OCTOBER TERM, 1997
Syllabus
UNITED STATES
v. RAMIREZ
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 96-1469. Argued January 13, 1998-Decided March 4, 1998
Based on a reliable confidential informant's statement that he
had seen a person he believed to be Alan Shelby, a dangerous
escaped prisoner, at respondent's home, and on a federal agent's
subsequent observation of a man resembling Shelby outside that
home, the Government obtained a "no-knock" warrant to enter and
search the home. Having gathered in the early morning hours to
execute the warrant, officers announced over a loud speaker system
that they had a search warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single
window in respondent's garage and pointed a gun through the
opening, hoping thereby to dissuade occupants from rushing to the
weapons stash the informant had told them was in the garage.
Awakened by the noise and fearful that his house was being
burglarized, respondent grabbed a pistol and fired it into the
garage ceiling. When the officers shouted "police," respondent
surrendered and was taken into custody. After he admitted that he
had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another in
the house, and that he was a convicted felon, respondent was
indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of
firearms. The District Court granted his motion to suppress
evidence regarding weapons possession, ruling that the officers had
violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. § 3109 because
there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify their
destruction of property in executing the warrant. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment does not hold officers to a higher
standard when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of
property. It is obvious from the holdings in
Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514
U. S. 927, 934, 936, and
Richards v.
Wisconsin,
520 U. S. 385,
that such an entry's lawfulness does not depend on whether property
is damaged in the course of the entry. Under
Richards, a
no-knock entry is justified if police have a "reasonable suspicion"
that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would
"be dangerous or futile, or ... inhibit the effective investigation
of the crime."
Id., at 394. Whether such a reasonable
suspicion exists does not depend on whether police must destroy
property in order to enter. This is not to say that the Fourth
Amendment does not speak to the manner of executing a warrant.
66
Syllabus
Such execution is governed by the general touchstone of
reasonableness that applies to all Fourth Amendment analysis. See
Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 108-109.
Excessive or unnecessary property destruction during a search may
violate the Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and
the fruits of the search not subject to suppression. Applying these
principles to the facts at hand demonstrates that no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred. The police certainly had a
"reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence
might be dangerous to themselves or others, in that a reliable
informant had told them that Alan Shelby might be in respondent's
home, an officer had confirmed this possibility, and Shelby had a
violent past and possible access to a large supply of weapons and
had vowed that he "would not do federal time." Moreover, the manner
in which the entry was accomplished was clearly reasonable, in that
the police broke but a single window in the garage to discourage
Shelby, or anyone else, from rushing to the weapons that the
informant had told them were there. Pp.70-72.
2. The officers executing the warrant did not violate § 3109,
which provides: "The officer may break open any ... window ... to
execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance .... " Contrary to respondent's
contention, that statute does not specify the only circumstances
under which an officer executing a warrant may damage property. By
its terms § 3109 prohibits nothing, but merely authorizes officers
to damage property in certain instances. Even accepting,
arguendo, that it implicitly forbids some of what it does
not expressly permit, it is of no help to respondent. In both
Miller v.
United States, 357 U. S. 301,313, and
Sabbath v.
United States, 391 U. S. 585, 591, n. 8,
this Court noted that § 3109's prior notice requirement codified a
common-law tradition. The Court now makes clear that § 3109 also
codified the exceptions to the common-law requirement of notice
before entry. Because that is the case, and because the common law
informs the Fourth Amendment,
Wilson and
Richards
serve as guideposts in construing the statute. In
Wilson,
the Court concluded that the common-law announcement principle is
an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry, but
noted that the principle was never stated as an inflexible rule
requiring announcement under all circumstances. 514 U. S., at 934.
In
Richards, the Court articulated the test used to
determine whether exigent circumstances justify a particular
no-knock entry. 520 U. S., at 394. Thus, § 3109 includes an exigent
circumstances exception and that exception's applicability in a
given instance is measured by the same standard articulated in
Richards. The police met that standard here. Pp. 72-74.
91 F.3d
1297, reversed and remanded.
67
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court.
David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States. With
him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and J.
Douglas Wilson.
Michael R. Levine argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent. *
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 394
(1997), we held that so-called "no-knock" entries are justified
when police officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking
and announcing their presence before entering would "be dangerous
or futile, or ... inhibit the effective investigation of
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by
Richard
M. Weintraub, Bernard J.
Farber, Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W
Schmidt, and
James P. Manak; and for the State of Ohio
et al. by
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio,
Jeffrey S.
Sutton, State Solicitor, and
Elise
Porter, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective jurisdictions as follows:
William
H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama,
Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska,
Winston Bryant of Arkansas,
Daniel E. Lungren of
California,
M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
Robert
Butterworth of Florida,
Margery S.
Bronster of
Hawaii,
Alan G.
Lance of Idaho,
James E. Ryan
of Illinois,
Carla J.
Stovall of Kansas,
Richard
P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J.
Joseph Curran, Jr., of
Maryland,
Frank J.
Kelley of Michigan,
Jeremiah W
Nixon of Missouri,
Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana,
Don
Stenberg of Nebraska,
Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada,
Dennis C.
Vacco of New York,
Michael F.
Easley of North Carolina,
Heidi Heitkamp of North
Dakota,
W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
Jose Fuentes
Agostini of Puerto Rico,
Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode
Island,
Charles M. Condon of South Carolina,
Mark
Barnett of South Dakota,
Jan Graham of Utah,
William
H. Sorrell of Vermont,
Richard Cullen of Virginia, and
Christine Q Gregoire of Washington.
John Wesley Hall, Jr., and
Lisa Kemler filed a
brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
amicus curiae urging affirmance.
68
the crime." In this case, we must decide whether the Fourth
Amendment holds officers to a higher standard than this when a
"no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property. We hold
that it does not.
Alan Shelby was a prisoner serving concurrent state and federal
sentences in the Oregon state prison system. On November 1,1994,
the Tillamook County Sheriff's Office took temporary custody of
Shelby, expecting to transport him to the Tillamook County
Courthouse, where he was scheduled to testify. On the way to the
courthouse, Shelby slipped his handcuffs, knocked over a deputy
sheriff, and escaped from custody.
It was not the first time Shelby had attempted escape. In 1991
he struck an officer, kicked out a jail door, assaulted a woman,
stole her vehicle, and used it to ram a police vehicle. Another
time he attempted escape by using a rope made from torn bedsheets.
He was reported to have made threats to kill witnesses and police
officers, to have tortured people with a hammer, and to have said
that he would "'not do federal time.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a.
It was also thought that Shelby had had access to large supplies of
weapons.
Shortly after learning of Shelby's escape, the authorities sent
out a press release, seeking information that would lead to his
recapture. On November 3, a reliable confidential informant told
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agent George Kim that on
the previous day he had seen a person he believed to be Shelby at
respondent Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Kim and the
informant then drove to an area near respondent's home, from where
Kim observed a man working outside who resembled Shelby.
Based on this information, a Deputy United States Marshal sought
and received a "no-knock" warrant granting permission to enter and
search Ramirez's home. Around this time, the confidential informant
also told authorities that respondent might have a stash of guns
and drugs hidden in
69
his garage. In the early morning of November 5, approximately 45
officers gathered to execute the warrant. The officers set up a
portable loudspeaker system and began announcing that they had a
search warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single window in the
garage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby to
dissuade any of the occupants from rushing to the weapons the
officers believed might be in the garage.
Respondent and his family were asleep inside the house at the
time this activity began. Awakened by the noise, respondent
believed that they were being burglarized. He ran to his utility
closet, grabbed a pistol, and fired it into the ceiling of his
garage. The officers fired back and shouted "police." At that point
respondent realized that it was law enforcement officers who were
trying to enter his home. He ran to the living room, threw his
pistol away, and threw himself onto the floor. Shortly thereafter,
he, his wife, and their child left the house and were taken into
police custody. Respondent waived his Miranda rights, and then
admitted that he had fired the weapon, that he owned both that gun
and another gun that was inside the house, and that he was a
convicted felon. Officers soon obtained another search warrant,
which they used to return to the house and retrieve the two guns.
Shelby was not found.
Respondent was subsequently indicted for being a felon in
possession of firearms. 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court
granted his motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of
the weapons, ruling that the police officers had violated both the
Fourth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. § 3109 because there were
"insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify the police
officers' destruction of property in their execution of the
warrant. App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
91 F.3d
1297 (1996). Applying Circuit precedent, that court concluded
that while a "mild exigency" is sufficient to justify a no-knock
entry that can be accomplished without the de-
70
struction of property, "'more specific inferences of exigency
are necessary'" when property is destroyed.
Id., at 130l. It
held that this heightened standard had not been met on the facts of
this case. We granted certiorari and now reverse. 521 U. S. 1103
(1997).
In two recent cases we have considered whether and to what
extent "no-knock" entries implicate the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. In
Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we
reviewed the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding that the common-law
requirement that police officers knock and announce their presence
before entering played no role in Fourth Amendment analysis. We
rejected that conclusion, and held instead that "in some
circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
Id., at 934. We
were careful to note, however, that there was no rigid rule
requiring announcement in all instances, and left "to the lower
courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an
unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
Id., at 934, 936.
In
Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385 (1997),1
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that police officers executing
search warrants in felony drug investigations were never required
to knock and announce their presence. We concluded that this
blanket rule was overly broad and held instead that "[i]n order to
justify a 'no-knock' entry, the police must have a reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the
particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it
would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, allowing the destruction of evidence."
Id., at
394.
Neither of these cases explicitly addressed the question whether
the lawfulness of a no-knock entry depends on whether property is
damaged in the course of the entry. It
1 It should be noted that our opinion in
Richards came
down after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this
case.
71
is obvious from their holdings, however, that it does not. Under
Richards, a no-knock entry is justified if police have a
"reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing would be
dangerous, futile, or destructive to the purposes of the
investigation. Whether such a "reasonable suspicion" exists depends
in no way on whether police must destroy property in order to
enter.
This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment speaks not at all
to the manner of executing a search warrant. The general touchstone
of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis, see
Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U. S. 106,108-109
(1977)
(per curiam), governs the method of execution of the
warrant. Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the
course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though
the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not
subject to suppression.
Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we conclude that
no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. A reliable confidential
informant had notified the police that Alan Shelby might be inside
respondent's home, and an officer had confirmed this possibility.
Shelby was a prison escapee with a violent past who reportedly had
access to a large supply of weapons. He had vowed that he would
"'not do federal time.'" The police certainly had a "reasonable
suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence might be
dangerous to themselves or to others.2
As for the manner in which the entry was accomplished, the
police here broke a single window in respondent's garage. They did
so because they wished to discourage Shelby, or any other occupant
of the house, from rushing to the weapons that the informant had
told them respondent might have
2 It is of no consequence that Shelby was not found. "[I]n
determining the lawfulness of entry and the existence of probable
cause we may concern ourselves only with what the officers had
reason to believe
at the time of their entry." Ker v.
California, 374
U. S. 23, 40-41, n. 12 (1963) (opinion of Clark, J.) (emphasis
in original).
72
kept there. Their conduct was clearly reasonable and we conclude
that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.3
Respondent also argues, however, that suppression is appropriate
because the officers executing the warrant violated 18 U. S. C. §
3109. This statutory argument fares no better. Section 3109
provides:
"The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of
a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a
search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he
is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a
person aiding him in the execution of the warrant."
Respondent contends that the statute specifies the only
circumstances under which an officer may damage property in
executing a search warrant, and that it therefore forbids all other
property-damaging entries.
But by its terms § 3109 prohibits nothing. It merely authorizes
officers to damage property in certain instances. Even accepting,
arguendo, that the statute implicitly forbids some of what
it does not expressly permit, it is of no help to respondent. In
Miller v.
United States, 357 U. S. 301, 313
(1958), we noted that § 3109's "requirement of prior notice ...
before forcing entry ... codif[ied] a tradition embedded in
Anglo-American law." We repeated this point in
Sabbath v.
United States, 391 U. S. 585, 591, n. 8
(1968) (referring to § 3109 as "codification" of the common law).
In neither of
3 After concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated
in this case, the Ninth Circuit further concluded that the guns
should be excluded from evidence. Because we conclude that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation, we need not decide whether, for
example, there was sufficient causal relationship between the
breaking of the window and the discovery of the guns to warrant
suppression of the evidence. Cf.
Nix v.
Williams,
467 U. S. 431
(1984);
Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).
73
these cases, however, did we expressly hold that § 3109 also
codified the exceptions to the common-law requirement of notice
before entry. In
Miller the Government made "no claim ... of
the existence of circumstances excusing compliance" and the
question was accordingly not before us. 357 U. S., at 309. In
Sabbath the Government did make such a claim, but because
the record did "not reveal any substantial basis for the failure of
the agents ... to announce their authority" we did not decide the
question. We did note, however, that "[e]xceptions to any possible
constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry have been
recognized ... and there is little reason why those limited
exceptions might not also apply to § 3109, since they existed at
common law, of which the statute is a codification." 391 U. S., at
591, n. 8.
In this case the question is squarely presented. We remove
whatever doubt may remain on the subject and hold that § 3109
codifies the exceptions to the common-law announcement requirement.
If § 3109 codifies the common law in this area, and the common law
in turn informs the Fourth Amendment, our decisions in
Wilson and
Richards serve as guideposts in construing
the statute. In
Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we
concluded that the common-law principle of announcement is "an
element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment,"
but noted that the principle "was never stated as an inflexible
rule requiring announcement under all circumstances."
Id.,
at 934. In
Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385 (1997), we
articulated the test used to determine whether exigent
circumstances justify a particular no-knock entry.
Id., at
394. We therefore hold that § 3109 includes an exigent
circumstances exception and that the exception's applicability in a
given instance is measured by the same standard we articulated in
Richards. The police met that standard here and § 3109 was
therefore not violated.
74
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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