. " '[T]he meaning of
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.'"
Brown v.
Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994)
(citing
King v.
St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221
(1991)). Looking past the word "use" itself, we read § 924(c)(1)
with the assumption that Congress intended each of its terms to
have meaning. "Judges should hesitate ... to treat [as surplusage]
statutory terms in any setting, and resistance should be heightened
when the words describe an element of a criminal offense."
Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U. S. 135, 140-141
(1994). Here, Congress has specified two types of conduct with a
firearm: "uses" or "carries."
Under the Government's reading of § 924(c)(1), "use" includes
even the action of a defendant who puts a gun into place to protect
drugs or to embolden himself. This reading is of such breadth that
no role remains for "carry." The Government admits that the
meanings of "use" and "carry" converge under its interpretation,
but maintains that this overlap is a product of the particular
history of § 924(c)(1). Therefore, the Government argues, the canon
of construction that instructs that "a legislature is presumed to
have used no superfluous words,"
Platt v.
Union Pacific
R. Co., 99 U. S.
48, 58 (1879), is inapplicable. Brief for United States
24-25.
146
We disagree. Nothing here indicates that Congress, when it
provided these two terms, intended that they be understood to be
redundant.
We assume that Congress used two terms because it intended each
term to have a particular, nonsuperfiuous meaning. While a broad
reading of "use" undermines virtually any function for "carry," a
more limited, active interpretation of "use" preserves a meaningful
role for "carries" as an alternative basis for a charge. Under the
interpretation we enunciate today, a firearm can be used without
being carried,
e. g., when an offender has a gun on
display during a transaction, or barters with a firearm without
handling it; and a firearm can be carried without being used,
e. g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his
clothing throughout a drug transaction.
This reading receives further support from the context of §
924(c)(1). As we observed in
Smith, "using a firearm" should
not have a "different meaning in § 924(c)(1) than it does in §
924(d)." 508 U. S., at 235. See also
United Sav. Assn. of
Tex. v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.,
484 U. S. 365,
371 (1988) ("A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme"). Section
924(d)(1) provides for the forfeiture of any firearm that is "used"
or "intended to be used" in certain crimes. In that provision,
Congress recognized a distinction between firearms "used" in
commission of a crime and those "intended to be used," and provided
for forfeiture of a weapon even before it had been "used." In §
924(c)(1), however, liability attaches only to cases of actual use,
not intended use, as when an offender places a firearm with the
intent to use it later if necessary. The difference between the two
provisions demonstrates that, had Congress meant to broaden
application of the statute beyond actual "use," Congress could and
would have so specified, as it did in § 924(d)(1).
147
The amendment history of § 924(c) casts further light on
Congress' intended meaning. The original version, passed in 1968,
read:
"(c) Whoever-
"(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States, or
"(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any
felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
"shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than
one year nor more than 10 years." § 102, 82 Stat. 1224.
The phrase "uses a firearm to commit" indicates that Congress
originally intended to reach the situation where the firearm was
actively employed during commission of the crime. This original
language would not have stretched so far as to cover a firearm that
played no detectable role in the crime's commission. For example, a
defendant who stored a gun in a nearby closet for retrieval in case
the deal went sour would not have "use[d] a firearm to commit" a
crime. This version also shows that "use" and "carry" were employed
with distinctly different meanings.
Congress' 1984 amendment to § 924(c) altered the scope of
predicate offenses from "any felony" to "any crime of violence,"
removed the "unlawfully" requirement, merged the "uses" and
"carries" prongs, substituted "during and in relation to" the
predicate crimes for the earlier provisions linking the firearm to
the predicate crimes, and raised the minimum sentence to five
years. § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2138-2139. The Government argues that
this amendment stripped "uses" and "carries" of the qualifications
("to commit" and "unlawfully during") that originally gave them
distinct meanings, so that the terms should now be understood to
overlap. Of course, in
Smith we recognized that Con-
148
gress' subsequent amendments to § 924(c) employed "use"
expansively, to cover both use as a weapon and use as an item of
barter. See
Smith, 508 U. S., at 236. But there is no
evidence to indicate that Congress intended to expand the meaning
of "use" so far as to swallow up any significance for "carry." If
Congress had intended to deprive "use" of its active connotations,
it could have simply substituted a more appropriate
term-"possession"-to cover the conduct it wished to reach.
The Government nonetheless argues that our observation in
Smith that "§ 924(c)(1)'s language sweeps broadly," 508 U.
S., at 229, precludes limiting "use" to active employment. But our
decision today is not inconsistent with
Smith. Although
there we declined to limit "use" to the meaning "use as a weapon,"
our interpretation of § 924(c)(1) nonetheless adhered to an active
meaning of the term. In
Smith, it was clear that the
defendant had "used" the gun; the question was whether that
particular use (bartering) came within the meaning of § 924(c)(1).
