OCTOBER TERM, 1995
Syllabus
ZICHERMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KOLE,
ET AL.
v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO., LTD.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
No.94-1361. Argued November 7, 1995-Decided January 16,
1996*
In a suit brought under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
governing international air transportation, petitioners Zicherman
and Mahalek were awarded loss-of-society damages for the death of
their mutual relative who was a passenger on respondent Korean Air
Lines' Flight KE007 when it was shot down over the Sea of Japan.
The Second Circuit set aside the award, holding that general
maritime law supplied the substantive compensatory damages law to
be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention and that, under
such law, a plaintiff can recover for loss of society only if he
was the decedent's dependent at the time of death. The court
concluded that Mahalek had not established dependent status and
remanded for the District Court to determine whether Zicherman was
a dependent of the decedent.
Held: In a suit brought under Article 17, a plaintiff may
not recover loss-of-society damages for the death of a relative in
a plane crash on the high seas, within the meaning of the Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Pp. 221-232.
(a) Article 17 permits compensation only for legally cognizable
harm, but leaves the specification of what harm is legally
cognizable to the domestic law applicable under the forum's
choice-of-law rules. That the Convention does not itself resolve
the issue of what harm is compensable is shown by the text of
Articles 17 and 24, the Convention's negotiating and drafting
history, the contracting states' postratification understanding of
the Convention, and the virtually unanimous view of expert
commentators. Pp.221-228.
(b) Having concluded that compensable harm is to be determined
by domestic law, the next logical question would be that of
which sovereign's domestic law. In this case, the Court need
not engage in this inquiry, because the parties have agreed that if
the issue of compensable harm is unresolved by the Warsaw
Convention, it is governed in the
*Together with No. 94-1477, Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. v.
Zicherman, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Kole, et
al., also on certiorari to the same court.
218
present case by the law of the United States. The final
unresolved question is then which particular United States law
applies. The death that occurred here falls within the literal
terms of DORSA § 761, and it is well established that those terms
apply to airplane crashes. Since recovery in a § 761 suit is
limited to pecuniary damages, § 762, petitioners cannot recover for
loss of society under DORSA. Moreover, where DORSA applies, neither
state law nor general maritime law can provide a basis for recovery
of loss-of-society damages. Because petitioners are not entitled to
recover loss-of-society damages under DORSA, this Court need not
reach the question whether, under general maritime law, dependency
is a prerequisite for loss-of-society damages. pp. 228-232.
43 F.3d
18, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
W Paul Needham argued the cause for petitioners in No.
94-1361 and respondents in No. 94-1477. With him on the briefs was
Kevin M. Hensley.
Andrew J. Harakas argued the cause for
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., in both cases. With him on the briefs
was
George N.
Tompkins, Jr. t
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action presents the question whether, in a suit brought
under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention governing international
air transportation, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929,49
Stat. 3000, T. S. No. 876 (1934) (reprinted in note following 49 U.
S. C. App. § 1502 (1988
t Juanita M. Madole, Donald W Madole, George E. Farrell, Milton
G.
Sincoff, and
Steven R. Pounian filed a brief for
Philomena Dooley et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amicus curiae were filed for Pan American World
Airways, Inc., by Richard M. Sharp and Frederick C. Schafrick; and
for the Plaintiffs' Committee in In re Air Crash Disaster at
Lockerbie, Scotland, by Lee S. Kreindler, Steven R. Pounian, James
P. Kreindler, Paul S. Edelman, Frank H. Granito, Jr., Frank H.
Granito III, and Michel F. Baumeister.
219
ed.)), a plaintiff may recover damages for loss of society
resulting from the death of a relative in a plane crash on the high
seas.
I
On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight KE007, en route
from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea, strayed into air
space of the Soviet Union and was shot down over the Sea of Japan.
All 269 persons on board were killed, including Muriel Kole.
Petitioners Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister
and mother, respectively, sued respondent Korean Air Lines Co.,
Ltd. (KAL), in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. Petitioners' final amended complaint
contained three counts, entitled, respectively, "Warsaw
Convention," "Death on the High Seas Act," and "Conscious Pain and
Suffering." At issue here is only the Warsaw Convention count, in
which petitioners sought "judgment against KAL for their pecuniary
damages, for their grief and mental anguish, for the loss of the
decedent's society and companionship, and for the decedent's
conscious pain and suffering." App.29.
Along with other federal-court actions arising out of the KAL
crash, petitioners' case was transferred to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for consolidated
proceedings on common issues of liability. There, a jury found that
the destruction of Flight KE007 was proximately caused by "willful
misconduct" of the flight crew, thus lifting the Warsaw
Convention's $75,000 cap on damages. See Warsaw Convention, Art.
25, 49 Stat. 3020; Order of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving
Increases in Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague
Protocol, reprinted in note following 49 U. S. C. App. § 1502 (1988
ed.). The jury awarded $50 million in punitive damages against KAL.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld
the finding of "willful misconduct," but vacated the punitive
damages award, holding that the Warsaw Convention does not permit
the recovery of punitive dam-
220
ages.
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,
932 F.2d
1475, 1479-1481, 1484-1490, cert. denied, 502 U. S. 994 (1991).
The individual cases were then remanded by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to the original transferor courts for
trial of compensatory damages issues.
At petitioners' damages trial in the Southern District of New
York, KAL moved for determination that the Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA), 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. App. § 761
et seq.
(1988 ed.), prescribed the proper claimants and the recoverable
damages, and that it did not permit damages for loss of society.
The District Court denied the motion and held,
inter alia,
that petitioners could recover for loss of "love, affection, and
companionship."
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1,
1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073, 1086-1088 (1992). The jury awarded
loss-of-society damages in the amount of $70,000 to Zicherman and
$28,000 to Mahalek.1
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside this
award. Applying its prior decisions in
In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988,
928
F.2d 1267,
1278-1279 (Lockerbie I), cert. denied
sub
nom. Rein v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 502 U. S.
920 (1991), and
In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on
Dec. 21, 1988,
37 F.3d
804 (1994)
(Lockerbie II), cert. denied
sub nom. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v.
Pagnucco, 513 U. S. 1126
(1995), it held that general maritime law supplied the substantive
law of compensatory damages to be applied in an action under the
Warsaw Convention.
43 F.3d
18, 21-22 (1994). Then, following its decision in
Lockerbie
II, it held that, under general maritime law, a plaintiff is
entitled to recover loss-of-society damages, but only if he was a
depend-
1 The jury also awarded petitioners $161,000 in survivors'
grief, $16,000 to Zicherman for loss of support and inheritance and
$100,000 to Zicherman for the decedent's pain and suffering. The
Second Circuit has set aside the award of grief damages and has
remanded for further proceedings on the award for loss of support
and inheritance. None of these awards is at issue here.
221
ent of the decedent at the time of death. 43 F. 3d, at 22. The
court concluded that as a matter of law Mahalek had not established
that status, and therefore vacated her award; it remanded to the
District Court for determination of whether Zicherman was a
dependent of Kole.
Ibid.
In their petition for certiorari, petitioners contended that
under general maritime law dependency is not a requirement for
recovering loss-of-society damages. In a cross-petition, KAL
contended that the Warsaw Convention does not allow loss-of-society
damages in this case, regardless of dependency. We granted
certiorari. 514 U. S. 1062 (1995).
II
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, as set forth in the
official American translation of the governing French text,
provides as follows:
"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." 49
Stat. 3018 (emphasis added).
The first and principal question before us is whether loss of
society of a relative is made recoverable by this provision.
It is obvious that the English word "damage" or "harm"or in the
official text of the Convention, the French word
"dommage"
2-can be applied to an extremely wide range of phenomena, from the
medical expenses incurred as a result
2 The French text of Article 17 reads:
"Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de
mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un
voyageur lorsque l'accident qui a cause Ie dommage s'est produit it
bord de l'aeronef ou au cours de toutes operations d'embarquement
et de debarquement." 49 Stat. 3005.
222
of Kole's injuries (for which every legal system would provide
tort compensation) to the mental distress of some stranger who
reads about Kole's death in the paper (for which no legal system
would provide tort compensation). It cannot seriously be maintained
that Article 17 uses the term in this broadest sense, thus
exploding tort liability beyond what any legal system in the world
allows, to the farthest reaches of what could be denominated
"harm." We therefore reject petitioners' initial proposal that we
simply look to English dictionary definitions of "damage" and apply
that term's "plain meaning." Brief for Petitioners 7-9.
There are only two thinkable alternatives to that. First, what
petitioners ultimately suggest: that
"dommage" means what
French law, in 1929, recognized as
legally cognizable harm,
which petitioners assert included not only
"dommage
materiel" (pecuniary harm of various sorts) but also
"dommage moral" (nonpecuniary harm of various sorts,
including loss of society). In support of that approach,
petitioners point out that in a prior case involving Article 17 we
were guided by French legal usage:
Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.
S. 392 (1985) (interpreting the term
"accident"). See
also
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd, 499 U. S. 530 (1991)
(interpreting the Article 17 term"
lesion corporelle"). What
is at issue here, however, is not simply whether we will be guided
by French legal usage
vel non. Because, as earlier
discussed, the dictionary meaning of the term
"dommage"
embraces harms that no legal system would compensate, it must be
acknowledged that the term is to be understood in its distinctively
legal sense-that is, to mean only
legally cognizable
harm. The nicer question, and the critical one here, is whether
the word
"dommage" establishes
as the content of the
concept "legally cognizable harm" what French law accepted as
such in 1929. No case of ours provides precedent for the adoption
of French law in such detail. In
Floyd, we looked to French
law to determine whether
"lesion corporelle" indeed meant
(as it had been translated)
223
"bodily injury" -not to determine the subsequent question
(equivalent to the question at issue here) whether "bodily injury"
encompassed psychic injury. See
id., at 536-540. And in
Saks, once we had determined that in French legal
terminology the word
"accident" referred to an unforeseen
event, we did not further inquire whether French courts would
consider the event at issue in the case unforeseen; we made that
judgment for ourselves. See 470 U. S., at 405-407.
It is particularly implausible that "the shared expectations of
the contracting parties,"
id., at 399, were that their mere
use of the French language would effect adoption of the precise
rule applied in France as to what constitutes legally cognizable
harm. Those involved in the negotiation and adoption of the
Convention could not have been ignorant of the fact that the law on
this point varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and
even from statute to statute within a single jurisdiction. Just as
we found it "unlikely" in
Floyd that Convention signatories
would have understood the general term
"lesion corporelle"
to confer a cause of action available under French law but
unrecognized in many other nations, see 499 U. S., at 540, so also
in the present case we find it unlikely that they would have
understood Article 17's use of the general term
"dommage" to
require compensation for elements of harm recognized in France but
unrecognized elsewhere, or to forbid compensation for elements of
harm
unrecognized in France but recognized elsewhere. Many
signatory nations, including Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and Sweden, did not, even many years
after the Warsaw Convention, recognize a cause of action for
nonpecuniary harm resulting from wrongful death. See 11
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law: Torts, ch. 9, pp.
15-18 (A. Tunc ed.
1972); Floyd, supra, at 544-545, n.
10.
The other alternative, and the only one we think realistic, is
to believe that
"dommage" means (as it does in French
224
legal usage) "legally cognizable harm," but that Article 17
leaves it to adjudicating courts to specify what harm is
cognizable. That is not an unusual disposition. Even within our
domestic law, many statutes that provide generally for "damages,"
or for reimbursement of "injury," leave it to the courts to decide
what sorts of harms are compensable. See,
e. g.,
Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 32 (1990)
(Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688 (1988 ed.), which provides
"action for damages" to "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal
injury," permits compensation only for pecuniary loss);
Michigan
Central R. Co. v.
Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 71 (1913)
(Employers' Liability Act of Apr. 22, 1908, which makes employer
"liable in damages ... for ... injury or death," permits
compensation only for pecuniary loss);
Broan Mfg. v.
Associated Distributors, Inc., 923 F.2d
1232, 1235-1236 (CA6 1991) (Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1117(a), which provides for recovery of "any damages sustained,"
permits compensation for future lost profits);
Phelps v.
White, 645 So. 2d 698, 703 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994)
(specifying elements of compensation allowable under La. Civ. Code
Ann. § 2315.2 (West Supp. 1995), providing for recovery of "damages
... sustained as a result" of wrongful death);
Department of
Ed. v.
Blevins, 707 S. W. 2d 782, 783 (Ky. 1986)
(Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.130 (Michie 1992), which provides
that "damages may be recovered" for wrongful death, does not permit
compensation for emotional distress).
That this is the proper interpretation is confirmed by another
provision of the Convention. Article 17 is expressly limited by
Article 24, which as translated provides:
"(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limits set out in this convention.
"(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the
questions as to who are the persons who have
225
the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights."
49 Stat. 3020 (emphasis added).3
The most natural reading of this Article is that, in an action
brought under Article 17, the law of the Convention does not affect
the substantive questions of who may bring suit and what they may
be compensated for. Those questions are to be answered by the
domestic law selected by the courts of the contracting states.
Petitioners contend that, because Article 24 refers to the parties'
"respective rights," this provision defers to domestic law
only on the "procedural" issues of who has standing to sue and how
the proceeds of a damages award under Article 17 should be divided
among eligible claimants. It does not seem to us that the question
of who is entitled to a damages award is procedural; and in any
event limiting Article 24 to procedural issues would render it
superfluous, since Article 28(2) provides that "[q]uestions of
procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which the
case is submitted." 49 Stat. 3021. More importantly, petitioners'
reading of Article 24(2) would produce a strange regime in which
1929 French law (embodied in the Convention) determines what harms
arising out of international air accidents must be indemnified,
while current domestic law determines who is entitled to the
indemnity and how it is to be divided among claimants. When
presented with an equally plausible reading of Article 24 that
leads to a more comprehensible result-that the Convention left to
domestic law the questions of who may recover and what compensatory
damages are available to them-we decline to
3 The governing French text of Article 24 provides:
"(1) Dans les cas prevus aux articles 18 et 19 toute action en
responsabilite, it quelque titre que ce soit, ne peut etre exercee
que dans les conditions et limites prevues par la presente
Convention.
"(2) Dans les cas prevus it l'article 17, s'appliquent egalement
les dispositions de l'alinea precedent, sans prejudice de la
determination des personnes qui ont Ie droit d'agir et de leurs
droits respectifs." 49 Stat. 3006.
226
embrace a reading that would produce the melange of French and
domestic law proposed by petitioners.
Because a treaty ratified by the United States is not only the
law of this land, see U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, but also an
agreement among sovereign powers, we have traditionally considered
as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history
(travaux prl3paratoiresJ and the postratification
understanding of the contracting parties. Both of these sources
confirm that the compensable injury is to be determined by domestic
law. In the drafting history, the only statements we know of that
directly discuss the point were made by the Comite International
Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens (CITEJA), which did the
preparatory work for the two Conferences (1925 in Paris, 1929 in
Warsaw) that produced the Warsaw Convention. In its report of May
15, 1928, the Committee stated:
"It was asked whether it would not be possible, in this respect,
to determine the category of damages subject to reparations.
"Although this question seemed very interesting, it was not
possible to find a satisfactory solution before knowing exactly the
legislation of the various countries. It was understood that the
question would be studied later on, when the issue of knowing which
are the persons, who according to the various national laws, have
the right to take action against the carrier, will have been
elucidated." Report of the Third Session of CITEJA by Henry de Vos,
reprinted in International Technical Committee of Legal Experts on
Air Questions 106 (May 1928).
To the same effect is the following passage from the CITEJA
Report accompanying the 1929 draft:
"The question was asked of knowing if one could determine who
the persons upon whom the action devolves in the case of death are,
and what are the damages sub-
227
ject to reparation. It was not possible to find a satisfactory
solution to this double problem, and the CITEJA esteemed that this
question of private international law should be regulated
independantly [sic] from the present Convention." Report of
the Third Session of CITEJA by Henry de Vos (Sept. 25, 1928),
reprinted in Second International Conference on Private
Aeronautical Law Minutes, Warsaw 1929, p. 255 (R. Horner & D.
