OPINION OF THE COURT
IOWA V. TOVAR
541 U. S. ____ (2004)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 02-1541
IOWA, PETITIONER
v. FELIPE EDGARDO
TOVAR
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
iowa
[March 8, 2004]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The Sixth Amendment safeguards to
an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all
critical stages of the criminal process.
Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U. S. 159, 170
(1985);
United States v.
Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 224
(1967). The entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a
felony charge, ranks as a “critical stage” at which the right to
counsel adheres.
Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 34 (1972);
White v.
Maryland, 373 U. S. 59, 60 (1963)
(per curiam). Waiver of the right to counsel, as of
constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a
“knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances.”
Brady v.
United
States, 397 U. S. 742, 748
(1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge,
before accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must
elaborate on the right to representation.
Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity
to consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to be assisted
by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court, specifically: (1)
advise the defendant that “waiving the assistance of counsel in
deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable
defense will be overlooked”; and (2) “admonis[h]” the defendant
“that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the
opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the
facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty”? 656
N. W. 2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003). The Iowa Supreme Court held
both warnings essential to the “knowing and intelligent” waiver of
the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
Ibid.
We hold that neither warning is mandated by
the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is satisfied
when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the
charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his
plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the
entry of a guilty plea.
I
On November 2, 1996, respondent
Felipe Edgardo Tovar, then a 21-year-old college student, was
arrested in Ames, Iowa, for operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol (OWI). See Iowa Code §321J.2
(1995).[
Footnote 1] An
intoxilyzer test administered the night of Tovar’s arrest showed he
had a blood alcohol level of 0.194. App. 24. The arresting officer
informed Tovar of his rights under
Miranda v
.
Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). Tovar signed a form stating that he waived those
rights and agreed to answer questions. Iowa State Univ. Dept. of
Public Safety, OWI Supplemental Report 3 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of
Petitioner; Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public Safety, Rights
Warnings (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner.
Some hours after his arrest,
Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story
County. The judge indicated on the Initial Appearance form that
Tovar appeared without counsel and waived application for
court-appointed counsel. Initial Appearance in No. OWCR 23989 (Nov.
2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner. The judge also marked on the
form’s checklist that Tovar was “informed of the charge and his …
rights and receive[d] a copy of the Complaint.”
Ibid.
Arraignment was set for November 18, 1996. In the interim, Tovar
was released from jail.
At the November 18 arraignment,[
Footnote 2] the court’s inquiries of Tovar
began: “Mr. Tovar appears without counsel and I see, Mr. Tovar,
that you waived application for a court appointed attorney. Did you
want to represent yourself at today’s hearing?” App. 8–9. Tovar
replied: “Yes, sir.”
Id., at 9. The court soon after
asked: “[H]ow did you wish to plead?” Tovar answered: “Guilty.”
Ibid. Tovar affirmed that he had not been promised
anything or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty.
Id., at 13–14.
Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required
by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Iowa Rule Crim. Proc.
8 (1992),[
Footnote 3] the court
explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled
to a speedy and public trial by jury, App. 15, and would have the
right to be represented at that trial by an attorney, who “could
help [Tovar] select a jury, question and cross-examine the State’s
witnesses, present evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make
arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf,”
id., at
16. By pleading guilty, the court cautioned, “not only [would
Tovar] give up [his] right to a trial [of any kind on the charge
against him], [he would] give up [his] right to be represented by
an attorney at that trial.”
Ibid. The court further
advised Tovar that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would
relinquish the right to remain silent at trial, the right to the
presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena witnesses and
compel their testimony.
Id., at 16–19.
Turning to the particular offense with which
Tovar had been charged, the court informed him that an OWI
conviction carried a maximum penalty of a year in jail and a $1,000
fine, and a minimum penalty of two days in jail and a $500 fine.
Id., at 20. Tovar affirmed that he understood his exposure
to those penalties.
Ibid. The court next explained that,
before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that
Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged offense.
Id., at
21–22. To that end, the court informed Tovar that the OWI charge
had only two elements: first, on the date in question, Tovar was
operating a motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second, when he did
so, he was intoxicated.
Id., at 23. Tovar confirmed that
he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on the night he was apprehended
and that he did not dispute the results of the intoxilyzer test
administered by the police that night, which showed that his blood
alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over.
Id., at 23–24.
After the plea colloquy, the court asked Tovar
if he still wished to plead guilty, and Tovar affirmed that he did.
Id., at 27–28. The court then accepted Tovar’s plea,
observing that there was “a factual basis” for it, and that Tovar
had made the plea “voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his]
rights, [and] … of the consequences of [pleading guilty].”
Id., at 28.
On December 30, 1996, Tovar appeared for
sentencing on the OWI charge[
Footnote 4] and, simultaneously, for arraignment on a
subsequent charge of driving with a suspended license.
Id., at 45–46; see Iowa Code §321J.21 (1995).[
Footnote 5] Noting that Tovar was again in
attendance without counsel, the court inquired: “Mr. Tovar, did you
want to represent yourself at today’s hearing or did you want to
take some time to hire an attorney to represent you?” App.
46.[
Footnote 6] Tovar replied
that he would represent himself.
Ibid. The court then
engaged in essentially the same plea colloquy on the suspension
charge as it had on the OWI charge the previous month.
Id., at 48–51. After accepting Tovar’s guilty plea on the
suspension charge, the court sentenced him on both counts: For the
OWI conviction, the court imposed the minimum sentence of two days
in jail and a $500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the
suspension conviction, the court imposed a $250 fine, plus a
surcharge and costs.
Id., at 55.
On March 16, 1998, Tovar was
convicted of OWI for a second time. He was represented by counsel
in that proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. Record 60; see App.
to Pet. for Cert. 24, n. 1.
On December 14, 2000,
Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a third offense, see
Iowa Code §321J.2 (1999), and additionally with driving while
license barred, see §321.561. Iowa law classifies first-offense OWI
as a serious misdemeanor and second-offense OWI as an aggravated
misdemeanor. §§321J.2(2)(a)–(b). Third-offense
OWI, and any OWI offenses thereafter, rank as class “D” felonies.
§321J.2(2)(c). Represented by an attorney, Tovar pleaded
not guilty to both December 2000 charges. Record
55.
In March 2001, through
counsel, Tovar filed a Motion for Adjudication of Law
Points;[Footnote 7] the motion
urged that Tovar’s first OWI conviction, in 1996, could not be used
to enhance the December 2000 OWI charge from a second-offense
aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. App.
3–5.[Footnote 8] Significantly,
Tovar did not allege that he was unaware at the November 1996
arraignment of his right to counsel prior to pleading guilty and at
the plea hearing. Instead, he maintained that his 1996 waiver of
counsel was invalid—not “full knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary”—because he “was never made aware by the court … of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Id., at
3–4.
The court denied
Tovar’s motion in May 2001, explaining: “Where the offense is
readily understood by laypersons and the penalty is not unduly
severe, the duty of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only
that which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to
counsel and a willingness to proceed without counsel in the face of
such awareness.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36–37 (brackets in
original). Tovar then waived his right to a jury trial and was
found guilty by the court of both the OWI third-offense charge and
driving while license barred. Id., at 33. Four months
after that adjudication, Tovar was sentenced. On the OWI
third-offense charge, he received a 180-day jail term, with all but
30 days suspended, three years of probation, and a $2,500 fine plus
surcharges and costs. App. 70–71. For driving while license barred,
Tovar received a 30-day jail term, to run concurrently with the OWI
sentence, and a suspended $500 fine. Id., at
71.
The Iowa Court of
Appeals affirmed, App. to Pet. for Cert. 23–30, but the Supreme
Court of Iowa, by a 4 to 3 vote, reversed and remanded for entry of
judgment without consideration of Tovar’s first OWI conviction, 656
N. W. 2d 112 (2003). Iowa’s highest court acknowledged that
“the dangers of proceeding pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will
be different than the dangers of proceeding pro se at a jury trial,
[therefore] the inquiries made at these proceedings will also be
different.” Id., at 119. The court nonetheless held that
the colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar’s 1996 guilty plea had
been constitutionally inadequate, and instructed
dispositively:
“[A] defendant such as
Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without the assistance of an
attorney must be advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the
dangers of self-representation in order to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel… . [T]he trial
judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are defenses
to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that
the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether
to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be
overlooked. The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his
right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an
independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law,
it is wise to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the
defendant understands the nature of the charges against him and the
range of allowable punishments.” Id., at 121.[Footnote 9]
We granted certiorari, 539
U. S. — (2003), in view of the division of opinion on the
requirements the Sixth Amendment imposes for waiver of counsel at a
plea hearing, compare, e.g., United States v.
Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1146–1147 (CA9 2002), with
State v. Cashman, 491 N. W. 2d 462, 465–466
(S. D. 1992), and we now reverse the judgment of the Iowa
Supreme Court.
II
The Sixth
Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right
to counsel at all “critical stages” of the criminal process. See,
e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S., at
170; United States v. Wade, 388 U. S., at 224. A
plea hearing qualifies as a “critical stage.” White v.
Maryland, 373 U. S., at 60. Because Tovar received a
two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he had a right to
counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to
contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.
S., at 34, 37.
A person
accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation.
While the Constitution “does not force a lawyer upon a defendant,”
Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 279
(1942), it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, see Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464
(1938). Tovar contends that his waiver of counsel in November 1996,
at his first OWI plea hearing, was insufficiently informed, and
therefore constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that
the trial judge did not elaborate on the value, at that stage of
the case, of an attorney’s advice and the dangers of
self-representation in entering a plea. Brief for Respondent
15.[Footnote
10]
We have
described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant
“knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
Adams, 317 U. S., at 279. We have not, however, prescribed
any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he
elects to proceed without counsel. The information a defendant must
possess in order to make an intelligent election, our decisions
indicate, will depend on a range of case-specific factors,
including the defendant’s education or sophistication, the complex
or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the
proceeding. See Johnson, 304 U. S., at
464.
As to
waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may
be allowed to proceed pro se, he must be warned
specifically of the hazards ahead. Faretta v.
California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), is
instructive. The defendant in Faretta resisted counsel’s
aid, preferring to represent himself. The Court held that he had a
constitutional right to self-representation. In recognizing that
right, however, we cautioned: “Although a defendant need not
himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order
competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he
should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that he
knows what he is doing … .” Id., at 835 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Later, in
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285 (1988), we elaborated on
“the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” to which
Faretta referred. “[A]t trial,” we observed, “counsel is
required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to the rules of
procedure and evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir
dire, examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively … ,
object to improper prosecution questions, and much more.” 487 U.
S., at 299, n. 13. Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to
trial without counsel, we therefore said, must be “rigorous[ly]”
conveyed. Id., at 298. We clarified, however, that at
earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal
colloquy may suffice. Id., at
299.
Patterson concerned postindictment
questioning by police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we
held, the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth Amendment
rights, but of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well. 487 U.
S., at 293. Miranda warnings, we said, effectively convey
to a defendant his right to have counsel present during
questioning. In addition, they inform him of the “ultimate adverse
consequence” of making uncounseled admissions, i.e., his
statements may be used against him in any ensuing criminal
proceeding. 487 U. S., at 293. The Miranda warnings, we
added, “also sufficed … to let [the defendant] know what a lawyer
could ‘do for him,’ ” namely, advise him to refrain from
making statements that could prove damaging to his defense. 487 U.
S., at 294.
Patterson describes a “pragmatic
approach to the waiver question,” one that asks “what purposes a
lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in
question, and what assistance he could provide to an accused at
that stage,” in order “to determine the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, and the type of warnings and procedures
that should be required before a waiver of that right will be
recognized.” Id., at 298. We require less rigorous
warnings pretrial, Patterson explained, not
because pretrial proceedings are “less important” than trial, but
because, at that stage, “the full dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation … are less substantial and more obvious to an
accused than they are at trial.” Id., at 299 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In Tovar’s
case, the State maintains that, like the Miranda warnings
we found adequate in Patterson, Iowa’s plea colloquy
suffices both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to
assure that his guilty plea is informed and voluntary. Brief for
Petitioner 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. The plea colloquy, according to
the State, “makes plain that an attorney’s role would be to
challenge the charge or sentence,” and therefore adequately conveys
to the defendant both the utility of counsel and the dangers of
self-representation. Brief for Petitioner 25. Tovar, on the other
hand, defends the precise instructions required by the Iowa Supreme
Court, see supra, at 7–8, as essential to a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent plea stage waiver of counsel. Brief for
Respondent 15.
To resolve
this case, we need not endorse the State’s position that nothing
more than the plea colloquy was needed to safeguard Tovar’s right
to counsel. Preliminarily, we note that there were some things more
in this case. Tovar first indicated that he waived counsel at his
Initial Appearance, see supra, at 3, affirmed that he
wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, see
supra, at 3, and declined the court’s offer of “time to
hire an attorney” at sentencing, when it was still open to him to
request withdrawal of his plea, see supra, at 4–5, and
n. 4. Further, the State does not contest that a defendant
must be alerted to his right to the assistance of counsel in
entering a plea. See Brief for Petitioner 19 (acknowledging
defendant’s need to know “retained or appointed counsel can assist”
at the plea stage by “work[ing] on the issues of guilt and
sentencing”). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to assume
that Tovar was informed of his entitlement to counsel’s aid or, at
least, to have pretermitted that issue. See 656 N. W. 2d, at
117. Accordingly, the State presents a narrower question: “Does the
Sixth Amendment require a court to give a rigid and detailed
admonishment to a pro se defendant pleading guilty of the
usefulness of an attorney, that an attorney may provide an
independent opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and that
without an attorney the defendant risks overlooking a defense?”
Pet. for Cert. i.
Training
on that question, we turn to, and reiterate, the particular
language the Iowa Supreme Court employed in announcing the warnings
it thought the Sixth Amendment required: “[T]he trial judge [must]
advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal
charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in
waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead
guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked,” 656
N. W. 2d, at 121; in addition, “[t]he defendant should be
admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose
the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under
the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty,”
ibid. Tovar did not receive such advice, and the sole
question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment compels the two
admonitions here in controversy.[Footnote 11] We hold it does
not.
This Court
recently explained, in reversing a lower court determination that a
guilty plea was not voluntary: “[T]he law ordinarily considers a
waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it
would likely apply in general in the circumstances—even
though the defendant may not know the specific detailed
consequences of invoking it.” United States v.
Ruiz, 536 U. S. 622, 629
(2002) (emphasis in original). We similarly observed in
Patterson: “If [the defendant] … lacked a full and
complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his
waiver, it does not defeat the State’s showing that the information
it provided to him satisfied the constitutional minimum.” 487 U.
S., at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Iowa Supreme
Court gave insufficient consideration to these guiding decisions.
In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in
every guilty plea instance, we further note, the Iowa high court
overlooked our observations that the information a defendant must
have to waive counsel intelligently will “depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,”
Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464; supra, at
9.
Moreover,
as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral attack on an uncounseled
conviction, it is the defendant’s burden to prove that he did not
competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of
counsel. See Watts v. State, 257 N. W. 2d
70, 71 (Iowa 1977); Brief for Respondent 5, 26–27. In that light,
we note that Tovar has never claimed that he did not fully
understand the charge or the range of punishment for the crime
prior to pleading guilty. Further, he has never “articulate[d] with
precision” the additional information counsel could have provided,
given the simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.
S., at 294; supra, at 4. Nor does he assert that he
was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at
his arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests only that he
“may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a
right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to plead
guilty.” Brief for Respondent 16 (emphasis added).[Footnote 12]
Given “the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case,” see
Johnson, 304 U. S., at 464, it is far from clear that
warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have
enlightened Tovar’s decision whether to seek counsel or to
represent himself. In a case so straightforward, the United States
as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might
confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The
warnings the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory might be
misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense
exists or that the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when
neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea
in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for
contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt disposition
of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State
(if the defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is
financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be wasted. Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 28–29; Tr. of Oral
Arg. 20–21.
We note,
finally, that States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or
decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they
deem useful. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 39(a)
(2003); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.111(d) (2003); Md. Ct. Rule 4–215
(2002); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 5.02 (2003); Pa. Rule Crim. Proc.
121, comment (2003). We hold only that the two admonitions the Iowa
Supreme Court ordered are not required by the Federal
Constitution.
* *
*
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so
ordered.
Footnote 1
“A person
commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person
operates a motor vehicle in this state in either of the following
conditions: a. While under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage … . b. While having an alcohol concentration
… of .10 or more.” Iowa Code §321J.2(1)
(1995).
Footnote 2
Tovar
appeared in court along with four other individuals charged with
misdemeanor offenses. App. 6–10. The presiding judge proposed to
conduct the plea proceeding for the five cases jointly, and each of
the individuals indicated he did not object to that course of
action. Id., at 11.
Footnote 3
The Rule
has since been renumbered 2.8.
Footnote 4
At that
stage, it was still open to Tovar to request withdrawal of his
guilty plea on the OWI charge and to substitute a plea of not
guilty. See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a)
(1992).
Footnote 5
In order
to appear at the OWI arraignment, Tovar drove to the courthouse
despite the suspension of his license; he was apprehended en route
home. App. 50, 53.
Footnote 6
Prior to
asking Tovar whether he wished to hire counsel, the court noted
that Tovar had applied for a court-appointed attorney but that his
application had been denied because he was financially dependent
upon his parents. Id., at 46. Tovar does not here
challenge the absence of counsel at
sentencing.
Footnote 7
See Iowa
Rule Crim. Proc. 10(2) (1992) (“Any defense, objection, or
request which is capable of determination without the trial of the
general issue may be raised before trial by motion.”);
State v. Wilt, 333 N.W.2d 457,
460 (Iowa 1983) (approving use of motions for adjudication of law
points under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2) where material
facts are undisputed).
Footnote 8
Tovar
conceded that the 1998 OWI conviction could be used for enhancement
purposes. Record 60.
Footnote 9
The
dissenting justices criticized the majority’s approach as “rigid”
and out of line with the pragmatic approach this Court described in
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285, 298 (1988). 656
N. W. 2d, at 122. They noted that, in addition to advice
concerning the constitutional rights a guilty plea relinquishes,
Tovar was “made fully aware of the penal consequences that might
befall him if he went forward without counsel and pleaded guilty.”
Ibid.
Footnote 10
The
United States as amicus curiae reads our decision in
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (1979), to
hold that a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel in a
misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting vacation of any term
of imprisonment, affords no ground for disturbing the underlying
conviction. Amicus accordingly contends that the
Constitution should not preclude use of an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction to enhance the penalty for a subsequent offense,
regardless of the validity of the prior waiver. See Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 11, n. 3. The State,
however, does not contest the Iowa Supreme Court’s determination
that a conviction obtained without an effective waiver of counsel
cannot be used to enhance a subsequent charge. See ibid.
We therefore do not address arguments amicus advances
questioning that premise. See also id., at 29,
n. 12.
Footnote 11
The
Supreme Court of Iowa also held that “the court must ensure the
defendant understands the nature of the charges against him and the
range of allowable punishments.” 656 N. W. 2d, at 121. The
parties do not dispute that Tovar was so
informed.
Footnote 12
The trial
court’s comment that Tovar appeared without counsel at the
arraignment and the court’s inquiry whether Tovar wanted to
represent himself at that hearing, see App. 8–9, hardly lend
support to Tovar’s suggestion of what he “may have” believed. See
also id., at 46 (court’s inquiry at sentencing whether
Tovar “want[ed] to take some time to hire an attorney”); Iowa Rule
Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992) (“[a]t any time before judgment,”
defendant may request withdrawal of guilty plea and substitution of
not guilty plea).
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