Smith did not address the question we face today of what
evidence is required to permit a jury to find that a firearm had
been used at all.
To illustrate the activities that fall within the definition of
"use" provided here, we briefly describe some of the activities
that fall within "active employment" of a firearm, and those that
do not.
The active-employment understanding of "use" certainly includes
brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most
obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm. We note that
this reading compels the conclusion that even an offender's
reference to a firearm in his possession could satisfy § 924(c)(1).
Thus, a reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a change
in the circumstances of the predicate offense is a "use," just as
the silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table
can be a "use."
The example given above-"I
use a gun to protect my house,
but I've never had to
use it" -shows that "use" takes
149
on different meanings depending on context. In the first phrase
of the example, "use" refers to an ongoing, inactive function
fulfilled by a firearm. It is this sense of "use" that underlies
the Government's contention that "placement for protection"-i.
e., placement of a firearm to provide a sense of security or
to embolden-constitutes a "use." It follows, according to this
argument, that a gun placed in a closet is "used," because its mere
presence emboldens or protects its owner. We disagree. Under this
reading, mere possession of a firearm by a drug offender, at or
near the site of a drug crime or its proceeds or paraphernalia, is
a "use" by the offender, because its availability for intimidation,
attack, or defense would always, presumably, embolden or comfort
the offender. But the inert presence of a firearm, without more, is
not enough to trigger § 924(c)(1). Perhaps the nonactive nature of
this asserted "use" is clearer if a synonym is used: storage. A
defendant cannot be charged under § 924(c)(1) merely for storing a
weapon near drugs or drug proceeds. Storage of a firearm, without
its more active employment, is not reasonably distinguishable from
possession.
A possibly more difficult question arises where an offender
conceals a gun nearby to be at the ready for an imminent
confrontation. Cf. 36 F. 3d, at 119 (Wald, J., dissenting)
(discussing distinction between firearm's accessibility to drugs or
drug proceeds and its accessibility to defendant). Some might argue
that the offender has "actively employed" the gun by hiding it
where he can grab and use it if necessary. In our view, "use"
cannot extend to encompass this action. If the gun is not disclosed
or mentioned by the offender, it is not actively employed, and it
is not "used." To conclude otherwise would distort the language of
the statute as well as create an impossible line-drawing problem.
How "at the ready" was the firearm? Within arm's reach? In the
room? In the house? How long before the confrontation did he place
it there? Five minutes or 24 hours? Placement for later active use
does not constitute "use." An alternative
150
rationale for why "placement at the ready" is a "use"that such
placement is made with the intent to put the firearm to a future
active use-also fails. As discussed above, § 924(d)(1) demonstrates
that Congress knew how to draft a statute to reach a firearm that
was "intended to be used." In § 924(c)(1), it chose not to include
that term, but instead established the 5-year mandatory minimum
only for those defendants who actually "use" the firearm.
While it is undeniable that the active-employment reading of
"use" restricts the scope of § 924(c)(1), the Government often has
other means available to charge offenders who mix guns and drugs.
The "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1), for example, brings some
offenders who would not satisfy the "use" prong within the reach of
the statute. And Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) provides an
enhancement for a person convicted of certain drug-trafficking
offenses if a firearm was possessed during the offense. United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (Nov.
1994). But the word "use" in § 924(c)(1) cannot support the
extended applications that prosecutors have sometimes placed on it,
in order to penalize drug-trafficking offenders for firearms
possession.
The test set forth by the Court of Appeals renders "use"
virtually synonymous with "possession" and makes any role for
"carry" superfluous. The language of § 924(c)(1), supported by its
history and context, compels the conclusion that Congress intended
"use" in the active sense of "to avail oneself of." To sustain a
conviction under the "use" prong of § 924(c)(1), the Government
must show that the defendant actively employed the firearm during
and in relation to the predicate crime.
III
Having determined that "use" denotes active employment, we must
conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support either
Bailey's or Robinson's conviction for "use" under § 924(c)(1).
151
The police stopped Bailey for a traffic offense and arrested him
after finding cocaine in the driver's compartment of his car. The
police then found a firearm inside a bag in the locked car trunk.
There was no evidence that Bailey actively employed the firearm in
any way. In Robinson's case, the unloaded, holstered firearm that
provided the basis for her § 924(c)(1) conviction was found locked
in a footlocker in a bedroom closet. No evidence showed that
Robinson had actively employed the firearm. We reverse both
judgments.
Bailey and Robinson were each charged under both the "use" and
"carry" prongs of § 924(c)(1). Because the Court of Appeals did not
consider liability under the "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1) for
Bailey or Robinson, we remand for consideration of that basis for
upholding the convictions.
It is so ordered.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment