OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
WRIGHT, WARDEN, ET AL.
v. WEST
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT
No. 91-542. Argued March 24, 1992-Decided June 19, 1992
A few weeks after a Virginia home was burglarized, over 15 of
the missing items were recovered from respondent West's home. At
his trial on grand larceny charges, he admitted to a prior felony
conviction, but denied having stolen the items, explaining that he
frequently bought and sold merchandise at different flea markets.
He offered no explanation for how he had acquired any of the stolen
items until cross-examination, when he gave vague, evasive, and
even contradictory answers; could not remember how he acquired
several major items, including a television set and a coffee table;
and failed to produce any evidence corroborating his story. West
was convicted. The State Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, both times
rejecting,
inter alia, West's contention that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. On federal habeas, the District Court also rejected that
contention. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the
standard of
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319-that
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction as a matter of due
process if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt" -had not been met.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
931 F.2d
262, reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE THOMAS, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA,
concluded that regardless of whether a federal habeas court should
review state-court applications of law to fact deferentially or
de novo, the trial record contains more than enough evidence
to support West's conviction.
Jackson repeatedly emphasizes
the deference owed the trier of fact and the sharply limited nature
of constitutional sufficiency review. The case against West was
strong. The jury was entitled to disbelieve his uncorroborated and
confused testimony, discount his credibility on account of his
prior felony conviction, and take his demeanor into account. The
jury was also permitted to consider what it concluded to be
perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt. Pp.
295-297.
278
Syllabus
JUSTICE WHITE concluded that there was enough evidence to
support West's conviction under the
Jackson standard. P.
297.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE
STEVENS, concluded that the evidence supported West's conviction
and that there was no need to decide the standard of review issue
to decide this case. Pp. 297, 305-306.
JUSTICE KENNEDY concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
convince a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and that
Teague v.
Lane, 489 U. S. 288, should not
be interpreted as calling into question the settled principle that
mixed questions are subject to
de novo review on federal
habeas corpus. Pp. 306-310.
JUSTICE SOUTER concluded that West sought the benefit of a "new
rule," and thus his claim was barred by
Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.
S. 288. The Court of Appeals misapplied
Teague's
commands, since, while the
Jackson rule was "old" enough to
have predated the finality of West's conviction, it was not
specific enough to dictate the rule on which the conviction was
held unlawful. Although the State Supreme Court was not entitled to
disregard
Jackson, it does not follow from
Jackson's
rule that the insufficiency of the evidence to support West's
conviction was apparent. Virginia has long recognized a rule that
evidence of falsely explained possession of recently stolen
property is sufficient to sustain a finding that the possessor took
the goods, and the jury's rejection of West's explanation implies a
finding that his explanation was false. Virginia's rule is
reasonable and has been accepted as good law against the backdrop
of a general state sufficiency standard no less stringent than the
Jackson rule. Thus, it is not possible to say that
reasonable jurists could not have considered Virginia's rule
compatible with the
Jackson standard. Pp. 310-316.
THOMAS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, J., joined. WHITE,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
297. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined,
post, p. 297.
KENNEDY, J.,
post, p. 306, and SOUTER, J.,
post, p.
310, filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
Donald R. Curry, Senior Assistant Attorney General of
Virginia, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs
were
Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General,
H. Lane
Kneedler, Chief Deputy Attorney General,
Stephen D.
Rosenthal, Deputy Attorney General, and
Jerry P.
Slonaker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
279
Maureen E. Mahoney, Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause
for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the
brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General
Mueller, and Deputy Solicitor General Roberts.
Steven H. Goldblatt argued the cause and filed a brief
for respondent. *
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Florida et al. by
Robert A. Butterworth,
Attorney General of Florida, and
Richard B. Martell,
Assistant Attorney General,
Charles E. Cole, Attorney
General of Alaska,
Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona,
Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas,
Daniel E.
Lungren, Attorney General of California,
Gale A. Norton,
Attorney General of Colorado,
Richard N. Palmer, Chief
State's Attorney of Connecticut,
Charles M. Oberly III,
Attorney General of Delaware,
Michael J.
Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia,
Warren Price
III, Attorney General of Hawaii,
Larry EchoHawk,
Attorney General of Idaho,
Linley E. Pearson, Attorney
General of Indiana,
Bonnie J. Campbell,
Attorney General of Iowa,
Robert T. Stephen, Attorney
General of Kansas,
Chris Gorman, Attorney General of
Kentucky,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of
Maryland,
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of
Minnesota,
Michael C.
Moore, Attorney General of
Mississippi,
William L. Webster, Attorney General of
Missouri,
Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana,
Don
Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska,
Frankie Sue Del
Papa, Attorney General of Nevada,
John P. Arnold,
Attorney General of New Hampshire,
Robert J. Del
Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey,
Tom Udall,
Attorney General of New Mexico,
Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney
General of North Carolina,
Nicholas J. Spaeth,
Attorney General of North Dakota,
Susan B. Loving, Attorney
General of Oklahoma,
Charles S.
Crookham, Attorney
General of Oregon,
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General
of Pennsylvania,
T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of
South Carolina,
Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South
Dakota,
Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas,
Paul Van
Dam, Attorney General of Utah,
Jeffrey L. Amestoy,
Attorney General of Vermont,
Kenneth O.
Eikenberry,
Attorney General of Washington,
Mario J.
Palumbo, Attorney General of West Virginia, and
Joseph B.
Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; and for the Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation by
Kent S.
Scheidegger.
Leslie A. Harris, Steven R. Shapiro, and
John A.
Powell filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et
al. as
amici curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for the State of New
York et al. by
Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York,
Lee Fisher, Attorney
280
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
JUSTICE THOMAS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA
joined.
In this case, we must determine whether the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit correctly applied our decision in
Jackson
v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), in
concluding that the evidence against respondent Frank West was
insufficient, as a matter of due process, to support his
state-court conviction for grand larceny.
I
Between December 13 and December 26, 1978, someone broke into
the Westmoreland County, Virginia, home of Angelo Card ova and
stole items valued at approximately $3,500. On January 10, 1979,
police conducted a lawful search of the Gloucester County,
Virginia, home of West and his wife. They discovered several of the
items stolen from the Cardova home, including various electronic
equipment (two television sets and a record player); articles of
clothing (an imitation mink coat with the name "Esther" embroidered
in it, a silk jacket emblazoned "Korea 1970," and a pair of shoes);
decorations (several wood carvings and a mounted lobster); and
miscellaneous household objects (a mirror framed with seashells, a
coffee table, a bar, a sleeping bag, and some silverware). These
items were valued at approximately $800, and the police recovered
other, unspecified items of Cardova's property with an approximate
value of $300.
West was charged with grand larceny. Testifying at trial on his
own behalf, he admitted to a prior felony conviction, but denied
having taken anything from Cardova's house.
General of Ohio,
Jerry Boone, Solicitor General of New
York,
Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and
Martin A. Hotvet, Assistant Attorney General; for Senator
Biden et al. by
William F.
Sheehan and
Christopher
E. Palmer; for the American Bar Association by
Talbot
D'Alemberte and
Seth P. Waxman; for Benjamin R.
Civiletti et al. by
Douglas G.
Robinson and
James S.
Liebman; and for Gerald Gunther et al. by
Larry W Yackle.
281
He explained that he had bought and sold "a lot of ...
merchandise" from "several guys" at "flea bargain places" where,
according to West, "a lot of times you buy things ... that are
stolen" although "you never know it." App. 21. On crossexamination,
West said that he had bought many of the stolen items from a Ronnie
Elkins, whom West claimed to have known for years. West testified
that he purchased one of the wood carvings, the jacket, mounted
lobster, mirror, and bar from Elkins for about $500. West initially
guessed, and then twice positively asserted, that this sale
occurred before January 1, 1979. In addition, West claimed to have
purchased the coat from Elkins for $5 around January 1, 1979. His
testimony did not make clear whether he was describing one
transaction or two, whether there were any other transactions
between himself and Elkins, where the transactions occurred, and
whether the transactions occurred at flea markets.1 West testified
further that he had purchased one of
1 The quality of West's testimony on these matters can best be
appreci-
ated by example:
"Q Are those items that you bought at a flea market?
"A Well, I didn't buy these items at a flea market, no sir. "Q
Whose items are they?
"A They are some items that I got from a Ronnie Elkins. "Q All
of the items you bought from him?
"A I can't say all.
"Q Which ones did you buy from him?
"A I can't say, because I don't have an inventory.
"Q Can you tell me the ones you bought from Ronnie Elkins? "A
Yes, I am sure I can.
"Q Which ones?
"A I would say the platter.
"Q How about the sea shell mirror? "A Yes, sir, I think so.
"Q Where did you buy that?
"A In Newport News at a flea market." App.21-22.
"Q I want to know about your business transactions with Ronnie
Elkins.
[Footnote 1 is continued on
p. 282J
282
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
the television sets in an entirely separate transaction in
Goochland County, from an individual whose name he had forgotten.
Finally, West testified that he did not remember how he had
acquired the second television, the coffee table, and the
silverware.
Under then-applicable Virginia law, grand larceny was defined as
the wrongful and nonconsensual taking of property worth at least
$100, with the intent to deprive the owner of it permanently. See
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-95 (1975);
Skeeter v.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 722, 725, 232 S. E. 2d 756, 758
(1977). Virginia law permits an inference that a person who fails
to explain, or falsely explains, his exclusive possession of
recently stolen property is the thief. See,
e. g., Moehring
v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 568, 290 S. E. 2d 891, 893
(1982); Best v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 387, 389, 282
S. E. 2d 16, 17 (1981). The trial court instructed the jurors about
this permissive inference, but warned that the inference did not
compromise their constitutional obligation to acquit unless they
found that the State had established every element
"A I buy and sell different items from different individuals at
flea
markets.
"Q Tell us where that market is.
"A In Richmond. You have them in Gloucester. "Q Where is Ronnie
Elkins' flea market?
"A He does not have one.
"Q Didn't you say you bought some items from Ronnie Elkins? "A
At a flea market.
"Q Tell the jury where that is at
[sic]. "A In
Gloucester.
"Q Tell the jury about this flea market and Ronnie Elkins, some
time around January 1, and these items, not the other items.
"A Ronnie Elkins does not own a flea market.
"Q Tell the jury, if you will, where Ronnie Elkins was on the
day that
you bought the items?
"A I don't remember. It was before January 1. "Q Where was
it?
"A I bought stuff from him in Richmond, Gloucester, and Newport
News."
Id., at 26-27.
283
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See
In re
Winship, 397 U.
S. 358 (1970).2
The jury returned a guilty verdict, and West received a 10-year
prison sentence. West petitioned for an appeal, contending (among
other things) that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In May 1980, the
Supreme Court of Virginia refused the petition-a disposition
indicating that the court found the petition without merit, see
Saunders v.
Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 700,204 S. E. 2d
421, 424 (1974). Seven years later, West filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the same court, supported by an affidavit
executed by Ronnie Elkins in April 1987. West renewed his claim
that the original trial record contained insufficient evidence to
support the conviction, and he argued in the alternative that
Elkins' affidavit, which tended to corroborate West's trial
testimony in certain respects, constituted new evidence entitling
him to a new trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia again denied
relief. West then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which
rejected both claims and denied relief.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.
931 F.2d
262 (1991). As the court correctly recognized, a
2 The instruction on the permissive inference read:
"If you belie[ve] from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that property of a value of $100.00 or more was stolen from Angelo
F. C[a]rdova, and that it was recently thereafter found in the
exclusive and personal possession of the defendant, and that such
possession has been unexplained or falsely denied by the defendant,
then such possession is sufficient to raise an inference that the
defendant was the thief; and if such inference, taking into
consideration the whole evidence, leads you to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the theft, then you
shall find the defendant guilty." App. 34.
Several other instructions emphasized that despite the
permissive inference, "[t]he burden is upon the Commonwealth to
prove by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt every material and
necessary element of the offense charged against the defendant."
Ibid.
284
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
claim that evidence is insufficient to support a conviction as a
matter of due process depends on "whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S., at 319 (emphasis in original). Five
considerations led the court to conclude that this standard was not
met: first, the items were recovered no sooner than two weeks after
they had been stolen; second, only about a third of the items
stolen from Cardova (measured by value) were recovered from West;
third, the items were found in West's house in plain view, and not
hidden away as contraband; fourth, West's explanation of his
possession was not so "inherently implausible," even if it were
disbelieved, that it could "fairly be treated as positive evidence
of guilt"; and fifth, there was no corroborating evidence (such as
fingerprints or eyewitness testimony) beyond the fact of mere
possession. See 931 F. 2d, at 268-270. The court viewed West's
testimony as "at most, a neutral factor,"
id., at 270,
despite noting his "confusion" about the details of his alleged
purchases,
id., at 269, and despite conceding that his
testimony "at first blush ... may itself seem incredible,"
id., at 270, n. 7. In holding that the
Jackson
standard was not met, the court did not take into consideration the
fact that the Supreme Court of Virginia had twice previously
concluded otherwise.
After the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by an equally
divided court, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 34-35, the warden and the
State Attorney General sought review in this Court on, among other
questions, whether the Court of Appeals had applied
Jackson
correctly in this case. We granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 1012
(1991), and requested additional briefing on the question whether a
federal habeas court should afford deference to state-court
determinations applying law to the specific facts of a case, 502 U.
S. 1021 (1991). We now reverse.
285
II
The habeas corpus statute permits a federal court to entertain a
petition from a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U. S. C. §2254(a). The court must "dispose of
the matter as law and justice require." § 2243. For much of our
history, we interpreted these bare guidelines and their
predecessors to reflect the common-law principle that a prisoner
seeking a writ of habeas corpus could challenge only the
jurisdiction of the court that had rendered the judgment under
which he was in custody. See,
e. g., In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278, 285-287
(1891) (Harlan, J.);
Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202
(1830) (Marshall, C. J.). Gradually, we began to expand the
category of claims deemed to be jurisdictional for habeas purposes.
See,
e. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 377 (1880)
(court without jurisdiction to impose sentence under
unconstitutional statute);
Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176
(1874) (court without jurisdiction to impose sentence not
authorized by statute). Next, we began to recognize federal claims
by state prisoners if no state court had provided a full and fair
opportunity to litigate those claims. See,
e. g., Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 91-92 (1923);
Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.
S. 309, 335336 (1915). Before 1953, however, the inverse of
this rule also remained true: Absent an alleged jurisdictional
defect, "habeas corpus would not lie for a [state] prisoner ... if
he had been given an adequate opportunity to obtain full and fair
consideration of his federal claim in the state courts."
Fay
v.
Noia, 372
U. S. 391, 459-460 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 478-499 (1963). In other
words, the state-court judgment was entitled to
"absolute
respect,"
Kuhlmann v.
Wil-
286
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
son, 477 U.
S. 436, 446 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added),
and a federal habeas court could not review it even for
reasonableness.3
3 JUSTICE O'CONNOR offers three criticisms of our summary of the
history of habeas corpus before 1953, none of which we find
convincing. First, she contends that the full-and-fair litigation
standard in
Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915), and
Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923),
served no purpose other than to define the scope of the underlying
alleged constitutional violation. See
post, at 297-299.
Frank and
Moore involved claims, rejected by the
state appellate courts, that a trial had been so dominated by a mob
as to violate due process. In
Frank, we denied relief not
because the state appellate court had decided the federal claim
correctly (the relevant question on direct review), and not
even because the state appellate court had decided the federal
claim
reasonably, but only "because Frank's federal claims
had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal,"
Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 476
(1976). In
Moore, which reaffirmed
Frank expressly,
see 261 U. S., at 90-91, we ordered the District Court to consider
the mob domination claim on the merits because the state appellate
court's "perfunctory treatment" of it "was not in fact acceptable
corrective process."
Noia, 372 U. S., at 458 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); see also Bator, 76 Harv. L. Rev., at 488-489. In both
cases, a claim that the habeas petitioner had been denied due
process
at trial was not cognizable on habeas unless the
petitioner
also had been denied a full and fair opportunity
to raise that claim
on appeal.
Second, JUSTICE O'CONNOR states that we mischaracterize the
views of Justice Powell about the history of habeas law between
1915 and 1953. See
post, at 299. In fact, however, Justice
Powell has often recounted exactly the same familiar history that
we summarize above. In
Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), for
example, he described
Frank as having "modestly expanded"
the "scope of the writ" in order to "encompass those cases where
the defendant's federal constitutional claims had not been
considered in the state-court proceeding." 443 U. S., at 580
(opinion concurring in judgment). Similarly, in
Schneckloth
v.
Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), he
described
Frank as having extended "[t]he scope of federal
habeas corpus" to permit consideration of "whether the applicant
had been given an adequate opportunity in state court to raise his
constitutional claims." 412 U. S., at 255-256 (concurring opinion).
In neither case, nor in
Kuhlmann, did Justice Powell even
suggest that federal habeas was available before 1953 to a prisoner
who had received a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
federal claim in state court.
Third, JUSTICE O'CONNOR criticizes our failure to acknowledge
Salinger
287
We rejected the principle of absolute deference in our landmark
decision in
Brown v.
Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953).
There, we held that a state-court judgment of conviction "is not
res judicata" on federal habeas with respect to federal
constitutional claims,
id., at 458, even if the state court
has rejected all such claims after a full and fair hearing.
Instead, we held, a district court must determine whether the
state-court adjudication "has resulted in a satisfactory
conclusion."
Id., at 463. We had no occasion to explore in
detail the question whether a "satisfactory" conclusion was one
that the habeas court considered
correct, as opposed to
merely
reasonable, because we concluded that the
constitutional claims advanced in
Brown itself would fail
even if the state courts' rejection of them were reconsidered
de
novo. See
id., at 465-476. Nonetheless, we indicated
that the federal courts enjoy at least the discretion to take into
consideration the fact that a state court has previously rejected
the federal claims asserted on habeas. See
id., at 465 ("As
the state and federal courts have the same responsibilities to
protect persons from violation of their constitutional rights, we
conclude that a federal district court may decline, without a
rehearing of the facts, to award a writ of habeas corpus to a state
prisoner where the legality of such detention has been
plicitly to hold that
"res judicata is not strictly
followed on federal habeas."
Post, at 299.
Salinger,
however, involved the degree of preclusive effect of a habeas
judgment upon
subsequent habeas petitions filed by a
federal prisoner. This case, of course, involves the degree
of preclusive effect of a criminal conviction upon an
initial habeas petition filed by a
state prisoner. We
cannot fault ourselves for limiting our focus to the latter
context. But even assuming its relevance,
Salinger hardly
advances the position advocated by JUSTICE O'CONNOR that a habeas
court must exercise
de novo review with respect to mixed
questions of law and fact. Despite acknowledging that a prior
habeas judgment is not entitled to absolute preclusive effect under
the doctrine of res judicata,
Salinger also indicated that
the prior habeas judgment
"may be considered, and even given
controlling weight." 265 U. S., at 231 (emphasis added).
288
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
determined, on the facts presented, by the highest state court
with jurisdiction").4
In an influential separate opinion endorsed by a majority of the
Court, Justice Frankfurter also rejected the principle of absolute
deference to fairly litigated state-court judgments. He emphasized
that a state-court determination of federal constitutional law is
not "binding" on federal habeas,
id., at 506, regardless of
whether the determination involves a pure question of law,
ibid., or a "so-called mixed questio[n]" requiring the
application of law to fact,
id., at 507. Nonetheless, he
stated quite explicitly that a "prior State determination may guide
[the] discretion [of the district court] in deciding upon the
appropriate course to be followed in disposing of the application."
Id., at 500. Discussing mixed questions specifically, he
noted further that "there is no need for the federal judge, if he
could, to shut his eyes to the State consideration."
Id., at
508.5
4JUSTICE O'CONNOR contends that the inclusion of this passage in
a section of our opinion entitled "Right to a Plenary Hearing"
makes clear that we were discussing only the resolution of
factual questions. See
post, at 300-301. In our
introduction to that section, however, we indicated that both
factual and legal questions were at issue. See 344 U. S., at 460
(noting contentions "that the District Court committed error when
it took no evidence
and heard no argument on the federal
constitutional issues" (emphasis added)). Indeed, if only
factual questions were at issue, we would have authorized a denial
of the writ not whenever the statecourt proceeding "has resulted in
a satisfactory
conclusion" (as we did),
id., at 463
(emphasis added), but only whenever the state-court proceeding has
resulted in satisfactory
factjinding.
5 JUSTICE O'CONNOR quotes Justice Frankfurter for the
proposition that a district judge on habeas"
'must exercise his
own judgment' "with respect to mixed questions.
Post, at
300 (quoting 344 U. S., at 507). Although we agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that this passage by itself suggests a
de novo
standard, it is not easily reconciled with Justice Frankfurter's
later statement that "there is no need for the federal judge, if he
could, to shut his eyes to the State consideration" of the mixed
question,
id., at 508. These statements can be reconciled,
of course, on the assumption that the habeas judge must review the
state-court determination for reasonableness. But we need not
attempt to defend that conclusion in detail, for
289
In subsequent cases, we repeatedly reaffirmed
Brown's
teaching that mixed constitutional questions are "open to review on
collateral attack,"
Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 342
(1980), without ever explicitly considering whether that "review"
should be
de novo or deferential. In some of these cases, we
would have denied habeas relief even under
de novo review,
see,
e. g., Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 698 (1984)
(facts make it "clear" that habeas petitioner did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel);
Neil v.
Biggers,
409 U. S. 188,
201 (1972) (facts disclose "no substantial likelihood" that habeas
petitioner was subjected to unreliable pretrial lineup); in others,
we would have awarded habeas relief even under deferential review,
see,
e. g., Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 405 (1977)
(facts provide "no reasonable basis" for finding valid waiver of
right to counsel);
Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 725 (1961)
(facts show "clear and convincing" evidence of biased jury); and in
yet others, we remanded for application of a proper legal rule
without addressing that standard of review question, see,
e. g.,
Cuyler, supra, at 342, 350. Nonetheless, because these cases
never qualified our early citation of
Brown for the
proposition that a federal habeas court
must reexamine mixed
constitutional questions "independently,"
Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.
S. 293, 318 (1963) (dictum), we have gradually come to treat as
settled the rule that mixed constitutional questions are "subject
to plenary federal review" on habeas,
Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.
S. 104, 112 (1985).6
we conclude not that
Brown v.
Allen establishes
deferential review for reasonableness, but only that
Brown
does not squarely foreclose it.
6 We have no disagreement with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that
Brown v.
Allen quickly came to be cited for the
proposition that a habeas court should review mixed questions
"independently"; that several of our cases since
Brown have
applied a
de novo standard with respect to pure and mixed
legal questions; and that the
de novo standard thus appeared
well settled with respect to both categories by the time the Court
decided
Miller v.
Fenton in 1985. See
post, at
301-302. Despite her extended discussion of the leading cases from
Brown through
Miller, however, JUSTICE O'CON-
290
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
Jackson itself contributed to this trend. There, we held
that a conviction violates due process if supported only by
evidence from which "no rational trier of fact could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U. S., at 317. We stated explicitly
that a state-court judgment applying the
Jackson rule in a
particular case "is of course entitled to deference" on federal
habeas.
Id., at 323; see also
id., at 336, n. 9
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("State judges are more
familiar with the elements of state offenses than are federal
judges and should be better able to evaluate sufficiency claims").
Notwithstanding these principles, however, we then indicated that
the habeas court itself should apply the
Jackson rule, see
id., at 324, rather than merely reviewing the state courts'
application of it for reasonableness. Ultimately, though, we had no
occasion to resolve our conflicting statements on the standard of
review question, because we concluded that the habeas petitioner
was not entitled to relief even under our own
de novo
application of
Jackson. See
id., at 324-326.7
NOR offers nothing to refute those of our limited observations
with which she evidently disagrees-that an unadorned citation to
Brown should not have been enough, at least as an original
matter, to establish
de novo review with respect to mixed
questions; and that in none of our leading cases was the choice
between a
de novo and a deferential standard outcome
determinative.
7 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that
Jackson "expressly
rejected" a "deferential standard of review" that she characterizes
as "very much like the one" urged on us by petitioners.
Post, at 303 (citing 443 U. S., at 323). What
Jackson
expressly rejected, however, was a proposal that habeas review
"should be foreclosed" if the state courts provide "appellate
review of the sufficiency of the evidence."
Ibid. That rule,
of course, would permit
no habeas review of a state-court
sufficiency determination. As we understand it, however,
petitioners' proposal would permit limited review for
reasonableness, a standard surely consistent with our own statement
that that state-court determination "is of course entitled to
deference."
Ibid. We agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that
Jackson itself applied a
de novo standard. See
post, at 303. Nonetheless, given our statement
291
Despite our apparent adherence to a standard of
de novo
habeas review with respect to mixed constitutional questions, we
have implicitly questioned that standard, at least with respect to
pure legal questions, in our recent retroactivity precedents. In
Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313-314
(1989), a majority of this Court endorsed the retroactivity
analysis advanced by JUSTICE O'CONNOR for a plurality in
Teague v.
Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989).
Under
Teague, a habeas petitioner generally cannot benefit
from a new rule of criminal procedure announced after his
conviction has become final on direct appeal. See
id., at
305-310 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).
Teague defined a "new"
rule as one that was "not
dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final."
Id., at
301 (emphasis in original). In
Butler v.
McKellar,
494 U. S. 407,
415 (1990), we explained that the definition includes all rules
"susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." Thus, if a state
court has reasonably rejected the legal claim asserted by a habeas
petitioner under existing law, then the claim seeks the benefit of
a "new" rule under
Butler, and is therefore not cognizable
on habeas under
Teague. In other words, a federal habeas
court "must defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim
unless that decision is patently unreasonable."
Butler,
supra, at 422 (Brennan, J., dissenting).8
expressly endorsing a notion of at least limited deference, and
given that the
Jackson petitioner would have lost under
either a
de novo standard or a reasonableness standard, we
cannot agree that the case "expressly rejected" the latter.
Post, at 303.
8JUSTICE O'CONNOR suggests that
Teague and its progeny
"did not establish a standard of review at all."
Post, at
303-304. Instead, she contends, these cases merely prohibit the
retroactive application of new rules on habeas,
ibid., and
establish the criterion for distinguishing new rules from old ones,
ibid. We have no difficulty with describing
Teague as
a case about retroactivity, rather than standards of review,
although we do not dispute JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S suggestion that the
difference, at least in practice, might well be "only 'a matter of
phrasing.'''
Post, at 304 (cita-
292
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
Teague was premised on the view that retroactivity
questions in habeas corpus proceedings must take account of the
nature and function of the writ, which we described as "'a
collateral remedy ... not designed as a substitute for
direct review.'" 489 U. S., at 306 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.)
(quoting
Mackey v.
United States, 401 U. S. 667, 682-683
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting
in part)) (emphasis in
Mackey). JUSTICE STEVENS reasoned
similarly in
Jackson, where he stressed that habeas corpus
"is not intended as a substitute for appeal, nor as a device for
reviewing the merits of guilt determinations at criminal trials,"
but only "to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems." 443 U. S., at 332, n. 5 (opinion
concurring in judgment); see also
Greer v.
Miller,
483 U. S. 756,
768-769 (1987) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Indeed, the
notion that different standards should apply on direct and
collateral review runs throughout our recent habeas jurisprudence.
We have said, for example, that new rules always have retroactive
application to
tion omitted). We do disagree, however, with JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S
definition of what constitutes a "new rule" for
Teague
purposes. A rule is new, she contends, if it "can be meaningfully
distinguished from that established by binding precedent at the
time [the] state court conviction became final."
Post, at
304. This definition leads her to suggest that a habeas court must
determine whether the state courts have interpreted old precedents
"properly."
Post, at 305. Our precedents, however, require a
different standard. We have held that a rule is "new" for
Teague purposes whenever its validity under existing
precedents is subject to debate among "reasonable minds,"
Butler, 494 U. S., at 415, or among "reasonable jurists,"
Sawyer v.
Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 234
(1990). Indeed, each of our last four relevant precedents has
indicated that
Teague insulates on habeas review the state
courts' '''reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing
precedents.'''
Ibid. (quoting
Butler, supra, at 414);
Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488 (1990)
(citing
Butler); see
Stringer v.
Black,
503 U. S. 222,
237 (1992) ("The purpose of the new rule doctrine is to validate
reasonable interpretations of existing precedents"). Thus,
Teague bars habeas relief whenever the state courts have
interpreted old precedents
reasonably, not only when they
have done so "properly."
Post, at 305.
293
criminal cases pending on direct review, see
Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479
U. S. 314, 320-328 (1987), but that they generally do not have
retroactive application to criminal cases pending on habeas, see
Teague, supra, at 305-310 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). We have
held that the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel on a
first direct appeal, see,
e. g., Douglas v.
California, 372 U. S. 353, 355-358
(1963), but that it guarantees no right to counsel on habeas, see,
e. g., Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555
(1987). On direct review, we have announced and enforced the rule
that state courts must exclude evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. See,
e. g., Mapp v.
Ohio,
367 U. S. 643,
654-660 (1961). We have also held, however, that claims under
Mapp are not cognizable on habeas as long as the state
courts have provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate them
at trial or on direct review. See
Stone v.
Powell,
428 U. S. 465,
489496 (1976).
These differences simply reflect the fact that habeas review
"entails significant costs."
Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126
(1982). Among other things, "'[i]t disturbs the State's significant
interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the
right to punish some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state
sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal
judicial authority.'"
Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 210 (1989)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (quoting
Harris v.
Reed,
489 U. S. 255,
282 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting)). In various contexts, we have
emphasized that these costs, as well as the countervailing
benefits, must be taken into consideration in defining the scope of
the writ. See,
e. g., Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 738-739
(1991) (procedural default);
McCleskey v.
Zant,
499 U. S. 467,
490-493 (1991) (abuse of the writ);
Teague, supra, at
308-310 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.) (retroactivity);
Kuhlmann
v.
Wilson, 477 U. S., at 444-455 (opinion of Powell, J.)
(successive petitions);
Stone v.
Powell, supra, at
491-492, n. 31 (cognizability of particular claims).
294
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
In light of these principles, petitioners ask that we reconsider
our statement in
Miller v.
Fenton that mixed
constitutional questions are "subject to plenary federal review" on
habeas, 474 U. S., at 112. By its terms,
Teague itself is
not directly controlling, because West sought federal habeas relief
under
Jackson, which was decided a year before his
conviction became final on direct review. Nonetheless, petitioners
contend, the logic of
Teague makes our statement in
Miller untenable. Petitioners argue that if deferential
review for reasonableness strikes an appropriate balance with
respect to purely legal claims, then it must strike an appropriate
balance with respect to mixed questions as well. Moreover, they
note that under the habeas statute itself, a state-court
determination of a purely factual question must be "presumed
correct," and can be overcome only by "convincing evidence," unless
one of eight statutorily enumerated exceptions is present. 28 U. S.
C. § 2254(d). It makes no sense, petitioners assert, for a habeas
court generally to review factual determinations and legal
determinations deferentially, but to review applications of law to
fact
de novo. Finally, petitioners find the prospect of
deferential review for mixed questions at least implicit in our
recent statement that
Teague concerns are fully implicated
"by the
application of an old rule in a manner that was not
dictated by precedent."
Stringer v.
Black, 503 U. S. 222, 228 (1992)
(emphasis added). For these reasons, petitioners invite us to
reaffirm that a habeas judge need not-and indeed may not-"shut his
eyes" entirely to state-court applications of law to fact.
Brown v.
Allen, 344 U. S., at 508 (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.). West develops two principal counterarguments:
first, that Congress implicitly codified a
de novo standard
with respect to mixed constitutional questions when it amended the
habeas statute in 1966; and second, that
295
de novo federal review is necessary to vindicate federal
constitutional rights.9
We need not decide such far-reaching issues in this case.
As in both
Brown and
Jackson, the claim advanced
by the habeas petitioner must fail even assuming that the state
court's rejection of it should be reconsidered
de novo.
Whatever the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that there
was more than enough evidence to support West's conviction.
The case against West was strong. Two to four weeks after the
Card ova home had been burglarized, over 15 of the items stolen
were recovered from West's home. On direct examination at trial,
West said nothing more than that he frequently bought and sold
items at different flea markets. He failed to offer specific
information about how he had come to acquire any of the stolen
items, and he did not even mention Ronnie Elkins by name. When
pressed on crossexamination about the details of his purchases,
West contradicted himself repeatedly about where he supposedly had
bought the stolen goods, and he gave vague, seemingly eva-
9 JUSTICE O'CONNOR criticizes our failure to highlight in text
the fact that Congress has considered, but failed to enact, several
bills introduced during the last 25 years to prohibit
de
novo review explicitly. See
post, at 305; see also Brief
for Senator Biden et al. as
Amici Curiae 10-16 (discussing
various proposals). Our task, however, is not to construe bills
that Congress has failed to enact, but to construe statutes that
Congress has enacted. The habeas corpus statute was last amended in
1966. See 80 Stat. 1104-1105. We have grave doubts that post-1966
legislative history is of any value in construing its provisions,
for we have often observed that" 'the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one.'''
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v.
GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 117
(1980), quoting
United States v.
Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313
(1960). Compare also
Sullivan v.
Finkelstein,
496 U. S. 617,
628, n. 8 (1990) (acknowledging "all the usual difficulties
inherent in relying on subsequent legislative history"), with
id., at 632 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part) ("Arguments
based on subsequent legislative history, like arguments based on
antecedent futurity, should not be taken seriously").
296
Opinion of THOMAS, J.
sive answers to various other questions. See n. 1,
supra.
He said further that he could not remember how he had acquired such
major household items as a television set and a coffee table, and
he failed to offer any explanation whatsoever about how he had
acquired Cardova's record player, among other things. Moreover, he
testified that he had acquired Card ova's second television set
from a seller other than Elkins (who remained unidentified) in an
entirely unrelated (but roughly contemporaneous) transaction.
Finally, he failed to produce any other supporting evidence, such
as testimony from Elkins, whom he claimed to have known for years
and done business with on a regular basis.
As the trier of fact, the jury was entitled to disbelieve West's
uncorroborated and confused testimony. In evaluating that
testimony, moreover, the jury was entitled to discount West's
credibility on account of his prior felony conviction, see Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-269 (1990);
Sadoski v.
Commonwealth, 219
Va. 1069, 254 S. E. 2d 100 (1979), and to take into account West's
demeanor when testifying, which neither the Court of Appeals nor we
may review. And if the jury did disbelieve West, it was further
entitled to consider whatever it concluded to be perjured testimony
as affirmative evidence of guilt, see,
e. g., Wilson v.
United States, 162 U. S. 613, 620-621 (1896);
United
States v.
Zafiro, 945 F.2d
881, 888 (CA7 1991) (Posner, J.), cert. granted on other
grounds, 503 U. S. 935 (1992);
Dyer v.
MacDougall,
201 F.2d
265, 269 (CA2 1952) (L. Hand, J.).
In
Jackson, we emphasized repeatedly the deference owed
to the trier of fact and, correspondingly, the sharply limited
nature of constitutional sufficiency review. We said that
"all
of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable
to the prosecution," 443 U. S., at 319 (emphasis in original); that
the prosecution need not affirmatively "rule out every hypothesis
except that of guilt,"
id., at 326; and that a reviewing
court "faced with a record of historical facts that supports
conflicting inferences must presume-even if
297
it does not affirmatively appear in the record-that the trier of
fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and
must defer to that resolution,"
ibid. Under these standards,
we think it clear that the trial record contained sufficient
evidence to support West's conviction.
Having granted relief on West's
Jackson claim, the Court
of Appeals declined to address West's additional claim that he was
entitled to a new trial, as a matter of due process, on the basis
of newly discovered evidence. See 931 F. 2d, at 271, n. 9. As that
claim is not properly before us, we decline to address it here. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979),
required the federal courts to deny the requested writ of habeas
corpus if, under the
Jackson standard, there was sufficient
evidence to support West's conviction, which, as the principal
opinion amply demonstrates, see
ante, at 295-296 and this
page, there certainly was.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the evidence sufficiently supported respondent's
conviction. I write separately only to express disagreement with
certain statements in JUSTICE THOMAS' extended discussion,
ante, at 285-295, of this Court's habeas corpus
jurisprudence.
First, JUSTICE THOMAS errs in describing the pre-1953 law of
habeas corpus.
Ante, at 285. While it is true that a state
prisoner could not obtain the writ if he had been provided a full
and fair hearing in the state courts, this rule governed the merits
of a claim under the Due Process Clause. It was not a threshold bar
to the consideration of
298
O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment
other federal claims, because, with rare exceptions,
there
were no other federal claims available at the time.
During the period JUSTICE THOMAS discusses, the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights were not yet understood to apply in state criminal
prosecutions. The only protections the Constitution afforded to
state prisoners were those for which the text of the Constitution
explicitly limited the authority of the States, most notably the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And in the area of
criminal procedure, the Due Process Clause was understood to
guarantee no more than a full and fair hearing in the state courts.
See,
e. g., Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254, 260 (1922)
("One accused of crime has a right to a full and fair trial
according to the law of the government whose sovereignty he is
alleged to have offended, but he has no more than that").
Thus, when the Court stated that a state prisoner who had been
afforded a full and fair hearing could not obtain a writ of habeas
corpus, the Court was propounding a rule of constitutional law, not
a threshold requirement of habeas corpus. This is evident from the
fact that the Court did not just apply this rule on habeas, but
also in cases on direct review. See,
e. g., Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 107-108
(1934) ("[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due
process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only");
Twining
v.
New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 110-111
(1908) ("Due process requires that the court which assumes to
determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction, and that
there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given the
parties. Subject to these two fundamental conditions, ... this
court has up to this time sustained all state laws, statutory or
judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and methods of
trial, and held them to be consistent with due process of law")
(citations omitted). As long as a state criminal prosecution was
fairly conducted by a court of competent jurisdiction according to
state law, no constitutional question was presented, whether
299
on direct
or habeas review.
Caldwell v.
Texas, 137 U.
S. 692, 698 (1891);
Brown v.
New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 175
(1899).
The cases cited by JUSTICE THOMAs-Moore v.
Dempsey,
261 U. S. 86
(1923), and
Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U. S. 309
(1915)-demonstrate that the absence of a full and fair hearing in
the state courts was
itself the relevant violation of the
Constitution; it was not a prerequisite to a federal court's
consideration of some other federal claim. Both cases held that a
trial dominated by an angry mob was inconsistent with due process.
In both, the Court recognized that the State could nevertheless
afford due process if the state appellate courts provided a fair
opportunity to correct the error. The state courts had provided
such an opportunity in
Frank; in
Moore, they had not.
In neither case is the "full and fair hearing" rule cited as a
deferential standard of review applicable to habeas cases; the rule
instead defines the constitutional claim itself, which was reviewed
de novo. See
Moore, supra, at 91-92.
Second, JUSTICE THOMAS quotes Justice Powell's opinion in
Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U. S. 436 (1986), out
of context.
Ante, at 285-286. Justice Powell said only that
the judgment of a committing court of competent jurisdiction was
accorded "absolute respect" on habeas in the 19th century, when the
habeas inquiry was limited to the jurisdiction of the court.
Kuhlmann, supra, at 446 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice
Powell was not expressing the erroneous view which JUSTICE THOMAS
today ascribes to him, that state court judgments were entitled to
complete deference before 1953.
Third, JUSTICE THOMAS errs in implying that
Brown v.
Allen, 344
U. S. 443 (1953), was the first case in which the Court held
that the doctrine of res judicata is not strictly followed on
federal habeas.
Ante, at 287. In fact, the Court explicitly
reached this holding for the first time in
Salinger v.
Loisel, 265 U.
S. 224, 230 (1924). Even
Salinger did not break new
ground: The
Salinger Court observed that such had been the
rule at common law, and that the Court had
300
O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment
implicitly followed it in
Carter v.
M cClaughry,
183 U. S. 365,
378 (1902), and
Ex parte Spencer, 228 U. S. 652, 658
(1913).
Salinger, supra, at 230. The Court reached the same
conclusion in at least two other cases between
Salinger and
Brown. See
Waley v.
Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 105
(1942);
Darr v.
Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 214
(1950).
Darr and
Spencer, like this case, involved
the initial federal habeas filings of state prisoners.
Fourth, JUSTICE THOMAS understates the certainty with which
Brown v.
Allen rejected a deferential standard of
review of issues of law.
Ante, at 287-288. The passages in
which the
Brown Court stated that a district court should
determine whether the state adjudication had resulted in a
"satisfactory conclusion," and that the federal courts had
discretion to give some weight to state court determinations,
ante, at 287, were passages in which the Court was
discussing how federal courts should resolve questions of
fact, not issues oflaw. This becomes apparent from a reading
of the relevant section of
Brown, 344 U. S., at 460-465, a
section entitled "Right to a Plenary Hearing." When the Court then
turned to the primary
legal question presented-whether the
Fourteenth Amendment permitted the restriction of jury service to
taxpayers-the Court answered that question in the affirmative
without any hint of deference to the state courts.
Id., at
467-474. The proper standard of review of issues of law was also
discussed in Justice Frankfurter's opinion, which a majority of the
Court endorsed. After recognizing that state court factfinding need
not always be repeated in federal court, Justice Frankfurter turned
to the quite different question of determining the law. He wrote:
"Where the ascertainment of the historical facts does not dispose
of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal significance
of such facts,
the District Judge must exercise his own
judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values. Thus,
socalled mixed questions or the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication
301
with the federal judge."
Id., at 507 (emphasis added;
citation omitted). Justice Frankfurter concluded: "The State court
cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and
what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a
federal constitutional right."
Id., at 508.
Fifth, JUSTICE THOMAS incorrectly states that we have never
considered the standard of review to apply to mixed questions of
law and fact raised on federal habeas.
Ante, at 289. On the
contrary, we did so in the very cases cited by JUSTICE THOMAS. In
Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), we
stated quite clearly that" 'mixed questions or the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of
adjudication with the federal judge.' It was, therefore, the duty
of the Court of Appeals to independently evaluate [the issue of
jury prejudice]."
Id., at 723 (quoting
Brown v.
Allen, supra, at 507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). We then
proceeded to employ precisely the same legal analysis as in cases
on direct appeal. 366 U. S., at 723-728.
In
Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), we
again said that "[a]lthough the district judge may, where the state
court has reliably found the relevant facts, defer to the state
court's findings of fact, he may not defer to its findings of law.
It is the district judge's duty to apply the applicable federal law
to the state court fact findings independently."
Id., at
318.
In
Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 (1972), we
addressed
de novo the question whether the state court
pretrial identification procedures were unconstitutionally
suggestive by using the same standard used in cases on direct
appeal: "'a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.'''
Id., at 198 (quoting
Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 384
(1968)).
In
Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), we
reviewed
de novo a state court's finding that a defendant
had waived his right to counsel. We held that "the question of
waiver
302
O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment
was not a question of historical fact, but one which, in the
words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, requires 'application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found .... '"
Id.,
at 403 (quoting
Brown v.
Allen, supra, at 507
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). We then employed the same legal
analysis used on direct review. 430 U. S., at 404.
In
Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), we
explicitly considered the question whether the Court of Appeals had
exceeded the proper scope of review of the state court's decision.
Id., at 341. We concluded that because the issue presented
was not one of historical fact entitled to a presumption of
correctness under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), the Court of Appeals was
correct in reconsidering the state court's "application of legal
principles to the historical facts of this case." 446 U. S., at
342. Although we held that the Court of Appeals had erred in
stating the proper legal principle, we remanded to have it consider
the case under the same legal principles as in cases on direct
review.
Id., at 345-350.
In
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), we
held that "[t]he principles governing ineffectiveness claims should
apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal
or in motions for a new trial. ... [N]o special standards ought to
apply to ineffectiveness claims made in habeas proceedings."
Id., at 697-698. We distinguished state court determinations
of mixed questions of fact and law, to which federal courts should
not defer, from state court findings of historical fact, to which
federal courts should defer.
Id., at 698.
Finally, in
Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U. S. 104 (1985), we
recognized that "an unbroken line of cases, coming to this Court
both on direct appeal and on review of applications to lower
federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus, forecloses the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the 'voluntariness' of a confession merits
something less than independent federal consideration."
Id.,
at 112.
303
To this list of cases cited by JUSTICE THOMAS, one could add the
following, all of which applied a standard of
de novo
review.
Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U. S. 556, 558-561
(1954);
United States ex rel. Jennings v.
Ragen,
358 U. S. 276,
277
(1959); Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 546
(1961);
Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 339-345
(1963);
Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 384-386
(1966);
Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 349-363
(1966);
McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766-774
(1970);
Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 482-490
(1972); Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 522-536
(1972);
Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480-490
(1972);
Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 781-791
(1973);
Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 222-249
(1973);
Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U. S. 98, 109-117
(1977);
Watkins v.
Sowders, 449 U. S. 341, 345-349
(1981);
Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 750754
(1983);
Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 435-442
(1984);
Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 420-434
(1986);
Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U. S. 365, 383-387
(1986);
Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356, 360-365
(1988);
Duckworth v.
Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 201-205
(1989). There have been many others.
Sixth, JUSTICE THOMAS misdescribes
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443
U. S. 307 (1979).
Ante, at 290. In
Jackson, the
respondents proposed a deferential standard of review, very much
like the one JUSTICE THOMAS discusses today, that they thought
appropriate for addressing constitutional claims of insufficient
evidence. 443 U. S., at 323. We expressly rejected this proposal.
Ibid. Instead, we adhered to the general rule of
de
novo review of constitutional claims on habeas.
Id., at
324.
Seventh, JUSTICE THOMAS mischaracterizes
Teague v.
Lane, 489
U. S. 288 (1989), and
Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989), as
"question[ing] thee] standard [of
de novo review] with
respect to pure legal questions."
Ante, at 291.
Teague did not establish a "deferential" standard of review
of state court determinations of federal law. It did not es-
304
O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment
tablish a standard of review at all. Instead,
Teague
simply requires that a state conviction on federal habeas be judged
according to the law in existence when the conviction became final.
Penry, supra, at 314;
Teague, supra, at 301. In
Teague, we refused to give state prisoners the retroactive
benefit of new rules of law, but we did
not create any
deferential standard of review with regard to old rules.
To determine what counts as a new rule,
Teague requires
courts to ask whether the rule a habeas petitioner seeks can be
meaningfully distinguished from that established by binding
precedent at the time his state court conviction became final. Cf.
Mackey v.
United States, 401 U. S. 667, 695 (1971)
(inquiry is "to determine whether a particular decision has really
announced a 'new' rule at all or whether it has simply applied a
well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is
closely analogous to those which have been previously
considered in the prior case law") (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgments in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted; emphasis added). Even though we have characterized the new
rule inquiry as whether "reasonable jurists" could disagree as to
whether a result is dictated by precedent, see
Sawyer v.
Smith, 497 U.
S. 227, 234 (1990), the standard for determining when a case
establishes a new rule is "objective," and the mere existence of
conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new.
Stringer v.
Black, 503 U. S. 222, 237
(1992). If a proffered factual distinction between the case under
consideration and pre-existing precedent does not change the force
with which the precedent's underlying principle applies, the
distinction is not meaningful, and any deviation from precedent is
not reasonable.
So, while JUSTICE THOMAS says that we "defer" to state courts'
determinations of federal law, the statement is misleading.
Although in practice, it may seem only "a matter of phrasing"
whether one calls the
Teague inquiry a standard of review or
not, "phrasing mirrors thought, [and] it is impor-
305
tant that the phrasing not obscure the true issue before a
federal court."
Brown v.
Allen, 344 U. S., at 501
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.). As JUSTICE KENNEDY convincingly
demonstrates, the duty of the federal court in evaluating whether a
rule is "new" is not the same as deference; federal courts must
make an independent evaluation of the precedent existing at the
time the state conviction became final in order to determine
whether the case under consideration is meaningfully
distinguishable.
Teague does not direct federal courts to
spend less time or effort scrutinizing the existing federal law, on
the ground that they can assume the state courts interpreted it
properly.
Eighth, though JUSTICE THOMAS suggests otherwise,
ante,
at 293,
de novo review is not incompatible with the maxim
that federal courts should "give great weight to the considered
conclusions of a coequal state judiciary,"
Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U. S., at 112, just as they do to persuasive,
wellreasoned authority from district or circuit courts in other
jurisdictions. A state court opinion concerning the legal
implications of precisely the same set of facts is the closest one
can get to a "case on point," and is especially valuable for that
reason. But this does not mean that we have held in the past that
federal courts must presume the correctness of a state court's
legal conclusions on habeas, or that a state court's incorrect
legal determination has ever been allowed to stand because it was
reasonable. We have always held that federal courts, even on
habeas, have an independent obligation to say what the law is.
Finally, in his one-sentence summary of respondent's arguments,
ante, at 294, JUSTICE THOMAS fails to mention that Congress
has considered habeas corpus legislation during 27 of the past 37
years, and on 13 occasions has considered adopting a deferential
standard of review along the lines suggested by JUSTICE THOMAS.
Congress has rejected each proposal. In light of the case law and
Congress' position, a move away from
de novo review of mixed
questions of law
306
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment
and fact would be a substantial change in our construction of
the authority conferred by the habeas corpus statute. As JUSTICE
THOMAS acknowledges, to change the standard of review would indeed
be "far-reaching,"
ante, at 295, and we need not decide
whether to do so in order to resolve this case.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment.
I do not enter the debate about the reasons that took us to the
point where mixed constitutional questions are subject to
de
novo review in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Whatever the
answer to that difficult historical inquiry, all agree that, at
least prior to the Court's adoption of the retroactivity analysis
of
Teague v.
Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), see
Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313-314
(1989), the matter was settled. It seems that the real issue
dividing my colleagues is whether the retroactivity analysis of
Teague casts doubt upon the rule of
Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.
S. 104, 112 (1985). Even petitioner State of Virginia and the
United States as
amicus curiae, both seeking a deferential
standard with respect to mixed questions, recognize that this is
how the standard of review question arises. See Brief for
Petitioners 11 ("The notion that a state prisoner has a right to
de novo federal collateral review of his constitutional
claims ... surely has not survived this Court's decisions in
Teague" and its progeny); Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 12 ("Prior to the rule established by
Teague [and later cases applying
Teague], this Court
often treated mixed questions of law and fact as subject to
independent review in federal habeas corpus").
If vindication of the principles underlying
Teague did
require that state-court rulings on mixed questions must be given
deference in a federal habeas proceeding, then indeed it might be
said that the
Teague line of cases is on a collision course
with the
Miller v.
Fenton line. And in the proper
case we would have to select one at the expense of the other. But
in my view neither the purpose for which
Teague was
307
adopted nor the necessary means for implementing its holding
creates any real conflict with the requirement of
de novo
review of mixed questions.
In my view, it would be a misreading of
Teague to
interpret it as resting on the necessity to defer to state-court
determinations.
Teague did not establish a deferential
standard of review of state-court decisions of federal law. It
established instead a principle of retroactivity. See
Teague
v.
Lane, supra, at 310 ("[WJe now adopt Justice Harlan's
view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review"). To be sure,
the fact that our standard for distinguishing old rules from new
ones turns on the reasonableness of a state court's interpretation
of then existing precedents suggests that federal courts do in one
sense defer to state-court determinations. But we should not lose
sight of the purpose of the reasonableness inquiry where a
Teague issue is raised: The purpose is to determine whether
application of a new rule would upset a conviction that was
obtained in accordance with the constitutional interpretations
existing at the time of the prisoner's conviction.
As we explained earlier this Term:
"When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief based upon a
principle announced after a final judgment, Teague and our
subsequent decisions interpreting it require a federal court to
answer an initial question, and in some cases a second. First, it
must be determined whether the decision relied upon announced a new
rule. If the answer is yes and neither exception applies, the
decision is not available to the petitioner. If, however, the
decision did not announce a new rule, it is necessary to inquire
whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because
the prior decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending
the precedent. The interests in finality, predictability, and
comity underlying our new rule jurisprudence may be undermined to
an equal degree by the invocation of a rule that was not
308
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment
dictated by precedent as by the application of an old rule in a
manner that was not dictated by precedent." Stringer v.
Black, 503 U.
S. 222, 227-228 (1992) (citation omitted).
The comity interest is not, however, in saying that since the
question is close the state-court decision ought to be deemed
correct because we are in no better position to judge. That would
be the real thrust of a principle based on deference. We see that
principle at work in the statutory requirement that, except in
limited circumstances, the federal habeas court must presume the
correctness of state-court factual findings. See 28 U. S. C. §
2254(d). See also
Rushen v.
Spain, 464 U. S. 114, 120 (1983)
(per curiam) (noting that "the state courts were in a far
better position than the federal courts to answer" a factual
question). Deference of this kind may be termed a comity interest,
but it is not the comity interest that underlies
Teague. The
comity interest served by
Teague is in not subjecting the
States to a regime in which finality is undermined by our changing
a rule once thought correct but now understood to be deficient on
its own terms. It is in recognition of this principle that we ask
whether the decision in question was dictated by precedent. See,
e. g., Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488
(1990).
Teague does bear on applications of law to fact which
result in the announcement of a new rule. Whether the prisoner
seeks the application of an old rule in a novel setting, see
Stringer, supra, at 228, depends in large part on the nature
of the rule. If the rule in question is one which of necessity
requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can
tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that
those applications themselves create a new rule. The rule of
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), is
an example. By its very terms it provides a general standard which
calls for some examination of the facts. The standard is whether
any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt after a review of all
309
the evidence, so of course there will be variations from case to
case. Where the beginning point is a rule of this general
application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating
a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that
yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not
dictated by precedent.
Although as a general matter "new rules will not be applied or
announced" in habeas proceedings,
Penry, 492 U. S., at 313,
there is no requirement that we engage in the threshold
Teague inquiry in a case in which it is clear that the
prisoner would not be entitled to the relief he seeks even if his
case were pending on direct review. See
Collins v.
Youngblood, 497
U. S. 37 (1990). Therefore, it is not necessary to the
resolution of this case to consider the oddity that reversing
respondent's conviction because of the quite factspecific
determination that there was insufficient evidence would have the
arguable effect of undercutting the wellestablished general
principle in Virginia and elsewhere that the trier of fact may
infer theft from unexplained or falsely denied possession of
recently stolen goods. Whether a holding that there was
insufficient evidence would constitute one of those unusual cases
in which an application of
Jackson would create a new rule
need not be addressed.
On these premises, the existence of
Teague provides added
justification for retaining
de novo review, not a reason to
abandon it.
Teague gives substantial assurance that habeas
proceedings will not use a new rule to upset a state conviction
that conformed to rules then existing. With this safeguard in
place, recognizing the importance of finality,
de novo
review can be exercised within its proper sphere.
For the foregoing reasons, I would not interpret
Teague
as calling into question the settled principle that mixed questions
are subject to plenary review on federal habeas corpus. And, for
the reasons I have mentioned, I do not think it necessary to
consider whether the respondent brings one of those unusual
Jackson claims which is
Teague-barred.
310
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
I agree that the evidence in this case was sufficient to
convince a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
and I concur in the judgment of the Court.
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in the judgment.
While I could not disagree with the majority that sufficient
evidence supported West's conviction, see,
e. g., ante, at
295297, I do not think the Court should reach that issue. We have
often said that when the principles first developed in
Teague v.
Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989),
pose a threshold question on federal habeas review, it is only
after an answer favorable to the prisoner that a court should
address the merits. See,
e. g., Collins v.
Youngblood, 497
U. S. 37, 40-41
(1990); Penry v.
Lynaugh,
492 U. S. 302,
313, 329 (1989);
Teague, supra, at 300 (plurality opinion).
This habeas case begins with a
Teague question, and its
answer does not favor West. I would go no further.1
I
Under cases in the line of
Teague v.
Lane, supra,
with two narrow exceptions not here relevant, federal courts
conducting collateral review may not announce or apply a "new" rule
for a state prisoner's benefit,
Butler v.
McKellar,
494 U. S. 407,
412 (1990);
Teague, supra, at 310 (plurality opinion), a new
rule being one that was "not
'dictated by precedent existing
at the time the defendant's conviction became final,'"
Sawyer v.
Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 234 (1990)
(quoting
Teague, supra, at 301 (plurality opinion))
(emphasis in original). Put differently, the new-rule enquiry asks
"whether a state court considering [the prisoner's] claim at the
time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by
existing precedent to conclude that the rule [the prisoner] seeks
was required by the Constitution."
Saffle v.
Parks,
494 U. S. 484,
488
1 Because my analysis ends the case for me without reaching
historical questions, I do not take a position in the disagreement
between JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE O'CONNOR.
311
(1990). Or, put differently yet again, if "reasonable jurists
[might have] disagree[d]" about the steps the law would take next,
its later development will not be grounds for relief.
Sawyer
v.
Smith, supra, at 234; see also
Butler, supra, at
415 ("susceptible to debate among reasonable minds").
The
Teague line of cases reflects recognition of
important "interests of comity and finality."
Teague, supra,
at 308 (plurality opinion). One purpose of federal collateral
review of judgments rendered by state courts in criminal cases is
to create an incentive for state courts to '" "conduct their
proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards," ,,,
Butler, supra, at 413 (quoting
Teague,
supra, at 306 (plurality opinion)), and "[t]he 'new rule'
principle" recognizes that purpose by "validat[ing] reasonable,
good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state
courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later
decisions."
Butler, supra, at 414 (citing
United
States
The crux of the analysis when
Teague is invoked, then, is
identification of the rule on which the claim for habeas relief
depends. To survive
Teague, it must be "old" enough to have
predated the finality of the prisoner's conviction, and specific
enough to dictate the rule on which the conviction may be held to
be unlawful. A rule old enough for
Teague may of course be
too general, and while identifying the required age of the rule of
relief is a simple matter of comparing dates, passing on its
requisite specificity calls for analytical care.
The proper response to a prisoner's invocation of a rule at too
high a level of generality is well illustrated by our cases. In
Butler, supra, for example, the prisoner relied on the rule
of
Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988),
which we announced after Butler's conviction had become final. We
held in
Roberson that the Fifth Amendment forbids police
interrogation about a crime after the suspect requests counsel,
even if his request occurs in the course of investigating a
312
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
different, unrelated crime.
Id., at 682. Butler argued
that he could invoke
Roberson's rule because it was "merely
an application of
Edwards [v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981)],"
in which we held that, if a person is in custody on suspicion of a
crime, the police must stop questioning him about that crime once
he invokes his right to counsel,
id., at 484-485, "to a
slightly different set of facts." 494 U. S., at 414. We rejected
this argument, saying that it "would not have been an illogical or
even a grudging application of
Edwards to decide that it did
not extend to the facts of
Roberson." Id., at 415.
Likewise, in
Sawyer, supra, the petitioner sought the
benefit of
Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985),
which had been announced after Sawyer's conviction was final. We
held in
Caldwell that the Eighth Amendment prohibits resting
"a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has
been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere."
Id., at 328-329. Sawyer argued that he was entitled to the
benefit of
Caldwell's rule as having been "dictated by the
principle of reliability in capital sentencing,"
Sawyer,
supra, at 236, which, he said, had been established by cases
announced before his conviction became final,
Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455
U. S. 104 (1982), and
Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978),
among them. We rejected the argument, saying that
"the [Teague] test would be meaningless if applied at
this level of generality. Cf. Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U. S. 635, 639 (1987) ('[I]f the test of "clearly
established law" were to be applied at this level of generality,
... [p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified
immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually
unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely
abstract rights')." 497 U. S., at 236 (internal quotation brackets
in original).
313
Although the principle that Sawyer invoked certainly "lent
general support to the conclusion reached in
Caldwell,"
ibid., we said that" 'it does not follow that
[Eddings
and
Lockett] compel the rule that [petitioner] seeks,'"
ibid. (second set of brackets in original) (quoting
Saffle, supra, at 491).
In sum, our cases have recognized that "[t]he interests in
finality, predictability, and comity underlying our new rule
jurisprudence may be undermined to an equal degree by the
invocation of a rule that was not dictated by precedent as by the
application of an old rule in a manner that was not dictated by
precedent."
Stringer v.
Black, 503 U. S. 222, 228
(1992). This does not mean, of course, that a habeas petitioner
must be able to point to an old case decided on facts identical to
the facts of his own. But it does mean that, in light of authority
extant when his conviction became final, its unlawfulness must be
apparent. Cf.
Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640
(1987).
II
In this case, the Court of Appeals overruled the Commonwealth's
Teague objection by saying that West merely claimed that the
evidence had been insufficient to support his conviction, so that
the result he sought was dictated by
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443
U. S. 307 (1979), a case announced before petitioner's
conviction became final for
Teague purposes in 1980.
931 F.2d
262, 265-267 (CA4 1991). Having thus surmounted
Teague's
time hurdle, the court went on to say that "the evidence here
consisted entirely of ... the ... facts ... that about one-third in
value of goods stolen between December 13 and December 26, 1978,
were found on January 10, 1979, in the exclusive possession of ...
West, coupled with [West's] own testimony explaining his possession
as having come about by purchases in the interval." 931 F. 2d, at
268. Applied in this context, the court held, the unadorned
Jackson norm translated into the more specific rule
announced in
Cosby v.
Jones, 682
F.2d 1373 (CAll
314
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
1982), which held that the evidence of unexplained or
unconvincingly explained possession of recently stolen goods was
not, without more, sufficient to prove theft, but must be weighed
more exactly after asking five questions: (1) Was "the possession
... recent, relative to the crime"? (2) Was a large majority of the
stolen items found in the defendant's possession? (3) Did the
defendant attempt to conceal the stolen items? (4) Was the
defendant's explanation, "even if discredited by the jury, ... 'so
implausible or demonstrably false as to give rise to positive
evidence in favor of the government'''? and (5) Was there
corroborating evidence supporting the conviction? 931 F. 2d, at 268
(quoting
Cosby, supra, at 1383, n. 19).
Applying
Cosby to the facts of this case, the Court of
Appeals found that all five factors were either neutral or
advantageous to West: (1) Two to four weeks elapsed between the
theft and the possession described in testimony,2 a time period
consistent with West's explanation that he had bought the goods in
the interval; (2) measured by value, a mere third of Cardova's
belongings surfaced in West's possession; (3) the stolen items were
found in plain view in West's home; (4) while "there was no third
person testimony corroborating [West's] explanation and on
cross-examination West exhibited confusion about the exact
circumstances of some of the purchases[,] ... he maintained his
general explanation that he had purchased all the items at flea
markets, and there was nothing inherently implausible about this
explanation"; and, finally, (5) there was no evidence corroborating
theft by West. 931 F. 2d, at 269-270. The Court of Appeals
concluded that "the evidence here, assessed in its entirety and in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, was not sufficient to
persuade any rational trier of fact of [West's] guilt .... "
Id., at 270.
2 The Court of Appeals overlooked that West testified that he
came into possession of Cardova's goods around January 1. See App.
25-27. Thus, a more accurate estimate of the time lapse would be
one to three weeks.
315
It is clear that the Court of Appeals misapplied the commands of
Teague by defining the rule from which West sought to
benefit at an unduly elevated level of generality. There can, of
course, be no doubt that, in reviewing West's conviction, the
Supreme Court of Virginia was not entitled to disregard
Jackson, which antedated the finality of West's conviction.
But from
Jackson's rule, that sufficiency depends on whether
a rational trier, viewing the evidence most favorably to the
prosecution, could find all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it
does not follow that the insufficiency of the evidence to support
West's conviction was apparent. Virginia courts have long
recognized a rule that evidence of unexplained or falsely explained
possession of recently stolen goods is sufficient to sustain a
finding that the possessor took the goods. See,
e. g.,
Montgomery v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 188, 190, 269 S. E.
2d 352, 353 (1980);
Henderson v.
Commonwealth, 215
Va. 811, 812-813, 213 S. E. 2d 782, 783-784
(1975); Bazemore
v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 351, 352, 170 S. E. 2d 774,776
(1969);
Bright v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251,
356 S. E. 2d 443, 444 (1987). In this case, we are concerned only
with the Virginia rule's second prong. West took the stand and gave
an explanation that the jury rejected, thereby implying a finding
that the explanation was false.3 Thus, the portion of the state
rule under attack here is that falsely explained recent possession
suffices to identify the possessor as the thief. The rule has the
virtue of much common sense. It is utterly reasonable to conclude
that a possessor of recently stolen goods who lies about where he
got them is the thief who took them, and it should come as no
surprise that the rule had been accepted as good law against the
backdrop of a general state sufficiency standard no less stringent
than that of
Jackson. See,
e. g., Bishop v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 169, 313 S. E. 2d 390, 393
(1984);
3 The jury's finding must of course be accepted under the
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979),
requirement to judge sufficiency by viewing the evidence "in the
light most favorable to the prosecution."
Id., at 319.
316
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
Inge v.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S. E.
2d 563, 568 (1976). It is simply insupportable, then, to say that
reasonable jurists could not have considered this rule compatible
with the
Jackson standard. There can be no doubt, therefore,
that in the federal courts West sought the benefit of a "new rule,"
and that his claim was barred by
Teague.
On this ground, I respectfully concur in the judgment of the
Court.
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