OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK ET AL.
v. OLECH
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 98-1288. Argued January 10, 2000-Decided February 23,
2000
When respondent Olech and her late husband first asked
petitioner Village of Willowbrook (Village) to connect their
property to the municipal water supply, the Village conditioned the
connection on the Olechs granting it a 33-foot easement. Although
it subsequently reduced the easement to the 15 feet required of
other property owners, Olech sued, claiming that the Village's
demand for an additional 18-foot easement violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and asserting that the
easement was irrational and arbitrary, that the Village was
motivated by ill will resulting from the Olechs' success in an
unrelated lawsuit against the Village, and that the Village acted
either with the intent to deprive Olech of her rights or in
reckless disregard of her rights. The District Court dismissed the
suit for failure to state a claim, but the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that Olech's spiteful ill will allegation stated
a claim.
Held: The Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause
of action on behalf of a "class of one" where the plaintiff does
not allege membership in a class or group, but alleges that she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for such treatment.
See,
e. g., Sioux City Bridge Co. v.
Dakota County,
260 U. S. 441.
The Clause secures every person within a State's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by a statute's express terms or by its improper
execution.
Id., at 445. Here, Olech's allegations that the
Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement from her when it
required only 15 feet from similarly situated property owners, that
the demand was irrational and arbitrary, and that the Village
ultimately connected her property in return for a 15-foot
easement-quite apart from the Village's subjective motive-state a
claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. Thus,
the Court does not reach the alternative "subjective ill will"
theory on which the Seventh Circuit relied.
160 F.3d
386, affirmed.
James L. DeAno argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioners.
563
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General
Underwood, and Mark B. Stern.
John R. Wimmer argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent. *
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Grace Olech and her late husband Thaddeus asked
petitioner Village of Willowbrook (Village) to connect their
property to the municipal water supply. The Village at first
conditioned the connection on the Olechs granting the Village a
33-foot easement. The Olechs objected, claiming that the Village
only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking
access to the water supply. After a 3-month delay, the Village
relented and agreed to provide water service with only a 15-foot
easement.
Olech sued the Village, claiming that the Village's demand of an
additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Olech asserted that the 33-foot easement
demand was "irrational and wholly arbitrary"; that the Village's
demand was actually motivated by ill will resulting from the
Olechs' previous filing of an unrelated, successful lawsuit against
the Village; and that the Village acted either with the intent to
deprive Olech of her rights or in reckless disregard of her rights.
App. 10, 12.
The District Court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cognizable
claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Relying on Circuit
precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
* Richard Ruda, James I. Crowley, and
Donald B.
Ayer filed a brief for the International City/County Management
Association et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal.
Harvey Grossman, Steven R. Shapiro, and Richard
J.
O'Brien filed a brief for the ACLU as amicus curiae urging
affirmance.
564
enth Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff can allege an
equal protection violation by asserting that state action was
motivated solely by a "'spiteful effort to "get" him for reasons
wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.'"
160 F.3d
386, 387 (1998) (quoting
Esmail v.
Macrane, 53 F.
3d 176, 180
(CA7 1995)). It determined that Olech's
complaint sufficiently alleged such a claim. 160 F. 3d, at 388. We
granted certiorari to determine whether the Equal Protection Clause
gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a "class of one" where
the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group. * 527
U. S. 1067 (1999).
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims
brought by a "class of one," where the plaintiff alleges that she
has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment. See
Sioux City Bridge Co. v.
Dakota
County, 260 U. S.
441 (1923);
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989). In
so doing, we have explained that" '[t]he purpose of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every
person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents.'"
Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, at 445 (quoting
Sunday Lake Iron Co. v.
Township of Wakefield,
247 U. S. 350,
352 (1918)).
*We note that the complaint in this case could be read to allege
a class of five. In addition to Grace and Thaddeus Olech, their
neighbors Rodney and Phyllis Zimmer and Howard Brinkman requested
to be connected to the municipal water supply, and the Village
initially demanded the 33-foot easement from all of them. The
Zimmers and Mr. Brinkman were also involved in the previous,
successful lawsuit against the Village, which allegedly created the
ill will motivating the excessive easement demand. Whether the
complaint alleges a class of one or of five is of no consequence
because we conclude that the number of individuals in a class is
immaterial for equal protection analysis.
565
That reasoning is applicable to this case. Olech's complaint can
fairly be construed as alleging that the Village intentionally
demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting her
property to the municipal water supply where the Village required
only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property
owners. See
Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46
(1957). The complaint also alleged that the Village's demand was
"irrational and wholly arbitrary" and that the Village ultimately
connected her property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot
easement. These allegations, quite apart from the Village's
subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief
under traditional equal protection analysis. We therefore affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but do not reach the
alternative theory of "subjective ill will" relied on by that
court.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in the result.
The Solicitor General and the village of Willowbrook have
expressed concern lest we interpret the Equal Protection Clause in
this case in a way that would transform many ordinary violations of
city or state law into violations of the Constitution. It might be
thought that a rule that looks only to an intentional difference in
treatment and a lack of a rational basis for that different
treatment would work such a transformation. Zoning decisions, for
example, will often, perhaps almost always, treat one landowner
differently from another, and one might claim that, when a city's
zoning authority takes an action that fails to conform to a city
zoning regulation, it lacks a "rational basis" for its action (at
least if the regulation in question is reasonably clear).
This case, however, does not directly raise the question whether
the simple and common instance of a faulty zoning decision would
violate the Equal Protection Clause. That is because the Court of
Appeals found that in this case respond-
566
ent had alleged an extra factor as well-a factor that the Court
of Appeals called "vindictive action," "illegitimate animus," or
"ill will."
160 F.3d
386, 388
(CA7 1998). And, in that respect, the court
said this case resembled
Esmail v.
Macrane, 53 F.3d
176 (CA71995), because the
Esmail plaintiff had
alleged that the municipality's differential treatment "was the
result not of prosecutorial discretion honestly (even if
ineptly-even if arbitrarily) exercised but of an illegitimate
desire to 'get' him." 160 F. 3d, at 388.
In my view, the presence of that added factor in this case is
sufficient to minimize any concern about transforming
run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right.
For this reason, along with the others mentioned by the Court, I
concur in the result.
567
The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 566
and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to
publish the orders with
permanent page numbers, thus making
the official citations available upon publication of the
preliminary prints of the United States Reports.
568
OCTOBER 4, 1999 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded
No. 98-9308. CROSS
V. CALIFORNIA. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App.
Dist.; and
No. 98-9504. COOPER
V. CALIFORNIA. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App.
Dist. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and
cases remanded for further consideration in light of
Lilly
v.
Virginia, 527 U. S. 116 (1999).
Miscellaneous Orders
No. D-1961. IN RE DISBARMENT OF WEISSER. Disbarment entered.
[For earlier order herein, see 524 U. S. 913.]
No. D-2073. IN RE DISBARMENT OF NUNES. Disbarment entered. [For
earlier order herein, see 526 U. S. 1128.]
No. D-2076. IN RE DISBARMENT OF PATT. Disbarment entered. [For
earlier order herein, see 526 U. S. 1143.]
No. D-2088. IN RE DISBARMENT OF ROBINS. Disbarment entered. [For
earlier order herein, see 527 U. S. 1020.]
No. D-2101. IN RE DISBARMENT OF JACOBS. Patricia Dianne Jacobs,
of Washington, D.
C., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D-2102. IN RE DISBARMENT OF EAGLE. Saul L. Eagle, of New
York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court,
and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to
show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law
in this Court.
No. D-2103. IN RE DISBARMENT OF MANEY. William Kenneth Maney, of
Johnson City, N. Y., is suspended from the practice 801
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