Legrez transl. 1975).
Both these statements make clear that the questions of who may
recover, and what compensatory damages they may receive, were
regarded as intertwined; and that both were unresolved by the
Convention and left to "private international law" -i.
e.,
to the area of jurisprudence we call "conflict of laws," dealing
with the application of varying domestic laws to disputes that have
an interstate or international component.
We are unpersuaded by petitioners' reliance on the comment of
French delegate Georges Ripert, asserting, as one basis for
rejecting application of domestic law to the issue of carriers'
vicarious liability, that it would be "the first time that
application of national law is required."
Id., at 66. Reply
Brief for Petitioners 2-3. Not only does this remark not have the
authority of submissions by the drafting committee, but it is a
generalization rather than a statement focused specifically upon
the issue here: what law governs the "category of damages subject
to reparations." And the generalization is demonstrably wrong to
boot, since it is incontrovertible that Article 24 of the
Convention requires the application of national law to
some
issues.
The postratification conduct of the contracting parties displays
the same understanding that the damages recoverable-so long as they
consist of compensation for harm incurred
(dommage
survenu)-are to be determined by domestic law. Some countries,
including England, Germany and the Netherlands, have adopted
domestic legislation to
228
govern the types of damages recoverable in a Convention case.
See Haanappel, The right to sue in death cases under the Warsaw
Convention, 6 Air Law 66, 72, 74 (1981); E. Giemulla, R. Schmid,
& P. Ehlers, Warsaw Convention 39, n. 5 (1992); German Law
Concerning Air Navigation (Luft VG) of Jan. 10, 1959, Arts. 35-36,
38, reprinted in 1 Senate Committee on Commerce, Air Laws and
Treaties of the World, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 766-768 (Comm. Print
1965); R. Mankiewicz, The Liability Regime of the International Air
Carrier, 187, pp. 160-161 (1981). Canada has adopted legislation
setting forth who may bring suit under Article 24(2), but has left
the question of what types of damages are recoverable to provincial
law. Haanappel,
supra, at 70-71. The Court of Appeals of
Quebec has rejected the argument that Article 17 permits damages
unrecoverable under domestic Quebec law.
Dame Surprenant v.
Air Canada, [1973] C. A. 107, 117-118, 126-127 (opinion of
Deschenes, J.). But see
Preston v.
Hunting Air Transport
Ltd., [1956] 1 Q. B. 454,461-462 (granting damages under
Convention, but without considering Article 24). Finally, the
expert commentators are virtually unanimous that the type of harm
compensable is to be determined by domestic law. See,
e.
g., H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air
Law , 111, pp. 125-126 (1954); Giemulla, Schmid, & Ehlers,
supra, at 33; D. Goedhuis, National Airlegislations and the
Warsaw Convention 269 (1937); Mankiewicz,
supra, , 187, at
160-161; G. Miller, Liability in International Air Transport: The
Warsaw System in Municipal Courts 125 (1977); see also Cha, The Air
Carrier's Liability to Passengers in International Law, 7 Air L.
Rev. 25, 56-57 (1936).
III
Having concluded that compensable harm is to be determined by
domestic law, the next question to which we would logically turn is
that of
which sovereign's domestic law. That is the "private
international law" issue alluded to in the last-quoted excerpt from
the CITEJA Report. Choice of
229
law is, of course, determined by the forum jurisdiction, see E.
Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.56 (1982), and would
normally be a question confronting us here. We have been spared
that inquiry, however, because both parties agree that if the issue
of compensable harm is (as we have determined) unresolved by the
Convention itself, it is governed in the present case by the law of
the United States.
