OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
HAFER
v. MELO ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT
No.90-681. Argued October 15, 1991-Decided November 5,1991
After petitioner Hafer, the newly elected auditor general of
Pennsylvania, discharged respondents from their jobs in her office,
they sued her for,
inter alia, monetary damages under 42 U.
S. C. § 1983. The District Court dismissed the latter claims under
Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 71, in which
the Court held that state officials "acting in their official
capacities" are outside the class of "persons" subject to liability
under § 1983. In reversing this ruling, the Court of Appeals found
that respondents sought damages from Hafer in her personal capacity
and held that, because she acted under color of state law,
respondents could maintain a § 1983 individual-capacity suit
against her.
Held: State officers may be held personally liable for
damages under § 1983 based upon actions taken in their official
capacities. pp. 25-31.
(a) The above-quoted language from
Will does not
establish that Hafer may not be held personally liable under § 1983
because she "act[ed]" in her official capacity. The claims
considered in
Will were official-capacity claims, and the
phrase "acting in their official capacities" is best understood as
a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not
the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury. Pp.
25-27.
(b) State officials, sued in their individual capacities, are
"persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Unlike official-capacity
defendants-who are not "persons" because they assume the identity
of the government that employs them,
Will, supra, at
71-officers sued in their personal capacity come to the court as
individuals and thus fit comfortably within the statutory term
"person," cf. 491 U. S., at 71, n. 10. Moreover, § 1983's
authorization of suits to redress deprivations of civil rights by
persons acting "under color of" state law means that Hafer may be
liable for discharging respondents precisely because of her
authority as auditor general. Her assertion that acts that are both
within the official's authority and necessary to the performance of
governmental functions (including the employment decisions at
issue) should be considered acts of the State that cannot give rise
to a personal-capacity action is unpersuasive. That contention
ignores this Court's holding that § 1983 was enacted to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a
badge of a State and represent it in some capacity,
22
whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse
it.
Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 243.
Furthermore, Hafer's theory would absolutely immunize state
officials from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of
the "official" nature of their acts, in contravention of this
Court's immunity decisions. See,
e. g., Scheuer, supra.
pp.27-29.
(c) The Eleventh Amendment does not bar § 1983 personal-capacity
suits against state officials in federal court.
Id., at 237,
238.
Will's language concerning suits against state
officials cannot be read as establishing the limits of liability
under the Amendment, since
Will arose from a suit in state
court and considered the Amendment only because the fact that
Congress did not intend to override state immunity when it enacted
§ 1983 was relevant to statutory construction. 491 U. S., at 66.
Although imposing personal liability on state officers may hamper
their performance of public duties, such concerns are properly
addressed within the framework of this Court's personal immunity
jurisprudence. pp.29-31.
912 F.2d
628, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except THOMAS, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
Jerome R. Richter argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was
Goncer M. Krestal.
William Goldstein argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief was
Edward H. Rubenstone. *
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U. S. 58
(1989), we held that state officials "acting in their official
capacities" are outside the class of "persons" subject to
liability
*
Richard Ruda filed a brief for the National Association
of Counties et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by
Andrew J.
Pincus, John A. Powell, and
Steven R. Shapiro; for
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations by
Robert M. Weinberg, Walter Kamiat, and
Laurence Gold; for Kenneth W. Fultz by
Cletus P.
Lyman; and for Nancy Haberstroh by
Stephen R.
Kaplan.
23
under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 491 U. S., at 71.
Petitioner takes this language to mean that § 1983 does not
authorize suits against state officers for damages arising from
official acts. We reject this reading of Will and hold that state
officials sued in their individual capacities are "persons" for
purposes of § 1983.
I
In 1988, petitioner Barbara Hafer sought election to the post of
auditor general of Pennsylvania. Respondents allege that during the
campaign United States Attorney James West gave Hafer a list of 21
employees in the auditor general's office who secured their jobs
through payments to a former employee of the office. App. 10. They
further allege that Hafer publicly promised to fire all employees
on the list if elected.
Ibid.
Hafer won the election. Shortly after becoming auditor general,
she dismissed 18 employees, including named respondent James Melo,
Jr., on the basis that they "bought" their jobs. Melo and seven
other terminated employees sued Hafer and West in Federal District
Court. They asserted state and federal claims, including a claim
under § 1983, and sought monetary damages. Carl Gurley and the
remaining respondents in this case also lost their jobs with the
auditor general soon after Hafer took office. These respondents
allege that Hafer discharged them because of their Democratic
political affiliation and support for her opponent in the 1988
election.
Id., at 28, 35, 40. They too filed suit against
Hafer, seeking monetary damages and reinstatement under § 1983.
After consolidating the Melo and Gurley actions, the District
Court dismissed all claims. In relevant part, the court held that
the § 1983 claims against Hafer were barred because, under Will,
she could not be held liable for employment decisions made in her
official capacity as auditor general.
24
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed this portion
of the District Court's decision.
912 F.2d
628 (1990). As to claims for reinstatement brought against
Hafer in her official capacity, the court rested on our statement
in Will that state officials sued for injunctive relief in their
official capacities are "persons" subject to liability under §
1983. See Will,
supra, at 71, n. 10. Turning to respondents'
monetary claims, the court found that six members of the Gurley
group had expressly sought damages from Hafer in her personal
capacity. The remaining plaintiffs "although not as explicit,
signified a similar intent." 912 F. 2d, at 636. * The court found
this critical. While Hafer's power to hire and fire derived from
her position as auditor general, it said, a suit for damages based
on the exercise of this authority could be brought against Hafer in
her personal capacity. Because Hafer acted under color of state
law, respondents could maintain a § 1983 individual-capacity suit
against her.
We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 1118 (1991), to address the
question whether state officers may be held personally liable for
damages under § 1983 based upon actions taken in their official
capacities.
*The Third Circuit looked to the proceedings below to determine
whether certain respondents brought their claims for damages
against Hafer in her official capacity or her personal capacity.
912 F. 2d, at 635636. Several other Courts of Appeals adhere to
this practice. See Con
ner v.
Reinhard, 847 F.2d
384, 394, n. 8
(CA7), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 856
(1988); Houston v.
Reich, 932 F.2d
883, 885 (CAlO 1991);
Lundgren v.
McDaniel,
814 F.2d
600, 603-604 (CAll 1987). Still others impose a more rigid
pleading requirement. See
Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d
591, 592 (CA6 1989) (§ 1983 plaintiff must specifically plead
that suit for damages is brought against state official in
individual capacity);
Nix v.
Norman, 879 F.2d
429, 431 (CA8 1989) (same). Because this issue is not properly
before us, we simply reiterate the Third Circuit's view that "[i]t
is obviously preferable for the plaintiff to be specific in the
first instance to avoid any ambiguity." 912 F. 2d, at 636, n. 7.
See this Court's Rule 14.1(a) ("Only the questions set forth in the
petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the
Court").
25
II
In
Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U. S. 159 (1985), the
Court sought to eliminate lingering confusion about the distinction
between personal- and official-capacity suits. We emphasized that
official-capacity suits "'generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.'''
Id., at 165 (quoting
Monell v.
New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 690, n. 55
(1978)). Suits against state officials in their official capacity
therefore should be treated as suits against the State. 473 U. S.,
at 166. Indeed, when officials sued in this capacity in federal
court die or leave office, their successors automatically assume
their roles in the litigation. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 25(d)(1);
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 43(c)(1); this Court's Rule 35.3. Because the
real party in interest in an officialcapacity suit is the
governmental entity and not the named official, "the entity's
'policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of
federal law."
Graham, supra, at 166 (quoting
Monell,
supra, at 694). For the same reason, the only immunities
available to the defendant in an officialcapacity action are those
that the governmental entity possesses. 473 U. S., at 167.
Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose
individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken
under color of state law. Thus, "[o]n the merits, to establish
personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show
that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the
deprivation of a federal right."
Id., at 166. While the
plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish a
connection to governmental "policy or custom," officials sued in
their personal capacities, unlike those sued in their official
capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as
objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.
Id., at
166-167.
Our decision in
Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U. S.
58 (1989), turned in part on these differences between
26
personal- and official-capacity actions. The principal issue in
Will was whether States are "persons" subject to suit under
§ 1983. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured .... "
The Court held that interpreting the words "[e]very person" to
exclude the States accorded with the most natural reading of the
law, with its legislative history, and with the rule that Congress
must clearly state its intention to alter" 'the federal balance'"
when it seeks to do so.
Will, supra, at 65 (quoting
United States v.
Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349
(1971)).
The Court then addressed the related question whether state
officials, sued for monetary relief in their official capacities,
are persons under § 1983. We held that they are not. Although
"state officials literally are persons," an officialcapacity suit
against a state officer "is not a suit against the official but
rather is a suit against the official's office. As such it is no
different from a suit against the State itself." 491 U. S., at 71
(citation omitted).
Summarizing our holding, we said: "[N]either a State nor its
officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under §
1983."
Ibid. Hafer relies on this recapitulation for the
proposition that she may not be held personally liable under § 1983
for discharging respondents because she "act[ed]" in her official
capacity as auditor general of Pennsylvania. Of course, the claims
considered in
Will were official-capacity claims; the phrase
"acting in their official capacities" is best understood as a
reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not
the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury. To
the extent that
Will
27
allows the construction Hafer suggests, however, we now
eliminate that ambiguity.
A
Will itself makes clear that the distinction between
officialcapacity suits and personal-capacity suits is more than "a
mere pleading device."
Ibid. State officers sued for damages
in their official capacity are not "persons" for purposes of the
suit because they assume the identity of the government that
employs them.
Ibid. By contrast, officers sued in their
personal capacity come to court as individuals. A government
official in the role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits
comfortably within the statutory term "person." Cf. id., at 71, n.
10 ("[A] state official in his or her official capacity, when sued
for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because
'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated
as actions against the State''') (quoting
Graham, 473 U. S.,
at 167, n. 14).
Hafer seeks to overcome the distinction between officialand
personal-capacity suits by arguing that § 1983 liability turns not
on the capacity in which state officials are sued, but on the
capacity in which they acted when injuring the plaintiff. Under
Will, she asserts, state officials may not be held liable in
their personal capacity for actions they take in their official
capacity. Although one Court of Appeals has endorsed this view, see
Cowan v.
University of Louisville School of Medicine,
900 F.2d
936, 942-943 (CA6 1990), we find it both unpersuasive as an
interpretation of § 1983 and foreclosed by our prior decisions.
Through § 1983, Congress sought "to give a remedy to parties
deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an
official's abuse of his position."
Monroe v.
Pape,
365 U. S. 167,
172 (1961). Accordingly, it authorized suits to redress
deprivations of civil rights by persons acting "under color of any
[state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." 42 U. S.
C. § 1983. The requirement of action under color of state law means
that Hafer may be liable for
28
discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as
auditor general. We cannot accept the novel proposition that this
same official authority insulates Hafer from suit.
In an effort to limit the scope of her argument, Hafer
distinguishes between two categories of acts taken under color of
state law: those outside the official's authority or not essential
to the operation of state government, and those both within the
official's authority and necessary to the performance of
governmental functions. Only the former group, she asserts, can
subject state officials to personal liability under § 1983; the
latter group (including the employment decisions at issue in this
case) should be considered acts of the State that cannot give rise
to a personal-capacity action.
The distinction Hafer urges finds no support in the broad
language of § 1983. To the contrary, it ignores our holding that
Congress enacted § 1983 "'to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State
and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance
with their authority or misuse it.'"
Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.
S. 232, 243 (1974) (quoting
Monroe v.
Pape,
supra, at 171-172). Because of that intent, we have held that
in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action "under color
of" state law is just as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment's "state
action" requirement.
Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U. S. 922,
929 (1982).
Furthermore, Hafer's distinction cannot be reconciled with our
decisions regarding immunity of government officers otherwise
personally liable for acts done in the course of their official
duties. Her theory would absolutely immunize state officials from
personal liability for acts within their authority and necessary to
fulfilling governmental responsibilities. Yet our cases do not
extend absolute immunity to all officers who engage in necessary
official acts. Rather, immunity from suit under § 1983 is
"predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity
historically accorded the relevant
29
official at common law and the interests behind it,"
Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421
(1976), and officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such
immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue,
Burns v.
Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 486-487 (1991).
This Court has refused to extend absolute immunity beyond a very
limited class of officials, including the President of the United
States, legislators carrying out their legislative functions, and
judges carrying out their judicial functions, "whose special
functions or constitutional status requires complete protection
from suit."
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 807
(1982). State executive officials are not entitled to absolute
immunity for their official actions.
Scheuer v.
Rhodes,
supra. In several instances, moreover, we have concluded that
no more than a qualified immunity attaches to administrative
employment decisions, even if the same official has absolute
immunity when performing other functions. See
Forrester v.
White, 484 U.
S. 219 (1988) (dismissal of court employee by state judge);
Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, supra (discharge of Air Force
employee, allegedly orchestrated by senior White House aides)
(action under
Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. S.
388 (1971));
Davis v.
Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979)
(dismissal of congressional aide)
(Bivens action). That
Hafer may assert personal immunity within the framework of these
cases in no way supports her argument here.
B
Hafer further asks us to read
Will's language concerning
suits against state officials as establishing the limits of
liability under the Eleventh Amendment. She asserts that imposing
personal liability on officeholders may infringe on state
sovereignty by rendering government less effective; thus, she
argues, the Eleventh Amendment forbids personalcapacity suits
against state officials in federal court.
30
Most certainly,
Will's holding does not rest directly on
the Eleventh Amendment. Whereas the Eleventh Amendment bars suits
in federal court "by private parties seeking to impose a liability
which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury,"
Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 663
(1974),
Will arose from a suit in
state court. We
considered the Eleventh Amendment in
Will only because the
fact that Congress did not intend to override state immunity when
it enacted § 1983 was relevant to statutory construction: "Given
that a principal purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to
provide a federal forum for civil rights claims," Congress' failure
to authorize suits against States in federal courts suggested that
it also did not intend to authorize such claims in state courts.
491 U. S., at 66.
To the extent that Hafer argues from the Eleventh Amendment
itself, she makes a claim that failed in
Scheuer v.
Rhodes, supra. In
Scheuer, personal representatives
of the estates of three students who died at Kent State University
in May 1970 sought damages from the Governor of Ohio and other
state officials. The District Court dismissed their complaints on
the theory that the suits, although brought against state officials
in their personal capacities, were in substance actions against the
State of Ohio and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
We rejected this view. "[S]ince
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)," we
said, "it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no
shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had
deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law."
Scheuer, supra, at 237. While the doctrine of
Ex parte
Young does not apply where a plaintiff seeks damages from the
public treasury, damages awards against individual defendants in
federal courts "are a permissible remedy in some circumstances
notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office." 416 U. S.,
at 238. That is, the Eleventh Amendment does not erect a
barrier
31
against suits to impose "individual and personal liability" on
state officials under § 1983.
Ibid.
To be sure, imposing personal liability on state officers may
hamper their performance of public duties. But such concerns are
properly addressed within the framework of our personal immunity
jurisprudence. See
Forrester v.
White, supra, at 223.
Insofar as respondents seek damages against Hafer personally, the
Eleventh Amendment does not restrict their ability to sue in
federal court.
We hold that state officials, sued in their individual
capacities, are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. The
Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers
absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by
virtue of the "official" nature of their acts.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
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