OCTOBER TERM, 1998
Syllabus
AMOCO PRODUCTION CO., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND THE CLASS IT
REPRESENTS
v. SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 98-830. Argued April 19, 1999-Decided June 7, 1999
Land patents issued to western settlers pursuant to the Coal
Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 conveyed the land and everything in it,
except the "coal," which was reserved to the United States.
Patented lands included reservation lands previously ceded by
respondent Southern Ute Indian Tribe to the United States. In 1938,
the United States restored to the Tribe, in trust, title to ceded
reservation lands still owned by the Government, including the
reserved coal in lands patented under the 1909 and 1910 Acts. These
lands contain large quantities of coalbed methane gas (CEM gas)
within the coal formations. At the time of the 1909 and 1910 Acts,
such gas was considered a dangerous waste product of coal mining,
but it is now considered a valuable energy source. Relying on a
1981 opinion by the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior
that CEM gas was not included in the Acts' coal reservation, oil
and gas companies entered into CEM gas leases with the individual
landowners of some 200,000 acres of patented land in which the
Tribe owns the coal. The Tribe filed suit against petitioners, the
royalty owners and producers under the leases, and federal agencies
and officials (respondents here), seeking,
inter alia, a
declaration that CEM gas is coal reserved by the 1909 and 1910
Acts. The District Court granted the defendants summary judgment,
holding that the plain meaning of the term "coal" in the Acts is a
solid rock substance that does not include CEM gas. In reversing,
the Tenth Circuit found the term ambiguous, invoked the canon that
ambiguities in land grants should be resolved in favor of the
sovereign, and concluded that the coal reservation encompassed CEM
gas. The Solicitor of the Interior has withdrawn the 1981 opinion,
and the United States now supports the Tribe's position.
Held: The term "coal" as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts
does not encompass CEM gas. Pp. 872-880.
(a) The question here is not whether, based on what scientists
know today, CEM gas is a constituent of coal, but whether Congress
so regarded it in 1909 and 1910. The common understanding of coal
at that
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866 AMOCO PRODUCTION CO.
v. SOUTHERN UTE TRIBE
Syllabus
time would not have encompassed CEM gas. Most dictionaries of
the day defined coal as the solid fuel resource and CEM gas as a
distinct substance that escaped from coal during mining, rather
than as a part of the coal itself. As a practical matter, moreover,
it is clear that Congress intended to reserve only the solid rock
fuel that was mined, shipped throughout the country, and then
burned to power the N ation's railroads, ships, and factories.
Public land statutes should be interpreted in light of the
country's condition when they were passed,
Leo Sheep Co. v.
United States, 440 U. S. 668, 682, and
coal, not gas, was the primary energy for the Industrial
Revolution. Congress passed the Acts to address concerns over the
short supply, mismanagement, and fraudulent acquisition of this
solid rock fuel and chose a narrow reservation to address these
concerns. That Congress viewed CEM gas as a dangerous waste product
is evident from earlier mine-safety legislation that prescribed
specific ventilation standards to dilute such gas. Congress' view
was confirmed by the fact that coal companies venting the gas while
mining coal made no attempt to capture or preserve the gas. To the
extent that Congress was aware of limited and sporadic drilling for
CEM gas as fuel, there is every reason to think it viewed this as
drilling for natural gas. Such a distinction is significant, since
the question is not whether Congress would have thought that CEM
gas had fuel value, but whether Congress thought it was coal fuel.
In the 1909 and 1910 Acts, Congress chose to reserve only coal, not
oil, natural gas, or other energy resources. This reservation's
limited nature is confirmed by subsequent enactments, in which
Congress used explicit terms to reserve gas rights. Pp.874-878.
(b) Respondents contend that Congress did not reserve the solid
coal but convey the CEM gas because the resulting split estate
would be impractical and mining would be difficult if miners had to
capture and preserve escaping CEM gas. It is unlikely that Congress
considered this issue, since it did not think that CEM gas would be
a profitable energy source. Nor would the prospect of a split
estate have deterred Congress from reserving only coal, since
including CEM gas in the coal reservation would create a split
estate between CEM gas and natural gas, which would be at least as
difficult to administer as a split coal/CEM gas estate. Pp.
878-880.
151 F.3d
1251, reversed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the OpInIOn of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, SOUTER, and
THOMAS, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p. 880. EREYER, J., took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
867
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were Stephen B. Kinnaird, Charles L. Kaiser, Gary L.
Paulson, Rebecca S. McGee, and David
Thomas J.
Davidson, Deputy Attorney General of
Wyoming, argued the cause for the State of Montana et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General of Wyoming, and
Drake D.
Hill and
Cynthia Lamb Harnett, Senior Assistant
Attorneys General, joined by
Jan Graham, Attorney General of
Utah,
Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota,
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, and
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General of New Mexico.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the federal respondents.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant
Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler,
Elizabeth Ann Peterson, and John
Thomas H. Shipps argued the cause for respondent Southern Ute
Indian Tribe. With him on the brief were Frank E. Maynes, Scott B.
McElroy, Alice E. Walker, and Michael T. McConnell. *
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. Land patents
issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 conveyed to
the patentee the land and everything in it, except the "coal,"
which was reserved to the United States. Coal Lands Act of 1909
(1909 Act), 35 Stat.
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
Campbell County, Wyoming, by S.
Thomas Throne; for the Coal
Bed Methane Ad Hoc Committee et al. by
L. Poe Leggette; for
the Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States by
William R. Rapson and
Mary Viviano Laitos; for La
Plata County, Colorado, by
Michael A. Goldman, Jeffery P.
Robbins, and
Sheryl Rogers; and for the Mountain States
Legal Foundation et al. by
William Perry Pendley and
Steven J.
Lechner.
Harold P. Quinn, Jr., filed a brief for the National
Mining Association as
amicus curiae urging affirmance.
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868 AMOCO PRODUCTION CO.
v. SOUTHERN UTE TRIBE
844, 30 U. S. C. § 81; Coal Lands Act of 1910 (1910 Act), ch.
318, 36 Stat. 583, 30 U. S. C. §§ 83-85. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that the reservation of
"coal" includes gas found within the coal formation, commonly
referred to as coalbed methane gas (CBM gas). See
151 F.3d
1251, 1256 (1998) (en bane). We granted certiorari, 525 U. S.
1118 (1999), and now reverse.
I
During the second half of the 19th century, Congress sought to
encourage the settlement of the West by providing land in fee
simple absolute to homesteaders who entered and cultivated tracts
of a designated size for a period of years. See,
e. g., 1862
Homestead Act, 12 Stat. 392; 1877 Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19
Stat. 377, as amended, 43 U. S. C. §§ 321-323. Public lands
classified as valuable for coal were exempted from entry under the
general land-grant statutes and instead were made available for
purchase under the 1864 Coal Lands Act, ch. 205, § 1, 13 Stat. 343,
and the 1873 Coal Lands Act, ch. 279, § 1, 17 Stat. 607, which set
a maximum limit of 160 acres on individual entry and minimum prices
of $10 to $20 an acre. Lands purchased under these early Coal Lands
Acts-like lands patented under the Homestead Acts-were conveyed to
the entryman in fee simple absolute, with no reservation of any
part of the coal or mineral estate to the United States. The coal
mined from the lands purchased under the Coal Lands Acts and from
other reserves fueled the Industrial Revolution.
At the turn of the 20th century, however, a coal famine struck
the West. See Hearings on Coal Lands and CoalLand Laws of the
United States before the House Committee on Public Lands, 59th
Cong., 2d Sess., 11-13 (1906) (testimony of Edgar E. Clark,
Interstate Commerce Commissioner). At the same time, evidence of
widespread fraud in the administration of federal coal lands came
to light. Lacking the resources to make an independent
assessment
869
of the coal content of each individual land tract, the
Department of the Interior in classifying public lands had relied
for the most part on the affidavits of entrymen.
Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U. S. 36, 48, and n. 9
(1983). Railroads and other coal interests had exploited the system
to avoid paying for coal lands and to evade acreage restrictions by
convincing individuals to falsify affidavits, acquire lands for
homesteading, and then turn the land over to them. C. Mayer &
G. Riley, Public Domain, Private Dominion 117118 (1985).
In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt responded to the perceived
crisis by withdrawing 64 million acres of public land thought to
contain coal from disposition under the public land laws.
Western Nuclear, 462 U. S., at 48-49. As a result, even
homesteaders who had entered and worked the land in good faith lost
the opportunity to make it their own unless they could prove to the
land office that the land was not valuable for coal.
President Roosevelt's order outraged homesteaders and western
interests, and Congress struggled for the next three years to
construct a compromise that would reconcile the competing interests
of protecting settlers and managing federal coal lands for the
public good. President Roosevelt and others urged Congress to begin
issuing limited patents that would sever the surface and mineral
estates and allow for separate disposal of each. See id., at 49
(quoting Special Message to Congress, Jan. 22, 1909, 15 Messages
and Papers of the Presidents 7266). Although various bills were
introduced in Congress that would have severed the estatessome of
which would have reserved "natural gas" as well as "coal" to the
United States-none was enacted. See 41 Congo Rec. 630 (1907) (bill
by Rep. Volstead "reserving coal, lignite, petroleum, and
natural-gas deposits from disposal ... under existing land laws");
id., at 1483-1484 (bill by Sen. La Follette providing for the sale
of surface lands, but "reserving from entry and sale the mineral
rights to coal and other
870
870 AMOCO PRODUCTION CO.
v. SOUTHERN UTE TRIBE
materials mined for fuel, oil, gas, or asphalt"); id., at 1788
(bill by Sen. Nelson "to provide for the reservation of the coal,
lignite, oil, and natural gas in the public lands").
Finally, Congress passed the 1909 Act, which authorized the
Federal Government, for the first time, to issue limited land
patents. In contrast to the broad reservations of mineral rights
proposed in the failed bills, however, the 1909 Act provided for
only a narrow reservation. The 1909 Act authorized issuance of
patents to individuals who had already made good-faith agricultural
entries onto tracts later identified as coal lands, but the
issuance was to be subject to "a reservation to the United States
of all coal in said lands, and the right to prospect for, mine, and
remove the same." 30 U. S. C. § 81. The 1909 Act also permitted the
patentee to "mine coal for use on the land for domestic purposes
prior to the disposal by the United States of the coal deposit."
Ibid. A similar Act in 1910 opened the remaining coal lands
to new entry under the homestead laws, subject to the same
reservation of coal to the United States. 30 U. S. C. §§83-85.
Among the lands patented to settlers under the 1909 and 1910
Acts were former reservation lands of the Southern Ute Indian
Tribe, which the Tribe had ceded to the United States in 1880 in
return for certain allotted lands provided for their settlement.
Act of June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199. In 1938, the United
States restored to the Tribe, in trust, title to the ceded
reservation lands still owned by the United States, including the
reserved coal in lands patented under the 1909 and 1910 Acts. As a
result, the Tribe now has equitable title to the coal in lands
within its reservation settled by homesteaders under the 1909 and
1910 Acts.
We are advised that over 20 million acres of land were patented
under the 1909 and 1910 Acts and that the landsincluding those
lands in which the Tribe owns the coal-contain large quantities of
CBM gas. Brief for Montana et al. as
Amici Curiae 2. At the
time the Acts were passed, CBM
871
gas had long been considered a dangerous waste product of coal
mining. By the 1970's, however, it was apparent that CBM gas could
be a significant energy resource, see Duel & Kimm, Coalbed Gas:
A Source of Natural Gas, Oil & Gas J., June 16, 1975, p.47,
and, in the shadow of the Arab oil embargo, the Federal Government
began to encourage the immediate production of CBM gas through
grants, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 5901-5915 (1994 ed. and Supp. III), and
substantial tax credits, see 26 U. S. C. § 29 (1994 ed. and Supp.
III).
Commercial development of CBM gas was hampered, however, by
uncertainty over its ownership. "In order to expedite the
development of this energy source," the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior issued a 1981 opinion concluding that the
reservation of coal to the United States in the 1909 and 1910 Acts
did not encompass CBM gas. See
Ownership of and Right to Extract
Coalbed Gas in Federal Coal Deposits, 88 1. D. 538, 539. In
reliance on the Solicitor's 1981 opinion, oil and gas companies
entered into leases to produce CBM gas with individual landowners
holding title under 1909 and 1910 Act patents to some 200,000 acres
in which the Tribe owns the coal.
In 1991, the Tribe brought suit in Federal District Court
against petitioners, the royalty owners and producers under the oil
and gas leases covering that land, and the federal agencies and
officials responsible for the administration of lands held in trust
for the Tribe. The Tribe sought,
inter alia, a declaration
that Congress' reservation of coal in the 1909 and 1910 Acts
extended to CBM gas, so that the Tribenot the successors in
interest of the land patentees-owned the CBM gas.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
holding that the plain meaning of "coal" is the "solid rock
substance" used as fuel, which does not include CBM gas. 874 F.
Supp. 1142, 1154 (Colo. 1995). On appeal, a panel of the Court of
Appeals reversed.
119 F.3d
816, 819 (CAlO 1997). The court then granted rehearing en
banc
872
872 AMOCO PRODUCTION CO.
v. SOUTHERN UTE TRIBE
on the question whether the term "coal" in the 1909 and 1910
Acts "unambiguously excludes or includes CBM." 151 F. 3d, at 1256.
Over a dissenting opinion by Judge Tacha, joined by two other
judges, the en banc court agreed with the panel.
Ibid. The
court held that the term "coal" was ambiguous.
Ibid. It
invoked the interpretive canon that ambiguities in land grants
should be resolved in favor of the sovereign and concluded that the
coal reservation encompassed CBM gas.
Ibid.
The United States did not petition for, or participate in, the
rehearing en banco Instead, it filed a supplemental brief
explaining that the Solicitor of the Interior was reconsidering the
1981 Solicitor's opinion in light of the panel's decision. Brief
for Federal Respondents 14, n. 8. On the day the federal
respondents' response to petitioners' certiorari petition was due,
see id., at 47, n. 37, the Solicitor of the Interior withdrew the
1981 opinion in a one-line order, see Addendum to Brief for Federal
Respondents in Opposition 1a. The federal respondents now support
the Tribe's position that CBM gas is coal reserved by the 1909 and
1910 Acts.
II
We begin our discussion as the parties did, with a brief
overview of the chemistry and composition of coal. Coal is a
heterogeneous, noncrystalline sedimentary rock composed primarily
of carbonaceous materials. See,
e. g., Gorbaty & Larsen,
Coal Structure and Reactivity, in 3 Encyclopedia of Physical
Science and Technology 437 (R. Meyers ed. 2d ed. 1992). It is
formed over millions of years from decaying plant material that
settles on the bottom of swamps and is converted by microbiological
processes into peat. D. Van Krevelen, Coal 90 (3d ed. 1993). Over
time, the resulting peat beds are buried by sedimentary deposits.
I d., at 91. As the beds sink deeper and deeper into the
earth's crust, the peat is transformed by chemical reactions which
increase the carbon content of the fossilized plant material.
Ibid.
873
The process in which peat transforms into coal is referred to as
coalification.
Ibid.
The coalification process generates methane and other gases. R.
Rogers, Coalbed Methane: Principles and Practice 148 (1994).
Because coal is porous, some of that gas is retained in the coal.
CBM gas exists in the coal in three basic states: as free gas; as
gas dissolved in the water in coal; and as gas "adsorped" on the
solid surface of the coal, that is, held to the surface by weak
forces called van der Waals forces.
Id., at 16-17,117. These
are the same three states or conditions in which gas is stored in
other rock formations. Because of the large surface area of coal
pores, however, a much higher proportion of the gas is adsorped on
the surface of coal than is adsorped in other rock.
Id., at
16-17. When pressure on the coalbed is decreased, the gas in the
coal formation escapes. As a result, CBM gas is released from coal
as the coal is mined and brought to the surface.
III
While the modern science of coal provides a useful backdrop for
our discussion and is consistent with our ultimate disposition, it
does not answer the question presented to us. The question is not
whether, given what scientists know today, it makes sense to regard
CBM gas as a constituent of coal but whether Congress so regarded
it in 1909 and 1910. In interpreting statutory mineral reservations
like the one at issue here, we have emphasized that Congress "was
dealing with a practical subject in a practical way" and that it
intended the terms of the reservation to be understood in "their
ordinary and popular sense."
Burke v.
Southern Pacific R.
Co., 234 U. S.
669, 679 (1914) (rejecting "scientific test" for determining
whether a reservation of "mineral lands" included "petroleum
lands"); see also
Perrin v.
United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979)
("[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" at the time
874
874 AMOCO PRODUCTION CO.
v. SOUTHERN UTE TRIBE
Congress enacted the statute). We are persuaded that the common
conception of coal at the time Congress passed the 1909 and 1910
Acts was the solid rock substance that was the country's primary
energy resource.
A
At the time the Acts were passed, most dictionaries defined coal
as the solid fuel resource. For example, one contemporary
dictionary defined coal as a "solid and more or less distinctly
stratified mineral, varying in color from darkbrown to black,
brittle, combustible, and used as fuel, not fusible without
decomposition and very insoluble." 2 Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia 1067 (1906). See also American Dictionary of the English
Language 244 (N. Webster 1889) (defining "coal" as a "black, or
brownish black, solid, combustible substance, consisting, like
charcoal, mainly of carbon, but more compact"); 2 New English
Dictionary on Historical Principles 549 (J. Murray ed. 1893)
(defining coal as a "mineral, solid, hard, opaque, black, or
blackish, found in seams or strata in the earth, and largely used
as fuel"); Webster's New International Dictionary of the English
Language 424 (W. Harris & F. Allen eds. 1916) (defining coal as
a "black, or brownish black, solid, combustible mineral
substance").
In contrast, dictionaries of the day defined CBM gasthen called
"marsh gas," "methane," or "fire-damp"-as a distinct substance, a
gas "contained in" or "given off by" coal, but not as coal itself.
See,
e. g., 3 Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia 2229 (1906)
(defining "fire-damp" as "[t]he gas contained in coal, often given
off by it in large quantities, and exploding, on ignition, when
mixed with atmospheric air"; noting that "[f]ire-damp is a source
of great danger to life in coal-mines").
As these dictionary definitions suggest, the common
understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not have encompassed
CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a solid
875
mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance
that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as a part
of the coal itself.
B
As a practical matter, moreover, it is clear that, by reserving
coal in the 1909 and 1910 Act patents, Congress intended to reserve
only the solid rock fuel that was mined, shipped throughout the
country, and then burned to power the Nation's railroads, ships,
and factories. Cf.
Leo Sheep Co. v.
United States,
440 U. S. 668,
682 (1979) (public land statutes should be interpreted in light of
"the condition of the country when the acts were passed" (internal
quotation marks omitted)). In contrast to natural gas, which was
not yet an important source of fuel at the turn of the century,
coal was the primary energy for the Industrial Revolution. See,
e. g., D. Yergin, The Prize 543 (1991). See also Brief for
Federal Respondents 30 (recognizing that the three primary sources
of energy in the United States at the turn of the century were
coal, oil, and wood, and that natural gas-even from conventional
reservoirs-was not yet an important energy resource).
As the history recounted in Part I,
supra, establishes,
Congress passed the 1909 and 1910 Acts to address concerns over the
short supply, mismanagement, and fraudulent acquisition of this
solid rock fuel resource. Rejecting broader proposals, Congress
chose a narrow reservation of the resource that would address the
exigencies of the crisis at hand without unduly burdening the
rights of homesteaders or impeding the settlement of the West.
It is evident that Congress viewed CBM gas not as part of the
solid fuel resource it was attempting to conserve and manage but as
a dangerous waste product, which escaped from coal as the coal was
mined. Congress was well aware by 1909 that the natural gas found
in coal formations was released during coal mining and posed a
serious threat to
876
876 AMOCO PRODUCTION CO.
v. SOUTHERN UTE TRIBE
mine safety. Explosions in coal mines sparked by CBM gas
occurred with distressing frequency in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Brief for National Mining Association as
Amicus
Curiae 7. Congress was also well aware that the CBM gas needed
to be vented to the greatest extent possible. Almost 20 years prior
to the passage of the 1909 and 1910 Acts, Congress had enacted the
first federal coalmine-safety law which, among other provisions,
prescribed specific ventilation standards for coal mines of a
certain depth "so as to dilute and render harmless ... the noxious
or poisonous gases." 1891 Territorial Mine Inspection Act, § 6, 26
Stat. 1105. See also 3 Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia,
supra, at 2229 (explaining the dangers associated with
fire-damp).
That CBM gas was considered a dangerous waste product which
escaped from coal, rather than part of the valuable coal fuel
itself, is also confirmed by the fact that coal companies venting
the gas to prevent its accumulation in the mines made no attempt to
capture or preserve it. The more gas that escaped from the coal
once it was brought to the surface, the better it was for the
mining companies because it decreased the risk of a dangerous gas
buildup during transport and storage. Cf. E. Moore, Coal: Its
Properties, Analysis, Classification, Geology, Extraction, Uses and
Distribution 308 (1922) (noting that the presence of gases such as
methane in the coal increases the risk of spontaneous combustion of
the coal during storage).
(The fact that CBM gas was known to escape naturally from coal
distinguishes it from the "producer gas" that was generated from
coal in the 1800's. Brief for Federal Respondents 30. Producer gas
was produced by "destructive distillation, that is, by heating the
coal to a temperature where it decomposed chemically." App. 531
(reproducing Perry, The Gasification of Coal, Scientific American
230, (Mar. 1974)). The natural escape of CBM gas from the coal also
distinguishes CBM gas from other "volatile matter,"
877
expelled when coal is heated, or liquid "coal extracts," which
"can be extracted through the use of appropriate solvents." Brief
for Federal Respondents 26-27. The federal respondents' expressed
concern that if the coal reservation does not encompass CBM gas it
does not encompass these "components" of coal, see
ibid., is
unfounded.)
There is some evidence of limited and sporadic exploitation of
CBM gas as a fuel prior to the passage of the 1909 and 1910 Acts.
See,
e. g., E. Craig & M. Myers, Ownership of Methane
Gas in Coalbeds, 24 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 767, 768 (1978) ("As
early as 1746, methane was being drained from an English coal mine
through pipes and used for heating"); see also
United States
Steel Corp. v.
Hoge, 503 Pa. 140, 146, 468 A. 2d 1380,
1383 (1983) (noting that as early as 1900, "certain wells were
drilled [into coalbeds in Pennsylvania, which] produced coalbed
gas"). It seems unlikely, though, that Congress considered this
limited drilling for CBM gas. To the extent Congress had an
awareness of it, there is every reason to think it viewed the
extraction of CBM gas as drilling for natural gas, not mining
coal.
That distinction is significant because the question before us
is not whether Congress would have thought that CBM gas had some
fuel value, but whether Congress considered it part of the coal
fuel. When it enacted the 1909 and 1910 Acts, Congress did not
reserve all minerals or energy resources in the lands. It reserved
only coal, and then only in lands that were specifically identified
as valuable for coal. It chose not to reserve oil, natural gas, or
any other known or potential energy resources.
The limited nature of the 1909 and 1910 Act reservations is
confirmed by subsequent congressional enactments. When Congress
wanted to reserve gas rights that might yield valuable fuel, it did
so in explicit terms. In 1912, for example, Congress enacted a
statute that reserved "oil and gas" in Utah lands. Act of Aug. 24,
1912, 37 Stat. 496. In addition, both the 1912 Act and a later Act
passed in 1914
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878 AMOCO PRODUCTION CO.
v. SOUTHERN UTE TRIBE
continued the tradition begun in the 1909 and 1910 Acts of
reserving only those minerals enumerated in the statute. See ibid.;
Act of July 17, 1914, 38 Stat. 509, as amended, 30 U. S. C. §§
121-123 (providing that "[l]ands withdrawn or classified as
phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas, or asphaltic minerals, or
which are valuable for those deposits," could be patented, subject
to a reservation to the United States of "the deposits on account
of which the lands so patented were withdrawn or classified or
reported as valuable"). It was not until 1916 that Congress passed
a public lands Act containing a general reservation of valuable
minerals in the lands. See Stock-Raising Homestead Act, ch. 9, 39
Stat. 862, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 299 (reserving "all the coal
and other minerals in the lands" in all lands patented under the
Act). See also
Western Nuclear, 462 U. S., at 49 ("Unlike
the preceding statutes containing mineral reservations, the [1916
Stock-Raising Homestead Act] was not limited to lands classified as
mineral in character, and it did not reserve only specifically
identified minerals").
C
Respondents contend that Congress did not reserve the solid coal
but convey the CBM gas because the resulting split estate would be
impractical and would make mining the coal difficult because the
miners would have to capture and preserve the CBM gas that escaped
during mining. See,
e. g., Brief for Respondent Southern Ute
Indian Tribe 46; see also id., at 25-26 (emphasizing that the
reservation includes the right to "mine" the coal, indicating that
"Congress reserved all rights needed to develop the underlying
coal" including the right to vent CBM gas during mining). We doubt
Congress would have given much consideration to these problems,
however, because-as noted above-it does not appear to have given
consideration to the possibility that CBM gas would one day be a
profitable energy source developed on a large scale.
879
It may be true, nonetheless, that the right to mine the coal
implies the right to release gas incident to coal mining where it
is necessary and reasonable to do so. The right to dissipate the
CBM gas where reasonable and necessary to mine the coal does not,
however, imply the ownership of the gas in the first instance.
Rather, it simply reflects the established common-law right of the
owner of one mineral estate to use, and even damage, a neighboring
estate as necessary and reasonable to the extraction of his own
minerals. See,
e. g.,
Williams v.
Gibson, 84
Ala. 228, 4 So. 350 (1888); Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation,
6 American Law of Mining § 200.04 (2d ed. 1997). Given that split
estates were already common at the time the 1909 and 1910 Acts were
passed, see,
e. g.,
Chartiers Block Coal Co. v.
Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893), and that the common
law has proved adequate to the task of resolving the resulting
conflicts between estates, there is no reason to think that the
prospect of a split estate would have deterred Congress from
reserving only the coal.
Were a case to arise in which there are two commercially
valuable estates and one is to be damaged in the course of
extracting the other, a dispute might result, but it could be
resolved in the ordinary course of negotiation or adjudication.
That is not the issue before us, however. The question is one of
ownership, not of damage or injury.
In all events, even were we to construe the coal reservation to
encompass CBM gas, a split estate would result. The United States
concedes (and the Tribe does not dispute) that once the gas
originating in the coal formation migrates to surrounding rock
formations it belongs to the natural gas, rather than the coal,
estate. See Brief for Federal Respondents 35; Brief for Respondent
Southern Ute Indian Tribe 3, n. 4. Natural gas from other sources
may also exist in the lands at issue. Including the CBM gas in the
coal reservation would, therefore, create a split gas estate that
would be at least as difficult to administer as a split
880
880 AMOCO PRODUCTION CO.
v. SOUTHERN UTE TRIBE
coal/CBM gas estate. If CBM gas were reserved with the coal
estate, those developing the natural gas resources in the land
would have to allocate the gas between the natural gas and coal
estates based on some assessment of how much had migrated outside
the coal itself. There is no reason to think Congress would have
been more concerned about the creation of a split coal/CBM gas
estate than the creation of a split gas estate.
Because we conclude that the most natural interpretation of
"coal" as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM
gas, we need not consider the applicability of the canon that
ambiguities in land grants are construed in favor of the sovereign
or the competing canons relied on by petitioners.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment below substantially for the reasons
stated by the Court of Appeals and the federal respondents. See
151 F.3d
1251, 1256-1267 (CAlO 1998) (en bane); Brief for Federal
Respondents 14-16. As the Court recognizes, in 1909 and 1910
coalbed methane gas (CBM) was a liability. See
ante, at
870-871, 875-876. Congress did not contemplate that the surface
owner would be responsible for it. More likely, Congress would have
assumed that the coal owner had dominion over, and attendant
responsibility for, CBM. I do not find it clear that Congress
understood dominion would shift if and when the liability became an
asset. I would therefore apply the canon that ambiguities in land
grants are construed in favor of the sovereign. See
Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U. S. 36, 59 (1983)
(noting "established rule that land grants are con-
881
strued favorably to the Government, that nothing passes except
what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there are doubts
they are resolved for the Government, not against it" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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