OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
v. MCORP
FINANCIAL, INC., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
No. 90-913. Argued October 7, 1991-Decided December 3,1991*
After MCorp, a bank holding company, filed voluntary bankruptcy
petitions, it initiated an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy
Court against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Board) seeking to enjoin the prosecution of two pending
administrative proceedings, one charging MCorp with a violation of
the Board's "source of strength" regulation and the other alleging
a violation of § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. The District Court
transferred the adversary proceeding to its own docket, ruled that
it had jurisdiction to enjoin the Board from prosecuting both
administrative proceedings, and entered a preliminary injunction
halting those proceedings. The Court of Appeals vacated the
injunction barring the § 23A proceeding, reasoning that the plain
language of the judicial review provisions of the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA), particularly 12 U. S.
C. § 1818(i)(I), deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to
enjoin either administrative proceeding. However, the Court of
Appeals also interpreted
Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U. S. 184, to
authorize an injunction against any administrative proceeding
conducted without statutory authorization, ruled that the Board's
promulgation and enforcement of its source of strength regulation
exceeded its statutory authority, and remanded the case with
instructions to the District Court to enjoin the Board from
enforcing the regulation.
Held: The District Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
either regulatory proceeding. Pp. 37-45.
(a) This litigation is controlled by § 1818(i)(I)'s plain,
preclusive language: "[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to affect
by injunction ... the issuance or enforcement of any [Board] notice
or order." That language is not qualified or superseded by the
Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay
*Together with No. 90-914,
MCorp et al. v.
Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, also on certiorari to
the same court.
33
provision, 11 U. S. C. § 362. The Board's planned actions
against MCorp fall squarely within §362(b)(4), which expressly
provides that the automatic stay will not reach proceedings to
enforce a "governmental unit's police or regulatory power." MCorp
is not protected by §§362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6)-which stay "any act"
to obtain possession of, or to exercise control over, property of
the estate, or to recover claims against the debtor that arose
prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition-because such
provisions do not have any application to ongoing, nonfinal
administrative proceedings such as those at issue here. Moreover,
MCorp's reliance on 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b)-which authorizes district
courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain
bankruptcy-related civil proceedings that would otherwise be
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of another "court" -is
misplaced, since the Board is not another "court," and since the
prosecution of the Board's proceedings, prior to the entry of a
final order and the commencement of any enforcement action, seems
unlikely to impair the Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction
over the property of the estate protected by § 1334(d).
pp.37-42.
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting Kyne to authorize
judicial review of the source of strength regulation. In contrast
to the situation in Kyne, FISA, in § 1818(h)(2), expressly provides
MCorp with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for review of the
regulation's validity and application if and when the Board finds
that MCorp has violated the regulation and, in § 1818(i)(I),
clearly and directly demonstrates a congressional intent to
preclude review. In such circumstances, the District Court is
without jurisdiction to review and enjoin the Board's ongoing
administrative proceedings. Pp. 42-45.
900 F.2d
852: No. 90-913, reversed; No. 90-914, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except THOMAS, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the cases.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for petitioner in No. 90-913
and respondent in No. 90-914. On the briefs were Solicitor General
Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General
Roberts, Michael R. Lazerwitz, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and James v:
Mattingly, Jr.
Alan B. Miller argued the cause for respondents in No.
90-913 and petitioners in No. 90-914. With him on the briefs were
Harvey R. Miller, Steven Alan Reiss, John D.
34
34 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS
v. MCORP FINANCIAL, INC.
Hawke, Jr., Jerome 1. Chapman, Howard N. Cayne, and David F.
Freeman, Jr.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. MCorp, a
bank holding company, filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions in March
1989. It then initiated an adversary proceeding against the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) seeking to
enjoin the prosecution of two administrative proceedings, one
charging MCorp with a violation of the Board's "source of strength"
regulation 1 and the other alleging a violation of § 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act, as added, 48 Stat. 183, and amended.2 The
District Court enjoined both proceedings, and the Board appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had no
jurisdiction to enjoin the § 23A proceeding, but that, under the
doctrine set forth in
Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U. S. 184
(1958), the District Court had jurisdiction to review the validity
of the "source of strength" regulation. The Court of Appeals then
ruled that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority in
promulgating that regulation.