That leaves a final question unresolved: Which particular law of
the United States provides the governing rule? The Second Circuit,
moved by the need to "maintain a uniform law under the Warsaw
Convention," held that general maritime law governs causes of
action under the Convention, whether the accident out of which they
arise occurs on land or on the high seas. 43 F. 3d, at 21-22. We
think not. As we have discussed, the Convention itself contains no
rule of law governing the present question; nor does it empower us
to develop some common-law rule-under cover of general admiralty
law or otherwise-that will supersede the normal federal
disposition. Congress may choose to enact special provisions
applicable to Warsaw Convention cases, as some countries have done.
See
supra, at 227-228. Absent such legislation, however,
Articles 17 and 24(2) provide nothing more than a pass-through,
authorizing us to apply the law that would govern in absence of the
Warsaw Convention. There is little doubt what that law is in this
case.
Section 761 of DOHSA provides:
"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or
the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal
representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in
the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the
exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child,
or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation
which would
230
have been liable if death had not ensued." 46 U. S. C. App. §
761 (1988 ed.).
The death that occurred here falls within the literal terms of
this provision, and it is well established that those literal terms
apply to airplane crashes. See
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc.
v.
Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249, 263-264
(1972). Section 762 of DOHSA provides that the recovery in a suit
under § 761 "shall be a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit
is brought." 46 U. S. C. App. § 762. Thus, petitioners cannot
recover loss-of-society damages under DOHSA. Moreover, where DOHSA
applies, neither state law, see
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.
Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 232-233
(1986), nor general maritime law, see
Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625-626
(1978), can provide a basis for recovery of loss-of-society
damages.4
Petitioners argue that DOHSA should not apply to this cause of
action because of the concern expressed by the Second Circuit: that
"a uniform law should govern Warsaw Convention cases." 43 F. 3d, at
21. They urge that, if we must look to domestic law, we should
craft a federal rule of damages that will be applicable in all
suits brought under the Convention. Undoubtedly it was a primary
function of the Warsaw Convention to foster uniformity in the law
of international air travel, see
Floyd, 499 U. S., at 552,
but as our discussion above has made clear, this is not an area in
which the imposition of uniformity was found feasible. See
supra, at 226-227. The Convention neither adopted any
uniform
4 We need not consider whether § 761 of DORSA calls into
question the District Court's determination that the decedent's
mother is a proper party to this suit, or its grant of a jury
trial, see
Romero v.
International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U. S.
354, 371, n. 28 (1959), and whether § 762 contradicts the
District Court's allowance of pain and suffering damages, see
Offshore Logistics, Inc., 477 U. S., at 215, n. 1. KAL
challenged none of these rulings in its petition for
certiorari.
231
rule of its own nor authorized national courts to pursue
uniformity in derogation of otherwise applicable law. Petitioners
argue, in effect, that the Convention contains an implicit
authorization for national courts to create uniformity between
overland and oversea accidents governed by their respective
domestic laws, even though it leaves the vast discrepancies among
the various domestic laws untouched. That is most unlikely.
Finally, petitioners contend that DOHSA cannot supply the
substantive law of damages, because this would result in an
unintended "double cap." They argue that the Warsaw Convention's
$75,000 per passenger limit on liability (except in cases of
willful misconduct), when combined with a DOHSA rule prohibiting
compensation for nonpecuniary harm, will not sufficiently deter
willful misconduct. We are unpersuaded. The Convention
unquestionably envisions the application of domestic law; it is the
function of Congress, and not of this Court, to decide that
domestic law, alone or in combination with the Convention, provides
inadequate deterrence.
***
We conclude that Articles 17 and 24(2) of the Warsaw Convention
permit compensation only for legally cognizable harm, but leave the
specification of what harm is legally cognizable to the domestic
law applicable under the forum's choice-of-law rules. Where, as
here, an airplane crash occurs on the high seas, DOHSA supplies the
substantive United States law. Because DOHSA permits only pecuniary
damages, petitioners are not entitled to recover for loss of
society. We therefore need not reach the question whether, under
general maritime law, dependency is a prerequisite for
loss-of-society damages.
Accordingly, that portion of the Second Circuit judgment
permitting Zicherman to recover loss-of-society damages if she can
establish her dependency on the decedent is re-
232
versed, and that portion of the judgment vacating the award of
loss-of-society damages to Mahalek is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment