OPINION OF THE COURT
UNITHERM FOOD SYSTEMS, INC. V. SWIFT-ECKRICH, INC.
546 U. S. ____ (2006)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 04-597
UNITHERM FOOD SYSTEMS, INC., PETITIONER
v.
SWIFT-ECKRICH, INC., dba CONAGRA REFRIGERATED FOODS
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the federal circuit
[January 23, 2006]
Justice Thomas delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Ordinarily, a party in a civil
jury trial that believes the evidence is legally insufficient to
support an adverse jury verdict will seek a judgment as a matter of
law by filing a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(a) before submission of the case to the jury, and then (if the
Rule 50(a) motion is not granted and the jury subsequently decides
against that party) a motion pursuant to Rule 50(b). In this case,
however, the respondent filed a Rule 50(a) motion before the
verdict, but did not file a Rule 50(b) motion after the verdict.
Nor did respondent request a new trial under Rule 59. The Court of
Appeals nevertheless proceeded to review the sufficiency of the
evidence and, upon a finding that the evidence was insufficient,
remanded the case for a new trial. Because our cases addressing the
requirements of Rule 50 compel a contrary result, we reverse.
I
The genesis of the underlying
litigation in this case was ConAgra’s attempt to enforce its patent
for “A Method for Browning Precooked Whole Muscle Meat Products,”
U. S. Patent No. 5,952,027 (’027 patent). In early 2000, ConAgra
issued a general warning to companies who sold equipment and
processes for browning precooked meats explaining that it intended
to “ ‘aggressively protect all of [its] rights under [the
’027] patent.’ ” 375 F. 3d 1341, 1344 (CA Fed. 2004).
Petitioner Unitherm sold such processes, but did not receive
ConAgra’s warning. ConAgra also contacted its direct competitors in
the precooked meat business, announcing that it was “ ‘making
the ’027 Patent and corresponding patents that may issue available
for license at a royalty rate of 10˘ per pound.’ ”
Id., at 1345. Jennie-O, a direct competitor, received
ConAgra’s correspondence and undertook an investigation to
determine its rights and responsibilities with regard to the ’027
patent. Jennie-O determined that the browning process it had
purchased from Unitherm was the same as the process described in
the ’027 patent. Jennie-O further determined that the ’027 patent
was invalid because Unitherm’s president had invented the process
described in that patent six years before ConAgra filed its patent
application.
Consistent with these
determinations, Jennie-O and Unitherm jointly sued ConAgra in the
Western District of Oklahoma. As relevant here, Jennie-O and
Unitherm sought a declaration that the ’027 patent was invalid and
unenforceable, and alleged that ConAgra had violated §2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §2, by attempting to enforce a patent
that was obtained by committing fraud on the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO). See
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 174
(1965) (holding that “the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud
on the Patent Office may be violative of §2 of the Sherman Act
provided the other elements necessary to a §2 case are present”).
The District Court construed the ’027 patent and determined that it
was invalid based on Unitherm’s prior public use and sale of the
process described therein. 35 U. S. C. §102(b). After
dismissing Jennie-O for lack of antitrust standing, the District
Court allowed Unitherm’s
Walker Process claim to proceed
to trial. Prior to the court’s submission of the case to the jury,
ConAgra moved for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a) based on
legal insufficiency of the evidence. The District Court denied that
motion.[
Footnote 1] The jury
returned a verdict for Unitherm, and ConAgra neither renewed its
motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), nor
moved for a new trial on antitrust liability pursuant to Rule
59.[
Footnote 2]
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, ConAgra
maintained that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the
jury’s
Walker Process verdict. Although the Federal
Circuit has concluded that a party’s “failure to present the
district court with a post-verdict motion precludes appellate
review of sufficiency of the evidence,”
Biodex Corp. v.
Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F. 2d 850, 862 (1991),
in the instant case it was bound to apply the law of the Tenth
Circuit. 375 F. 3d, at 1365, n. 7 (“On most issues
related to Rule 50 motions … we generally apply regional circuit
law unless the precise issue being appealed pertains uniquely to
patent law”). Under Tenth Circuit law, a party that has failed to
file a postverdict motion challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence may nonetheless raise such a claim on appeal, so long as
that party filed a Rule 50(a) motion prior to submission of the
case to the jury.
Cummings v.
General Motors
Corp., 365 F. 3d 944, 950–951 (2004). Notably, the only
available relief in such a circumstance is a new trial.
Id., at 951.
Freed to examine the sufficiency of the
evidence, the Federal Circuit concluded that, although Unitherm had
presented sufficient evidence to support a determination that
ConAgra had attempted to enforce a patent that it had obtained
through fraud on the PTO, 375 F. 3d, at 1362, Unitherm had
failed to present evidence sufficient to support the remaining
elements of its antitrust claim.
Id., at 1365 (“Unitherm
failed to present any economic evidence capable of sustaining its
asserted relevant antitrust market, and little to support any other
aspect of its Section 2 claim”). Accordingly, it vacated the jury’s
judgment in favor of Unitherm and remanded for a new trial. We
granted certiorari,
543 U. S. 1186 (2005),
and now reverse.
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50 sets forth the procedural requirements for challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence in a civil jury trial and establishes
two stages for such challenges—prior to submission of the case to
the jury, and after the verdict and entry of judgment. Rule 50(a)
allows a party to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence prior
to submission of the case to the jury, and authorizes the District
Court to grant such motions at the court’s discretion:
“(a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.
“(1) If during a trial by jury a party has
been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on
that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party
and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that
party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the
controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable
finding on that issue.
“(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law
may be made at any time before submission of the case to the jury.
Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the
facts on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment.”
Rule 50(b), by contrast, sets forth the procedural
requirements for renewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge
after the jury verdict and entry of judgment.
“(b) Renewing Motion for Judgment
After Trial; Alternative Motion for New Trial. If, for any reason,
the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law
made at the close of all the evidence, the court is considered to
have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s later
deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may
renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a
motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment—and may
alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial
under Rule 59. In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may:
“(1) if a verdict was returned:
“(A) allow the judgment to stand,
“(B) order a new trial, or
“(C) direct entry of judgment as a matter
of
law … .”
This Court has addressed the
implications of a party’s failure to file a postverdict motion
under Rule 50(b) on several occasions and in a variety of
procedural contexts. This Court has concluded that, “[i]n the
absence of such a motion” an “appellate court [is] without power to
direct the District Court to enter judgment contrary to the one it
had permitted to stand.”
Cone v.
West Virginia Pulp
& Paper Co., 330 U. S. 212, 218
(1947). This Court has similarly concluded that a party’s failure
to file a Rule 50(b) motion deprives the appellate court of the
power to order the entry of judgment in favor of that party where
the district court directed the jury’s verdict,
Globe Liquor
Co. v.
San Roman, 332 U. S. 571 (1948), and where the
district court expressly reserved a party’s preverdict motion for a
directed verdict and then denied that motion after the verdict was
returned.
Johnson v.
New York, N. H. &
H. R. Co., 344 U. S. 48 (1952). A
postverdict motion is necessary because “[d]etermination of whether
a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered under Rule
50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of the judge who
saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the case which no
appellate printed transcript can impart.”[
Footnote 3]
Cone,
supra, at 216.
Moreover, the “requirement of a timely application for judgment
after verdict is not an idle motion” because it “is … an essential
part of the rule, firmly grounded in principles of fairness.”
Johnson,
supra, at 53.
The foregoing authorities lead us to reverse
the judgment below. Respondent correctly points out that these
authorities address whether an appellate court may enter judgment
in the absence of a postverdict motion, as opposed to whether an
appellate court may order a new trial (as the Federal Circuit did
here). But this distinction is immaterial. This Court’s
observations about the necessity of a postverdict motion under Rule
50(b), and the benefits of the district court’s input at that
stage, apply with equal force whether a party is seeking judgment
as a matter of law or simply a new trial. In
Cone, this
Court concluded that, because Rule 50(b) permits the district court
to exercise its discretion to choose between ordering a new trial
and entering judgment, its “appraisal of the bona fides of the
claims asserted by the litigants is of great value in reaching a
conclusion as to whether a
new trial should be granted.”
330 U. S., at 216 (emphasis added). Similarly, this Court has
determined that a party may only pursue on appeal a particular
avenue of relief available under Rule 50(b), namely the entry of
judgment
or a new trial, when that party has complied with
the Rule’s filing requirements by requesting that particular relief
below. See
Johnson,
supra, at 54 (“Respondent
made a motion to set aside the verdict and for new trial within the
time required by Rule 50(b). It failed to comply with permission
given by 50(b) to move for judgment
n. o. v.
after the verdict. In this situation respondent is entitled only to
a new trial, not to a judgment in its favor”).[
Footnote 4]
Despite the straightforward language employed
in
Cone,
Globe Liquor, and
Johnson,
respondent maintains that those cases dictate affirmance here,
because in each of those cases the litigants secured a new trial.
But in each of those cases the appellants moved for a new trial
postverdict in the District Court, and did not seek to establish
their entitlement to a new trial solely on the basis of a denied
Rule 50(a) motion. See
Cone,
supra, at 213
(noting that respondent moved for a new trial);[
Footnote 5]
Globe Liquor, 332 U. S., at
572 (“The respondents … moved for a new trial on the ground … that
there were many contested issues of fact”). Indeed,
Johnson concluded that respondent was
only
entitled to a new trial by virtue of its motion for such “within
the time required by Rule 50(b).” 344 U. S., at 54. Accordingly,
these outcomes merely underscore our holding today—a party is not
entitled to pursue a new trial on appeal unless that party makes an
appropriate postverdict motion in the district court.
Our determination that respondent’s failure to
comply with Rule 50(b) forecloses its challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence is further validated by the purported basis of
respondent’s appeal, namely the District Court’s denial of
respondent’s preverdict Rule 50(a) motion. As an initial matter,
Cone,
Globe Liquor, and
Johnson
unequivocally establish that the precise subject matter of a
party’s Rule 50(a) motion—namely, its entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law—cannot be appealed unless that motion is renewed
pursuant to Rule 50(b). Here, respondent does not seek to pursue on
appeal the precise claim it raised in its Rule 50(a) motion before
the District Court—namely, its entitlement to judgment as a matter
of law. Rather, it seeks a
new trial based on the legal
insufficiency of the evidence. But if, as in
Cone, Globe
Liquor, and
Johnson, a litigant that has failed to
file a Rule 50(b) motion is foreclosed from seeking the relief it
sought in its Rule 50(a) motion—
i.e., the entry of
judgment—then surely respondent is foreclosed from seeking a new
trial, relief it did not and could not seek in its preverdict
motion. In short, respondent never sought a new trial before the
District Court, and thus forfeited its right to do so on appeal.
Yakus v.
United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444
(1944) (“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court
than that a … right may be forfeited … by the failure to make
timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction
to determine it”).
The text of Rule 50(b) confirms that
respondent’s preverdict Rule 50(a) motion did not present the
District Court with the option of ordering a new trial. That text
provides that a district court may only order a new trial on the
basis of issues raised in a preverdict Rule 50(a) motion when
“ruling on a renewed motion” under Rule 50(b). Accordingly, even if
the District Court was inclined to grant a new trial on the basis
of arguments raised in respondent’s preverdict motion, it was
without the power to do so under Rule 50(b) absent a postverdict
motion pursuant to that Rule. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
was similarly powerless.
Similarly, the text and application of Rule
50(a) support our determination that respondent may not challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal on the basis of the
District Court’s denial of its Rule 50(a) motion. The Rule provides
that “the court
may determine” that “there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [a]
party on [a given] issue,” and “
may grant a motion for
judgment as a matter of law against that party … .” (Emphasis
added.) Thus, while a district court is permitted to enter judgment
as a matter of law when it concludes that the evidence is legally
insufficient, it is not required to do so. To the contrary, the
district courts are, if anything, encouraged to submit the case to
the jury, rather than granting such motions. As Wright and Miller
explain:
“Even at the close of all the
evidence it may be desirable to refrain from granting a motion for
judgment as a matter of law despite the fact that it would be
possible for the district court to do so. If judgment as a matter
of law is granted and the appellate court holds that the evidence
in fact was sufficient to go to the jury, an entire new trial must
be had. If, on the other hand, the trial court submits the case to
the jury, though it thinks the evidence insufficient, final
determination of the case is expedited greatly. If the jury agrees
with the court’s appraisal of the evidence, and returns a verdict
for the party who moved for judgment as a matter of law, the case
is at an end. If the jury brings in a different verdict, the trial
court can grant a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Then if the appellate court holds that the trial court was in error
in is appraisal of the evidence, it can reverse and order judgment
on the verdict of the jury, without any need for a new trial. For
this reason the appellate courts repeatedly have said that it
usually is desirable to take a verdict, and then pass on the
sufficiency of the evidence on a post-verdict motion.” 9A Federal
Practice §2533, at 319 (footnote omitted).
Thus, the District Court’s denial of respondent’s
preverdict motion cannot form the basis of respondent’s appeal,
because the denial of that motion was not error. It was merely an
exercise of the District Court’s discretion, in accordance with the
text of the Rule and the accepted practice of permitting the jury
to make an initial judgment about the sufficiency of the evidence.
The only error here was counsel’s failure to file a postverdict
motion pursuant to Rule 50(b).[
Footnote 6]
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we
hold that since respondent failed to renew its preverdict motion as
specified in Rule 50(b), there was no basis for review of
respondent’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge in the Court of
Appeals. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.[
Footnote 7]
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1
Petitioner contends that respondent’s
Rule 50(a) motion pertained only to the fraud element of
petitioner’s Walker Process claim, and that it did not
encompass the remaining antitrust elements of that claim. Because
we conclude that petitioner is entitled to prevail irrespective of
the scope of respondent’s Rule 50(a) motion, we assume without
deciding that that motion pertained to all aspects of petitioner’s
§2 claim. But see Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
134 F. R. D. 525, 687 (1991) (“A post-trial motion for
judgment can be granted only on grounds advanced in the pre-verdict
motion”).
Footnote 2
While ConAgra did file a postverdict motion
seeking a new trial on antitrust damages, that motion did not seek
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing antitrust
liability and thus has no bearing on the instant case.
Footnote 3
Neither
Neely v.
Martin K. Eby
Constr. Co., 386 U. S. 317 (1967),
nor
Weisgram v.
Marley Co., 528 U. S. 440 (2000),
undermine our judgment about the benefit of postverdict input from
the district court. In those cases this Court determined that an
appellate court may, in certain circumstances, direct the entry of
judgment when it reverses the district court’s denial of a Rule
50(b) motion. But in such circumstances the district court will
have had an opportunity to consider the propriety of entering
judgment or ordering a new trial by virtue of the postverdict
motion. Moreover, these cases reiterate the value of the district
court’s input, cautioning the courts of appeals to be
“ ‘constantly alert’ to ‘the trial judge’s first-hand
knowledge of witnesses, testimony, and issues.’ ”
Id., at 443 (quoting
Neely,
supra, at
325).
Footnote 4
The dissent’s suggestion that 28 U.
S. C. §2106 permits the Courts of Appeals to consider the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying a civil jury verdict
notwithstanding a party’s failure to comply with Rule 50 is
foreclosed by authority of this Court. While the dissent observes
that §2106 was enacted after
Cone and
Globe Liquor
Co. v.
San Roman, 332 U. S. 571 (1948),
post,
at 2 (opinion of Stevens, J.), it fails to note that it was enacted
prior to
Johnson. Johnson explicitly reaffirmed
those earlier cases, concluding that “in the absence of a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made in the trial court
within ten days after reception of a verdict [Rule 50] forbids the
trial judge or an appellate court to enter such judgment.” 344 U.
S., at 50. Moreover, in
Neely, this Court observed that
§2106 is “broad enough to include the power to direct entry of
judgment
n. o. v. on appeal,” 386 U.
S., at 322, but nonetheless reaffirmed that
Cone,
Globe Liquor, and
Johnson “make it clear that an
appellate court may not order judgment
n. o. v.
where the verdict loser has failed to strictly comply with the
procedural requirements of Rule 50(b).” 386 U. S., at 325. Contrary
to the dissent’s suggestion,
Neely confirms that the broad
grant of authority to the Courts of Appeals in §2106 must be
exercised consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as interpreted by this Court.
The dissent’s approach is not only foreclosed
by authority of this Court, it also may present Seventh Amendment
concerns. The implication of the dissent’s interpretation of §2106
is that a court of appeals would be free to examine the sufficiency
of the evidence regardless of whether the appellant had filed a
Rule 50(a) motion in the district court and, in the event the
appellant had filed a Rule 50(a) motion, regardless of whether the
district court had ever
ruled on that motion. The former
is squarely foreclosed by
Slocum v.
New York Life Ins.
Co., 228 U. S.
364 (1913), and the latter is inconsistent with this Court’s
explanation of the requirements of the Seventh Amendment in
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Redman,
295 U. S. 654,
658 (1935) (explaining that “under the pertinent rules of the
common law the court of appeals could set aside the verdict for
error of law, such as the trial court’s
ruling respecting
the sufficiency of the evidence, and direct a new trial, but could
not itself determine the issues of fact and direct a judgment for
the defendant, for this would cut off the plaintiff’s unwaived
right to have the issues of fact determined by a jury” (emphasis
added)). Indeed, Rule 50 was drafted with such concerns in mind.
See 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§2522, pp. 244–246 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Federal
Practice).
Footnote 5
While the precise nature of the new trial
motion at issue in
Cone is difficult to ascertain from
this Court’s description of that motion, the Court of Appeals
opinion in that case confirms that the movant had properly objected
to the admission of certain evidence, and then moved postverdict
“for a new trial [on the basis of the inadmissible evidence] and
later renewed this motion upon the basis of newly-discovered
evidence.”
West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v.
Cone, 153 F. 2d 576, 580 (CA4 1946). This Court did
not disturb the Court of Appeals holding that formed the basis of
the movant’s entitlement to a new trial, namely “the Circuit Court
of Appeals’ holding that there was prejudicial error in the
admission of evidence.” 330 U. S., at 215.
Footnote 6
Respondent claims that its failure to renew
its Rule 50(a) motion was in reliance on the Tenth Circuit’s
determination that it could order a new trial in the absence of a
Rule 50(b) motion. But respondent cannot credibly maintain that it
wanted the Court of Appeals to order a new trial as opposed to
entering judgment. And, as the Tenth Circuit has recognized,
respondent could not obtain the entry of judgment unless it
complied with Rule 50(b).
Cummings v.
General Motors
Corp., 365 F. 3d 944, 951 (2004). Respondent therefore
had every incentive to comply with that Rule’s requirements.
Accordingly, we reject its contention that our application of Rule
50(b) to the instant case is impermissibly retroactive. See also
Harper v.
Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 97 (1993)
(“[W]e can scarcely permit the substantive law to shift and spring
according to the particular equities of individual parties’ claims
of actual reliance on an old rule and of harm from a retroactive
application of the new rule” (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted)).
Footnote 7
We reject respondent’s contention that it is
entitled to a remand for reconsideration in light of
Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303 (CA
Fed. 2005). The Federal Circuit has already denied respondent’s
petition for rehearing raising this issue.
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