PER CURIAM
ERICKSON V. PARDUS
551 U. S. ____ (2007)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WILLIAM ERICKSON
v. BARRY J. PARDUS
et al.
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the tenth circuit
No. 06–7317. Decided June 4, 2007
Per Curiam.
Imprisoned by the State of
Colorado and alleging violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment, William
Erickson, the petitioner in this Court, filed suit against prison
officials in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. He alleged that a liver condition resulting from
hepatitis C required a treatment program that officials had
commenced but then wrongfully terminated, with life-threatening
consequences. Deeming these allegations, and others to be noted, to
be “conclusory,” the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
198 Fed. Appx. 694, 698 (2006). The holding departs in so stark a
manner from the pleading standard mandated by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that we grant review. We vacate the court’s
judgment and remand the case for further consideration.
Petitioner was incarcerated in the Limon
Correctional Facility in Limon, Colorado, where respondents Barry
Pardus and Dr. Anita Bloor were working as prison officials. After
Dr. Bloor removed petitioner from the hepatitis C treatment he had
been receiving, petitioner sued under 42 U. S. C. §1983,
complaining,
inter alia, that Dr. Bloor had violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by demonstrating deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs. See,
e.g.,
Estelle v.
Gamble,
429
U. S. 97, 104–105 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment,” and
this includes “indifference . . . manifested by prison doctors in
their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed”
(footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Helling v.
McKinney,
509 U. S. 25, 35–37
(1993).
Petitioner based his claim on the following
allegations, which we assume to be true for purposes of review
here: Officials at Colorado’s Department of Corrections
(Department) diagnosed petitioner as requiring treatment for
hepatitis C. After completing the necessary classes and otherwise
complying with the protocols set forth by the Department,
petitioner began treatment for the disease. The treatment, which
would take a year to complete, involved weekly self-injections of
medication by use of a syringe. Soon after petitioner began this
treatment, prison officials were unable to account for one of the
syringes made available to petitioner (and other prisoners) for
medical purposes. Upon searching, they found it in a communal trash
can, modified in a manner suggestive of use for injection of
illegal drugs. Prisoner Complaint in Civ. Action No.
05–CV–00405–LTB–MJW (D. Colo.), p. 3 (hereinafter Petitioner’s
Complaint).
Prison officials, disbelieving petitioner’s
claim not to have taken the syringe, found that his conduct
constituted a violation of the Colorado Code of Penal Discipline
for possession of drug paraphernalia. Letter from Anthony A.
DeCesaro to William Erickson (Sept. 30, 2004), attached to
Petitioner’s Complaint. This conduct, according to the officials,
led to the “reasonable inference” that petitioner had intended to
use drugs, so the officials removed petitioner from his hepatitis C
treatment.
Ibid. “The successful treatment of Hepatitis C
is incumbent upon the individual remaining drug and alcohol free to
give the liver a better chance of recovery,” they indicated,
ibid., an explanation they later offered to defend against
petitioner’s allegations of cruel and unusual punishment, see
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Civ. Action No.
05–CV–00405–LTB–MJW, p. 10. Assuming that a person in the course of
this treatment takes illicit drugs, the prison’s protocol mandates
a waiting period of one year followed by a mandatory drug education
class lasting six months. Brief in Opposition 4. Petitioner
therefore could face a delay of some 18 months before he would be
able to restart treatment.
In his complaint petitioner alleged Dr. Bloor
had “removed [him] from [his] hepatitis C treatment” in violation
of department protocol, “thus endangering [his] life.” Petitioner’s
Complaint 2. Petitioner attached to the complaint certain grievance
forms. In these he claimed, among other things, he was suffering
from “continued damage to [his] liver” as a result of the
nontreatment. Colorado Dept. of Corrections Offender Grievance Form
(June 30, 2004). The complaint requested relief including damages
and an injunction requiring that the Department treat petitioner
for hepatitis C “under the standards of the treatment [protocol]
established by [the Department].” Petitioner’s
Complaint 8.
Three months after filing his complaint, and
well before the District Court entered a judgment against him,
petitioner filed a Motion for Expedited Review Due to Imminent
Danger, in Civ. Action No. 05–B–405 (MJW) (D. Colo.).