900 F.2d
852 (CA5 1990). We granted certiorari, 499 U. S. 904 (1991), to
review the entire action but, because we conclude that the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin either regulatory proceeding,
we do not reach the merits of MCorp's challenge to the
regulation.
I
In 1984, the Board promulgated a regulation reqUIrmg every bank
holding company to "serve as a source of financial
1 The "source of strength" regulation provides in relevant
part:
"A bank holding company shall serve as a source of financial and
managerial strength to its subsidiary banks and shall not con[d]uct
its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner." 12 CFR §
225.4(a)(1) (1991).
2 Section 23A sets forth restrictions on bank holding companies'
corporate practices, including restrictions on transactions between
subsidiary banks and nonbank affiliates. See 12 U. S. C. §
371c.
35
and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks." 3 In October
1988, the Board commenced an administrative proceeding against
MCorp,4 alleging that MCorp violated the source of strength
regulation and engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices that
jeopardized the financial condition of its subsidiary banks. The
Board also issued three temporary cease-and-desist orders.5 The
first forbids MCorp to declare or pay any dividends without the
prior approval of the Board. App. 65-67. The second forbids MCorp
to dissipate any of its nonbank assets without the prior approval
of the Board.
Id., at 68-70. The third directs MCorp to use
"all of its assets to provide capital support to its Subsidiary
Banks in need of additional capital."
Id., at 85. By
agreement, enforcement of the third order was suspended while MCorp
sought financial assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).6
In March 1989, the FDIC denied MCorp's request for assistance.
Thereafter, creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition
against MCorp in the Southern District of N ew York, and the
Comptroller of the Currency determined that 20 of MCorp's
subsidiary banks were insolvent and, accordingly, appointed the
FDIC as receiver of those banks. MCorp then filed voluntary
bankruptcy petitions in the
3 See n. 1, supra. In 1987, the Board clarified its policy and
stated that a "bank holding company's failure to assist a troubled
or failing subsidiary bank ... would generally be viewed as an
unsafe and unsound banking practice or a violation of [12 CFR §
225.4(a)(1)] or both." 52 Fed. Reg. 15707-15708.
4 The term "MCorp" refers to the corporation and to two of its
wholly owned subsidiaries, MCorp Financial, Inc., and MCorp
Management.
5 MCorp timely challenged these orders in the District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, pursuant to 12 U. S. C. §
1818(c)(2). The District Court stayed MCorp's challenge pending
resolution of this proceeding. Brief for MCorp et al. 3.
6 The current status of this order is unclear. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 22-25, 41-42. We address only MCorp's effort to enjoin the
Board's administrative proceedings and express no opinion on the
continuing vitality or validity of any of the temporary
cease-and-desist orders.
36
36 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS
v. MCORP FINANCIAL, INC.
Southern District of Texas and all bankruptcy proceedings were
later consolidated in that forum.
At the end of March, the Board commenced a second administrative
proceeding against MCorp alleging that it had violated § 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act by causing two of its subsidiary banks to
extend unsecured credit of approximately $63.7 million to an
affiliate. For convenience, we shall refer to that proceeding as
the "§ 23A proceeding" and to the earlier proceeding as the "source
of strength proceeding. "
In May 1989, MCorp initiated this litigation by filing a
complaint in the Bankruptcy Court against the Board seeking a
declaration that both administrative proceedings had been
automatically stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code; in the
alternative, MCorp prayed for an injunction against the further
prosecution of those proceedings without the prior approval of the
Bankruptcy Court. On the Board's motion, the District Court
transferred that adversary proceeding to its own docket.
In June 1989, the District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction
to enjoin the Board from prosecuting both administrative
proceedings against MCorp and entered a preliminary injunction
halting those proceedings. The injunction restrained the Board from
exercising "its authority over bank holding companies ... to
attempt to effect, directly or indirectly, a reorganization of the
MCorp group [of companies] except through participation in the
bankruptcy proceedings."
In re MCorp, 101 B. R. 483, 491.
The Board appealed.
Although the District Court did not differentiate between the
two Board proceedings, the Court of Appeals held that the § 23A
proceeding could go forward but that the source of strength
proceeding should be enjoined. The court reasoned that the plain
language of the judicial review provisions of the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966
37
(FISA), 80 Stat. 1046, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1818
et
seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II), particularly § 1818(i)(1),
deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to enjoin either
proceeding, but that our decision in
Leedom v.
Kyne,
358 U. S. 184
(1958), nevertheless authorized an injunction against an
administrative proceeding conducted without statutory
authorization. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Board's
promulgation and enforcement of its source of strength regulation
exceeded its statutory authority. Accordingly, the court vacated
the District Court injunction barring the § 23A proceeding, but
remanded the case with instructions to enjoin the Board from
enforcing its source of strength regulation. Both parties
petitioned for certiorari.
The Board's petition challenges the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of
Leedom v.
Kyne, as well as its
invalidation of the source of strength regulation. MCorp's petition
challenges the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the relationship
between the provisions governing judicial review of Board
proceedings and those governing bankruptcy proceedings. We first
address the latter challenge.
II
A series of federal statutes gives the Board substantial
regulatory power over bank holding companies and establishes a
comprehensive scheme of judicial review of Board actions. See FISA;
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA), 12 U. S. C. § 1841
et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II); and the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U. S. C. § 3901
et seq.
In this litigation, the most relevant of these is FISA.7
7 Although the several "Notices of Charges and of Hearing"
issued by the Board against MCorp relied on FISA
and the
BHCA,
e. g., App. 57, 72, the parties have focused only on
the former. We note, however, that the BHCA includes a preclusion
provision that is similar to § 1818(i)(1) in FISA. See 12 U. S. C.
§ 1844(e)(2).
38
38 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS
v. MCORP FINANCIAL, INC.
FISA authorizes the Board to institute administrative
proceedings culminating in cease-and-desist orders, 12 U. S. c. §§
1818(a)-(b) (1988 ed., Supp. II), and to issue temporary
cease-and-desist orders that are effective upon service on a bank
holding company. § 1818(c). In addition, FISA establishes a
tripartite regime of judicial review. First, § 1818(c)(2) provides
that, within 10 days after service of a temporary order, a bank
holding company may seek an injunction in district court
restraining enforcement of the order pending completion of the
related administrative proceeding. Second, § 1818(h) authorizes
court of appeals review of final Board orders on the application of
an aggrieved party.8 Finally, § 1818(i)(1) provides that the Board
may apply to district court for enforcement of any effective and
outstanding notice or order.
None of these provisions controls this litigation: The action
before us is not a challenge to a temporary Board order, nor a
petition for review of a final Board order, nor an enforcement
action initiated by the Board. Instead, FISA's preclusion provision
appears to speak directly to the jurisdictional question at issue
in this litigation:
8 The statute characterizes such review of final Board orders as
"exclusive" and provides:
"(2) Any party to any proceeding under paragraph (1) may obtain
a review ... by the filing in the court of appeals of the United
States for the circuit in which the home office of the depository
institution is located, or in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, within thirty days after the
date of service of such order, a written petition praying that the
order of the agency be modified, terminated, or set aside .... Upon
the filing of such petition, such court shall have jurisdiction,
which upon the filing of the record shall except as provided in the
last sentence of said paragraph (1) be exclusive, to affirm,
modify, terminate, or set aside, in whole or in part, the order of
the agency." 12 U. S. C. § 1818(h)(2) (1988 ed., Supp. II).
The referenced exception concerns actions taken by the agency
with permission of the court.
39
"[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section no court shall
have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance
or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to
review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or
order." Ibid.
Notwithstanding this plain, preclusive language, MCorp argues
that the District Court's injunction against the prosecution of the
Board proceedings was authorized either by the automatic stay
provision in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. s. C. § 362, or by the
provision of the Judicial Code authorizing district courts in
bankruptcy proceedings to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
certain civil proceedings, 28 U. s. C. § 1334(b). We find no merit
in either argument.
The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic
stay of several categories of judicial and administrative
proceedings.9 The Board's planned actions against MCorp constitute
the "continuation ... [of] administrative ... proceeding[s]" and
would appear to be stayed by 11 U. s. C. § 362(a)(1). However, the
Board's actions also fall squarely
9 The automatic stay provision provides in relevant part:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an
application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or
to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or
of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of
the estate;
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title .... " 11 U. S. C. § 362(a).
40
40 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS
v. MCORP FINANCIAL, INC.
within § 362(b)(4), which expressly provides that the automatic
stay will not reach proceedings to enforce a "governmental unit's
police or regulatory power." 10
MCorp contends that in order for § 362(b)(4) to obtain, a court
must first determine whether the proposed exercise of police or
regulatory power is legitimate and that, therefore, in this
litigation the lower courts did have the authority to examine the
legitimacy of the Board's actions and to enjoin those actions. We
disagree. MCorp's broad reading of the stay provisions would
require bankruptcy courts to scrutinize the validity of every
administrative or enforcement action brought against a bankrupt
entity. Such a reading is problematic, both because it conflicts
with the broad discretion Congress has expressly granted many
administrative entities and because it is inconsistent with the
limited authority Congress has vested in bankruptcy courts. We
therefore reject MCorp's reading of § 362(b)(4).
MCorp also argues that it is protected by §§ 362(a)(3) and
362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Those provisions stay "any act"
to obtain possession of, or to exercise control over, property of
the estate, or to recover claims against the debtor that arose
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. MCorp contends that
the ultimate objective of the source of strength proceeding is to
exercise control of corporate assets and that the § 23A proceeding
seeks enforcement of a prepetition claim.
We reject these characterizations of the ongoing administrative
proceedings. At this point, the Board has only issued "Notices of
Charges and of Hearing" and has expressed
lOTitle 11 U. S. C. §362(b)(4) provides:
"(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C.
78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay-
"(4) under subsection (a)(l) of this section, of the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or
regulatory power .... "
41
its intent to determine whether MCorp has violated specified
statutory and regulatory provisions. It is possible, of course,
that the Board proceedings, like many other enforcement actions,
may conclude with the entry of an order that will affect the
Bankruptcy Court's control over the property of the estate, but
that
possibility cannot be sufficient to justify the
operation of the stay against an enforcement proceeding that is
expressly exempted by § 362(b)(4). To adopt such a characterization
of enforcement proceedings would be to render subsection (b)(4)'s
exception almost meaningless. If and when the Board's proceedings
culminate in a final order, and if and when judicial proceedings
are commenced to enforce such an order, then it may well be proper
for the Bankruptcy Court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction
under 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b). We are not persuaded, however, that
the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code have any
application to ongoing, nonfinal administrative proceedings. 11
MCorp's final argument rests on 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b).
That section authorizes a district court to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over certain bankruptcy-related civil proceedings that
would otherwise be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of another
court.12 MCorp's reliance is misplaced. Section 1334(b) concerns
the allocation of jurisdiction between bankruptcy courts and other
"courts," and, of
11 The Board suggests that the automatic stay provisions of §
362 do not themselves confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court,
and thus that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an
automatic stay only where the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction has
not already been precluded by a statute like § 1818(i)(I). We need
not address this question in light of our determination that the
automatic stay does not apply to the Board's ongoing administrative
proceedings.
12 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1334(b) provides:
"(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts,
the district court shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11."
42
42 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS
v. MCORP FINANCIAL, INC.
course, an administrative agency such as the Board is not a
"court." Moreover, contrary to MCorp's contention, the prosecution
of the Board proceedings, prior to the entry of a final order and
prior to the commencement of any enforcement action, seems unlikely
to impair the Bankruptcy Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the
property of the estate protected by 28 U. s. C. § 1334(d).13 In
sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the specific
preclusive language in 12 U. s. C. § 1818(i)(1) (1988 ed., Supp.
II) is not qualified or superseded by the general provisions
governing bankruptcy proceedings on which MCorp relies.
III
Although the Court of Appeals found that § 1818(i)(1) precluded
judicial review of many Board actions, it exercised jurisdiction in
this litigation based on its reading of
Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.
S. 184 (1958).
Kyne involved an action in District Court
challenging a determination by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) that a unit including both professional and nonprofessional
employees was appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes-a
determination in direct conflict with a provision of the National
Labor Relations Act. 14 The Act, however, did not expressly
authorize any judicial review of such a determination. Relying on
Switchmen v.
National Mediation Bd., 320 U. S. 297 (1943), the
NLRB argued that the statutory provisions establishing review of
final Board orders in the courts of appeals indicated a
congressional intent to bar review of any NLRB action
13 That subsection provides:
"(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is
commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of
the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the
commencement of such case, and of property of the estate."
14 See 29 U. S. C. § 159(b)(1).
43
in the District Court.15 The Court rejected that argument,
emphasizing the presumption that Congress normally intends the
federal courts to enforce and protect the rights that Congress has
created. Concluding that the Act did not bar the District Court's
jurisdiction, we stated: "This Court cannot lightly infer that
Congress does not intend judicial protection of rights it confers
against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers." 358 U.
S., at 190.
In this litigation, the Court of Appeals interpreted our opinion
in
Kyne as authorizing judicial review of any agency action
that is alleged to have exceeded the agency's statutory authority.
Kyne, however, differs from this litigation in two critical
ways. First, central to our decision in
Kyne was the fact
that the Board's interpretation of the Act would wholly deprive the
union of a meaningful and adequate means of vindicating its
statutory rights.
"Here, differently from the Switchmen's case, 'absence of
jurisdiction of the federal courts' would mean 'a sacrifice or
obliteration of a right which Congress' has given professional
employees, for there is no other means, within their control ... to
protect and enforce that right." Ibid.
The cases before us today are entirely different from
Kyne because FISA expressly provides MCorp with a meaningful
and adequate opportunity for judicial review of the validity of the
source of strength regulation. If and when the Board
15 In
Switchmen v.
National Mediation Ed., 320 U.
S., at 306, the Court had reasoned:
"When Congress in § 3 and in § 9 provided for judicial review of
two types of orders or awards and in § 2 of the same Act omitted
any such provision as respects a third type, it drew a plain line
of distinction. And the inference is strong from the history of the
Act that that distinction was not inadvertent. The language of the
Act read in light of that history supports the view that Congress
gave administrative action under § 2, Ninth a finality which it
denied administrative action under the other sections of the
Act."
44
44 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS
v. MCORP FINANCIAL, INC.
finds that MCorp has violated that regulation, MCorp will have,
in the Court of Appeals, an unquestioned right to review of both
the regulation and its application.
The second, and related, factor distinguishing this litigation
from
Kyne is the clarity of the congressional preclusion of
review in FISA. In
Kyne, the NLRB contended that a statutory
provision that provided for judicial review implied, by its
silence, a preclusion of review of the contested determination. By
contrast, in FISA Congress has spoken clearly and directly:
"[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or
otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any [Board] notice or
order under this section." 12 U. S. C. § 1818(i)(1) (1988 ed.,
Supp. II) (emphasis added). In this way as well, this litigation
differs from
Kyne.16
Viewed in this way,
Kyne stands for the familiar
proposition that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing
evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts
restrict access to judicial review."
Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387
U. S. 136, 141 (1967). As we have explained, however, in this
case the statute provides us with clear and convincing evidence
that Congress intended to deny the District Court jurisdiction to
review and enjoin the Board's ongoing administrative
proceedings.
IV
The Court of Appeals therefore erred when it held that it had
jurisdiction to consider the merits of MCorp's challenge to the
source of strength regulation. In No. 90-913, the
16 The other cases relied upon by the Court of
Appeals-Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476
U. S. 667 (1986);
Breen v.
Selective Service Local
Bd. No. 16,
396
U. S. 460 (1970); and
Oestereich v.
Selective Service
System Local Bd. No. 11,
393 U. S. 233 (1968)-are
distinguishable from this litigation for the same reasons. In each
of those cases, the Court recognized that an unduly narrow
construction of the governing statute would severely prejudice the
party seeking review, and construed the statute to allow judicial
review not expressly provided.
45
judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case with
instructions to enjoin the source of strength proceedings is
therefore reversed. In No. 90-914, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals vacating the District Court's injunction against
prosecution of the § 23A proceeding is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of
these cases.
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