OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
JINKS
v. RICHLAND COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA No. 02-258.
Argued March 5, 2003-Decided April 22, 2003
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1367 determines whether a federal district
court with jurisdiction over a civil action may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over other claims forming part of the
same Article III "case or controversy." If the court declines to
exercise such jurisdiction, the claims will be dismissed and must
be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on
those claims from expiring while they are pending in federal court,
§ 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a
supplemental claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days
after its dismissal unless state law provides for a longer tolling
period. Petitioner filed a federal-court action claiming that
Richland County (hereinafter respondent) and others violated 42 U.
S. C. § 1983 in connection with her husband's death. She also
asserted supplemental claims for wrongful death and survival under
South Carolina law. The District Court granted defendants summary
judgment on the § 1983 claim and declined to exercise jurisdiction
over the state-law claims. Petitioner then filed the supplemental
claims in state court and won a wrongfuldeath verdict against
respondent. The State Supreme Court reversed, finding the state-law
claims time barred. Although they would not have been barred under
§ 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held § 1367(d) unconstitutional
as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's
political subdivisions.
Held: Section 1367(d)'s application to claims brought
against a State's political subdivisions is constitutional. Pp.
461-467.
(a) The Court rejects respondent's contention that § 1367(d) is
facially invalid because it exceeds Congress's enumerated powers.
Rather, it is necessary and proper for executing Congress's power
"[tJo constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court," Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 9, and assuring that those tribunals may fairly and
efficiently exercise "[tJhe judicial Power of the United States,"
Art. III, § 1. As to "necessity": It suffices that § 1367(d) is
conducive to the administration of justice in federal court and is
plainly adapted to that end. See
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,421. And as to propriety: Contrary to
respondent's claim, § 1367(d) does not violate state-sovereignty
principles by regulating state-court procedures. Pp. 461-465.
457
(b) Also without merit is respondent's contention that § 1367(d)
should not be interpreted to apply to claims brought against a
State's political subdivisions. Congress lacks Article I authority
to override a State's immunity from suit in its own courts, see
Alden v.
Maine, 527 U. S. 706, but it may
subject a municipality to suit in state court if that is done
pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers, see
id., at 756. This is merely the consequence of those cases,
which respondent does not ask the Court to overrule, holding that
municipalities do not enjoy a constitutionally protected immunity
from suit. And any suggestion that an "unmistakably clear"
statement is required before an Act of Congress may expose a local
government to liability cannot possibly be reconciled with
Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436
U. S. 658. Pp. 465-467.
349 S. C. 298, 563 S. E. 2d 104, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. SOUTER,
J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p. 467.
Robert S.
Peck argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were
James Mixon Griffin and
Bradford P. Simpson.
Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States as
intervenor. On the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant
Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement,
Malcolm L. Stewart, Mark B. Stern, and Al isa B. Klein.
Andrew F. Lindemann argued the cause for respondent
Richland County. With him on the brief were
William H. Davidson
II and
David L. Morrison.*
* Barbara Arnwine and
Thomas J.
Henderson filed a brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law as
amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the State of Alabama et al. by
William H. Pryor, Jr.,
Attorney General of Alabama,
Nathan A. Forrester, Solicitor
General,
Carter G.
Phillips, and
Gene C.
Schaerr, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows:
Ken Salazar of Colorado,
M. Jane
Brady of Delaware,
Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia,
Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii,
Steve Carter
of Indiana,
Thomas J. Miller of Iowa,
Carla J. Stovall of Kansas,
Mike Moore
of
458
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina dismissed petitioner's
lawsuit against Richland County (hereinafter respondent) as time
barred. In doing so it held that 28 U. S. C. § 1367(d), which
required the state statute of limitations to be tolled for the
period during which petitioner's cause of action had previously
been pending in federal court, is unconstitutional as applied to
lawsuits brought against a State's political subdivisions. The
issue before us is the validity of that constitutional
determination.
I A
When a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a
civil cause of action, § 1367 determines whether it may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over other claims that do not
independently come within its jurisdiction, but that form part of
the same Article III "case or controversy." Section 1367(a)
provides:
"Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
Mississippi,
Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon of Missouri,
David
Samson of New Jersey,
Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota,
W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
Charlie Condon of
South Carolina,
Paul G.
Summers of Tennessee,
Greg
Abbott of Texas,
Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and
Jerry
W Kilgore of Virginia; and for the Council of State Governments
et al. by
Richard Ruda and
James I. Crowley.
459
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties."
As the introductory clause suggests, not every claim within the
same "case or controversy" as the claim within the federal courts'
original jurisdiction will be decided by the federal court; §§
1367(b) and (c) describe situations in which a federal court mayor
must decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Section
1367(c), for example, states:
"The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-
"(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
"(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
"(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction, or
"(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction."
Thus, some claims asserted under § 1367(a) will be dismissed
because the district court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
them and, if they are to be pursued, must be refiled in state
court. To prevent the limitations period on such supplemental
claims from expiring while the plaintiff was fruitlessly pursuing
them in federal court, § 1367(d) provides a tolling rule that must
be applied by state courts:
"The period of limitations for any claim asserted under
subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is
voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of
the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is
pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless
State law provides for a longer tolling period."
460
B
On October 14, 1994, Carl H. Jinks was arrested and jailed for
failure to pay child support. Four days later, while confined at
respondent's detention center, he died of complications associated
with alcohol withdrawal. In 1996, within the applicable statute of
limitations, petitioner Susan Jinks, Carl Jinks's widow, brought an
action in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina against respondent, its detention center director,
and its detention center physician. She asserted a cause of action
under Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U. S. C. § 1983, and also supplemental
claims for wrongful death and survival under the South Carolina
Tort Claims Act. See S. C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10
et seq.
(West Supp. 2002). On November 20, 1997, the District Court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim,
and two weeks later issued an order declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining statelaw claims, dismissing them
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1367(c)(3).
On December 18, 1997, petitioner filed her wrongful-death and
survival claims in state court. After the jury returned a verdict
of $80,000 against respondent on the wrongfuldeath claim,
respondent appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which
reversed on the ground that petitioner's state-law claims were time
barred. Although they would not have been time barred under §
1367(d)'s tolling rule, the State Supreme Court held that § 1367(d)
was unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court
against a State's political subdivisions, because it "interferes
with the State's sovereign authority to establish the extent to
which its political subdivisions are subject to suit." 349 S. C.
298, 304, 563 S. E. 2d 104, 107 (2002).
We granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 972 (2002).
461
II A
Respondent and its
amici first contend that § 1367(d) is
facially invalid because it exceeds the enumerated powers of
Congress. We disagree. Although the Constitution does not expressly
empower Congress to toll limitations periods for state-law claims
brought in state court, it does give Congress the authority "[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution [Congress's Article I, § 8,] Powers and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States
.... " Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The enactment of § 1367(d) was not the
first time Congress prescribed the alteration of a state-law
limitations period; 1 nor is this the first case in which we have
ruled on its authority to do so. In
Stewart v.
Kahn,
11 Wall.
1 See,
e. g., Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. § 525 ("The period of military
service shall not be included in computing any period now or
hereafter to be limited by any law, regulation, or order for the
bringing of any action or proceeding in any court ... by or against
any person in military service"); 42 U. S. C. § 9658(a)(I) ("In the
case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or
property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to
any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into
the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations
period for such action (as specified in the State statute of
limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which
is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such
period shall commence at the federally required commencement date
in lieu of the date specified in such State statute"); 11 U. S. C.
§ lO8(c) ("Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if
applicable nonbankruptcy law ... fixes a period for commencing or
continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court
on a claim against the debtor ... and such period has not expired
before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period
does not expire until the later of-(l) the end of such period,
including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the
commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the
termination or expiration of the stay under section 362, 922, 1201,
or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect to such
claim").
462
493 (1871), we upheld as constitutional a federal statute that
tolled limitations periods for state-law civil and criminal cases
for the time during which actions could not be prosecuted because
of the Civil War. We reasoned that this law was both necessary and
proper to carrying into effect the Federal Government's war powers,
because it "remed[ied] the evils" that had arisen from the war. "It
would be a strange result if those in rebellion, by protracting the
conflict, could thus rid themselves of their debts, and Congress,
which had the power to wage war and suppress the insurrection, had
no power to remedy such an evil, which is one of its consequences."
Id., at 507.
Of course § 1367(d) has nothing to do with the war power.
We agree with petitioner and intervenor United States, however,
that § 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into execution
Congress's power "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court," U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and to assure that those
tribunals may fairly and efficiently exercise "[t]he judicial Power
of the United States," Art. III, § 1. As to "necessity": The
federal courts can assuredly exist and function in the absence of §
1367(d), but we long ago rejected the view that the Necessary and
Proper Clause demands that an Act of Congress be
"'absolutely necessary''' to the exercise of an enumerated
power. See
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
414-415 (1819). Rather, it suffices that § 1367(d) is "conducive to
the due administration of justice" in federal court,2 and is
"plainly adapted" to that end,
id., at 417, 421. Section
1367(d) is conducive to the administration of justice because it
provides an alternative to the unsatisfactory options that federal
judges faced when they decided whether to retain jurisdiction over
supplemental state-law claims that might be time barred in state
court. In the pre-§ 1367(d) world, they had three basic
choices:
2This was Chief Justice Marshall's description in
McCulloch of whyby way of example-legislation punishing
perjury in the federal courts is valid under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. See 4 Wheat., at 417.
463
First, they could condition dismissal of the state-law claim on
the defendant's waiver of any statute-of-limitations defense in
state court. See,
e. g., Duckworth v.
Franzen, 780 F.
2d 645, 657
(CA7 1985);
Financial General Bankshares,
Inc. v.
Metzger, 680 F.2d
768, 778
(CADC 1982). That waiver could be refused,
however, in which case one of the remaining two choices would have
to be pursued. Second, they could retain jurisdiction over the
state-law claim even though it would more appropriately be heard in
state court. See
Newman v.
Burgin, 930 F.2d
955, 963-964
(CA1 1991) (collecting cases). That would
produce an obvious frustration of statutory policy. And third, they
could dismiss the state-law claim but allow the plaintiff to reopen
the federal case if the state court later held the claim to be time
barred. See,
e. g., Rheaume v.
Texas Dept. of Public
Safety, 666 F.2d
925, 932
(CA5 1982). That was obviously inefficient. By
providing a straightforward tolling rule in place of this regime, §
1367(d) unquestionably promotes fair and efficient operation of the
federal courts and is therefore conducive to the administration of
justice.
And it is conducive to the administration of justice for another
reason: It eliminates a serious impediment to access to the federal
courts on the part of plaintiffs pursuing federaland state-law
claims that "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,"
Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725
(1966). Prior to enactment of § 1367(d), they had the following
unattractive options: (1) They could file a single federalcourt
action, which would run the risk that the federal court would
dismiss the state-law claims after the limitations period had
expired; (2) they could file a single state-law action, which would
abandon their right to a federal forum; (3) they could file
separate, timely actions in federal and state court and ask that
the state-court litigation be stayed pending resolution of the
federal case, which would increase litigation costs with no
guarantee that the state court would oblige. Section 1367(d)
replaces this selection of inadequate choices
464
with the assurance that state-law claims asserted under §
1367(a) will not become time barred while pending in federal
court.
We are also persuaded, and respondent does not deny, that §
1367(d) is "plainly adapted" to the power of Congress to establish
the lower federal courts and provide for the fair and efficient
exercise of their Article III powers. There is no suggestion by
either of the parties that Congress enacted § 1367(d) as a
"pretext" for "the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
[federal] government,"
McCulloch, supra, at 423, nor is the
connection between § 1367(d) and Congress's authority over the
federal courts so attenuated as to undermine the enumeration of
powers set forth in Article I, § 8, cf.
United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.
S. 549, 567-568
(1995); United States v.
Morrison, 529
U. S. 598, 615 (2000).
Respondent and its
amici further contend, however, that §
1367(d) is not a "proper" exercise of Congress's Article I powers
because it violates principles of state sovereignty. See
Printz v.
