OCTOBER TERM, 1998
Syllabus
WEST, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
v.
GIBSON
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 98-238. Argued April 26, 1999-Decided June 14, 1999
In 1972, Congress extended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to prohibit employment discrimination in the Federal
Government, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16, to authorize the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce that
prohibition through "appropriate remedies, including reinstatement
or hiring ... with or without back pay," §2000e-16(b), and to
empower courts to entertain an action by a complainant still
aggrieved after final agency action, § 2000e-16(c). In 1991,
Congress again amended Title VII in the Compensatory Damages
Amendment (CDA), which, among other things, permits victims of
intentional discrimination to recover compensatory damages "[i]n an
action ... under [§ 2000e-16]," § 1981a(a)(1), and adds that any
party in such an action may demand a jury trial, § 1981a(c).
Thereafter, the EEOC began to grant compensatory damages awards in
Federal Government employment discrimination cases. Respondent
Gibson filed a complaint charging that the Department of Veterans
Affairs had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on
the basis of his gender. The EEOC found in his favor and awarded
him the promotion plus backpay. Gibson later filed this suit asking
for compensatory damages and other relief, but the District Court
dismissed the complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting
the Department's argument that, because Gibson had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to an award of
compensatory damages, he could not bring that claim in court. In
the Seventh Circuit's view, the EEOC lacked the legal power to
award compensatory damages; consequently there was no
administrative remedy to exhaust.
Held:
1. The EEOC possesses the legal authority to require federal
agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in
employment in violation of Title VII. Read literally, the language
of the 1972 Title VII extension and the CDA is consistent with a
grant of that authority. Section 2000e-16(b) empowers the EEOC to
enforce §2000e16(a) through a "remedy" that is "appropriate."
Although §2000e-16(b) explicitly mentions only equitable
remedies-reinstatement, hiring, and backpay-the preceding word
"including" makes clear that the authori-
213
zation is not limited to the remedies specified. See
Phelps
Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 189. The
1972 Title VII extension's choice of examples is not surprising,
for in 1972 (and until the 1991 CDA) Title VII itself authorized
only equitable remedies. Words in statutes can enlarge or contract
their scope as required by other changes in the law or the world.
See,
e. g., Browder v.
United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339340.
The meaning of the word "appropriate" permits its scope to expand
to include Title VII remedies that were not appropriate before
1991, but in light of legal change wrought by the 1991 CDA are
appropriate now. Examining the purposes of the 1972 Title VII
extension shows that this is the correct reading. Section 717's
general purpose is to remedy discrimination in federal employment
by creating a system that requires resort to administrative relief
prior to court action to encourage quicker, less formal, and less
expensive resolution of disputes. To deny that an EEOC compensatory
damages award is, statutorily speaking, "appropriate" would
undermine this remedial scheme. This point is reinforced by the
CDA's history, which says nothing about limiting the EEOC's ability
to use the new damages remedy or in any way suggests that it would
be desirable to distinguish the new Title VII remedy from the old
ones. Respondent's arguments in favor of depriving the EEOC of the
power to award compensatory damages-that the CDA's reference to an
"action" refers to a judicial case, not to an administrative
proceeding; that an EEOC compensatory damages award would not
involve a jury trial, as authorized by the CDA; and that any waiver
of the Government's sovereign immunity to permit the EEOC to award
compensatory damages must be construed narrowly-are unconvincing.
Pp.217-223.
2. Respondent's claims that he can proceed in District Court on
alternative grounds include matters that fall outside the scope of
the question presented in the Government's petition for certiorari.
The case is remanded so that the Court of Appeals can determine
whether these questions have been properly raised and, if so,
decide them. P.223.
137 F.3d
992, vacated and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA
and THOMAS, JJ., joined,
post, p. 224.
Barbara McDowell argued the cause for petitioner. With
her on the briefs were
Solicitor General Waxman, Acting
214
Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General
Underwood, Marleigh D. Dover, and Steven 1. Frank.
Timothy M. Kelly argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent. *
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) possesses the legal authority to
require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they
discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 Stat. 121, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e
et
seq. We conclude that the EEOC does have that authority.
I A
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment
discrimination. In 1972 Congress extended Title VII so that it
applies not only to employment in the private sector, but to
employment in the Federal Government as well. See Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 111, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16. This
1972 Title VII extension, found in § 717 of Title VII, has three
relevant subsections.
The first subsection, § 717(a), sets forth the basic Federal
Government employment antidiscrimination standard. It says that
"[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment [of specified Government agencies and departments] shall
be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(a).
*Mark D. Roth and
Joseph F.
Henderson filed
a brief for the American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, as
amicus curiae urging reversal.
Edward H. Passman and
Paula A. Brantner filed a
brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association as
amicus
curiae.
215
The second subsection, § 717(b), provides the EEOC with the
power to enforce the standard. It says (among other things)
that
"the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have
authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) ... through
appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this section .... " 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16(b) (emphasis
added).
The third subsection, § 717(c), concerns a court's authority to
enforce the standard. It says that, after an agency or the EEOC
takes final action on a complaint (or fails to take action within a
certain time),
"an employee or applicant [who is still] aggrieved ... may file
a civil action as provided in section [706, dealing with
discrimination by private employers], in which civil action the
head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be
the defendant." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c).
In 1991 Congress again amended Title VII. The amendment relevant
here permits victims of intentional employment discrimination
(whether within the private sector or the Federal Government) to
recover compensatory damages. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105
Stat. 1072, 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(1). The relevant portion of that
amendment, which we shall call the Compensatory Damages Amendment
(CDA), says:
"In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706
[dealing with discrimination by private employers] or 717 [dealing
with discrimination by the Federal Government] against a respondent
who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination ..., the
complaining party may recover compensatory... damages .... " 42 U.
S. C. § 1981a(a)(1).
216
The
CDA also sets forth certain conditions and
exceptions. It imposes, for example, a cap on compensatory damages
(of up to $300,000 for large employers, § 1981a(b)(3)(D)). And it
adds: "If a complaining party seeks compensatory ... damages under
this section ... any party may demand a trial by jury .... " §
1981a(c). Once the
CDA became law, the EEOC began to grant
compensatory damages awards in Federal Government employment
discrimination cases. Compare 29 CFR pt. 1613, App. A (1990) (no
reference to compensatory damages in preamendment list of EEOC
remedies), with,
e. g., Jackson v.
Runyon, EEOC Appeal No. 01923399, p.3 (Nov. 12, 1992)
("[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1991 ... makes compensatory damages
available to federal sector complainants in the administrative
process").
B
Respondent, Michael Gibson, filed a complaint with the
Department of Veterans Affairs charging that the Department had
discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis
of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. The EEOC,
however, subsequently found in Gibson's favor and awarded the
promotion plus backpay. Three months later Gibson filed a complaint
in Federal District Court, asking the court to order the Department
to comply immediately with the EEOC's order and also to pay
compensatory damages. Complaint ~ 17 (App. 28). The Department then
voluntarily complied with the EEOC's order, but it continued to
oppose Gibson's claim for compensatory damages.
Eventually, the District Court dismissed Gibson's compensatory
damages claim. On appeal, the Department supported the District
Court's dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory
damages claim; hence, he could not bring that claim in court.
Gibson v.
Brown, 137 F.3d
992, 994
(CA 7 1998). The Seventh Circuit, however,
re-
217
versed the District Court's dismissal. It rejected the
Department's argument because, in its view, the EEOC lacked the
legal power to award compensatory damages; consequently there was
no administrative remedy to exhaust.
I d., at 995-998.
Because the Circuits have disagreed about whether the EEOC has
the power to award compensatory damages, compare
Fitzgerald
v.
Secretary, Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d
203, 207
(CAS 1997) (EEOC may award compensatory
damages), with
Crawford v.
Babbitt, 148 F.3d
1318, 1326 (CAll 1998) (EEOC cannot award compensatory
damages), and 137 F. 3d, at 996-998 (same), we granted certiorari
in order to decide that question.
II
The language, purposes, and history of the 1972 Title VII
extension and the 1991
CDA convince us that Congress has
authorized the EEOC to award compensatory damages in Federal
Government employment discrimination cases. Read literally, the
language of the statutes is consistent with a grant of that
authority. The relevant portion of the Title VII extension, namely,
§ 717(b), says that the EEOC "shall have authority" to enforce §
717(a) "through
appropriate remedies, including
reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay." 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-16(b). After enactment of the 1991
CDA, an
award of compensatory damages is a "remedy" that is
"appropriate."
We recognize that § 717(b) explicitly mentions certain equitable
remedies, namely, reinstatement, hiring, and backpay, and it does
not explicitly refer to compensatory damages. But the preceding
word "including" makes clear that the authorization is not limited
to the specified remedies there mentioned; and the 1972 Title VII
extension's choice of examples is not surprising, for in 1972 (and
until 1991) Title VII itself authorized only equitable remedies.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. §
2000e-5(g) (pri-
218
vate sector discrimination); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 86 Stat. 111, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16 (federal sector
discrimination).
Section 717's language, however, does not freeze the scope of
the word "appropriate" as of 1972. Words in statutes can enlarge or
contract their scope as other changes, in law or in the world,
require their application to new instances or make old applications
anachronistic. See,
e. g., Browder v.
United States,
312 U. S. 335,
339-340 (1941) (new, unforeseen "use" of passport); see also
United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U. S. 157,
172-173 (1968) (cable television as "communications");
Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U. S. 390,
395-396 (1968) (old statutory language read to reflect
technological change).
The meaning of the word "appropriate" permits its scope to
expand to include Title VII remedies that were not appropriate
before 1991, but in light of legal change are appropriate now. The
word "including" makes clear that "appropriate remedies" are not
limited to the examples that follow that word. See
Phelps Dodge
Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 189
(1941). And in context the word "appropriate" most naturally refers
to forms of relief that Title VII itself authorizes-at least where
that relief is of a kind that agencies typically can provide. Thus,
Congress' decision in the 1991
CDA to permit a "complaining
party" to "recover compensatory damages" in "an action brought
under section ... 717," by adding compensatory damages to Title
VII's arsenal of remedies, could make that form of relief
"appropriate" under § 717(b) as well.
An examination of the purposes of the 1972 Title VII extension
shows that this permissible reading of the language is also the
correct reading. Section 717's general purpose is to remedy
discrimination in federal employment. It does so in part by
creating a dispute resolution system that requires a complaining
party to pursue administrative relief prior to
219
court action, thereby encouraging quicker, less formal, and less
expensive resolution of disputes within the Federal Government and
outside of court. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c) (court action
permitted only where complainant disagrees with final agency
disposition or, if complainant pursued discretionary appeal to
EEOC, with EEOC disposition; or if either agency or EEOC
disposition is delayed);
Brown v.
GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 833 (1976)
(discussing § 717's "rigorous administrative exhaustion
requirements"); see also 29 CFR § 1614.105(a) (1998) (requiring
complainant initially to notify agency and make effort to resolve
matter informally); § 1614.106(d)(2) (requiring agency
investigation prior to EEOC consideration).
To deny that an EEOC compensatory damages award is, statutorily
speaking, "appropriate" would undermine this remedial scheme. It
would force into court matters that the EEOC might otherwise have
resolved. And by preventing earlier resolution of a dispute, it
would increase the burdens of both time and expense that accompany
efforts to resolve hundreds, if not thousands, of such disputes
each year. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Federal
Sector Report on EEO Complaints Processing and Appeals by Federal
Agencies for Fiscal Year 1997, pp. 19, 61 (1998) (28,947 Federal
Government employment discrimination claims filed in 1997; 7,112
claims appealed to EEOC); Reply Brief for Petitioner 12-13, n. 9
(estimating "hundreds" of cases each year that involve claims for
compensatory damages).
The history of the
CDA reinforces this point. The CDA's
sponsors and supporters spoke frequently of the need to create a
new remedy in order, for example, to "help make victims whole." H.
R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, pp. 64-65 (1991); see also Civil Rights
Act of 1991, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 42 U. S. C. § 1981 note
(congressional finding that "additional remedies under Federal law
are needed to deter ... intentional discrimination in the
workplace");
id., § 3 (one purpose
220
of Act is "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional
discrimination ... in the workplace"); 137 Congo Rec. 2863628638,
28663-28667, 28676-28680 (1991) (introduction and discussion of
Danforth/Kennedy Amendment No. 1274, in relevant part permitting
recovery of compensatory damages);
id., at 28880-28881
(statements of Sen. Warner and Sen. Kennedy) (clarifying that
Danforth/Kennedy amendment covers federal employees and suggesting
amendment to this effect). But the CDA's sponsors and supporters
said nothing about limiting the EEOC's ability to use the new Title
VII remedy or suggesting that it would be desirable to distinguish
the new Title VII remedy from old Title VII remedies in that
respect. This total silence is not surprising. What reason could
there be for Congress, anxious to have the EEOC consider as a
preliminary matter every other possible remedy, not to want the
EEOC similarly to consider compensatory damages as well?
Respondent makes three important arguments in favor of a more
limited interpretation of the statutes-an interpretation that would
deprive the EEOC of the power to award compensatory damages. First,
respondent points out that the
CDA says nothing about the
EEOC, or EEOC proceedings, but rather states only that a
complaining party may recover compensatory damages "in
an
action brought under section ... 717." 42 U. S. C. §
1981a(a)(1) (emphasis added). And the word "action" often refers to
judicial cases, not to administrative "proceedings." See
New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 60-62 (1980)
(distinguishing civil "actions" from administrative
"proceedings").
Had Congress thought it important so to limit the scope of the
CDA, however, it could easily have cross-referenced §
717(c), the civil action subsection itself, rather than
crossreferencing the whole of § 717, which includes authorization
for the EEOC to enforce the section through "appropriate remedies."
Regardless, the question, as we see it, is
221
whether, by using the word "action," Congress intended to deny
that compensatory damages is
"appropriate" administrative
relief within the terms of § 717(b). In light of the previous
discussion, see
supra, at 217-220, we do not believe the
simple use of the word "action" in the context of a crossreference
to the whole of § 717 indicates an intent to deprive the EEOC of
that authority.
Second, in an effort to explain why Congress might have wanted
to impose a special EEOC-related limitation in respect to
compensatory damages, respondent points to the language in the
CDA that says: "If a complaining party seeks compensatory
... damages under this section ...
any party may demand a
trial by jury." 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(c) (emphasis added). Respondent
notes that an EEOC compensatory damages award would not involve a
jury. And an agency cannot proceed to court under § 717(c) because
that subsection makes a court action available only to an aggrieved
complaining party, not to the agency. §2000e-16(c). Thus,
respondent concludes that the
CDA must implicitly forbid any
such EEOC award, for that award would take place without the jury
trial that § 1981a(c) guarantees.
This argument, however, draws too much from too little.
One easily can read the jury trial provision in § 1981a(c) as
simply guaranteeing either party a jury trial in respect to
compensatory damages
if a complaining party proceeds to
court under § 717(c). The words "under this section" in § 1981a(c)
support that interpretation, for "this section," § 1981a, refers
primarily to court proceedings. And there is no reason to believe
Congress intended more. The history of the jury trial provision
suggests that Congress saw the provision primarily as a benefit to
complaining parties, not to the Government. See,
e.
g., 137 Congo Rec., at 29051-29052 (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(for "the first time, women and the disabled could recover damages
and have jury trials for claims of intentional discrimination");
id., at 30668 (state-
222
ment of Rep. Ford) (provision will "provid[e] all victims of
intentional discrimination a right to trial by jury"); see also,
e. g., id., at 29053-29054 (statement of Sen. Wallop)
(discussing "economically devastating lawsuits");
id., at
29041 (statement of Sen. Bumpers) (relating fears about "runaway
jur[ies]"). The fact that Congress permits an employee to file a
complaint in court, but forbids the agency to challenge an adverse
EEOC decision in court, also suggests that Congress was not
inordinately and unusually concerned with invoking special judicial
safeguards to protect the Government.
Finally, respondent argues that insofar as the law permits the
EEOC to award compensatory damages, it waives the Government's
sovereign immunity, and we must construe any such waiver narrowly.
See
Lane v.
Pena, 518 U. S. 187, 192
(1996);
Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 160-161
(1981). There is no dispute, however, that the
CDA waives
sovereign immunity in respect to an award of compensatory damages.
Whether, in light of that waiver, the
CDA permits the EEOC
to consider the same matter at an earlier phase of the employment
discrimination claim is a distinct question concerning how the
waived damages remedy is to be administered. Because the
relationship of this kind of administrative question to the goals
and purposes of the doctrine of sovereign immunity may be unclear,
ordinary sovereign immunity presumptions may not apply. In the
Secretary's view here, for example, the EEOC's preliminary
consideration, by lowering the costs of resolving disputes, does
not threaten, but helps to protect, the public fisc. Regardless, if
we must apply a specially strict standard in such a case, which
question we need not decide, that standard is met here. We believe
that the statutory language, taken together with statutory
purposes, history, and the absence of any convincing reason for
denying the EEOC the relevant power, produce evidence of a waiver
that satisfies the stricter standard.
223
For these reasons, we conclude that the EEOC possesses the legal
authority to enforce § 717 through an award of compensatory
damages.
III
Respondent asks us to affirm on alternative grounds the Seventh
Circuit's judgment permitting his case to proceed in the District
Court. The Seventh Circuit considered whether Gibson had "asked the
EEOC for compensatory damages." 137 F. 3d, at 994. It added that if
"he did, then the government's failure-to-exhaust argument
obviously is a non-starter."
Ibid. But the Court of Appeals
concluded that Gibson did not "put the EEOC on notice that he was
seeking compensatory damages."
Ibid. Respondent claims that
he can proceed in District Court because he did satisfy the law's
exhaustion requirements, even if the EEOC has the legal power to
award compensatory damages and even if he did not give notice to
the EEOC that he sought compensatory damages. He argues that is so
because (1) the requirement of notice for exhaustion purposes is
unusually weak in respect to compensatory damages, (2) he did
request a "monetary cash award," and (3) special circumstances
estop the Government from asserting a "no exhaustion" claim in this
case.
These matters fall outside the scope of the question presented
in the Government's petition for certiorari. See
Roberts v.
Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U. S. 249, 253-254
(1999)
(per curiam). We remand the case so that the Court of
Appeals can determine whether these questions have been properly
raised and, if so, decide them.
***
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
224
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA,
and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
The rules governing this case are clear and well established, or
at least had been before the majority's unsettling opinion today.
Relief may not be awarded against the United States unless it has
waived its sovereign immunity. See
Department of Army v.
Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U. S. 255 (1999). The
waiver must be expressed in unequivocal statutory text and cannot
be implied.
Id., at 261;
Lane v.
Pena,
518 U. S. 187,
192 (1996). Even when the United States has waived its immunity,
the waiver must be "strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in
favor of the sovereign,"
Blue Fox, supra, at 261; accord,
Lane, supra, at 192, for" 'this Court has long decided that
limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be
sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be
implied,'"
Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 161
(1981), quoting
Soriano v.
United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276
(1957). Not only do these rules reserve authority over the public
fisc to the branch of Government with which the Constitution has
placed it, they also form an important part of the background of
settled legal principles upon which Congress relied in enacting
various statutes authorizing suits against the United States, such
as the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491; § 10(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702; and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2671
et seq. The rules
governing waivers of sovereign immunity make clear that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) may not award or authorize
compensatory damages against the United States unless it is
permitted to do so by a statutory provision which waives the United
States' immunity to the awards in clear and unambiguous terms.
Section 717(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-16(b), which authorizes the EEOC to enforce
federal compliance with Title VII "through appropriate remedies,
including reinstatement or hiring of employees
225
with or without back pay," effects a waiver of the United
States' sovereign immunity for some purposes. Unlike other similar
statutes, however, the provision does not mention awards of
compensatory damages. Compare § 717(b) with 2 U. S. C. §§
1311(b)(1)(B), 1405(g) (1994 ed., Supp. III). A waiver of immunity
to other types of relief does not provide the unequivocal statement
required to establish a waiver of immunity to damages awards. See
United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992)
("Though [11 U. S. C. § 106(c)], too, waives sovereign immunity, it
fails to establish unambiguously that the waiver extends to
monetary claims");
Lane, supra, at 192.
Nor does the statutory grant of authority to the EEOC to enforce
Title VII through appropriate remedies include, in unequivocal
terms or even by necessary implication, the power to award or
authorize compensatory damages. Even if the phrase "appropriate
remedies" had been intended, as the majority maintains, to
incorporate relief authorized for violations of Title VII under
other statutory provisions, it is not obvious that the phrase's
meaning would have been intended also to "expand" to include
remedies that were not available at the time § 717 was adopted.
Ante, at 218.
It is far from clear, moreover, that the phrase was intended to
incorporate other statutory provisions at all. Unlike other
subsections of § 717, see § 717(d) (incorporating various
provisions relating to judicial actions), § 717(b) does not make an
explicit reference to other statutory provisions. In addition, the
specific examples given by the statute of appropriate
remedies-reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without
backpay-are equitable in nature. See
United States v.
Burke, 504 U.
S. 229, 238 (1992). The interpretive canons of
noscitur a
sociis and
ejusdem generis suggest the appropriate
remedies authorized by § 717(b) are remedies of the same nature as
reinstatement, hiring, and backpay-i.
e., equitable
remedies. The phrase "appropriate remedies," furthermore, connotes
the remedial discre-
226
tion which is the hallmark of equity. A plausible, and perhaps
even the best, interpretation of § 717(b), then, is that it grants
administrative authority to determine which of the traditional
forms of equitable relief are appropriate in any given case of
discrimination. Whether or not this is the better reading, it
should suffice to establish beyond dispute that the statute does
not authorize awards of compensatory damages in express and
unequivocal terms. As a consequence, § 717(b) cannot provide the
required waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.
Unlike § 717(b), 42 U. S. C. § 1981a does authorize awards of
compensatory damages against the United States. Although it is
clear the statute authorizes courts to award damages, however, §
1981a does not so much as mention the EEOC, much less empower it to
award or authorize money damages. It is settled law that a waiver
of sovereign immunity in one forum does not effect a waiver in
other forums. See,
e. g., McElrath v.
United States, 102 U. S. 426, 440 (1880)
("[The Government] can declare in what court it may be sued, and
prescribe the forms of pleading and the rules of practice to be
observed in such suits");
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U. S.
47, 54, n. 6 (1944) ("The Federal Government's consent to suit
against itself, without more, in a field of federal power does not
authorize a suit in a state court");
Case v.
Terrell,
11 Wall. 199, 201 (1871) (The United States' consent to suit in the
Court of Claims does not extend to other federal courts).
The majority's attempt to read 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(1) to
authorize administrative awards of compensatory damages is not
persuasive. Section 1981a(a)(1) provides:
"In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706
or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... the complaining party
may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in
subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief
authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ....
"
227
The provision authorizes an award of compensatory damages in an
"action" brought under § 717; the word "action" is often used to
distinguish judicial cases from administrative "proceedings." See
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 60-62
(1980). Unlike § 717(b), which authorizes administrative
proceedings, § 717(c) authorizes "civil action[s]" in court. It is
most natural, therefore, to understand the phrase "an action
brought by a complaining party under section ... 717" as a
reference to a judicial action under § 717(c) but not to an
administrative proceeding under § 717(b). Compensatory awards are
authorized under § 1981a(a)(1), moreover, "in addition to any
relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964." Section 706(g) authorizes a "court" to grant equitable
relief for violations of Title VII. This provision, as incorporated
through § 717(d), applies only in "civil actions" brought under §
717(c); it does not apply in proceedings before the EEOC or any
other agency. Section 1981a(a)(1)'s express reference to § 706(g)
confirms that compensatory damages are available only in judicial
actions.
Other provisions of § 1981a also make clear that the statute
authorizes compensatory damages only in judicial actions. Section
1981a(c) provides that "[i]f a complaining party seeks compensatory
... damages under this section-(l) any party may demand a trial by
jury; and (2) the court shall not inform the jury of the
limitations [on damages awards] described in subsection (b)(3) of
this section." It cannot be disputed that this provision
contemplates a jury trial overseen by a court. With due respect to
the majority, the provision does not guarantee a jury trial to
either party
"if a complaining party proceeds to court under
§ 717(c),"
ante, at 221; it provides that either party may
obtain a jury trial "[i]f a complaining party seeks compensatory
... damages," § 1981a(c).
While falling short of embracing the argument as its own, the
majority flirts with the contention that allowing agencies rather
than juries to award compensatory damages lowers
228
the costs of resolving employment disputes and protects the
public fisc. It is not clear to me that juries would be less
protective of the fisc than would one group of Government employees
who deem themselves empowered by agency interpretation to award
Government funds to fellow employees. When a Government employee
seeks damages from the Government itself, there may be advantages
in insisting upon the expertise of a trial court with experience in
awarding damages in all types of cases, with the additional
safeguards of trial in a forum of high visibility, trial by jury if
either party chooses to ask for it, and appellate review. These
factors are disregarded by the majority, which seems instead to
suggest that the nature and convenience of administrative
proceedings will by necessity provide a financial advantage to the
Government.
In all events, speculation does not suffice to overcome the rule
that waivers of sovereign immunity must be clear and express. An
unequivocal waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity to
administrative awards of compensatory damages cannot be found in
the relevant statutory provisions. To the extent the majority
relies on textual analysis, it establishes at most (if at all) that
the statutes might be read to authorize such awards, not that the
statutes must be so read. To the extent the majority relies on
legislative history and other extratextual sources, it contradicts
our precedents and sets us on a new course, for before today it was
well settled that "[a] statute's legislative history cannot supply
a waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory text."
Lane, 518 U. S., at 192; accord,
Nordic Village, 503
U. S., at 37 ("[T]he 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of
sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in
statutory text. If clarity does not exist there, it cannot be
supplied by a committee report"). With respect, I dissent.
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