On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice REHNQUIST, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
This case raises a question of the proper application of Rule 19
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1. Because I believe the
Court of Appeals seriously misapprehended the import of the rule, I
respectfully dissent.
Petitioner Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee ("JATC") is
the board of trustees for the Carpenters Ap-
Page 459 U.S.
917 , 918
prenticeship and Training Trust Fund for Northern California.
The labor- management agreement that created JATC requires it to
establish and maintain programs for training apprentices.
Respondents, two women who sought unsuccessfully to become
carpentry apprentices, sued JATC in the District Court, claiming
its selection process discriminates against women in violation of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The District Court set out the facts
in detail in its first opinion,
440 F.
Supp. 506, 510-14 (N.D.Cal. 1977).
JATC's program provides 4 years of classroom instruction for
apprentices, who receive on-the-job training from an employer. In
theory, applicants can become indentured apprentices in one of two
ways. First, they can wait in line at a local JATC office to obtain
a place on a referral list. Employers can call the local office,
which will refer to them the applicant at the top of the list.
Employers are entitled under their collective bargaining agreements
to reject referred applicants "for any reason." If the employer
hires the referred applicant, he or she is indentured and thus
admitted to the training program.
Second, local JATC offices will give anyone a "hunting license,"
which enables the holder to hunt for jobs directly from employers.
If the applicant obtains a job, he or she is indentured without
regard to the referral list. In practice, very few employers use
the referral list and virtually all apprentices obtain their jobs
through a hunting license.
As the Court of Appeals found, the essence of respondents'
amended complaint is that JATC adopted the hunting license system
knowing it has a discriminatory effect on women. Respondents claim
that employers discriminate against women when hiring applicants
with hunting licenses, and that JATC's use of the system therefore
violates Title VII.
662 F.2d
534, 536 (CA9 1981). Respondents sought injunctive relief
requiring JATC to adopt some other system. As the District Court
noted:
Page 459 U.S.
917 , 919
(Respondents) have not specified the precise system they seek to
have instituted, but it is plain that they envision a system
requiring an employer who wishes to hire a beginning apprentice to
contact the union local and enter a request without naming any
individual, whereupon the union would be required to dispatch an
applicant selected by the JATC by means of one of a number of
non-discriminatory techniques.
440 F.Supp., at 514 (footnote omitted).
The District Court held the employers are necessary parties
under Rule 19(a) (1). It reasoned that any relief it might grant
against JATC alone would be ineffective. Although more women might
obtain referrals, they would not be any more successful in becoming
apprentices. "There is no evidence that any change in the referral
system sought here will have any effect on the apparent source of
the discrimination alleged-the absent employers." 2 440 F.Supp., at
521.
Furthermore, the District Court reasoned, employers have a
substantial interest in selecting their own apprentices. Even if
the court could affect employers' hiring decisions by a decree
entered only against petitioner, it would be unfair to do so
without affording them an opportunity to contest the allegations.
Thus the employers are also necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(2)
(i) 3. 440 F.Supp., at 522-23.
Page 459 U.S.
917 , 920
The District Court applied the balancing process established by
Rule 19(b) 4 and concluded that the employers are indispensible
parties. Respondents were unable to join the 4500 employers, so the
District Court dismissed the action without prejudice under Rule
41(b). 83 F.R.D. 136 (N. D.Cal.1979).
The Court of Appeals reversed. 662 F.2d, at 537-38. Although the
Court of Appeals claimed "the district court misapprehended the
legal inquiry required by rule 19(a)(1)," it did not state what
form of inquiry would be appropriate. It believed the court has
"both the power and the duty to enjoin" activities that violate
Title VII. "(R)elief on plaintiffs' claims against JATC as an
entity could be afforded by an injunction against JATC alone." 622
F.2d, at 537. This seems to mean that since plaintiffs have sought
only an injunction against JATC, the District Court can afford the
complete relief contemplated by Rule 19(a)(1) by granting only what
the plaintiffs seek, regardless whether the order would have any
impact on the discrimination that was apparently the reason for the
lawsuit. This approach is hardly the "pragmatic" reasoning this
Court commended in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Patterson,
390 U.S.
102, 106-107, 116-17, n. 12, 736-737, 741-42 n.12d 936
(1968).
Page 459 U.S.
917 , 921
Although the Court of Appeals thought there was "no evidence"
that " employers would refuse to hire women admitted to the
apprentice program pursuant to any judgment that may be entered
against JATC," 662 F.2d, at 537, the substance of respondents'
complaint is that employers discriminate against women. See 83
F.R.D., at 138. The District Court correctly perceived the dilemma
it and respondents faced. If it ordered relief against JATC alone,
it could not affect the alleged discriminatory practices. Rule
19(a)(1). If it ordered relief against the employers, it would
almost certainly affect their right to select apprentices without
affording them an opportunity to rebut the charge that they
discriminate. Rule 19(a)(2)(i) 5.
The Court of Appeals sought to avoid the force of this argument
by claiming that because the agreement that created JATC grants it
"full authority to structure the apprenticeship program and to
select the apprentices ... the employers have by contract ceded to
JATC whatever legally protectible interest they may have had in
selecting apprentices to be trained." 662 F.2d, at 538. This is
simply not correct. The agreement gives JATC authority only to
select persons to refer to employers; an applicant does not become
an apprentice and begin the training program until and unless an
employer hires him. 440 F.Supp., at 510-512, 83 F.R.D., at 137.
And, as noted above, employers have bargained to retain their right
to reject any applicant for any reason. Yet the Court of Appeals
rather cavalierly found, in a proceeding to which the employers
were not parties, that the employers have ceded these rights.
The impropriety of the Court of Appeals' ruling is demonstrated
by General Building Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
-- U.S. -- (1982), in which we considered a similar apprenticeship
system. We held that a district
Page 459 U.S.
917 , 922
court cannot issue an injunction against employers in an
employment discrimination case under 42 U.S.C. 1981 when the
employers are not guilty of intentional discrimination. In that
case there apparently was no hunting license system, and the
discrimination was caused by the JATC and the union, but the bar to
an injunction was the same as the bar that will face the District
Court on remand in this case: it is improper for a court to act
against a person who has not been found to have violated the
law.
The Court of Appeals, as if recognizing the unsatisfactory
posture of the litigation for providing meaningful adjudication and
relief, commented that "on remand it is possible that some
employers ... may move to intervene." 662 F.2d, at 538. But to
secure full participation only by torturing the meaning of Rule 19
to avoid dismissal, in the hopes that the absent parties will then
take it upon themselves to protect their interests, is not an
appealing basis for the result reached by the Court of Appeals. It
is respondents who have sought to affect the hiring practices of
some 4500 employers; it is respondents, and not the absent
employers, who should shoulder the responsibility of joining the
necessarily affected employers or suffering dismissal of their
lawsuit.
If I only disagreed with The Court of Appeals' conclusion, this
case would not merit this Court's attention. However, in choosing
this approach over the District Court's reasoned, pragmatic path,
the Court of Appeals has, I believe, embraced a significant
departure from the meaning of Rule 19. Since courts will not, I am
confident, begin issuing injunctions against non-parties, the
approach of the Court of Appeals will tend to reduce the district
courts to issuers of " 'paper' decrees which neither adjudicate
nor, in the end, protect rights." Schutten v. Shell Oil Co.,
421 F.2d
869, 874 (CA5 1970). This is hardly a sound way to expend the
energies of overburdened district judges. Furthermore, plaintiffs
will be frustrated by their failure to obtain effective relief, but
will gain this frustration only after lengthy litigation and
the
Page 459 U.S.
917 , 923
attendant inconvenience and expense, instead of reaching the
same practical result after relatively brief proceedings. Indeed,
the only genuine beneficiaries of the Court of Appeals' approach
are attorneys who may be able to collect statutory attorneys' fees
from defendants on the basis of a legal "success," without having
gained anything of practical value for their clients.
Since the Court of Appeals held the employers were not necessary
parties, it did not reach the question whether they were also
indispensible parties under Rule 19(b). It will thus suffice for me
to indicate my agreement with the reasoning of the District Court
on this question as well. I would grant the petition for
certiorari.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 Rule 19(a)
provides in pertinent part:
A person ... shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in
his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or ( 2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest or ( ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring ...
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he
has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a
party.
Footnote 2 The District
Court acknowledged that it could order JATC to include women in its
classroom programs, but noted that such an order would not help any
woman obtain the on-the-job training that is a prerequisite for
employment as a journeyman carpenter. "Thus the relief obtained in
this lawsuit would serve only to swell the ranks of unemployed
apprentices. This surely cannot be the 'complete relief'
contemplated by Rule 19(a)." 440 F.Supp., at 520.
See generally Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry.,
509 F.2d
48, 52-53 ( CA8 1975); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel,
503 F.2d
177, 181 (CADC 1974).
Footnote 3 The District
Court found the employers' interests were not sufficiently similar
to JATC's interests for a decree against JATC to bind the employers
as non-party participants under Rule 65(d). This ruling was
apparently not challenged on appeal.
Footnote 4 Rule 19(b)
provides:
If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot
be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and
good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before
it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded
as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court
include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties;
second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment
rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder.
Footnote 5 See NLRB v. Doug
Neal Management Co.,
620 F.2d
1133, 1139-40 (CA6 1980) (adopting the approach of and quoting
extensively from the opinion of the District Court in this
case).
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