United States, 521 U. S. 898, 923-924
(1997). Respondent views § 1367(d)'s tolling rule as a regulation
of state-court "procedure," and contends that Congress may not,
consistent with the Constitution, prescribe procedural rules for
state courts' adjudication of purely state-law claims. See,
e. g., Bellia, Federal Regulation of State Court
Procedures, 110 Yale L. J. 947 (2001);
Congressional Authority
to Require State Courts to Use Certain Procedures in Products
Liability Cases, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 372, 373-374 (1989)
(stating that "potential constitutional questions" arise when
Congress "attempts to prescribe directly the state court procedures
to be followed in products liability cases"). Assuming for the sake
of argument that a principled dichotomy can be drawn, for purposes
of determining whether an Act of Congress is "proper," between
federal laws that regulate state-court "procedure" and laws that
change the "substance" of state-law rights of action, we do not
think that
465
state-law limitations periods fall into the category of
"procedure" immune from congressional regulation. Respondent's
reliance on
Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U. S. 717 (1988),
which held a state statute of limitations to be "procedural" for
purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is misplaced. As we
noted in that very case, the meaning of " 'substance'" and
"'procedure'" in a particular context is "largely determined by the
purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn."
Id., at 726. For
purposes of
Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), for
example, statutes of limitations are treated as substantive.
Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
Stewart v.
Kahn, 11 Wall., at 506507, provides ample
support for the proposition that-if the substance-procedure
dichotomy posited by respondent is valid-the tolling of limitations
periods falls on the "substantive" side of the line. To sustain §
1367(d) in this case, we need not (and do not) hold that Congress
has unlimited power to regulate practice and procedure in state
courts.
We therefore reject respondent's contention that § 1367(d) is
facially unconstitutional.
B
Respondent next maintains that § 1367(d) should not be
interpreted to apply to claims brought against a State's political
subdivisions. We find this contention also to be without merit.
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S. C. Code Ann. § 15
78-10
et seq. (West Supp. 2002), confers upon respondent an immunity
from tort liability for any claim brought more than two years after
the injury was or should have been discovered. In respondent's
view, § 1367(d)'s extension of the time period in which a State's
political subdivisions may be sued constitutes an impermissible
abrogation of "sovereign immunity." That is not so. Although we
have held that Congress lacks authority under Article I to override
a
State's immunity from suit in its own courts, see
Alden v.
Maine,
466
527 U. S. 706
(1999), it may subject a
municipality to suit in state court
if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated
powers, see
id., at 756. Section 1367(d) tolls the
limitations period with respect to
state-law causes of
action brought against municipalities, but we see no reason why
that represents a greater intrusion on "state sovereignty" than the
undisputed power of Congress to override state-law immunity when
subjecting a municipality to suit under a federal cause of action.
In either case, a State's authority to set the conditions upon
which its political subdivisions are subject to suit in its own
courts must yield to the enactments of Congress. This is not an
encroachment on "state sovereignty," but merely the consequence of
those cases (which respondent does not ask us to overrule) which
hold that municipalities, unlike States, do not enjoy a
constitutionally protected immunity from suit.
Nor do we see any reason to construe § 1367(d) not to apply to
claims brought against a State's political subdivisions absent an
"unmistakably clear" statement of the statute's applicability to
such claims. Although we held in
Raygor v.
Regents of
Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533 (2002),
that § 1367(d) does not apply to claims filed in federal court
against
States but subsequently dismissed on sovereign
immunity grounds, we did so to avoid interpreting the statute in a
manner that would raise "serious constitutional doubt" in light of
our decisions protecting a
State's sovereign immunity from
congressional abrogation,
id., at 543. As we have just
explained, however, no such constitutional doubt arises from
holding that petitioner's claim against respondent-which is not a
State, but a political subdivision of a State-falls under the
definition of
"any claim asserted under subsection (a)." §
1367(d) (emphasis added). In any event, the idea that an
"unmistakably clear" statement is required before an Act of
Congress may expose a
local government to liability cannot
possibly be reconciled with our holding in
Monell v.
New
467
York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978),
that municipalities are subject to suit as "persons" under §
1983.
***
The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring.
In joining the Court today, I do not signal any change of
opinion from my dissent in
Alden v.
Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 760
(1999).
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