OPINION OF SCALIA, J.
VIETH V. JUBELIRER
541 U. S. ____ (2004)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 02-1580
RICHARD VIETH, NORMA JEAN VIETH, and SUSAN FUREY,
APPELLANTS
v. ROBERT C. JUBELIRER, PRESIDENT OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA SENATE, et al.
on appeal from the united states district court for
the middle district of pennsylvania
[April 28, 2004]
Justice Scalia announced the
judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief
Justice, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas join.
Plaintiffs-appellants Richard
Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey challenge a map drawn by
the Pennsylvania General Assembly establishing districts for the
election of congressional Representatives, on the ground that the
districting constitutes an unconstitutional political
gerrymander.[
Footnote 1] In
Davis v.
Bandemer, 478
U. S. 109 (1986), this Court held that political gerrymandering
claims are justiciable, but could not agree upon a standard to
adjudicate them. The present appeal presents the questions whether
our decision in
Bandemer was in error, and, if not, what
the standard should be.
I
The facts, as alleged by the
plaintiffs, are as follows. The population figures derived from the
2000 census showed that Pennsylvania was entitled to only 19
Representatives in Congress, a decrease in 2 from the
Commonwealth’s previous delegation. Pennsylvania’s General Assembly
took up the task of drawing a new districting map. At the time, the
Republican party controlled a majority of both state Houses and
held the Governor’s office. Prominent national figures in the
Republican Party pressured the General Assembly to adopt a partisan
redistricting plan as a punitive measure against Democrats for
having enacted pro-Democrat redistricting plans elsewhere. The
Republican members of Pennsylvania’s House and Senate worked
together on such a plan. On January 3, 2002, the General Assembly
passed its plan, which was signed into law by Governor Schweiker as
Act 1.
Plaintiffs, registered Democrats
who vote in Pennsylvania, brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeking to
enjoin implementation of Act 1 under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.
S. C. §1983. Defendants-appellees were the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and various executive and legislative officers
responsible for enacting or implementing Act 1. The complaint
alleged, among other things, that the legislation created
malapportioned districts, in violation of the one-person, one-vote
requirement of Article I, §2, of the United States Constitution,
and that it constituted a political gerrymander, in violation of
Article I and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. With regard to the latter contention, the complaint
alleged that the districts created by Act 1 were “meandering and
irregular,” and “ignor[ed] all traditional redistricting criteria,
including the preservation of local government boundaries, solely
for the sake of partisan advantage.” Juris. Statement 136a, ¶ ;22,
135a, ¶ ;20.
A three-judge panel was convened pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §2284. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
District Court granted the motion with respect to the political
gerrymandering claim, and (on Eleventh Amendment grounds) all
claims against the Commonwealth; but it declined to dismiss the
apportionment claim as to other defendants. See
Vieth v.
Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532 (MD Pa. 2002)
(Vieth I). On trial of the apportionment claim, the
District Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. See
Vieth v.
Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672 (MD Pa. 2002)
(Vieth II). It retained jurisdiction over the case pending
the court’s review and approval of a remedial redistricting plan.
On April 18, 2002, Governor Schweiker signed into law Act No.
2002–34, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §3595.301 (Purdon Supp. 2003)
(Act 34), a remedial plan that the Pennsylvania General Assembly
had enacted to cure the apportionment problem of Act 1.
Plaintiffs moved to impose remedial districts,
arguing that the District Court should not consider Act 34 to be a
proper remedial scheme, both because it was malapportioned, and
because it constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander
like its predecessor. The District Court denied this motion,
concluding that the new districts were not malapportioned, and
rejecting the political gerrymandering claim for the reasons
previously assigned in
Vieth I.
Vieth v.
Pennsylvania,
241 F.
Supp. 2d 478, 484–485 (MD Pa. 2003)
(Vieth III). The
plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their Act 34 political
gerrymandering claim.[
Footnote
2] We noted probable jurisdiction.
539 U. S. 957
(2003).
II
Political gerrymanders are not
new to the American scene. One scholar traces them back to the
Colony of Pennsylvania at the beginning of the 18th century, where
several counties conspired to minimize the political power of the
city of Philadelphia by refusing to allow it to merge or expand
into surrounding jurisdictions, and denying it additional
representatives. See E. Griffith, The Rise and Development of the
Gerrymander 26–28 (1974) (hereinafter Griffith). In 1732, two
members of His Majesty’s Council and the attorney general and
deputy inspector and comptroller general of affairs of the Province
of North Carolina reported that the Governor had proceeded to
“divide old Precincts established by Law, & to enact new Ones
in Places, whereby his Arts he has endeavored to prepossess People
in a future election according to his desire, his Designs herein
being … either to endeavor by his means to get a Majority of his
creatures in the Lower House” or to disrupt the assembly’s
proceedings. 3 Colonial Records of North Carolina 380–381 (W.
Saunders ed. 1886); see also Griffith 29. The political gerrymander
remained alive and well (though not yet known by that name) at the
time of the framing. There were allegations that Patrick Henry
attempted (unsuccessfully) to gerrymander James Madison out of the
First Congress. See 2 W. Rives, Life and Times of James Madison
655, n. 1 (reprint 1970); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
William Short, Feb. 9, 1789, reprinted in 5 Works of Thomas
Jefferson 451 (P. Ford ed. 1904). And in 1812, of course, there
occurred the notoriously outrageous political districting in
Massachusetts that gave the gerrymander its name—an amalgam of the
names of Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry and the creature
(“salamander”) which the outline of an election district he was
credited with forming was thought to resemble. See Webster’s New
International Dictionary 1052 (2d ed. 1945). “By 1840 the
gerrymander was a recognized force in party politics and was
generally attempted in all legislation enacted for the formation of
election districts. It was generally conceded that each party would
attempt to gain power which was not proportionate to its numerical
strength.” Griffith 123.
It is significant that the
Framers provided a remedy for such practices in the Constitution.
Article 1, §4, while leaving in state legislatures the initial
power to draw districts for federal elections, permitted Congress
to “make or alter” those districts if it wished.[
Footnote 3] Many objected to the congressional
oversight established by this provision. In the course of the
debates in the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinkney and John
Rutledge moved to strike the relevant language. James Madison
responded in defense of the provision that Congress must be given
the power to check partisan manipulation of the election process by
the States:
“Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite
measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their
regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed.
Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures
of particular States, would produce a like inequality in their
representation in the Natl. Legislature, as it was presumable that
the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to
themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a
controuling power to the Natl. Legislature?” 2 Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 240–241 (M. Farrand ed.
1911).
Although the motion of Pinkney and Rutledge failed,
opposition to the “make or alter” provision of Article I, §4—and
the defense that it was needed to prevent political
gerrymandering—continued to be voiced in the state ratifying
debates. A delegate to the Massachusetts convention warned that
state legislatures
“might make an unequal and partial division of the
states into districts for the election of representatives, or they
might even disqualify one third of the electors. Without these
powers in Congress, the people can have no remedy; But the 4th
section provides a remedy, a controlling power in a legislature,
composed of senators and representatives of twelve states, without
the influence of our commotions and factions, who will hear
impartially, and preserve and restore to the people their equal and
sacred rights of election.” 2 Debates on the Federal Constitution
27 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876).
The power bestowed on Congress to
regulate elections, and in particular to restrain the practice of
political gerrymandering, has not lain dormant. In the
Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 Stat. 491, Congress provided that
Representatives must be elected from single-member districts
“composed of contiguous territory.” See Griffith 12 (noting that
the law was “an attempt to forbid the practice of the
gerrymander”). Congress again imposed these requirements in the
Apportionment Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 572, and in 1872 further
required that districts “contai[n] as nearly as practicable an
equal number of inhabitants,” 17 Stat. 28, §2. In the Apportionment
Act of 1901, Congress imposed a compactness requirement. 31 Stat.
733. The requirements of contiguity, compactness, and equality of
population were repeated in the 1911 apportionment legislation, 37
Stat. 13, but were not thereafter continued. Today, only the
single-member-district-requirement remains. See 2 U. S. C.
§2c. Recent history, however, attests to Congress’s awareness of
the sort of districting practices appellants protest, and of its
power under Article I, §4 to control them. Since 1980, no fewer
than five bills have been introduced to regulate gerrymandering in
congressional districting. See H. R. 5037, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990); H. R. 1711, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989);
H. R. 3468, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H. R. 5529,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H. R. 2349, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).[
Footnote 4]
Eighteen years ago, we held that the Equal
Protection Clause grants judges the power—and duty—to control
political gerrymandering, see
Davis v.
Bandemer, 478
U. S. 109 (1986). It is to consideration of this precedent that
we now turn.
III
As Chief Justice Marshall
proclaimed two centuries ago, “[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
Sometimes, however, the law is that the judicial department has no
business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—because the
question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves
no judicially enforceable rights. See,
e.g.,
Nixon v.
United States, 506 U. S. 224 (1993) (challenge to
procedures used in Senate impeachment proceedings);
Pacific
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912)
(claims arising under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, §4). Such
questions are said to be “nonjusticiable,” or “political
questions.”
In
Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), we
set forth six independent tests for the existence of a political
question:
“[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
[2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of the government; or [5] an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
Id., at 217.
These tests are probably listed in descending order
of both importance and certainty. The second is at issue here, and
there is no doubt of its validity. “The judicial Power” created by
Article III, §1, of the Constitution is not
whatever
judges choose to do, see
Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454
U. S. 464, 487 (1982); cf.
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S. A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 332–333
(1999), or even
whatever Congress chooses to assign them,
see
Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 576–577
(1992);
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 110–114
(1948). It is the power to act in the manner traditional for
English and American courts. One of the most obvious limitations
imposed by that requirement is that judicial action must be
governed by
standard, by
rule. Laws promulgated
by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and
ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must be principled,
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.
Over the dissent of three Justices, the Court
held in
Davis v.
Bandemer that, since it was “not
persuaded that there are no judicially discernible and manageable
standards by which political gerrymander cases are to be decided,”
478 U. S., at 123, such cases
were justiciable. The clumsy
shifting of the burden of proof for the premise (the Court was “not
persuaded” that standards do not exist, rather than “persuaded”
that they do) was necessitated by the uncomfortable fact that the
six-Justice majority could not discern what the judicially
discernable standards might be. There was no majority on that
point. Four of the Justices finding justiciability believed that
the standard was one thing, see
id., at 127 (plurality
opinion of White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ.); two believed it was something else, see
id., at 161
(Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The lower courts have lived with that
assurance of a standard (or more precisely, lack of assurance that
there is no standard), coupled with that inability to specify a
standard, for the past 18 years. In that time, they have considered
numerous political gerrymandering claims; this Court has never
revisited the unanswered question of what standard governs.
Nor can it be said that the lower courts have,
over 18 years, succeeded in shaping the standard that this Court
was initially unable to enunciate. They have simply applied the
standard set forth in
Bandemer’s four-Justice plurality
opinion. This might be thought to prove that the four-Justice
plurality standard has met the test of time—but for the fact that
its application has almost invariably produced the same result
(except for the incurring of attorney’s fees) as would have
obtained if the question were nonjusticiable: judicial intervention
has been refused. As one commentary has put it, “[t]hroughout its
subsequent history,
Bandemer has served almost exclusively
as an invitation to litigation without much prospect of redress.”
S. Issacharoff, P. Karlan, & R. Pildes, The Law of Democracy
886 (rev. 2d ed. 2002). The one case in which relief was provided
(and merely preliminary relief, at that) did
not involve
the drawing of district lines[
Footnote 5]; in
all of the cases we are aware of
involving that most common form of political gerrymandering, relief
was denied.[
Footnote 6]
Moreover, although the case in which relief was provided seemingly
involved the
ne plus ultra of partisan manipulation, see
n. 5,
supra, we would be at a loss to explain why the
Bandemer line should have been drawn just there, and
should not have embraced several districting plans that were upheld
despite allegations of extreme partisan discrimination, bizarrely
shaped districts, and disproportionate results. See,
e.g.,
Session v.
Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (ED
Tex. 2004)
(per curiam);
O’Lear v.
Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850 (ED Mich.), summarily
aff’d,
537 U. S. 997 (2002);
Badham
v.
Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (ND Cal. 1988),
summarily aff’d,
488 U. S. 1024 (1989). To think that
this lower-court jurisprudence has brought forth “judicially
discernible and manageable standards” would be fantasy.
Eighteen years of judicial effort with
virtually nothing to show for it justify us in revisiting the
question whether the standard promised by
Bandemer exists.
As the following discussion reveals, no judicially discernible and
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering
claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that
Bandemer
was wrongly decided.
A
We begin our review of possible
standards with that proposed by Justice White’s plurality opinion
in
Bandemer because, as the narrowest ground for our
decision in that case, it has been the standard employed by the
lower courts. The plurality concluded that a political
gerrymandering claim could succeed only where plaintiffs showed
“both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political
group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.” 478 U.
S., at 127. As to the intent element, the plurality acknowledged
that “[a]s long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it
should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political
consequences of the reapportionment were intended.”
Id.,
at 129. However, the effects prong was significantly harder to
satisfy. Relief could not be based merely upon the fact that a
group of persons banded together for political purposes had failed
to achieve representation commensurate with its numbers, or that
the apportionment scheme made its winning of elections more
difficult.
Id., at 132. Rather, it would have to be shown
that, taking into account a variety of historic factors and
projected election results, the group had been “denied its chance
to effectively influence the political process” as a whole, which
could be achieved even without electing a candidate.
Id.,
at 132–133. It would not be enough to establish, for example, that
Democrats had been “placed in a district with a supermajority of
other Democratic voters” or that the district “departs from
pre-existing political boundaries.”
Id., at 140–141.
Rather, in a challenge to an individual district the inquiry would
focus “on the opportunity of members of the group to participate in
party deliberations in the slating and nomination of candidates,
their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to
directly influence the election returns and to secure the attention
of the winning candidate.”
Id., at 133. A statewide
challenge, by contrast, would involve an analysis of “the voters’
direct
or indirect influence on the elections of the state
legislature as a whole.”
Ibid. (emphasis added). With what
has proved to be a gross understatement, the plurality acknowledged
this was “of necessity a difficult inquiry.”
Id., at
143.
In her
Bandemer
concurrence, Justice O’Connor predicted that the plurality’s
standard “will over time either prove unmanageable and arbitrary or
else evolve towards some loose form of proportionality.”
Id., at 155 (opinion concurring in judgment, joined by
Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J.). A similar prediction of
unmanageability was expressed in Justice Powell’s opinion, making
it the prognostication of a majority of the Court. See
id., at 171 (“The … most basic flaw in the plurality’s
opinion is its failure to enunciate any standard that affords
guidance to legislatures and courts”). That prognostication has
been amply fulfilled.
In the lower courts, the legacy of the
plurality’s test is one long record of puzzlement and
consternation. See,
e.g.,
Session,
supra, at 474 (“Throughout this case we have borne witness
to the powerful, conflicting forces nurtured by
Bandemer’s
holding that the judiciary is to address ‘excessive’ partisan
line-drawing, while leaving the issue virtually unenforceable”);
Vieth I, 188 F. Supp. 2d, at 544 (noting that the
“recondite standard enunciated in
Bandemer offers little
concrete guidance”);
Martinez v.
Bush, 234
F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1352 (SD Fla. 2002) (three-judge court)
(Jordan, J., concurring) (the “lower courts continue to struggle in
an attempt to interpret and apply the ‘discriminatory effect’ prong
of the [
Bandemer] standard”);
O’Lear,
supra, at 855 (describing
Bandemer’s standard for
assessing discriminatory effect as “somewhat murky”). The test has
been criticized for its indeterminacy by a host of academic
commentators. See,
e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law §13–9, p. 1083 (2d ed. 1988) (“Neither Justice White’s nor
Justice Powell’s approach to the question of partisan apportionment
gives any real guidance to lower courts forced to adjudicate this
issue …”); Still, Hunting of the Gerrymander, 38 UCLA L. Rev.
1019, 1020 (1991) (noting that the plurality opinion has
“confounded legislators, practitioners, and academics alike”);
Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1325, 1365 (1987) (noting
that the
Bandemer plurality’s standard requires judgments
that are “largely subjective and beg questions that lie at the
heart of political competition in a democracy”); Issacharoff,
Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 Texas L. Rev. 1643, 1671 (1993)
(“
Bandemer begot only confusion”); Grofman, An Expert
Witness Perspective on Continuing and Emerging Voting Rights
Controversies, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 783, 816 (1992) (“[A]s far
as I am aware I am one of only two people who believe that
Bandemer makes sense. Moreover, the other person, Daniel
Lowenstein, has a diametrically opposed view as to
what
the plurality opinion means”). Because this standard was misguided
when proposed, has not been improved in subsequent application, and
is not even defended before us today by the appellants, we decline
to affirm it as a constitutional requirement.
B
Appellants take a run at
enunciating their own workable standard based on Article I, §2, and
the Equal Protection Clause. We consider it at length not only
because it reflects the litigant’s view as to the best that can be
derived from 18 years of experience, but also because it shares
many features with other proposed standards, so that what is said
of it may be said of them as well. Appellants’ proposed standard
retains the two-pronged framework of the
Bandemer
plurality—intent plus effect—but modifies the type of showing
sufficient to satisfy each.
To satisfy appellants’ intent
standard, a plaintiff must “show that the mapmakers acted with a
predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage,” which
can be shown “by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that
other neutral and legitimate redistricting criteria were
subordinated to the goal of achieving partisan advantage.” Brief
for Appellants 19 (emphasis added). As compared with the
Bandemer plurality’s test of mere intent to disadvantage
the plaintiff’s group, this proposal seemingly makes the standard
more difficult to meet—but only at the expense of making the
standard more indeterminate.
“Predominant intent” to disadvantage the
plaintiff political group refers to the relative importance of that
goal as compared with all the other goals that the map seeks to
pursue—contiguity of districts, compactness of districts,
observance of the lines of political subdivision, protection of
incumbents of all parties, cohesion of natural racial and ethnic
neighborhoods, compliance with requirements of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 regarding racial distribution, etc. Appellants contend
that their intent test
must be discernible and manageable
because it has been borrowed from our racial gerrymandering cases.
See
Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995);
Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U. S. 630 (1993). To
begin with, in a very important respect that is not so. In the
racial gerrymandering context, the predominant intent test has been
applied to the challenged district in which the plaintiffs voted.
See
Miller,
supra; United States v.
Hays, 515 U. S. 737 (1995).
Here, however, appellants do not assert that an apportionment fails
their intent test if any single district does so. Since “it would
be quixotic to attempt to bar state legislatures from considering
politics as they redraw district lines,” Brief for Appellants 3,
appellants propose a test that is satisfied only when “partisan
advantage was the predominant motivation
behind the entire
statewide plan,”
id., at 32 (emphasis added). Vague
as the “predominant motivation” test might be when used to evaluate
single districts, it all but evaporates when applied statewide.
Does it mean, for instance, that partisan intent must outweigh all
other goals—contiguity, compactness, preservation of neighborhoods,
etc.—
statewide? And how is the statewide “outweighing” to
be determined? If three-fifths of the map’s districts forgo the
pursuit of partisan ends in favor of strictly observing
political-subdivision lines, and only two-fifths ignore those lines
to disadvantage the plaintiffs, is the observance of political
subdivisions the “predominant” goal between those two? We are sure
appellants do not think so.
Even within the narrower compass of challenges
to a single district, applying a “predominant intent” test to
racial gerrymandering is easier and less disruptive. The
Constitution clearly contemplates districting by political
entities, see Article I, §4, and unsurprisingly that turns out to
be root-and-branch a matter of politics. See
Miller,
supra, at 914 (“[R]edistricting in most cases will
implicate a political calculus in which various interests compete
for recognition …”);
Shaw, supra, at 662 (White, J.,
dissenting) (“[D]istricting inevitably is the expression of
interest group politics …”);
Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 753
(1973) (“The reality is that districting inevitably has and is
intended to have substantial political consequences”). By contrast,
the purpose of segregating voters on the basis of race is not a
lawful one, and is much more rarely encountered. Determining
whether the shape of a particular district is so substantially
affected by the presence of a rare and constitutionally suspect
motive as to invalidate it is quite different from determining
whether it is so substantially affected by the excess of an
ordinary and lawful motive as to invalidate it. Moreover, the fact
that partisan districting is a lawful and common practice means
that there is almost
always room for an election-impeding
lawsuit contending that partisan advantage was the predominant
motivation; not so for claims of racial gerrymandering. Finally,
courts might be justified in accepting a modest degree of
unmanageability to enforce a constitutional command which (like the
Fourteenth Amendment obligation to refrain from racial
discrimination) is clear; whereas they are not justified in
inferring a judicially enforceable constitutional obligation (the
obligation not to apply
too much partisanship in
districting) which is both dubious and severely unmanageable. For
these reasons, to the extent that our racial gerrymandering cases
represent a model of discernible and manageable standards, they
provide no comfort here.
The effects prong of appellants’ proposal
replaces the
Bandemer plurality’s vague test of “denied
its chance to effectively influence the political process,” 478 U.
S., at 132–133, with criteria that are seemingly more specific. The
requisite effect is established when “(1) the plaintiffs show that
the districts systematically ‘pack’ and ‘crack’ the rival party’s
voters,[
Footnote 7]
and (2) the court’s examination of the ‘totality of
circumstances’ confirms that the map can thwart the plaintiffs’
ability to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats.”
Brief for Appellants 20 (emphasis and footnote added). This test is
loosely based on our cases applying §2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. §1973, to discrimination by race, see,
e.g.,
Johnson v.
De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997 (1994).
But a person’s politics is rarely as readily discernible—and
never as permanently discernible—as a person’s race.
Political affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may
shift from one election to the next; and even within a given
election, not all voters follow the party line. We dare say (and
hope) that the political party which puts forward an utterly
incompetent candidate will lose even in its registration
stronghold. These facts make it impossible to assess the effects of
partisan gerrymandering, to fashion a standard for evaluating a
violation, and finally to craft a remedy. See
Bandemer,
supra, at 156 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).[
Footnote 8]
Assuming, however, that the effects of
partisan gerrymandering can be determined, appellants’ test would
invalidate the districting only when it prevents a majority of the
electorate from electing a majority of representatives. Before
considering whether this particular standard is judicially
manageable we question whether it is judicially discernible in the
sense of being relevant to some constitutional violation. Deny it
as appellants may (and do), this standard rests upon the principle
that groups (or at least political-action groups) have a right to
proportional representation. But the Constitution contains no such
principle. It guarantees equal protection of the law to persons,
not equal representation in government to equivalently sized
groups. It nowhere says that farmers or urban dwellers, Christian
fundamentalists or Jews, Republicans or Democrats, must be accorded
political strength proportionate to their numbers.[
Footnote 9]
Even if the standard were relevant, however,
it is not judicially manageable. To begin with, how is a party’s
majority status to be established? Appellants propose using the
results of statewide races as the benchmark of party support. But
as their own complaint describes, in the 2000 Pennsylvania
statewide elections some Republicans won and some Democrats won.
See Juris. Statement 137a–138a (describing how Democrat candidates
received more votes for President and auditor general, and
Republicans received more votes for United States Senator, attorney
general, and treasurer). Moreover, to think that majority status in
statewide races establishes majority status for district contests,
one would have to believe that the only factor determining voting
behavior at all levels is political affiliation. That is assuredly
not true. As one law review comment has put it:
“There is no statewide vote in this country for the
House of Representatives or the state legislature. Rather, there
are separate elections between separate candidates in separate
districts, and that is all there is. If the districts change, the
candidates change, their strengths and weaknesses change, their
campaigns change, their ability to raise money changes, the issues
change—everything changes. Political parties do not compete for the
highest statewide vote totals or the highest mean district vote
percentages: They compete for specific seats.” Lowenstein &
Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public
Interest: Elusive or Illusory, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 59–60
(1985).
See also Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A
Political Problem Without Judicial Solution, in Political
Gerrymandering and the Courts 240, 241 (B. Grofman ed. 1990).
But if we could identify a majority party, we
would find it impossible to assure that that party wins a majority
of seats—unless we radically revise the States’ traditional
structure for elections. In any winner-take-all district system,
there can be no guarantee, no matter how the district lines are
drawn, that a majority of party votes statewide will produce a
majority of seats for that party. The point is proved by the 2000
congressional elections in Pennsylvania, which, according to
appellants’ own pleadings, were conducted under a judicially drawn
district map “free from partisan gerrymandering.” Juris. Statement
137a. On this “neutral playing fiel[d],” the Democrats’ statewide
majority of the major-party vote (50.6%) translated into a minority
of seats (10, versus 11 for the Republicans).
Id., at
133a, 137a. Whether by reason of partisan districting or not, party
constituents may always wind up “packed” in some districts and
“cracked” throughout others. See R. Dixon, Democratic
Representation 462 (1968) (“All Districting is
‘Gerrymandering’ ”); Schuck, 87 Colum. L. Rev., at 1359.
Consider, for example, a legislature that draws district lines with
no objectives in mind except compactness and respect for the lines
of political subdivisions. Under that system, political groups that
tend to cluster (as is the case with Democratic voters in cities)
would be systematically affected by what might be called a
“natural” packing effect. See
Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 159
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
Our one-person, one-vote cases, see
Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964);
Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964), have
no bearing upon this question, neither in principle nor in
practicality. Not in principle, because to say that each individual
must have an equal say in the selection of representatives, and
hence that a majority of individuals must have a majority say, is
not at all to say that each discernable group, whether farmers or
urban dwellers or political parties, must have representation
equivalent to its numbers. And not in practicality, because the
easily administrable standard of population equality adopted by
Wesberry and
Reynolds enables judges to decide
whether a violation has occurred (and to remedy it) essentially on
the basis of three readily determined factors—where the plaintiff
lives, how many voters are in his district, and how many voters are
in other districts; whereas requiring judges to decide whether a
districting system will produce a statewide majority for a majority
party casts them forth upon a sea of imponderables, and asks them
to make determinations that not even election experts can agree
upon.
For these reasons, we find appellants’
proposed standards neither discernible nor manageable.
C
For many of the same reasons, we
also reject the standard suggested by Justice Powell in
Bandemer. He agreed with the plurality that a plaintiff
should show intent and effect, but believed that the ultimate
inquiry ought to focus on whether district boundaries had been
drawn solely for partisan ends to the exclusion of “all other
neutral factors relevant to the fairness of redistricting.” 478 U.
S., at 161 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also
id., at 164–165. Under that inquiry, the courts
should consider numerous factors, though “[n]o one factor should be
dispositive.”
Id., at 173. The most important would be
“the shapes of voting districts and adherence to established
political subdivision boundaries.”
Ibid. “Other relevant
considerations include the nature of the legislative procedures by
which the apportionment law was adopted and legislative history
reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals.”
Ibid. These
factors, which “bear directly on the fairness of a redistricting
plan,” combined with “evidence concerning population disparities
and statistics tending to show vote dilution,” make out a claim of
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.
Ibid.
While Justice Powell rightly
criticized the Bandemer plurality for failing to suggest a
constitutionally based, judicially manageable standard, the
standard proposed in his opinion also falls short of the mark. It
is essentially a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, where all
conceivable factors, none of which is dispositive, are weighed with
an eye to ascertaining whether the particular gerrymander has gone
too far—or, in Justice Powell’s terminology, whether it is not
“fair.” “Fairness” does not seem to us a judicially manageable
standard. Fairness is compatible with noncontiguous districts, it
is compatible with districts that straddle political subdivisions,
and it is compatible with a party’s not winning the number of seats
that mirrors the proportion of its vote. Some criterion more solid
and more demonstrably met than that seems to us necessary to enable
the state legislatures to discern the limits of their districting
discretion, to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts,
and to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a
process that is the very foundation of democratic
decisionmaking.
IV
We turn next to consideration of
the standards proposed by today’s dissenters. We preface it with
the observation that the mere fact that these four dissenters come
up with three different standards—all of them different from the
two proposed in
Bandemer and the one proposed here by
appellants—goes a long way to establishing that there is no
constitutionally discernible standard.
A
Justice Stevens concurs in the
judgment that we should not address plaintiffs’ statewide political
gerrymandering challenges. Though he reaches that result via
standing analysis,
post, at 12, 13 (dissenting opinion),
while we reach it through political-question analysis, our
conclusions are the same: these statewide claims are
nonjusticiable.
Justice Stevens would, however, require courts
to consider political gerrymandering challenges at the
individual-district level. Much of his dissent is addressed to the
incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic
principles. We do not disagree with that judgment, any more than we
disagree with the judgment that it would be unconstitutional for
the Senate to employ, in impeachment proceedings, procedures that
are incompatible with its obligation to “try” impeachments. See
Nixon v.
United States, 506 U. S. 224 (1993). The issue we
have discussed is not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate
the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to say when a
violation has occurred, and to design a remedy. On that point,
Justice Stevens’s dissent is less helpful, saying, essentially,
that if we can do it in the racial gerrymandering context we can do
it here.
We have examined,
supra, at 15–18,
the many reasons why that is not so. Only a few of them are
challenged by Justice Stevens. He says that we “mistakenly assum[e]
that race cannot provide a legitimate basis for making political
judgments.”
Post, at 23. But we do not say that
race-conscious decisionmaking is always unlawful. Race can be used,
for example, as an indicator to achieve the purpose of neighborhood
cohesiveness in districting. What we have said is impermissible is
“the purpose of segregating voters on the basis of race,”
supra, at 16—that is to say, racial gerrymandering for
race’s sake, which would be the equivalent of political
gerrymandering for politics’ sake. Justice Stevens says we “er[r]
in assuming that politics is ‘an ordinary and lawful motive’ ”
in districting,
post, at 8—but all he brings forward to
contest that is the argument that an
excessive injection
of politics is
unlawful. So it is, and so does our opinion
assume. That does not alter the reality that setting out to
segregate voters by race is unlawful and hence rare, and setting
out to segregate them by political affiliation is (so long as one
doesn’t go too far) lawful and hence ordinary.
Justice Stevens’s confidence that what courts
have done with racial gerrymandering can be done with political
gerrymandering rests in part upon his belief that “the same
standards should apply,”
post, at 20. But in fact the
standards are quite different. A purpose to discriminate on the
basis of race receives the strictest scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, while a similar purpose to discriminate on the
basis of politics does not. “[N]othing in our case law compels the
conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to
precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. In fact, our country’s
long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting—as
well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has
reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of
race—would seem to compel the opposite conclusion.”
Shaw,
509 U. S., at 650 (internal citation omitted). That quoted passage
was in direct response to (and rejection of) the suggestion made by
Justices White and Stevens in dissent that “a racial gerrymander of
the sort alleged here is functionally equivalent to gerrymanders
for nonracial purposes, such as political gerrymanders.”
Ibid. See also
Bush v.
Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 964
(1996) (plurality opinion) (“We have not subjected political
gerrymandering to strict scrutiny”).
Justice Stevens relies on
First
Amendment cases to suggest that politically
discriminatory gerrymanders are subject to strict scrutiny under
the
Equal Protection Clause. See
post, at 8–9. It
is elementary that scrutiny levels are claim specific. An action
that triggers a heightened level of scrutiny for one claim may
receive a very different level of scrutiny for a different claim
because the underlying rights, and consequently constitutional
harms, are not comparable. To say that suppression of political
speech (a claimed First Amendment violation) triggers strict
scrutiny is not to say that failure to give political groups equal
representation (a claimed equal protection violation) triggers
strict scrutiny. Only an equal protection claim is before us in the
present case—perhaps for the very good reason that a First
Amendment claim, if it were sustained, would render unlawful
all consideration of political affiliation in districting,
just as it renders unlawful
all consideration of political
affiliation in hiring for non-policy-level government jobs. What
cases such as
Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976),
require is not merely that Republicans be given a decent share of
the jobs in a Democratic administration, but that political
affiliation
be disregarded.
Having failed to make the case for strict
scrutiny of political gerrymandering, Justice Stevens falls back on
the argument that scrutiny levels simply do not matter for purposes
of justiciability. He asserts that a standard imposing a strong
presumption of invalidity (strict scrutiny) is no more discernible
and manageable than a standard requiring an evenhanded balancing of
all considerations with no thumb on the scales (ordinary scrutiny).
To state this is to refute it. As is well known, strict scrutiny
readily, and almost always, results in invalidation. Moreover, the
mere fact that there exist standards which this Court could
apply—the proposition which much of Justice Stevens’s opinion is
devoted to establishing, see,
e.g.,
post, at
5–11, 25–26—does not mean that those standard are discernible in
the Constitution. This Court may not willy-nilly apply
standards—even manageable standards—having no relation to
constitutional harms. Justice Stevens points out, see
post, at 11, n. 15, that
Bandemer said
differences between racial and political groups “may be relevant to
the manner in which the case is adjudicated, but these differences
do not justify a refusal to entertain such a case.” 478 U. S., at
125. As 18 years have shown,
Bandemer was wrong.
B
Justice Souter, like Justice
Stevens, would restrict these plaintiffs, on the allegations before
us, to district-specific political gerrymandering claims.
Post, at 6, 12 (dissenting opinion). Unlike Justice
Stevens, however, Justice Souter recognizes that there is no
existing workable standard for adjudicating such claims. He
proposes a “fresh start,”
post, at 4: a newly constructed
standard loosely based in form on our Title VII cases, see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973),
and complete with a five-step prima facie test sewn together from
parts of, among other things, our Voting Rights Act jurisprudence,
law review articles, and apportionment cases. Even if these
self-styled “clues” to unconstitutionality could be manageably
applied, which we doubt, there is no reason to think they would
detect the constitutional crime which Justice Souter is
investigating—an “extremity of unfairness” in partisan competition.
Post, at 2–3.
Under Justice Souter’s proposed standard, in
order to challenge a particular district, a plaintiff must show (1)
that he is a member of a “cohesive political group”; (2) “that the
district of his residence . . . paid little or no heed” to
traditional districting principles; (3) that there were “specific
correlations between the district’s deviations from traditional
districting principles and the distribution of the population of
his group”; (4) that a hypothetical district exists which includes
the plaintiff’s residence, remedies the packing or cracking of the
plaintiff’s group, and deviates less from traditional districting
principles; and (5) that “the defendants acted intentionally to
manipulate the shape of the district in order to pack or crack his
group.”
Post, at 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. When those showings have
been made, the burden would shift to the defendants to justify the
district “by reference to objectives other than naked partisan
advantage.”
Post, at 10.
While this five-part test seems eminently
scientific, upon analysis one finds that each of the last four
steps requires a quantifying judgment that is unguided and ill
suited to the development of judicial standards:
How much
disregard of traditional districting principles?
How many
correlations between deviations and distribution?
How much
remedying of packing or cracking by the hypothetical district?
How many legislators must have had the intent to pack and
crack—and
how efficacious must that intent have been (must
it have been, for example, a
sine qua non cause of the
districting, or a
predominant cause)? At step two, for
example, Justice Souter would require lower courts to assess
whether mapmakers paid “little or no heed to . . . traditional
districting principles.”
Post, at 6. What is a lower court
to do when, as will often be the case, the district adheres to some
traditional criteria but not others? Justice Souter’s only response
to this question is to evade it: “It is not necessary now to say
exactly how a district court would balance a good showing on one of
these indices against a poor showing on another, for that sort of
detail is best worked out case by case.”
Post, at 7. But
the devil lurks precisely in such detail. The central problem is
determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far. It does
not solve that problem to break down the original unanswerable
question (How much political motivation and effect is too much?)
into four more discrete but equally unanswerable questions.
Justice Souter’s proposal is doomed to failure for a more basic
reason: No test—yea, not even a five-part test—can possibly be
successful unless one knows what he is testing
for. In the
present context, the test ought to identify deprivation of that
minimal degree of representation or influence to which a political
group is constitutionally entitled. As we have seen, the
Bandemer test sought (unhelpfully, but at least gamely) to
specify what that minimal degree was: “[a] chance to effectively
influence the political process.” 478 U. S., at 133. So did the
appellants’ proposed test: “[the] ability to translate a majority
of votes into a majority of seats.” Brief for Appellants 20.
Justice Souter avoids the difficulties of those formulations by
never telling us what his test is looking for, other than the
utterly unhelpful “extremity of unfairness.” He vaguely describes
the harm he is concerned with as vote dilution,
post, at
10, a term which usually implies some actual effect on the weight
of a vote. But no element of his test looks to the effect of the
gerrymander on the electoral success, the electoral opportunity, or
even the political influence, of the plaintiff group. We do not
know the precise constitutional deprivation his test is designed to
identify and prevent.
Even if (though it is implausible) Justice Souter believes that
the constitutional deprivation consists of merely “vote dilution,”
his test would not even identify
that effect. Despite his
claimed reliance on the
McDonnell Douglas framework,
Justice Souter would allow the plaintiff no opportunity to show
that the mapmakers’ compliance with traditional districting factors
is pretextual.[
Footnote 10]
His reason for this is never stated, but it certainly cannot be
that adherence to traditional districting factors negates any
possibility of intentional vote dilution. As we have explained
above, packing and cracking, whether intentional or no, are quite
consistent with adherence to compactness and respect for political
subdivision lines. See
supra, at 20. An even better
example is the traditional criterion of incumbency protection.
Justice Souter has previously acknowledged it to be a traditional
and constitutionally acceptable districting principle. See
Vera, 517 U. S., at 1047–1048 (dissenting opinion). Since
that is so, his test would not protect those who are packed, and
often tightly so, to ensure the reelection of representatives of
either party. Indeed, efforts to maximize partisan representation
statewide might well begin with packing voters of the opposing
party into the districts of existing incumbents of that party. By
this means an incumbent is protected, a potential adversary to the
districting mollified, and votes of the opposing party are
diluted.
Like us, Justice Souter acknowledges and
accepts that “some intent to gain political advantage is
inescapable whenever political bodies devise a district plan, and
some effect results from the intent.”
Post, at 2. Thus,
again like us, he recognizes that “the issue is one of how much is
too much.”
Ibid. And once those premises are conceded, the
only line that can be drawn must be based, as Justice Souter again
candidly admits, upon a substantive “notio[n] of fairness.”
Ibid. This is the same flabby goal that deprived Justice
Powell’s test of all determinacy. To be sure, Justice Souter frames
it somewhat differently: courts must intervene, he says, when
“partisan competition has reached an
extremity of
unfairness.”
Post, at 2–3 (emphasis added). We do not
think the problem is solved by adding the
modifier.
C
We agree with much of Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion, which convincingly demonstrates that
“political considerations will likely play an important, and
proper, role in the drawing of district boundaries.”
Post,
at 4. This places Justice Breyer, like the other dissenters, in the
difficult position of drawing the line between good politics and
bad politics. Unlike them, he would tackle this problem at the
statewide level.
The criterion Justice Breyer proposes is
nothing more precise than “the
unjustified use of
political factors to entrench a minority in power.”
Post,
at 6 (emphasis in original). While he invokes in passing the Equal
Protection Clause, it should be clear to any reader that what
constitutes
unjustified entrenchment depends on his own
theory of “effective government.”
Post, at 2. While one
must agree with Justice Breyer’s incredibly abstract starting point
that our Constitution sought to create a “basically democratic”
form of government,
ibid., that is a long and impassable
distance away from the conclusion that the judiciary may assess
whether a group (somehow defined) has achieved a level of political
power (somehow defined) commensurate with that to which they would
be entitled absent
unjustified political machinations
(whatever that means).
Justice Breyer provides no real guidance for
the journey. Despite his promise to do so,
post, at 1, he
never tells us what he is testing for, beyond the unhelpful
“
unjustified entrenchment.”
Post, at 6. Instead,
he “set[s] forth several sets of circumstances that lay out the
indicia of abuse,” “along a continuum,”
post, at 12,
proceeding (presumably) from the most clearly unconstitutional to
the possibly unconstitutional. With regard to the first “scenario,”
he is willing to assert that the indicia “would be sufficient to
support a claim.”
Post, at 12. This seems refreshingly
categorical, until one realizes that the indicia consist not merely
of the failure of the party receiving the majority of votes to
acquire a majority of seats in two successive elections,
but
also of the fact that there is no “neutral” explanation for
this phenomenon.
Ibid. But of course there
always
is a neutral explanation—if only the time-honored criterion of
incumbent protection. The indicia set forth in Justice Breyer’s
second scenario “
could also add up to unconstitutional
gerrymandering,”
post, at 12–13 (emphasis added); and for
those in the third “a court
may conclude that the map
crosses the constitutional line,”
post, at 13 (emphasis
added). We find none of this helpful. Each scenario suffers from at
least one of the problems we have previously identified, most
notably the difficulties of assessing partisan strength statewide
and of ascertaining whether an entire statewide plan is motivated
by political or neutral justifications, see
supra, at
15–16, 19–20. And even at that, the last two scenarios
do not
even purport to provide an answer, presumably leaving it to
each district court to determine whether, under those
circumstances, “
unjustified entrenchment” has occurred. In
sum, we neither know precisely what Justice Breyer is testing for,
nor precisely what fails the test.
But perhaps the most surprising omission from
Justice Breyer’s dissent, given his views on other matters, is the
absence of any cost-benefit analysis. Justice Breyer acknowledges
that “a majority normally can work its political will,”
post, at 8, and well describes the number of actors, from
statewide executive officers, to redistricting commissions, to
Congress, to the People in ballot initiatives and referenda, that
stand ready to make that happen. See
post, at 8–9. He
gives no instance (and we know none) of permanent frustration of
majority will. But where the majority has failed to assert itself
for some indeterminate period (two successive elections, if we are
to believe his first scenario), Justice Breyer simply assumes that
“court action may prove necessary,”
post, at 10. Why so?
In the real world, of course, court action that is available tends
to be sought, not just where it is necessary, but where it is in
the interest of the seeking party. And the vaguer the test for
availability, the more frequently interest rather than necessity
will produce litigation. Is the regular insertion of the judiciary
into districting, with the delay and uncertainty that brings to the
political process and the partisan enmity it brings upon the
courts, worth the benefit to be achieved—an accelerated (by some
unknown degree) effectuation of the majority will? We think
not.
V
Justice Kennedy recognizes that
we have “demonstrat[ed] the shortcomings of the other standards
that have been considered to date,”
post, at 3 (opinion
concurring in judgment). He acknowledges, moreover, that we “lack .
. . comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral
boundaries,”
post, at 1; and that there is an “absence of
rules to limit and confine judicial intervention,”
ibid. From these premises, one might think that
Justice Kennedy would reach the conclusion that political
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable. Instead, however, he
concludes that courts should continue to adjudicate such claims
because a standard
may one day be discovered.
The first thing to be said about Justice
Kennedy’s disposition is that it is not legally available. The
District Court in this case considered the plaintiffs’ claims
justiciable but dismissed them because the standard for
unconstitutionality had not been met. It is logically impossible to
affirm that dismissal without either (1) finding that the
unconstitutional-districting standard applied by the District
Court, or some other standard that it
should have applied,
has not been met, or (2) finding (as we have) that the claim is
nonjusticiable. Justice Kennedy seeks to affirm “[b]ecause, in the
case before us, we have no standard.”
Post, at 8. But it
is
our job, not the plaintiffs’, to explicate the standard
that makes the facts alleged by the plaintiffs adequate or
inadequate to state a claim. We cannot nonsuit
them for
our failure to do so.
Justice Kennedy asserts that to declare
nonjusticiability would be incautious.
Post, at 6. Our
rush to such a holding after a mere 18 years of fruitless
litigation “contrasts starkly” he says, “with the more patient
approach” that this Court has taken in the past.
Post, at
5. We think not. When it has come to determining what areas fall
beyond our Article III authority to adjudicate, this Court’s
practice, from the earliest days of the Republic to the present,
has been more reminiscent of Hannibal than of Hamlet. On July 18,
1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson wrote the Justices at the
direction of President Washington, asking whether they might answer
“questions [that] depend for their solution on the construction of
our treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of
the land,” but that arise “under circumstances
which do not
give a cognisance of them to the tribunals of the country.” 3
Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486–487 (H. Johnston
ed. 1891) (emphasis in original). The letter specifically invited
the Justices to give less than a categorical yes-or-no answer,
offering to present the particular questions “from which [the
Justices] will themselves strike out such as any circumstances
might, in their opinion, forbid them to pronounce on.”
Id., at 487. On August 8, 1793, the Justices responded in
a categorical and decidedly “impatient” manner, saying that the
giving of advisory opinions—not just advisory opinions on
particular questions but
all advisory opinions, presumably
even those concerning legislation affecting the Judiciary—was
beyond their power. “[T]he lines of separation drawn by the
Constitution between the three departments of the government”
prevented it.
Id., at 488. The Court rejected the more
“cautious” course of not “deny[ing] all hopes of intervention,”
post, at 5, but leaving the door open to the possibility
that at least
some advisory opinions (on a theory we could
not yet imagine) would not violate the separation of powers. In
Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 7 (1973), a
case filed after the Ohio National Guard’s shooting of students at
Kent State University, the plaintiffs sought “initial judicial
review and continuing surveillance by a federal court over the
training, weaponry, and orders of the Guard.” The Court held the
suit nonjusticiable; the matter was committed to the political
branches because,
inter alia, “it is difficult to conceive
of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less
competence.”
Id., at 10. The Court did not adopt the more
“cautious” course of letting the lower courts try their hand at
regulating the military before we declared it impossible. Most
recently, in
Nixon v.
United States, the Court,
joined by Justice Kennedy, held that a claim that the
Senate had employed certain impermissible procedures in trying an
impeachment was a nonjusticiable political question. Our decision
was not limited to the particular procedures under challenge, and
did not reserve the possibility that sometime, somewhere,
technology or the wisdom derived from experience might make a court
challenge to Senate impeachment all right.
The only cases Justice Kennedy cites in
defense of his never-say-never approach are
Baker v.
Carr and
Bandemer. See
post, at 5–6.
Bandemer provides no cover. There, all of the Justices who
concluded that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable
proceeded to describe what they regarded as the discernible and
manageable standard that rendered it so. The lower courts were set
wandering in the wilderness for 18 years not because the
Bandemer majority thought it a good idea, but because five
Justices could not agree upon a single standard, and because the
standard the plurality proposed turned out not to work.
As for
Baker v.
Carr: It is
true enough that, having had no experience
whatever in
apportionment matters of any sort, the Court there refrained from
spelling out the equal-protection standard. (It did so a mere two
years later in
Reynolds v.
Sims.) But the
judgment under review in
Baker, unlike the one under
review here, did not
demand the determination of a
standard. The lower court in
Baker had held the
apportionment claim of the plaintiffs
nonjusticiable, and
so it was logically possible to dispose of the appeal by simply
disagreeing with the nonjusticiability determination. As we
observed earlier, that is not possible here, where the lower court
has held the claim
justiciable but unsupported by the
facts. We must either enunciate the standard that causes us to
agree or disagree with that merits judgment, or else affirm that
the claim is beyond our competence to adjudicate.
Justice Kennedy worries that “[a]
determination by the Court to deny all hopes of intervention could
erode confidence in the courts as much as would a premature
decision to intervene.”
Post, at 5. But it is the function
of the courts to provide relief, not hope. What we think would
erode confidence is the Court’s refusal to do its job—announcing
that there may well be a valid claim here, but we are not yet
prepared to figure it out. Moreover, that course does more than
erode confidence; by placing the district courts back in the
business of pretending to afford help when they in fact can give
none, it deters the political process from affording genuine
relief. As was noted by a lower court confronted with a political
gerrymandering claim:
“When the Supreme Court resolves
Vieth, it
may choose to retreat from its decision that the question is
justiciable, or it may offer more guidance on the nature of the
required effect. . . . We have learned firsthand what will result
if the Court chooses to do neither. Throughout this case we have
borne witness to the powerful, conflicting forces nurtured by
Bandemer’s holding that the judiciary is to address
‘excessive’ partisan line-drawing, while leaving the issue
virtually unenforceable. Inevitably, as the political party in
power uses district lines to lock in its present advantage, the
party out of power attempts to stretch the protective cover of the
Voting Rights Act, urging dilution of critical standards that may,
if accepted, aid their party in the short-run but work to the
detriment of persons now protected by the Act in the long-run.
Casting the appearance both that there is a wrong and that the
judiciary stands ready with a remedy,
Bandemer as applied
steps on legislative incentives for self-correction.”
Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 474.
But the conclusive refutation of
Justice Kennedy’s position is the point we first made: it is not an
available disposition. We can affirm because political districting
presents a nonjusticiable question; or we can affirm because we
believe the correct standard which identifies unconstitutional
political districting has not been met; we cannot affirm because we
do not know what the correct standard is. Reduced to its essence,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion boils down to this: “As presently
advised, I know of no discernible and manageable standard that can
render this claim justiciable. I am unhappy about that, and hope
that I will be able to change my opinion in the future.” What are
the lower courts to make of this pronouncement? We suggest that
they must treat it as a reluctant fifth vote against justiciability
at district and statewide levels—a vote that may change in some
future case but that holds, for the time being, that this matter is
nonjusticiable.
VI
We conclude that neither Article
I, §2, nor the Equal Protection Clause, nor (what appellants only
fleetingly invoke) Article I, §4, provides a judicially enforceable
limit on the political considerations that the States and Congress
may take into account when districting.
Considerations of
stare decisis do
not compel us to allow
Bandemer to stand. That case
involved an interpretation of the Constitution, and the claims of
stare decisis are at their weakest in that field, where
our mistakes cannot be corrected by Congress. See
Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828
(1991). They are doubly weak in
Bandemer because the
majority’s inability to enunciate the judicially discernible and
manageable standard that it thought existed (or did not think did
not exist) presaged the need for reconsideration in light of
subsequent experience. And they are triply weak because it is hard
to imagine how any action taken in reliance upon
Bandemer
could conceivably be frustrated—except the bringing of lawsuits,
which is not the sort of primary conduct that is relevant.
While we do not lightly overturn one of our own holdings, “when
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’ ”
Id., at 827 (quoting
Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665
(1944)). Eighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have
persuaded us that
Bandemer is incapable of principled
application. We would therefore overrule that case, and decline to
adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims.
The judgment of the District
Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1
The term “political gerrymander” has been
defined as “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into
electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one
political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s
voting strength.” Black’s Law Dictionary 696 (7th ed. 1999).
Footnote 2
The plaintiffs apparently never amended their
complaint to allege that Act 34 was a political gerrymander, yet
the District Court’s decision in
Vieth III resolved that
claim on the merits. Because subject-matter jurisdiction is not
implicated and neither party has raised the point, we assume that
the District Court deemed the plaintiffs’ original complaint to
have been constructively amended.
Footnote 3
Article I, §4, provides as follows:
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.”
Footnote 4
The States, of course, have taken their own
steps to prevent abusive districting practices. A number have
adopted standards for redistricting, and measures designed to
insulate the process from politics. See,
e.g., Iowa Code
§42.4(5) (2003); N. J. Const., Art. II, §2; Haw. Rev.
Stat. §25–2 (1993); Idaho Code §72–1506 (1948–1999); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 21–A, §§1206, 1206–A (West Supp. 2003); Mont. Code Ann.
§5–1–115 (2003); Wash. Rev. Code §44.05.090 (1994).
Footnote 5
See
Republican Party of North
Carolina v.
Martin, 980 F. 2d 943 (CA4 1992)
(upholding denial of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
judgment for the defendants);
Republican Party of North
Carolina v.
North Carolina State Board of Elections,
27 F. 3d 563 (CA4 1994) (unpublished opinion) (upholding, as
modified, a preliminary injunction).
Martin dealt with
North Carolina’s system of electing superior court judges
statewide, a system that had resulted in the election of only a
single Republican judge since 1900. 980 F. 2d, at 948. Later
developments in the case are described in n. 8,
infra.
Footnote 6
For cases in which courts rejected prayers
for relief under
Davis v.
Bandemer, 478
U. S. 109 (1986), see,
e.g.,
Duckworth v.
State Administrative Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F. 3d
769 (CA4 2003);
Smith v.
Boyle, 144 F. 3d
1060 (CA7 1998);
La Porte County Republican Central Comm.
v.
Bd. of Comm’rs of County of La Porte, 43 F. 3d
1126 (CA7 1994);
Session v.
Perry, 298
F. Supp. 2d 451 (ED Tex. 2004)
(per curiam);
Martinez v.
Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (SD
Fla. 2002) (three-judge panel);
O’Lear v.
Miller,
222 F. Supp. 2d 850 (ED Mich.), summarily aff’d,
537 U. S. 997 (2002);
Marylanders
for Fair Representation, Inc. v.
Schaefer, 849
F. Supp. 1022 (Md. 1994) (three-judge panel);
Terrazas v.
Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162 (WD
Tex. 1993) (three-judge panel);
Pope v.
Blue, 809
F. Supp. 392 (WDNC) (three-judge panel), summarily aff’d,
506 U. S. 801
(1992);
Illinois Legislative Redistricting Comm’n v.
LaPaille, 782 F. Supp. 1272 (ND Ill. 1992);
Fund
for Accurate and Informed Representation, Inc. v.
Weprin, 796 F. Supp. 662 (NDNY) (three-judge panel),
summarily aff’d,
506 U. S. 1017 (1992);
Holloway v.
Hechler, 817 F. Supp. 617 (SD
W. Va. 1992) (three-judge panel), summarily aff’d,
507 U. S. 956 (1993);
Hastert v.
State Bd. of Elections, 777
F. Supp. 634 (ND Ill. 1991) (three-judge panel);
Anne
Arundel County Republican Central Comm. v.
State
Administrative Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394
(Md. 1991) (three-judge panel), summarily aff’d,
504 U. S. 938 (1992);
Republican Party of Virginia v.
Wilder, 774
F. Supp. 400 (WD Va. 1991) (three-judge panel);
Badham v.
Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (ND Cal.
1988), summarily aff’d,
488 U. S. 1024 (1989);
In re
2003 Legislative Apportionment of House of Representatives,
2003 ME 81, 827 A. 2d 810;
McClure v.
Secretary
of Commonwealth, 436 Mass. 614, 766 N. E. 2d 847 (2002);
Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 629
A. 2d 646 (1993);
Kenai Peninsula Borough v.
State, 743 P. 2d 1352 (Alaska 1987).
Footnote 7
“Packing” refers to the practice of filling a
district with a supermajority of a given group or party. “Cracking”
involves the splitting of a group or party among several districts
to deny that group or party a majority in any of those
districts.
Footnote 8
A delicious illustration of this is the one
case we have found—alluded to above—that provided relief under
Bandemer. See n. 5,
supra. In
Republican
Party of North Carolina v.
Hunt, No. 94–2410, 1996 WL
60439 (CA4, Feb. 12, 1996)
(per curiam) (unpublished),
judgt. order reported at 77 F. 3d 470, the district court,
after a trial with no less than 311 stipulations by the parties,
132 witness statements, approximately 300 exhibits, and 2 days of
oral argument, concluded that North Carolina’s system of electing
superior court judges on a statewide basis “had resulted in
Republican candidates experiencing a consistent and pervasive lack
of success and exclusion from the electoral process as a whole and
that these effects were likely to continue unabated into the
future.” 1996 WL 60439, at *1. In the elections for superior court
judges conducted just
five days after this pronouncement,
“every Republican candidate standing for the office of superior
court judge was victorious at the state level,”
ibid., a
result which the Fourth Circuit thought (with good reason)
“directly at odds with the recent prediction by the district
court,”
id., at *2, causing it to remand the case for
reconsideration.
Footnote 9
The Constitution also does not share
appellants’ alarm at the asserted tendency of partisan
gerrymandering to create more partisan representatives. Assuming
that assertion to be true, the Constitution does not answer the
question whether it is better for Democratic voters to have their
State’s congressional delegation include 10 wishy-washy Democrats
(because Democratic voters are “effectively” distributed so as to
constitute bare majorities in many districts), or 5 hardcore
Democrats (because Democratic voters are tightly packed in a few
districts). Choosing the former “dilutes” the vote of the radical
Democrat; choosing the latter does the same to the moderate.
Neither Article I, §2, nor the Equal Protection Clause takes sides
in this dispute.
Footnote 10
Justice Souter would allow a State, in
proving its affirmative defense, to demonstrate that the reasons
given for the district’s shape “were more than a mere pretext for
an old-fashioned gerrymander.”
Post, at 11. But the need
to establish that affirmative defense does not arise until the
plaintiff has established his prima facie case. And that prima
facie case fails when, under step two, the district on its face
complies with traditional districting criteria.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment