SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 22–448
_________________
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, et al.,
PETITIONERS
v. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, LIMITED, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit
[May 16, 2024]
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Gorsuch
joins, dissenting.
Since the earliest days of our Republic,
Congress’s “power over the purse” has been its “most complete and
effectual weapon” to ensure that the other branches do not exceed
or abuse their authority. The Federalist No. 58, p. 359 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The Appropriations Clause protects
this power by providing that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Art.
I, §9, cl. 7. This provision has a rich history extending back
centuries before the founding of our country. Its aim is to ensure
that the people’s elected representatives monitor and control the
expenditure of public funds and the projects they finance, and it
imposes on Congress an important duty that it cannot sign away.
“Any other course” would give the Executive “a most dangerous
discretion.”
Reeside v.
Walker, 11 How. 272, 291
(1851).
Unfortunately, today’s decision turns the
Appropriations Clause into a minor vestige. The Court upholds a
novel statutory scheme under which the powerful Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) may bankroll its own agenda without any
congressional control or oversight. According to the Court, all
that the Appropriations Clause demands is that Congress “identify a
source of public funds and authorize the expenditure of those funds
for designated purposes.”
Ante, at 6. Under this
interpretation, the Clause imposes no temporal limit that would
prevent Congress from authorizing the Executive to spend public
funds in perpetuity. Contra, Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws,
bk. XI, ch. VI, p. 160 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent transl. 1949)
(warning that a legislature will lose its power of the purse if it
passes an appropriation that lasts “forever”). Nor does the Court’s
interpretation require Congress to set an upper limit on the amount
of money that the Executive may take. Today’s decision does not
even demand that an agency’s funds come from the Treasury. As the
Solicitor General admitted at argument, under this interpretation,
the Appropriations Clause would permit an agency to be funded
entirely by private sources. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–35. In short,
there is apparently nothing wrong with a law that empowers the
Executive to draw as much money as it wants from any identified
source for any permissible purpose until the end of time.
That is not what the Appropriations Clause was
understood to mean when it was adopted. In England, Parliament had
won the power over the purse only after centuries of struggle with
the Crown. Steeped in English constitutional history, the Framers
placed the Appropriations Clause in the Constitution to protect
this hard-won legislative power.
I
In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Congress created the CFPB, an independent
regulatory agency with “vast rulemaking, enforcement, and
adjudicatory authority over a significant portion of the U. S.
economy.”
Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 203 (2020); see
id., at 222,
n. 8. And in designing the CFPB, “Congress deviated from the
structure of nearly every other independent administrative agency
in our history.”
Id., at 203. At every turn, the statute
attempted to insulate the CFPB from control by any official
answerable to the people. First, “Congress provided that the CFPB
would be led by a single Director, who serves for a longer term
than the President,” and Congress attempted to protect the Director
from removal by the President “except for inefficiency, neglect, or
malfeasance.”
Ibid. In
Seila Law, we struck down this
restriction because it placed “potent” power in the hands of an
official who was “neither elected by the people nor meaningfully
controlled . . . by someone who is.”
Id., at 206,
224–225.
Elected in the atmosphere that followed the
financial crisis of 2008, the Congress that created the CFPB also
sought to free the CFPB from supervision by subsequent Congresses
that might wish to superintend the Bureau’s exercise of its vast
powers. To achieve that end, the CFPB was given an unprecedented
way of obtaining funds that was expressly designed to make it
totally “independent of the Congressional appropriations process.”
S. Rep. No. 111–176, p. 163 (2010).
Under that scheme, the CFPB is not funded by
appropriations enacted by Congress. Instead, each year, the CFPB
Director tells the Federal Reserve Board of Governors how much
money it thinks is “reasonably necessary” to carry out the CFPB’s
operations. 12 U. S. C. §5497(a)(1). So long as this
amount does not exceed 12% of the Federal Reserve System’s total
operating expenses, the Board of Governors must comply with that
demand and hand over the specified sum “from the combined earnings
of the Federal Reserve System.” §§5497(a)(1), (2)(A). These
earnings come from the Federal Reserve Banks, which are federally
chartered corporations that are “not departments of the
government.”
Emergency Fleet Corp. v.
Western Union
Telegraph Co.,
275 U.S.
415,
426
(1928); see §341.[
1] The
Federal Reserve Banks’ earnings represent interest on and gains
derived from the purchase and sale of securities, as well as fees
they receive for services provided to depository institutions,
“such as check clearing, funds transfers, and automated
clearinghouse operations.” United States Federal Reserve System,
The Fed Explained: What the Central Bank Does 4 (11th ed. 2021);
see also Brief for Petitioners 23. At present, the CFPB’s maximum
annual draw is nearly $750 million.[
2]
In addition, the CFPB, unlike most agencies,
does not have to return any unspent funds to the Treasury. 12
U. S. C. §5497(b). Instead, the CFPB may invest or roll
over any unspent money into a separate fund, which it may use in
the future “to pay the expenses of the [CFPB] in carrying out its
duties and responsibilities.” §§5497(b)–(c).[
3] As of September 30, 2022, the CFPB had built up
an endowment worth nearly $340 million. See 2022 Report, at 86.
In devising this novel scheme, Congress appears
to have anticipated that it might be challenged under the
Appropriations Clause, and Congress therefore attempted to shield
its new creation by providing that “[f]unds obtained by or
transferred to the [CFPB] shall not be construed to be Government
funds or appropriated monies.”[
4] §5497(c)(2). And to impede congressional oversight of
the CFPB’s use of this money, the Act added that the Bureau’s funds
are not “subject to review by the Committees on Appropriations.”
§5497(a)(2)(C).
The Framers would be shocked, even horrified, by
this scheme. Beginning with the First Congress, agencies[
5] were generally funded by annual
appropriations from the Treasury. K. Stith, Congress’ Power of the
Purse, 97 Yale L. J. 1343, 1354, n. 53 (1988) (Stith).
While there have been departures from this dominant model, nothing
like the CFPB’s funding scheme has previously been seen. In the
decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s unparalleled
financial independence violates the Appropriations Clause and “the
constitutional separation of powers.” 51 F. 4th 616, 642 (2022).
Because I agree that the CFPB’s funding structure is
unconstitutional, I would affirm the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.
II
A
The Appropriations Clause is found in Article
I, §9, clause 7, of the Constitution, which provides:
“No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of
all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
The first part of this provision is customarily
called the Appropriations Clause, and the second is referred to as
the Statement and Account Clause.
The Appropriations Clause contains two key
terms—“Money . . . drawn from the Treasury” and
“Appropriations”—both of which require a little explanation. As the
Government acknowledges, “Money . . . drawn from the
Treasury” is synonymous with the term “public Money,”[
6] which appears in the Statement and Account
Clause. And in this case, it is undisputed that the funds
requisitioned by the CFPB constitute “public Money.”[
7] Thus, the only remaining textual question
is whether the CFPB gets its funding from “Appropriations” in the
sense in which the Constitution uses that term.
The Court answers that question by consulting a
few old dictionaries, which it says establish that “[i]n ordinary
usage, . . . an appropriation of public money would be a
law authorizing the expenditure of particular funds for specified
ends.”
Ante, at 7. It accordingly concludes that the
Appropriations Clause requires no more than a law, a fund, and a
purpose.
Ante, at 6–7.
This analysis overlooks the fact that the term
“Appropriations,” as used in the Constitution, is a term of art
whose meaning has been fleshed out by centuries of history. To be
sure, in interpreting the Constitution, we
start with the
presumption that “ ‘its words and phrases’ ” carry their
“ ‘normal and ordinary’ ” meaning.
District of
Columbia v.
Heller,
554 U.S.
570, 576 (2008) (quoting
United States v.
Sprague,
282 U.S.
716, 731 (1931)). But our analysis cannot end there. Some
provisions use terms with specialized and well-established meanings
that we cannot use dictionaries to brush aside. “ ‘[I]f a word
is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the
common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with
it.’ ”
Sekhar v.
United States,
570 U.S.
729, 733 (2013); see also A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 73–77 (2012). Applied here,
this rule means that the term “Appropriatio[n]” should be
interpreted in light of “legal tradition and . . .
centuries of practice.”
Morissette v.
United States,
342 U.S.
246, 263 (1952). I therefore turn to that history.
B
1
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention
did not invent the appropriations requirement. Rather, that
important safeguard arose from centuries of “British experience.”
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v.
All Am. Check
Cashing, Inc., 33 F. 4th 218, 224 (CA5 2022) (en banc)
(Jones, J., concurring). The Framers were aware of the
requirement’s deep roots and the critical role it had played in
“the history of the British Constitution.” The Federalist No. 58,
at 359. By steadily asserting the power to condition
appropriations, the House of Commons, originally “an infant and
humble representation of the people[,] gradually enlarg[ed] the
sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reduc[ed], as
far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of
the other branches of the government.”
Ibid.
A short summary of this process illustrates the
important role of the appropriations requirement. During the Middle
Ages, kings relied almost entirely on what was called “ordinary”
revenue. F. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 433
(1908) (reprint 1993) (Maitland). This included income from lands
owned by the Crown, customs duties, and feudal dues. See 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 281–306 (2d ed.
1766). Consequently, there was little meaningful difference
“between the national revenue and the king’s private pocket-money.”
Maitland 433.
The Crown’s financial independence gave it the
ability to govern with little parliamentary interference. As
Maitland puts it, “throughout the Middle Ages the king’s revenue
had been in a very true sense the king’s revenue, and parliament
had but seldom attempted to give him orders as to what he should do
with it.”
Id., at 309. “Under the Tudors, parliament hardly
dared to meddle with such matters.”
Ibid.
In the 17th century, however, this pattern began
to change.
Id., at 309–310. By that time, “the king’s
ordinary revenues were no longer even remotely sufficient to cover
the normal costs of royal governance,” and the heavy expenditures
of James I and Charles I exacerbated the problem. J. Chafetz,
Congress’s Constitution 47 (2017) (Chafetz). Rather than seeking
appropriations from Parliament, the early Stuart kings engaged in
controversial efforts to obtain additional ordinary income through
the use of various royal “prerogative[s].” G. Smith, A
Constitutional and Legal History of England 315 (1955) (Smith).
Among other things, they unilaterally imposed duties on imports,
stepped up the collection of feudal dues, sold monopolies, and
forced individuals to loan money on pain of imprisonment. See
id., at 315, 318.
These measures aroused opposition and, in any
event, did not yield sufficient funds. As a result, James I and
Charles I periodically found it necessary to ask Parliament to
impose new taxes in order to obtain the funds they wanted. When
they did so, the Commons began to flex the power of the purse and
to demand a measure of royal accountability. Disputes between the
Commons and the Stuart kings about the power of the purse played a
pivotal role in the transition from royal to parliamentary
financial supremacy.
A few incidents illustrate this dynamic. In
1621, the power of the purse played a central role in disputes
between the Crown and Parliament over religious, geopolitical, and
judicial authority. For some months, Parliament ignored requests
from James I for more tax revenue. T. Taswell-Langmead, English
Constitutional History From the Teutonic Conquest to the Present
Time 532 (3d ed. 1886) (Taswell-Langmead). Though Parliament
finally expressed “willing[ness] to grant a moderate subsidy,” it
insisted “first” on redress for “grievances.”
Id., at 533;
see also Smith 315–316. Parliament’s petition infuriated James I,
who ultimately dissolved Parliament and sent several of its
leaders—including Sir Matthew Hale—to the Tower of London.
Taswell-Langmead 534, 536.
Under Charles I, the situation worsened. At the
beginning of his reign, the Commons refused to grant him the
life-time power to impose tonnage and poundage duties,
i.e.,
duties on imports and exports, as had been the custom, but instead
granted the power for only one year.
Id., at 539. The
members of Commons “had no intention of refusing a further supply,
but were resolved to avail themselves of their Constitutional right
to make it dependent upon redress of grievances.”
Ibid.
Indignant about this temerity, the King hastily dissolved
Parliament before the Lords passed the bill.
Id., at 540;
Smith 318. But as a consequence, the King once again then found
himself without sufficient funds. So he took matters into his own
hands by resorting to the monarchy’s “old illegal methods of
raising money.” Taswell-Langmead 543.
This reignited a power struggle between the two
branches. As a result, when Charles I again turned to Parliament in
1628, the Commons refused to grant funds until he agreed to the
Petition of Right, which demanded that he cease efforts to obtain
more “ordinary income” by objectionable means, such as compulsory
loans and the payment of “any tax, tallage,[
8] aid, or other like charge not set by common consent,
in parliament.” 3 Car. I., c. 1. (1628). The King, of course, did
not like this. So when the Commons continued to challenge royal
prerogatives, Charles I prorogued Parliament. And during the long
period that ensued in which Parliament did not meet (1629–1640),
the King sought new sources of “ordinary income,” including the
imposition of “Ship-money,” that is, fees imposed on both maritime
and inland counties to pay for the construction of ships.
Taswell-Langmead 566–569. These practices “further enraged an
already alienated Parliament, reinforcing a vicious cycle that led
to the Civil War and, ultimately, to Charles’s beheading.” Chafetz
47.
This constitutional crisis restored the English
Government’s financial separation of powers for a season. During
the Commonwealth, the Commons exercised “complete authority
. . . over the whole receipts and expenditure of the
national treasury.” Taswell-Langmead 626. But shortly after the
Restoration, the war for the supremacy of the purse reignited.
Starting in 1665, “Parliament was largely unwilling to grant [the
King] additional money without specifying in some measure how it
was to be used.” Chafetz 50. “This precedent was followed in some,
but not all . . . cases under Charles II.” Maitland 310.
Charles II, “fed up with parliamentary interference, ruled without
Parliament, and therefore without any parliamentary taxation, for
the rest of his reign.” Chafetz 50
.
After the Revolution of 1688, Parliament took
strong measures to curb the Crown’s financial independence. The
1689 Bill of Rights declared “[t]hat levying Money for or to the
Use of the Crowne by pretence of Prerogative, without Grant of
Parlyament for longer time or in other manner than the same is or
shall be granted is Illegall.” 1 Wm. 3 & Mary 2, c. 2 (1688).
In other words, to ensure “that it was supreme in directing the use
of [all] public funds,” Parliament “asserted that any use of funds
by the monarch that lacked Parliament’s authorization was
unlawful.” Congressional Research Service, S. Stiff, Congress’s
Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
8 (2020).
These steps, however, did not cement
Parliament’s power of the purse. Royal officers continued to
collect revenue and to evade the appropriations requirement by
exaggerating collection costs, giving very little in “net receipts”
to Parliament, and keeping the rest for the use of the Crown. P.
Einzig, The Control of the Purse 164, 188 (1959) (Einzig). So
Parliament took steps to crack down on this practice.
Id.,
at 188. In 1711, for example, Parliament passed a resolution
declaring that “ ‘applying any sum of un- appropriated money,
or surplusages of funds to usages not voted, or addressed for by
parliament, hath been a misapplication of the public money.’ ”
6 Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England 1025 (1810).
Parliament also appointed a commission to
prevent the Crown from defying the appropriations requirement. In
that commission’s very first report, it recommended that “[r]evenue
should come from the Pocket of the Subject directly into the
Exchequer.” Report Relative to the Balances in the Hands of the
Receivers General of the Land Tax, Nov. 27, 1780 (First Report),
reprinted in 1 Reports of the Commissioners Appointed To Examine,
Take, and State the Public Accounts of the Kingdom 14 (W. Molleson
ed. 1783). Permitting revenue departments to retain or divert any
public funds, the Commissioners concluded, would create a “private
Interest . . . in direct Opposition to that of the
Public.”
Ibid. Finally, Parliament took an increasingly
“firmer line . . . against
virement, that is, the
transfer of funds appropriated for one department for the use of
another department.” Einzig 144.
2
The Court’s treatment of this history begins
by conceding most of what I have recounted. The Court notes that
after the Revolution of 1688, “Parliament’s usual practice was to
appropriate government revenue ‘to particular purposes more or less
narrowly defined,’ ” and “Parliament began limiting the
duration of its revenue grants.”
Ante, at 9 (quoting
Maitland 433). “ ‘Every year,’ ” the Court continues, the
King and his ministers “ ‘had to come, cap in hand, to the
House of Commons, and more often than not the Commons drove a
bargain and exacted a
quid pro quo in return for
supply.’ ”
Ante, at 9 (quoting G. Trevelyan, The
English Revolution of 1688–1689, pp. 180–181 (1939)).
In an effort to find a trace of helpful
precedent in pre-founding British constitutional history, the Court
turns to laws appropriating funds for the “civil list,” which it
touts as a particularly “notable exception” to the centuries-long
understanding of appropriations.
Ante, at 9, 12, 19. In
truth, however, Parliament’s treatment of the civil list actually
undermines the Court’s position. The civil list, although renamed
in 2012, remains to this day, and it consists of the money needed
to cover the expenses of the royal family.[
9] By the end of the 17th century, “the Civil List was
a relatively small share of the total public expenditure,” but the
independence it afforded the Crown “presented a constitutional
problem in the conflict between the principle of the independence
of the Crown and the principle of parliamentary control of
finance.” E. Reitan, The Civil List in Eighteenth-Century British
Politics: Parliamentary Supremacy Versus the Independence of the
Crown, 9 Hist. J. 318, 320, 322 (1966) (Reitan).
To prevent the Crown from using the civil list
to erode Parliament’s hard-fought supremacy over the purse, eminent
statesmen like Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox began pushing for
substantial reforms.
Id., at 328–337. Beginning in 1760,
Parliament enacted a series of laws that altered the appropriation
of civil list funds.
Id., at 324; see,
e.
g., 1
H. Cavendish, Debates of the House of Commons 267–307 (1841). And
by 1782, Parliament finally secured its “right . . . to
interfere at its discretion in the affairs of the Civil List.”
Reitan 336–337. “The eighteenth-century tension between the
conflicting principles of parliamentary supremacy and an
independent financial provision for the Crown had been resolved—as
it had to be—in favour of parliamentary supremacy.”
Id., at
336.
C
1
“The conflicts between Parliament and the
Crown over the power of the purse . . . were replayed in
the American colonies in struggles between the royal governors and
provincial assemblies.” R. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional”
Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of
the Purse, 155 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1998); see also P. Wolfson, Is a
Presidential Item Veto Constitutional? 96 Yale L. J. 838,
841–842 (1987). But learning from Parliament’s experiences with the
monarchy, some of the American Colonies assumed appropriations
authority “greater even than that of the British House of Commons,”
exercising significant auditing powers and legislative oversight.
J. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the
Southern Royal Colonies 106 (1963). Indeed, by 1787, all but one of
the 11 State Constitutions provided their respective legislatures
with some control over appropriations; and no State allowed the
executive to draw money from the state treasury without legislative
approval. Chafetz 55, and nn. 119–120 (citing provisions); see
also The Federalist No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison) (noting that, under
many state constitutions, “the legislative department alone has
access to the pockets of the people”).
The Framers built on this legacy at the
Constitutional Convention when they adopted the Appropriations
Clause, which they “well understood” would “complet[e] the power
vested in Congress over money.” 7 Annals of Cong. 1124 (1798)
(statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). The Clause not only “gives to
the Legislature an exclusive authority of raising and granting
money,” but it also obligates Congress to keep that authority from
“the hands of the Executive” at all times thereafter.
Ibid.
It makes the President “depen[d] on the will of [Congress] for
supplies of money” in the first instance and puts him continually
“in a state of subordinate dependence” to the people’s elected
representatives. 3 Debates on the Constitution 17 (J. Elliot ed.
1836) (statement of Wilson Nicholas). The Appropriations Clause
enables Congress, “
without the concurrence of the other
branches, to check, by refusing money, any mischief in the
operations carrying on in any department of the Government.” 5
Annals of Cong. 509 (1796) (statement of Rep. William Branch Giles)
(emphasis added).
Early budgets illustrate how the appropriations
power was understood. Although the Constitution does not require
that appropriations be limited to a single year, that was the
dominant practice in the years immediately following the adoption
of the Constitution. See
ante, at 12. And while the first
few appropriations laws were brief and lacked details about how the
money was to be spent, the amounts approved closely tracked the
estimates submitted by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton. See Chafetz 58–59. Indeed, the second appropriations act
expressly incorporated the estimates of specific expenses contained
in Hamilton’s report to Congress. Compare Appropriations Act, §1,
1Stat. 104, with 5 American State Papers: Finance 33 (1832). As a
result, Congress clearly contemplated that the money would be
devoted toward particular purposes.
In the mid-1790s, appropriations laws became
even more specific. Chafetz 59. And when Thomas Jefferson became
President, he urged Congress “to multiply barriers against” the
“dissipation” of public funds by “appropriating specific sums to
every specific purpose susceptible of definition,” and “by
disallowing applications of money varying from the appropriation in
object, or transcending it in amount.” First Annual Message (Dec.
8, 1801), reprinted in 9 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 336 (P. Ford
ed. 1905); see also Letter from Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson
(Nov. 1801), reprinted in 1 The Writings of Albert Gallatin 68 (H.
Adams ed. 1879) (“Congress should adopt such measures as will
effectually guard against misapplication of public moneys”).
To be sure, not all early funding laws followed
the dominant model of specified short-term appropriations. Agencies
that provided services to a particular segment of the public were
funded by fees that were paid by the recipients of those services.
See,
e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1792, §§2–3, 1Stat. 233–234
(funding the Post Office through collection of postage rates); Act
of Apr. 2, 1792, ch. 16, §§1, 14, 1Stat. 246, 249 (funding the
National Mint in part through collection of fees); Act of July 31,
1789, §29, 1Stat. 44–45 (funding customs collection through tonnage
fees). If these fees exceeded the costs of providing the services,
however, these agencies were required to send the surplus to the
Treasury, which oversaw the collection and use of such
fees.[
10]
As the Government notes, Brief for Petitioners
21–22, this practice had deep historical roots, see N. Parrillo,
Against the Profit Motive 65 (2013) (Parrillo),[
11] and was presumably based on the idea
that the cost of providing certain services should be borne by the
recipients of those services rather than the general public. At the
same time, the requirement that fees in excess of what was needed
to defray the cost of providing services be turned over to the
Treasury ensured that Congress maintained control over the ways in
which this money was spent. Under these arrangements, therefore,
Congress exercised close control over both the amount of money that
the agencies in question obtained and the way in which that money
was used. The agencies received and were allowed to use the amount
of money necessary to provide their narrowly prescribed services.
All the rest was sent to the Treasury and could then be used only
as authorized by a congressional appropriation.
2
In discussing this early American history, the
Court begins by essentially conceding the principal lesson outlined
above. As the Court candidly puts it, “ ‘[w]hen called upon to
grant supplies,’ the lower houses in the colonial assemblies
‘insisted upon appropriating them in detail.’ ”
Ante,
at 10.[
12] The best the
Court can muster to support its assertion that “state legislative
bodies often opted for open-ended, discretionary appropriations”
are a few minor state laws that, when understood in relation to the
Constitutions of the States in question, provide no support for the
Court’s argument.
Ibid.[
13]
* * *
In sum, centuries of historical practice show
that the Appropriations Clause demands legislative control over the
source and disposition of the money used to finance Government
operations and projects.[
14]
III
A
As the previous discussion shows, today’s case
turns on a simple question: Is the CFPB financially accountable to
Congress in the way the Appropriations Clause demands? History
tells us it is not. As we said in
Seila Law,
“ ‘[p]erhaps the most telling indication of [a] severe
constitutional problem’ with an executive entity ‘is [a] lack of
historical precedent’ to support it.” 591 U. S., at 220
(quoting
Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company
Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S.
477, 505 (2010)). And the Government agrees with this
principle. In its briefing and at argument, the Government admitted
that an utterly unprecedented funding scheme would raise a serious
constitutional problem. Reply Brief 18; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 26.
The Government therefore attempts to show that there is ample
precedent for the CFPB scheme, but that effort fails.
The CFPB’s funding scheme contains the following
features: (1) it applies in perpetuity; (2) the CFPB has
discretion to select the amount of funding that it receives, up to
a statutory cap; (3) the funds taken by the CFPB come from
other entities; (4) those entities are self-funded
corporations that obtain their funding from fees on private
parties, “not departments of the Government,”
Emergency Fleet
Corp., 275 U. S., at 426; (5) the CFPB is not
required to return unspent funds or transfer them to the Treasury;
and (6) those funds may be placed in a separate fund that
earns interest and may be used to pay the CFPB’s expenses in the
future. At argument, the Government was unable to cite any other
agency with a funding scheme like this, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 31–33,
39–41, and thus no other agency—old or new—has enjoyed so many
layers of insulation from accountability to Congress.
The Government points to the Post Office and the
Customs Service as founding-era precedents for the CFPB, but the
analogy is flawed. As noted, funding Government agencies with fees
charged to the beneficiaries of their services has long been viewed
as consistent with the appropriations requirement. And both the
Post Office and the Customs Service fell comfortably into that
category.
A quick look at the laws that set up the Post
Office and the Customs Service shows that they were nothing like
the CFPB. In the Act establishing the Post Office, Congress gave
that agency a narrow and specific mission: to “provide for carrying
the mail of the United States.” See,
e.g., Act of Feb. 20,
1792, §3, 1Stat. 234. The Postmaster’s discretionary authority was
modest. (He could, for example, decide whether mail should be
carried on particular routes “by stage carriages or horses.”
Ibid.) The Act specified in minute detail the fees that
could be collected from those who used the Post Office’s services.
§9,
id., at 235. And it required the Postmaster “to render
to the secretary of the treasury, a quarterly account of all the
receipts and expenditures” and to “pay quarterly, into the treasury
. . . , the balance in his hands.” §4,
id.,
at 234. Under this arrangement, Congress controlled the amount that
the Post Office took in (
i.e., the sum total of the fees
specified by law) and how those fees were to be spent (
i.e.,
to provide for carrying the mail).
Much the same is true with respect to the
Customs Service, which the Government claims “best” resembles the
CFPB. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. Like the Post Office, the Customs
Service had a carefully delineated mission—basically, to control
imports and exports, and to collect duties and other payments from
those engaged in those activities. To maintain accountability, the
early tariff Acts spelled out in excruciating detail the various
fees, fines, and forfeitures that officers were to collect, as well
as the salaries and commissions that were to be paid out of those
receipts. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1Stat. 29–49; L.
Schmeckebier, The Customs Service: Its History, Activities and
Organization 3–6 (1924). Surplus funds had to be sent to the
Treasury, Act of July 31, 1789, §§9, 38, 1Stat. 38, 48, and for
many years, these funds were the lifeblood of the Federal
Government. From 1789 to 1862, “[n]early all of federal revenue was
derived from customs duties.” A. Reamer, Before the U. S.
Tariff Commission: Congressional Efforts To Obtain Statistics and
Analysis for Tariff-setting, 1789–1916, in A Centennial History of
the United States International Trade Commission 35
(2017).[
15]
The CFPB, by contrast, is an entirely different
creature. Its powers are broad and vast. It enjoys substantial
discretionary authority. It does not collect fees from persons and
entities to which it provides services or persons and entities that
are subject to its authority. And it is permitted to keep and
invest surplus funds. In short, the Government’s “best” argument
fails.
The Government’s next-best analogs fare no
better. Moving to modern agencies, the Government claims that the
CFPB’s funding scheme is not materially different from the funding
schemes of a list of other currently existing agencies. See Brief
for Petitioners 22–23, 29–36 (comparing the CFPB to the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and others).
But unlike the CFPB, the agencies cited by the
Government are funded in whole or in part by fees charged those who
make use of their services or are subject to their regulation. This
is true for the OCC, see 12 U. S. C. §16; the FDIC, see
§1815; the NCUA, see §1755; the FCA, §2250; and the FHFA, see
§4516.[
16]
For these reasons, it is undeniable that the
combination of features in the CFPB funding scheme is
unprecedented. And it is likewise clear that this assemblage was no
accident. Rather, it was carefully designed to give the Bureau
maximum unaccountability. Our decision in
Seila Law
addressed part of the problem posed by this arrangement. It made
the CFPB accountable to the President, but that decision did
nothing to protect Congress’s power of the purse. Indeed, standing
alone,
Seila Law worsens the appropriations problem. The
appropriations requirement developed to ensure that the Executive
(in England, the monarch) would be accountable to the people’s
elected representatives.
Seila Law, however, increased the
power of the
Executive over appropriations. By brandishing
or wielding the threat of removal, a President may push the CFPB
director to requisition the amount of money that the President
thinks is appropriate and to spend that money as the President
wishes. I joined the decision in
Seila Law and continue to
believe that it was correctly decided, but it solved only half the
accountability problem that inheres in the CFPB’s structure.
B
Left with no analog in history, the Government
employs a divide-and-conquer strategy to defend the CFPB’s funding
scheme. It argues that even if no prior agency had a funding scheme
with all the features of the CFPB’s, the funding schemes of other
presumptively constitutional agencies contain one or more of the
features found in the CFPB’s scheme. It then reasons that the
combination of these features in the CFPB’s scheme must be
constitutional as well.
This argument founders for two reasons. First,
the CFPB’s scheme includes an important feature never before seen.
As explained, the CFPB’s money does not come from Congress, from
private recipients of its services, or from private entities that
it regulates. It does not even originate with another Government
agency. Instead, the CFPB gets its money via a three-step process:
The Federal Reserve Banks earn money from the purchase and sale of
securities, as well as from the fees they charge for providing
services to depository institutions. The Federal Reserve Banks then
deliver these earnings to the Federal Reserve System. Finally, the
CFPB requests an amount from the Federal Reserve Board. That
feature of the CFPB scheme is entirely new.
Second, the Government’s argument fails “to
engage with the Dodd-Frank Act as a whole.”
Seila Law, 591
U. S., at 230. By addressing the individual elements of the
CFPB’s setup one-by-one, the Government seeks to divert attention
from the combined layers that insulate the CFPB from accountability
to Congress. Elements that are safe or tolerable in isolation may
be unsafe when combined. In the case of the CFPB, the combination
is deadly. The whole point of the appropriations requirement is to
protect “the right of the people,” through their elected
representatives in Congress, to “be actually consulted” about the
expenditure of public money. St. George Tucker, View of the
Constitution of the United States 297 (1803) (C. Wilson ed. 1999).
The CFPB’s design strips the people of this power.
The Federal Reserve’s earnings represent
“specific charges for specific services to specific individuals or
companies.”
FPC v.
New England Power Co.,
415 U.S.
345, 349 (1974). It would be “a sharp break with our
traditions” to allow the CFPB to use these earnings to fund a
broader array of governmental activities that have little-to-no
relationship with those specific charges, services, and regulated
entities.
National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v.
United
States,
415 U.S.
336, 341 (1974). By allowing the CFPB to use the Federal
Reserve’s earnings to enforce and implement broader consumer
protection laws, Congress impermissibly removed the CFPB “from its
customary orbit” as an agency, authorizing the Bureau to
appropriate funds obtained from private sources “in the manner of
an Appropriations Committee.”
Ibid. In other words, Congress
abdicated its appropriations authority, an exclusively legislative
prerogative.
Knote v.
United States,
95 U.S.
149, 156 (1877). But Congress lacks the authority to “transfer
to another branch powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative.”
Gundy v.
United States, 588 U.S. 128,
135 (2019) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In sum, the CFPB’s unprecedented combination of
funding features affords it the very kind of financial independence
that the Appropriations Clause was designed to prevent. It is not
an exaggeration to say that the CFPB enjoys a degree of financial
autonomy that a Stuart king would envy.
C
This autonomy has real-world consequences. The
CFPB is a powerful agency with the authority to impose “substantive
rules [on] a wide swath of industries” and “lev[y] knee-buckling
penalties against private citizens.”
Seila Law, 591
U. S., at 222, n. 8. In the last several months alone,
the Bureau has announced plans to effectuate not one, but three
major changes in consumer protection law. The CFPB has issued
guidance cautioning financial institutions from “denying credit to
individuals based on their [illegal] immigration status, regardless
of their personal circumstances and demonstrated ability to
repay.”[
17] It has also
begun “a rulemaking process to remove medical bills from Americans’
credit reports”[
18] and to
cap overdraft fees “at an established benchmark—as low as
$3.”[
19] These may or may
not be wise policies, but Congress did not specifically authorize
any of them, and if the CFPB’s financing scheme is sustained,
Congress cannot control or monitor the CFPB’s use of funds to
implement such changes. That is precisely what the Appropriations
Clause was meant to prevent.
* * *
The Court holds that the Appropriations Clause
is satisfied by any law that authorizes the Executive to take any
amount of money from any source for any period of time for any
lawful purpose. That holding has the virtue of clarity, but such
clarity comes at too high a price. There are times when it is our
duty to say simply that a law that blatantly attempts to circumvent
the Constitution goes too far. This is such a case. Today’s
decision is not faithful to the original understanding of the
Appropriations Clause and the centuries of history that gave birth
to the appropriations requirement,[
20] and I therefore respectfully dissent.
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