Indicating it was “undisputed” that he had hepatitis C, that he met
the Department’s standards for treatment of the disease, and that
“furtherance of this disease can cause irreversible damage to [his]
liver and possible death,” petitioner alleged that “numerous
inmates” in his prison community had died of the disease and that
he was “in imminent danger” himself “due to [the Department’s]
refusal to treat him.”
Ibid. He had identified similar
allegations in an earlier filing, explaining that “his liver is
suffering irreversible damage” due to the decision to remove him
from treatment and that he “will suffer irreparable damage if his
disease goes untreated.” Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate’s
Recommendations in Civ. Action No. 05–CV–00405–LTB–MJW, p. 3.
Respondents answered these filings with a
motion to dismiss. The Magistrate Judge recommended, as relevant,
that the District Court dismiss the complaint on the ground it
failed to allege Dr. Bloor’s actions had caused petitioner
“substantial harm.” Recommendation on Defendants’ Motion To
Dismiss, p. 12. The District Court issued a short order indicating
its agreement with the Magistrate Judge and dismissing the
complaint.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It quoted
extensively from the Magistrate Judge’s discussion of “substantial
harm” before holding that petitioner had made “only conclusory
allegations to the effect that he has suffered a cognizable
independent harm as a result of his removal from the [hepatitis C]
treatment program.” 198 Fed. Appx., at
698.
Acknowledging decisions by courts that have found Eighth Amendment
violations when delays in medical treatment have involved
“life-threatening situations and instances in which it is apparent
that delay would exacerbate the prisoner’s medical problems” (and
that have, moreover, indicated the Eighth Amendment “protects
against future harm to an inmate”), id., at 697 (internal
quotation marks omitted), the court nevertheless found petitioner’s
complaint deficient: Petitioner had, according to the court, failed
to “allege that as a result of the discontinuance of the treatment
itself shortly after it began or the interruption of treatment for
approximately eighteen months he suffered any harm, let alone
substantial harm, [other] than what he already faced from the
Hepatitis C itself,” id., at 698 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Having reached this conclusion, the court saw no need to
address whether the complaint alleged facts sufficient to support a
finding that Dr. Bloor had made her decisions with a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Id., at 697, 698 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
It may in the final analysis be
shown that the District Court was correct to grant respondents’
motion to dismiss. That is not the issue here, however. It was
error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the allegations in
question, concerning harm caused petitioner by the termination of
his medication, were too conclusory to establish for pleading
purposes that petitioner had suffered “a cognizable independent
harm” as a result of his removal from the hepatitis C treatment
program. Id., at 698.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific facts are
not necessary; the statement need only “ ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.
S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 7–8) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355
U. S. 41, 47 (1957)). In addition, when ruling on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint. Bell Atlantic
Corp., supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8–9) (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 508, n. 1
(2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319, 327
(1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 236
(1974)).
The complaint stated that Dr.
Bloor’s decision to remove petitioner from his prescribed hepatitis
C medication was “endangering [his] life.” Petitioner’s Complaint
2. It alleged this medication was withheld “shortly after”
petitioner had commenced a treatment program that would take one
year, that he was “still in need of treatment for this disease,”
and that the prison officials were in the meantime refusing to
provide treatment. Id., at 3, 4. This alone was enough to
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Petitioner, in addition, bolstered his claim
by making more specific allegations in documents attached to the
complaint and in later filings.
The Court of Appeals’ departure
from the liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2) is
even more pronounced in this particular case because petitioner has
been proceeding, from the litigation’s outset, without counsel. A
document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed,”
Estelle, 429 U. S., at 106, and “a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”
ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice”).
Whether petitioner’s complaint
is sufficient in all respects is a matter yet to be determined, for
respondents raised multiple arguments in their motion to dismiss.
In particular, the proper application of the controlling legal
principles to the facts is yet to be determined. The case cannot,
however, be dismissed on the ground that petitioner’s allegations
of harm were too conclusory to put these matters in issue.
Certiorari and leave to proceed in forma pauperis are
granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia
would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.
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