SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 22–429
_________________
ACHESON HOTELS, LLC, PETITIONER
v.
DEBORAH LAUFER
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the first circuit
[December 5, 2023]
Justice Jackson, concurring in the
judgment.
I agree with the Court that this case is moot
and that it should be resolved on that basis. But the Court goes
further, ordering vacatur of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
under
United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc.,
340 U.S.
36 (1950). See
ante, at 3–4. In my view, when mootness
ends an appeal, the question of what to do with the lower court’s
judgment, if anything, raises a separate issue that must be
addressed separately.
I
Mootness and vacatur are distinct concepts.
Start with mootness. The doctrine of mootness stems from Article
III of the Constitution, which permits federal courts to adjudicate
only “Cases” and “Controversies.” “Simply stated, a case is moot
when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack
a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”
Powell v.
McCormack,
395 U.S.
486, 496 (1969). If a case becomes moot, “the existence of a
case or controversy” is at an end, and there is therefore no basis
for “the exercise of judicial power.”
Liner v.
Jafco,
Inc.,
375 U.S.
301, 306, n. 3 (1964); see also
Chapman v.
Doe, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 3). Mootness thus justifies only
dismissal. Barring some other justification, we can go no
further.
Vacatur is a different animal entirely. Vacatur
is a remedy that erases a judgment that has already been rendered.
Here, the Court invokes a so-called
Munsingwear vacatur, see
ante, at 3–4, a species of vacatur that we have sometimes
applied to judgments in civil cases that have “become moot while on
[their] way here or pending our decision on the merits,” 340
U. S., at 39.
The precise origins of vacatur, both as a
general matter and in its
Munsingwear form, are uncertain.
In fact, some have described the power of a court to vacate a
judgment as “shrouded in ancient lore and mystery.” Advisory
Committee’s Note on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b), 28
U. S. C. App., p. 289.[
1] It seems plausible that our authority to vacate a lower
court’s judgment under
Munsingwear arises from our
“supervisory appellate power” to “make such disposition of the case
as justice requires.”
Walling v.
James V. Reuter,
Inc.,
321 U.S.
671, 676 (1944); see also
U. S. Bancorp Mortgage
Co. v.
Bonner Mall Partnership,
513 U.S.
18, 21–22 (1994). All agree, however, that vacatur extends from
the historical practice of equity, which for centuries has provided
courts with the power “to protect all rights and do justice to all
concerned.”
Rubber Co. v.
Goodyear, 9 Wall. 805, 807
(1870). The
Munsingwear remedy, like its vacatur kin,
developed from “this equitable tradition.”
Bancorp, 513
U. S., at 26.
As an equitable remedy, vacatur “is not granted
as a matter of course.”
Salazar v.
Buono,
559 U.S.
700, 714 (2010). Instead, precisely “[b]ecause [vacatur] is
rooted in equity, the decision whether to vacate turns on ‘the
conditions and circumstances of the particular case.’ ”
Azar v.
Garza, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018)
(
per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (quoting
United
States v.
Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien
Gesellschaft,
239 U.S.
466,
478
(1916)). Per historical tradition, a court that is asked to
exercise its equitable authority to vacate a lower court’s judgment
must determine, in essence, whether it is “most consonant to
justice” for the judgment to “remain undisturbed” or be vacated.
South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v.
Amador Medean Gold
Mining Co.,
145 U.S.
300, 301–302 (1892) (emphasis deleted).
II
Because mootness and vacatur involve different
legal analyses, see Part I,
supra, I think courts should
address them separately. Moreover, at least in theory if not in
practice, vacatur does not—and cannot—automatically follow from
mootness.
For one thing, automatic vacatur plainly flouts
the requirement of an individualized, circumstance-driven fairness
evaluation, which, as I have explained, is the hallmark of an
equitable remedy. “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power . . . to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case.”
Hecht Co. v.
Bowles,
321 U.S.
321, 329 (1944). Vacatur is an “extraordinary” exercise of an
appellate court’s “equitable” authority.
Bancorp, 513
U. S., at 26. As such, it simply cannot be a one-size-fits-all
solution.
Second, and perhaps even more fundamentally,
automatic vacatur is flatly inconsistent with our common-law
tradition of case-by-case adjudication, which “assumes that
judicial decisions are valuable and should not be cast aside
lightly.”
Chapman, 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3).
Our legal system rests not only on the holdings of this Court, but
also on the reasoned decisions of duly authorized lower court
judges. Jurists presiding over cases at every level have a duty “to
say what the law is.”
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 177 (1803). That mootness can sometimes leave parties unable
to appeal does not bear on the continued validity of those lower
court opinions in any respect.
We do not consider a court’s judgment to be any
less binding on the parties simply because there is not an appeal;
appeal or not, lower court rulings are still law. And it is not as
if a decision rendered by a lower court is less than final, or is
not perfected, unless and until it receives the
imprimatur
of this Court. Indeed, many lower court determinations are not even
appealable as a matter of law. See,
e.g., 28
U. S. C. §1447(d) (providing that, with limited
exceptions, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise”);
cf. §1292(a) (authorizing appeals of only certain kinds of
interlocutory orders). Our legal system regards those decisions as
pronouncements of law nevertheless.
In other words, even if a party cannot appeal,
or opts not to do so, lower court judgments are binding and
presumptively valid. And the lack of an appeal, on its own, does
not suffice to rebut that presumption. Any suggestion to the
contrary misunderstands the scope of the authority that all federal
judges have pursuant to Article III, and disrespects the time and
talent of the jurists who have previously undertaken to assess the
merits of the matter.
Nor is the validity of a lower court’s judgment
cast into doubt as a result of the case’s subsequent mootness. We
do not erase past precedents just because those cases cease to be
live, litigated matters. Every federal case fades to black at some
point, yet in our common-law system of case-by-case adjudication,
the rulings that Article III judges have issued in those cases
remain good law. “[T]here is no particular reason to assume that a
decision, later mooted, is any less valid as precedent than any
other opinion of a court.”
Mahoney v.
Babbitt,
113 F.3d 219, 222 (CADC 1997).
III
A
Why, then, does the possibility of nullifying
a lower court’s judgment by ordering
Munsingwear vacatur
exist? I submit that it serves a specific, equitable function: to
address any unjust circumstances or unfairness that might stem from
the inability to appeal a particular lower court decision,
notwithstanding its presumptive validity. And just as in
Munsingwear itself, “the party seeking relief from the
status quo of the appellate judgment” bears the burden of
establishing “equitable entitlement to [this] extraordinary
remedy.”
Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26.[
2]
Thus, in my view, sound vacatur arguments must
be rooted in fairness. Likewise, I believe that a court’s
Munsingwear determination should involve a particularized
assessment of whether “the conditions and circumstances of the
particular case”
warrant vacatur of the lower court’s
judgment.
Garza, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
It is, of course, impossible to catalog all of
the potential circumstances that might justify vacatur of a lower
court’s judgment on fairness grounds, so I will not attempt to do
so here. As a general matter, I believe that a party who claims
equitable entitlement to vacatur must explain what harm—other than
having to accept the law as the lower court stated it—flows from
the inability to appeal the lower court decision. The procedural
history of
Munsingwear provides one example of the kind of
harm that might warrant vacatur. See n. 2,
supra.
Another stems from the fact that courts “must also take account of
the public interest” when making a vacatur determination,
Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26, which raises broader
fairness concerns—such as “the orderly operation of the federal
judicial system,”
id., at 27. For that reason, I think that
the Court’s “sensitiv[ity] to Acheson’s concern about litigants
manipulating this Court’s jurisdiction,”
ante, at 3, could
be a relevant vacatur consideration, and is likewise reflected in
our prior observation that it would be “strange” to “permit a
plaintiff to obtain a favorable judgment, take voluntary action
that moots the dispute, and then retain the benefit of the
judgment.”
Garza, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3)
(internal quotation marks omitted).[
3]
It suffices for now to say that “[f]lexibility
rather than rigidity has distinguished” a court’s equitable power
and the potential reasons for exercising it.
Hecht, 321
U. S., at 329. Still, it bears repeating that the reason for a
vacatur remedy must be more than “mere disagreement with the
decision that one seeks to have vacated.”
Chapman, 598
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Every lower court loser would,
of course, prefer that the lower court’s opinion not exist. But in
each and every case in our adversarial justice system, one side
loses—and generally must accept that outcome.
To me, such first principles about the nature of
the vacatur remedy, the design of our common-law system, and the
scope of appellate authority best inform how this Court, and other
Courts of Appeals, should proceed when addressing a
Munsingwear motion. Mindful that vacatur of a lower court’s
judgment is an extraordinary equitable remedy designed to ensure
fairness, and fully cognizant of the danger of uprooting
presumptively valid legal precedents—contributions to the common
law that belong to all who are governed by the rule of law in our
constitutional system, not just the parties in the particular
case—we should carefully evaluate the purported need for vacatur,
in terms of the harms it would avert. And in the absence of
any demonstrated harm-related justification for vacating a lower
court’s opinion, we should conclude that “[t]he ‘public interest’
. . . is generally better served by leaving appellate
judgments intact.”
Alvarez v.
Smith,
558 U.S.
87, 98 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
B
All that said, I am aware that a party who is
deprived of the opportunity to appeal due to mootness (like
Acheson) might feel that loss acutely. It might even experience the
thwarting of its chance to obtain a reversal on appeal as a grave
injustice, on par with any other fairness-based justification for
vacatur of the lower court’s ruling. I also recognize that this
Court has previously expressed sympathy for that view. See,
e.
g.,
Camreta v.
Greene,
563 U.S.
692, 713 (2011) (suggesting that the inability to challenge “a
legally consequential decision” warrants vacatur). But I disagree.
There is nothing inherently inequitable about not being able to
pursue an appeal.
To reiterate the basic bottom line: The lack of
jurisdiction that prevents an appeal and the set of circumstances
that relate to whether the lower court’s judgment should be
permitted to stand are entirely distinct. The lower court issued
its ruling while the case was alive. And so rendered, that ruling
is precedent—“presumptively correct and valuable to the legal
community as a whole.”
Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26. The
observation that “what is done is done” is thus the starting point
for assessing any response to mootness beyond mere dismissal of the
appeal.
It is true that the losing party would
ordinarily have the right to challenge a lower court’s decision by
pursuing an appeal. But that right is not absolute or inviolate.
Wanted appeals sometimes cannot proceed for a host of
reasons,[
4] and in such
instances, the losing party is normally stuck with the outcome that
the lower court announced after its consideration of the matter in
dispute. We do not consider the proposers of unrequited requests
for appellate review to have been unjustly wronged.
To be sure, in the instant case, there is
another wrinkle: We not only granted Acheson’s petition for
certiorari, but we also heard oral argument related to the merits
of its claim that the lower court’s judgment was erroneous. Thus,
Acheson had a better opportunity than most to achieve the requested
reversal of the Court of Appeals’ unfavorable decision. But this
Court’s demonstrated interest in reviewing Acheson’s challenge to
respondent’s moot legal action does not add anything to the
fairness equation. Now that its appeal has been mooted, Acheson is
in no different position than the multitude of other litigants who
suffered defeat in the Courts of Appeals and will not get a review
of their case on the merits from this Court. To sustain a request
for vacatur, Acheson needs to rely on something more than its own
abject disappointment.
* * *
The parties in this case have not provided any
equitable basis for vacatur of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, nor
has the majority described any, beyond its reference to the Court’s
past practices and a citation to
Munsingwear. See
ante, at 3–4. For the reasons explained above, I would
ordinarily not agree to the imposition of a vacatur remedy that was
not fully discussed, much less established. But I recognize that
this Court’s vacatur ruling is consistent with our “established
practice” of vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals below
“when mootness occurs through . . . the unilateral action
of the party who prevailed in the lower court.”
Arizonans for
Official English v.
Arizona,
520 U.S.
43, 70–71 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Garza, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3);
supra, at 6, and n. 3. I concur in the judgment on the
basis of that precedent, despite my own views of this practice,
because respondent’s voluntary dismissal is the sort of “unilateral
action” that we have previously deemed adequate for vacatur.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment