OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
UNITED STATES
v. OAKLAND CANNABIS BUYERS' COOPERATIVE ET
AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No.00-151. Argued March 28, 200l-Decided May 14,2001
Respondent Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to
distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes.
The United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive
director, also a respondent (together, the Cooperative), under the
Controlled Substances Act. The United States argued that the
Cooperative's activities violated the Act's prohibitions on
distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to
distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. The District
Court enjoined the Cooperative's activities, but the Cooperative
continued to distribute marijuana. The District Court found the
Cooperative in contempt, rejecting its defense that any
distributions were medically necessary. The court later rejected
the Cooperative's motion to modify the injunction to permit
medically necessary distributions. The Cooperative appealed, and
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the ruling on the motion to
modify the injunction. According to the Ninth Circuit, medical
necessity is a legally cognizable defense likely applicable in the
circumstances, the District Court mistakenly believed it had no
discretion to issue an injunction more limited in scope than the
Controlled Substances Act, and the District Court should have
weighed the public interest and considered factors such as the
serious harm in depriving patients of marijuana in deciding whether
to modify the injunction.
Held:
1. There is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled
Substances Act's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing
marijuana. Pp. 489-495.
(a) Because that Act classifies marijuana as a schedule I
controlled substance, it provides only one express exception to the
prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing the drug:
Government-approved research projects. The Cooperative's contention
that a common-law medical necessity defense should be written into
the Act is rejected. There is an open question whether federal
courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity defense not
provided by statute. But that question need not be answered to
resolve the issue presented here, for the terms
484
Syllabus
of the Controlled Substances Act leave no doubt that the medical
necessity defense is unavailable. Pp. 489-491.
(b) Under any conception of legal necessity, the defense cannot
succeed when the legislature itself has made a determination of
values. Here, the Act reflects a determination that marijuana has
no medical benefits worthy of an exception (other than
Government-approved research). Whereas other drugs can be dispensed
and prescribed for medical use, see 21 U. S. C. § 829, the same is
not true for marijuana, which has "no currently accepted medical
use" at all, § 812. This conclusion is supported by the structure
of the Act, which divides drugs into five schedules, depending in
part on whether a drug has a currently accepted medical use, and
then imposes restrictions according to the schedule in which it has
been placed. The Attorney General is authorized to include a drug
in schedule I, the most restrictive schedule, only if the drug has
no currently accepted medical use. The Cooperative errs in arguing
that, because Congress, instead of the Attorney General, placed
marijuana into that schedule, marijuana can be distributed when
medically necessary. The statute treats all schedule I drugs alike,
and there is no reason why drugs that Congress placed there should
be subject to fewer controls than those that the Attorney General
placed there. Also rejected is the Cooperative's argument that a
drug may be found medically necessary for a particular patient or
class even when it has not achieved general acceptance as a medical
treatment. It is clear from the text of the Act that Congress
determined that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an
exception granted to other drugs. The statute expressly
contemplates that many drugs have a useful medical purpose, see §
801(1), but it includes no exception at all for any medical use of
marijuana. This Court is unwilling to view that omission as an
accident and is unable, in any event, to override a legislative
determination manifest in the statute. Finally, the canon of
constitutional avoidance has no application here, because there is
no statutory ambiguity. Pp. 491-495.
2. The discretion that courts of equity traditionally possess in
fashioning relief does not serve as a basis for affirming the Ninth
Circuit in this case. To be sure, district courts properly acting
as courts of equity have discretion unless a statute clearly
provides otherwise. But the mere fact that the District Court had
discretion does not suggest that the court, when evaluating the
motion, could consider any and all factors that might relate to the
public interest or the parties' conveniences, including medical
needs. Equity courts cannot ignore Congress' judgment expressed in
legislation. Their choice is whether a particular means of
enforcement should be chosen over another permissible means,
485
not whether enforcement is preferable to no enforcement at all.
To the extent a district court considers the public interest and
parties' conveniences, the court is limited to evaluating how those
factors are affected by the selection of an injunction over other
enforcement mechanisms. Because the Controlled Substances Act
covers even those who have what could be termed a medical
necessity, it precludes consideration of the evidence that the
Ninth Circuit deemed relevant. pp. 495-499.
190 F.3d
1109, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined,
post, p. 499. BREYER, J.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Acting Solicitor General Underwood argued the cause for the
United States. With her on the briefs were former Solicitor General
Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, and Lisa Schiavo Blatt.
Gerald F. Uelmen argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were James J. Brosnahan, Annette P.
Carnegie, Christina Kirk-Kazhe, Robert A. Raich, and Randy E.
Barnett. *
*
Janet M. LaRue filed a brief for the Family Research
Council as
amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the State of California by
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General,
and
David De Alba, Special Assistant Attorney General; for
the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by
Steven R. Shapiro,
Daniel P. Tokaji, and
Jordan C.
Budd; for the
American Public Health Association et al. by
Daniel N.
Abrahamson; for the Marijuana Policy Project et al. by
Cheryl Flax-Davidson; for the National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws et al. by
R. Keith Stroup, John Wesley
Hall, Jr., and
Lisa B. Kemler; for Edward Neil
Brundridge et al. by
Thomas V. Loran III; and for Sheriff
Mark N. Dion et al. by
Julie M. Carpenter.
Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for the California
Medical Association et al. by
Catherine I. Hanson and
Alice P. Mead; and for the Institute on Global Drug Policy
of the Drug Free America Foundation et al. by
David G.
Evans and
John E. Lamp.
486
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U. S. C. § 801
et seq., prohibits the manufacture and distribution of
various drugs, including marijuana. In this case, we must decide
whether there is a medical necessity exception to these
prohibitions. We hold that there is not.
I
In November 1996, California voters enacted an initiative
measure entitled the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. Attempting
"[t]o ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to
obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes," Cal. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2001), the statute creates
an exception to California laws prohibiting the possession and
cultivation of marijuana. These prohibitions no longer apply to a
patient or his primary caregiver who possesses or cultivates
marijuana for the patient's medical purposes upon the
recommendation or approval of a physician.
Ibid. In the wake
of this voter initiative, several groups organized "medical
cannabis dispensaries" to meet the needs of qualified patients.
United States v.
Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F.
Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (ND Cal. 1998). Respondent Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Cooperative is one of these groups.
The Cooperative is a not-for-profit organization that operates
in downtown Oakland. A physician serves as medical director, and
registered nurses staff the Cooperative during business hours. To
become a member, a patient must provide a written statement from a
treating physician assenting to marijuana therapy and must submit
to a screening interview. If accepted as a member, the patient
receives an identification card entitling him to obtain marijuana
from the Cooperative.
In January 1998, the United States sued the Cooperative and its
executive director, respondent Jeffrey Jones (to-
487
gether, the Cooperative), in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California. Seeking to enjoin the
Cooperative from distributing and manufacturing marijuana,l the
United States argued that, whether or not the Cooperative's
activities are legal under California law, they violate federal
law. Specifically, the Government argued that the Cooperative
violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on
distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to
distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. 21 U. S. C. §
841(a). Concluding that the Government had established a
probability of success on the merits, the District Court granted a
preliminary injunction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a-40a; 5 F. Supp.
2d, at 1105.
The Cooperative did not appeal the injunction but instead openly
violated it by distributing marijuana to numerous persons, App. to
Pet. for Cert. 21a-23a. To terminate these violations, the
Government initiated contempt proceedings. In defense, the
Cooperative contended that any distributions were medically
necessary. Marijuana is the only drug, according to the
Cooperative, that can alleviate the severe pain and other
debilitating symptoms of the Cooperative's patients.
Id., at
29a. The District Court rejected this defense, however, after
determining there was insufficient evidence that each recipient of
marijuana was in actual danger of imminent harm without the drug.
Id., at 29a-32a. The District Court found the Cooperative in
contempt and, at the Government's request, modified the preliminary
injunction to empower the United States Marshal to seize the
Cooperative's premises.
Id., at 37a. Although recognizing
that
1 The Government requested, and the District Court granted, an
injunction that prohibited the possession of marijuana with the
intent to manufacture and distribute, as well as the distribution
and manufacture of marijuana. For simplicity, in this opinion, we
refer to these activities collectively as distributing and
manufacturing marijuana. The legal issues are the same for all of
these activities.
488
"human suffering" could result, the District Court reasoned that
a court's "equitable powers [do] not permit it to ignore federal
law."
Ibid. Three days later, the District Court summarily
rejected a motion by the Cooperative to modify the injunction to
permit distributions that are medically necessary.
The Cooperative appealed both the contempt order and the denial
of the Cooperative's motion to modify. Before the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit decided the case, however, the Cooperative
voluntarily purged its contempt by promising the District Court
that it would comply with the initial preliminary injunction.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals determined that the appeal of
the contempt order was moot.
190 F.3d
1109, 1112-1113 (1999).
The denial of the Cooperative's motion to modify the injunction,
however, presented a live controversy that was appealable under 28
U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1). Reaching the merits of this issue, the Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded. According to the Court of
Appeals, the medical necessity defense was a "legally cognizable
defense" that likely would apply in the circumstances. 190 F. 3d,
at 1114. Moreover, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the District
Court erroneously "believed that it had no discretion to issue an
injunction that was more limited in scope than the Controlled
Substances Act itself."
Id., at 1114-1115. Because,
according to the Court of Appeals, district courts retain "broad
equitable discretion" to fashion injunctive relief, the District
Court could have, and should have, weighed the "public interest"
and considered factors such as the serious harm in depriving
patients of marijuana.
Ibid. Remanding the case, the Court
of Appeals instructed the District Court to consider "the criteria
for a medical necessity exemption, and, should it modify the
injunction, to set forth those criteria in the modification order."
Id., at 1115. Following these instructions, the District
Court granted the Cooperative's
489
motion to modify the injunction to incorporate a medical
necessity defense.2
The United States petitioned for certiorari to review the Court
of Appeals' decision that medical necessity is a legally cognizable
defense to violations of the Controlled Substances Act. Because the
decision raises significant questions as to the ability of the
United States to enforce the Nation's drug laws, we granted
certiorari. 531 U. S. 1010 (2000).
II
The Controlled Substances Act provides that, "[e]xcept as
authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). The
subchapter, in turn, establishes exceptions.
2 The amended preliminary injunction reaffirmed that the
Cooperative is generally enjoined from manufacturing, distributing,
and possessing with the intent to manufacture or distribute
marijuana, but it carved out an exception for cases of medical
necessity. Specifically, the District Court ordered that "[t]he
foregoing injunction does not apply to the distribution of cannabis
by [the Cooperative] to patient-members who (1) suffer from a
serious medical condition, (2) will suffer imminent harm if the
patient-member does not have access to cannabis, (3) need cannabis
for the treatment of the patient-member's medical condition, or
need cannabis to alleviate the medical condition or symptoms
associated with the medical condition, and (4) have no reasonable
legal alternative to cannabis for the effective treatment or
alleviation of the patient-member's medical condition or symptoms
associated with the medical condition because the patient-member
has tried all other legal alternatives to cannabis and the
alternatives have been ineffective in treating or alleviating the
patientmember's medical condition or symptoms associated with the
medical condition, or the alternatives result in side effects which
the patient-member cannot reasonably tolerate." App. to Pet. for
Cert. 16a-17a.
The United States appealed the District Court's order amending
the preliminary injunction. At the Government's request, we stayed
the order pending the appeal. 530 U. S. 1298 (2000). The Court of
Appeals has postponed oral argument pending our decision in this
case.
490
For marijuana (and other drugs that have been classified as
"schedule I" controlled substances), there is but one express
exception, and it is available only for Government-approved
research projects, § 823(f). Not conducting such a project, the
Cooperative cannot, and indeed does not, claim this statutory
exemption.
The Cooperative contends, however, that notwithstanding the
apparently absolute language of § 841(a), the statute is subject to
additional, implied exceptions, one of which is medical necessity.
According to the Cooperative, because necessity was a defense at
common law, medical necessity should be read into the Controlled
Substances Act. We disagree.
As an initial matter, we note that it is an open question
whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity
defense not provided by statute. A necessity defense "traditionally
covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's
control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils."
United States v.
Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 410
(1980). Even at common law, the defense of necessity was somewhat
controversial. See,
e. g., Queen v.
Dudley &
Stephens, 14 Q. B. 273 (1884). And under our constitutional system,
in which federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by
common law, see
United States v.
Hudson, 7 Cranch 32,
34 (1812), it is especially so. As we have stated:
"Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created is
a question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference."
United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 559
(1979). Nonetheless, we recognize that this Court has discussed the
possibility of a necessity defense without altogether rejecting it.
See,
e. g., Bailey, supra, at 415.3
3 The Cooperative is incorrect to suggest that
Bailey has
settled the question whether federal courts have authority to
recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute. There, the
Court rejected the necessity defense of a prisoner who contended
that adverse prison conditions justified his prison escape. The
Court held that the necessity defense is un-
491
We need not decide, however, whether necessity can ever be a
defense when the federal statute does not expressly provide for it.
In this case, to resolve the question presented, we need only
recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at
odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act. The statute,
to be sure, does not explicitly abrogate the defense.4 But its
provisions leave no doubt that the defense is unavailable.
Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is clear:
The defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made a
"determination of values." 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive
Criminal Law § 5.4, p. 629 (1986). In the case of the Controlled
Substances Act, the statute reflects a determination that marijuana
has no medical benefits worthy of an exception (outside the
confines of a Governmentapproved research project). Whereas some
other drugs can be dispensed and prescribed for medical use, see 21
U. S. C. § 829, the same is not true for marijuana. Indeed, for
purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana has "no
currently accepted medical use" at all. § 812.
The structure of the Act supports this conclusion. The statute
divides drugs into five schedules, depending in part on whether the
particular drug has a currently accepted
available to prisoners, like Bailey, who fail to present
evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender as soon as the claimed
necessity had lost its coercive force. 444 U. S., at 415. It was
not argued, and so there was no occasion to consider, whether the
statute might be unable to bear any necessity defense at all. And
although the Court noted that Congress "legislates against a
background of Anglo-Saxon common law" and thus "may" have
contemplated a necessity defense, the Court refused to "balanc[e]
[the] harms," explaining that "we are construing an Act of
Congress, not drafting it."
Id., at 415-416, n. 11.
4 We reject the Cooperative's intimation that elimination of the
defense requires an "explici[t]" statement. Brief for Respondents
21. Considering that we have never held necessity to be a viable
justification for violating a federal statute, see
supra, at
490, and n. 3, and that such a defense would entail a social
balancing that is better left to Congress, we decline to set the
bar so high.
492
medical use. The Act then imposes restrictions on the
manufacture and distribution of the substance according to the
schedule in which it has been placed. Schedule I is the most
restrictive schedule.5 The Attorney General can include a drug in
schedule I only if the drug "has no currently accepted medical use
in treatment in the United States," "has a high potential for
abuse," and has "a lack of accepted safety for use ... under
medical supervision." §§ 812(b)(1)(A)-(C). Under the statute, the
Attorney General could not put marijuana into schedule I if
marijuana had any accepted medical use.
The Cooperative points out, however, that the Attorney General
did not place marijuana into schedule 1. Congress put it there, and
Congress was not required to find that a drug lacks an accepted
medical use before including the drug in schedule 1. We are not
persuaded that this distinction has any significance to our
inquiry. Under the Cooperative's logic, drugs that Congress places
in schedule I could be distributed when medically necessary whereas
drugs that the Attorney General places in schedule I could not.
Nothing in the statute, however, suggests that there are two tiers
of schedule I narcotics, with drugs in one tier more readily
available than drugs in the other. On the contrary, the statute
consistently treats all schedule I drugs alike. See,
e. g.,
§ 823(a) (providing criteria for Attorney General to consider when
determining whether to register an applicant to manufacture
schedule I controlled substances), § 823(b) (providing criteria for
Attorney General to consider when determining whether to register
an applicant to distribute schedule I controlled substances), §
823(f) (providing procedures for becoming a government-approved
research project), § 826 (establishing production quotas for
schedule I drugs). Moreover,
5 As noted,
supra, at 490, the only express exception for
schedule I drugs is the Government-approved research project, see
21 U. S. C. § 823(f). Unlike drugs in other schedules, see § 829,
schedule I drugs cannot be dispensed under a prescription.
493
the Cooperative offers no convincing explanation for why drugs
that Congress placed on schedule I should be subject to fewer
controls than the drugs that the Attorney General placed on the
schedule. Indeed, the Cooperative argues that, in placing marijuana
and other drugs on schedule I, Congress "wishe[d] to assert the
most restrictive level of controls created by the [Controlled
Substances Act]." Brief for Respondents 24. If marijuana should be
subject to the most restrictive level of controls, it should not be
treated any less restrictively than other schedule I drugs.
The Cooperative further argues that use of schedule I drugs
generally-whether placed in schedule I by Congress or the Attorney
General-can be medically necessary, notwithstanding that they have
"no currently accepted medical use." According to the Cooperative,
a drug may not yet have achieved general acceptance as a medical
treatment but may nonetheless have medical benefits to a particular
patient or class of patients. We decline to parse the statute in
this manner. It is clear from the text of the Act that Congress has
made a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy
of an exception. The statute expressly contemplates that many drugs
"have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to
maintain the health and general welfare of the American people," §
801(1), but it includes no exception at all for any medical use of
marijuana. Unwilling to view this omission as an accident, and
unable in any event to override a legislative determination
manifest in a statute, we reject the Cooperative's argument.6
6 The Government argues that the 1998 "sense of the Congress"
resolution, 112 Stat. 2681-760 to 2681-761, supports its position
that Congress has foreclosed the medical necessity defense.
Entitled "Not Legalizing Marijuana for Medicinal Use," the
resolution declares that "Congress continues to support the
existing Federal legal process for determining the safety and
efficacy of drugs and opposes efforts to circumvent this process by
legalizing marijuana, and other Schedule I drugs, for medicinal use
without valid scientific evidence and the approval of the Food and
Drug Administration." Because we conclude that the Controlled
Substances
494
Finally, the Cooperative contends that we should construe the
Controlled Substances Act to include a medical necessity defense in
order to avoid what it considers to be difficult constitutional
questions. In particular, the Cooperative asserts that, shorn of a
medical necessity defense, the statute exceeds Congress' Commerce
Clause powers, violates the substantive due process rights of
patients, and offends the fundamental liberties of the people under
the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. As the Cooperative
acknowledges, however, the canon of constitutional avoidance has no
application in the absence of statutory ambiguity. Because we have
no doubt that the Controlled Substances Act cannot bear a medical
necessity defense to distributions of marijuana, we do not find
guidance in this avoidance principle. Nor do we consider the
underlying constitutional issues today. Because the Court of
Appeals did not address these claims, we decline to do so in the
first instance.
For these reasons, we hold that medical necessity is not a
defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana.7 The
Act cannot sustain the medical necessity defense, we need not
consider whether the 1998 "sense of the Congress resolution" is
additional evidence of a legislative determination to eliminate the
defense.
7 Lest there be any confusion, we clarify that nothing in our
analysis, or the statute, suggests that a distinction should be
drawn between the prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing
and the other prohibitions in the Controlled Substances Act.
Furthermore, the very point of our holding is that there is no
medical necessity exception to the prohibitions at issue, even when
the patient is "seriously ill" and lacks alternative avenues for
relief. Indeed, it is the Cooperative's argument that its patients
are "seriously ill," see,
e. g., Brief for Respondents 11,
13, 17, and lacking "alternatives," see,
e. g., id., at 13.
We reject the argument that these factors warrant a medical
necessity exception. If we did not, we would be affirming instead
of reversing the Court of Appeals.
Finally, we share JUSTICE STEVENS' concern for "showing respect
for the sovereign States that comprise our Federal Union."
Post, at 502 (opinion concurring in judgment). However, we
are "construing an Act of Congress, not drafting it."
United
States v.
Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 415, n. 11
(1980). Because federal courts interpret, rather than author,
the
495
Court of Appeals erred when it held that medical necessity is a
"legally cognizable defense." 190 F. 3d, at 1114. It further erred
when it instructed the District Court on remand to consider "the
criteria for a medical necessity exemption, and, should it modify
the injunction, to set forth those criteria in the modification
order."
Id., at 1115.
III
The Cooperative contends that, even if the Controlled Substances
Act forecloses the medical necessity defense, there is an
alternative ground for affirming the Court of Appeals. This case,
the Cooperative reminds us, arises from a motion to modify an
injunction to permit distributions that are medically necessary.
According to the Cooperative, the Court of Appeals was correct that
the District Court had "broad equitable discretion" to tailor the
injunctive relief to account for medical necessity, irrespective of
whether there is a legal defense of necessity in the statute.
Id., at 1114. To sustain the judgment below, the argument
goes, we need only reaffirm that federal courts, in the exercise of
their equity jurisdiction, have discretion to modify an injunction
based upon a weighing of the public interest.8
We disagree. Although district courts whose equity powers have
been properly invoked indeed have discretion in fashioning
injunctive relief (in the absence of a statutory restriction), the
Court of Appeals erred concerning the factors that the district
courts may consider in exercising such discretion.
federal criminal code, we are not at liberty to rewrite it. Nor
are we passing today on a constitutional question, such as whether
the Controlled Substances Act exceeds Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause.
8 Notwithstanding JUSTICE STEVENS' concerns,
post, at
502-503, it is appropriate for us to address this issue because
this case arises from a motion to modify the injunction, because
the Court of Appeals held that the District Court misconstrued its
equitable discretion, and because the Cooperative offers this
conclusion as an alternative ground for affirmance.
496
A
As an initial matter, the Cooperative is correct that, when
district courts are properly acting as courts of equity, they have
discretion unless a statute clearly provides otherwise. For
"several hundred years," courts of equity have enjoyed "sound
discretion" to consider the "necessities of the public interest"
when fashioning injunctive relief.
Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.
S. 321, 329-330 (1944). See also
id., at 329 ("The
essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor
to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the
particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished
it");
Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312 (1982)
("In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay
particular regard for the public consequences in employing the
extraordinary remedy of injunction"). Such discretion is displaced
only by a "clear and valid legislative command."
Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 398
(1946). See also
Romero-Barcelo, supra, at 313 ("Of course,
Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the
courts' discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has
intended to depart from established principles").
The Cooperative is also correct that the District Court in this
case had discretion. The Controlled Substances Act vests district
courts with jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the Act, 21 U. S.
C. § 882(a). But a "grant of jurisdiction to issue [equitable
relief] hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all
circumstances,"
Hecht, supra, at 329 (emphasis deleted).
Because the District Court's use of equitable power is not
textually required by any "clear and valid legislative command,"
the court did not have to issue an injunction.
TVA v.
Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978),
does not support the Government's contention that the District
Court lacked discretion in fashioning injunctive relief. In
Hill, the Court held that the Endangered Species Act of 1973
required the
497
District Court to enjoin completion of a dam, whose operation
would either eradicate the known population of the snail darter or
destroy its critical habitat.
Id., at 193-195. The District
Court lacked discretion because an injunction was the "only means
of ensuring compliance."
Romero-Barcelo, supra, at 314
(explaining why the District Court in
Hill lacked
discretion). Congress' "order of priorities," as expressed in the
statute, would be deprived of effect if the District Court could
choose to deny injunctive relief.
Hill, supra, at 194. In
effect, the District Court had only a Hobson's choice. By contrast,
with respect to the Controlled Substances Act, criminal enforcement
is an alternative, and indeed the customary, means of ensuring
compliance with the statute. Congress' resolution of the policy
issues can be (and usually is) upheld without an injunction.
B
But the mere fact that the District Court had discretion does
not suggest that the District Court, when evaluating the motion to
modify the injunction, could consider any and all factors that
might relate to the public interest or the conveniences of the
parties, including the medical needs of the Cooperative's patients.
On the contrary, a court sitting in equity cannot "ignore the
judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation."
Virginian R. Co. v.
Railway Employees, 300 U. S. 515, 551
(1937). A district court cannot, for example, override Congress'
policy choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should
be prohibited. "Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has
decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is ... for the
courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought."
Hill,
437 U. S., at 194. Courts of equity cannot, in their discretion,
reject the balance that Congress has struck in a statute.
Id., at 194-195. Their choice (unless there is statutory
language to the contrary) is simply whether a particular means of
enforcing the statute should be chosen over another per-
498
missible means; their choice is not whether enforcement is
preferable to no enforcement at alP Consequently, when a court of
equity exercises its discretion, it may not consider the advantages
and disadvantages of nonenforcement of the statute, but only the
advantages and disadvantages of "employing the extraordinary remedy
of injunction,"
RomeroBarcelo, 456 U. S., at 312, over the
other available methods of enforcement. Cf. id., at 316 (referring
to "discretion to rely on remedies other than an immediate
prohibitory injunction"). To the extent the district court
considers the public interest and the conveniences of the parties,
the court is limited to evaluating how such interest and
conveniences are affected by the selection of an injunction over
other enforcement mechanisms.
C
In this case, the Court of Appeals erred by considering relevant
the evidence that some people have "serious medical conditions for
whom the use of cannabis is necessary in order to treat or
alleviate those conditions or their symptoms," that these people
"will suffer serious harm if they are denied cannabis," and that
"there is no legal alternative to cannabis
9 Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944), for
example, held that the District Court was not required to issue an
injunction to restrain violations of the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942 and regulations thereunder when "some 'other order'
might be more appropriate, or at least so appear to the court."
Id., at 328 (quoting statutory provision that enabled
district court to issue an injunction, a restraining order, "or
other order").
Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305 (1982),
held that a District Court had discretion not to issue an
injunction precluding the United States Navy from releasing
ordnance into water, but to rely on other means of ensuring
compliance, including ordering the Navy to obtain a permit.
Id., at 314-318. See also
Amoco Production Co. v.
Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 544-546 (1987) (holding that a
District Court did not err in declining to issue an injunction to
bar exploratory drilling on Alaskan public lands, because the
District Court's decision "did not undermine" the policy of the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U. S. C. §
3120, and because the Secretary of the Interior had other means of
meaningfully complying with the statute).
499
for the effective treatment of their medical conditions." 190 F.
3d, at 1115. As explained above, in the Controlled Substances Act,
the balance already has been struck against a medical necessity
exception. Because the statutory prohibitions cover even those who
have what could be termed a medical necessity, the Act precludes
consideration of this evidence. It was thus error for the Court of
Appeals to instruct the District Court on remand to consider "the
criteria for a medical necessity exemption, and, should it modify
the injunction, to set forth those criteria in the modification
order."
Ibid.
***
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE GINSBURG
join, concurring in the judgment.
Lest the Court's narrow holding be lost in its broad dicta, let
me restate it here: "[W]e hold that medical necessity is not a
defense to
manufacturing and
distributing marijuana."
Ante, at 494 (emphasis added). This confined holding is
consistent with our grant of certiorari, which was limited to the
question "[w]hether the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U. S. C. 801
et seq., forecloses a medical necessity defense to the Act's
prohibition against
manufacturing and
distributing
marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance." Pet. for Cert. (I)
(emphasis added). And, at least with respect to distribution, this
holding is consistent with how the issue was raised and litigated
below. As stated by the District Court, the question before it was
"whether [respondents'] admitted
distribution of marijuana
for use by seri-
500
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
ously ill persons upon a physician's recommendation violates
federal law," and if so, whether such distribution "should be
enjoined pursuant to the injunctive relief provisions of the
federal Controlled Substances Act."
United States v.
Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (ND Cal.
1998) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, in the lower courts as well as here, respondents
have raised the medical necessity defense as a justification for
distributing marijuana to cooperative members, and it was in that
context that the Ninth Circuit determined that respondents had "a
legally cognizable defense."
190 F.3d
1109, 1114 (1999). The Court is surely correct to reverse that
determination. Congress' classification of marijuana as a schedule
I controlled substance-that is, one that cannot be distributed
outside of approved research projects, see 21 U. S. C. §§ 812,
823(f), 829-makes it clear that "the Controlled Substances Act
cannot bear a medical necessity defense to
distributions of
marijuana,"
ante, at 494 (emphasis added).l
Apart from its limited holding, the Court takes two unwarranted
and unfortunate excursions that prevent me from joining its
opinion. First, the Court reaches beyond its holding, and beyond
the facts of the case, by suggesting that the defense of necessity
is unavailable for anyone under the
1 In any event, respondents do not fit the paradigm of a
defendant who may assert necessity. The defense "traditionally
covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's
control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils."
United States v.
Bailey, 444 U. S. 394,410 (1980);
see generally 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 5.4, pp. 627-640 (1986). Respondents, on the other hand, have not
been forced to confront a choice of evils-violating federal law by
distributing marijuana to seriously ill patients or letting those
individuals suffer-but have thrust that choice upon themselves by
electing to become distributors for such patients. Of course,
respondents also cannot claim necessity based upon the choice of
evils facing seriously ill patients, as that is not the same choice
respondents face.
501
Controlled Substances Act.
Ante, at 491-493,494-495, n.
7, 499. Because necessity was raised in this case as a defense to
distribution, the Court need not venture an opinion on whether the
defense is available to anyone other than distributors. Most
notably, whether the defense might be available to a seriously ill
patient for whom there is no alternative means of avoiding
starvation or extraordinary suffering is a difficult issue that is
not presented here.2
Second, the Court gratuitously casts doubt on "whether necessity
can ever be a defense" to
any federal statute that does not
explicitly provide for it, calling such a defense into question by
a misleading reference to its existence as an "open question."
Ante, at 490, 491. By contrast, our precedent has expressed
no doubt about the viability of the common-law defense, even in the
context of federal criminal statutes that do not provide for it in
so many words. See,
e. g.,
United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.
S. 394, 415 (1980) ("We therefore hold that, where a criminal
defendant is charged with escape and claims that he is entitled to
an instruction on the theory of duress or necessity, he must
proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to
custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its
coercive force"); id., at 416, n. 11 ("Our principal difference
with the dissent, therefore, is not as to the
existence of
such a defense but as to the importance of surrender as an element
of it" (emphasis added)). Indeed, the Court's comment on the
general availability of the necessity defense is completely
unnecessary because the Government has made no such suggestion. Cf.
Brief for United States 17-18 (narrowly arguing that necessity
defense cannot succeed if legislature has
2 As a result, perhaps the most glaring example of the Court's
dicta is its footnote 7, where it opines that "nothing in our
analysis, or the statute, suggests that a distinction should be
drawn between the prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing
and the other prohibitions in the Controlled Substances Act."
Ante, at 494, n. 7.
502
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
already "canvassed the issue" and precluded it for a particular
statute (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court's opinion on
this point is pure dictum.
The overbroad language of the Court's opinion is especially
unfortunate given the importance of showing respect for the
sovereign States that comprise our Federal Union. That respect
imposes a duty on federal courts, whenever possible, to avoid or
minimize conflict between federal and state law, particularly in
situations in which the citizens of a State have chosen to "serve
as a laboratory" in the trial of "novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
New State
Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). In my view, this is such a case.3 By
passing Proposition 215, California voters have decided that
seriously ill patients and their primary caregivers should be
exempt from prosecution under state laws for cultivating and
possessing marijuana if the patient's physician recommends using
the drug for treatment.4 This case does not call upon the Court to
deprive
all such patients of the benefit of the necessity
defense to federal prosecution, when the case itself does not
involve
any such patients.
An additional point deserves emphasis. This case does not
require us to rule on the scope of the District Court's discretion
to enjoin, or to refuse to enjoin, the possession of marijuana or
other potential violations of the Controlled
3 Cf. Feeney, Bush Backs States' Rights on Marijuana: He Opposes
Medical Use But Favors Local Control, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 20,
1999, p. 6A, 1999 WL 28018944 (then-Governor Bush supporting state
selfdetermination on medical marijuana use).
4 Since 1996, six other States-Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Nevada,
Oregon, and Washington-have passed medical marijuana initiatives,
and Hawaii has enacted a similar measure through its legislature.
See Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.010 to 17.37.080 (2000);
Colo. Const., Art. XVIII, § 14; Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 329-121 to
329-128 (Supp. 2000); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, § 2383-B(5)
(Supp. 2000); Nev. Const., Art. 4, § 38; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 475.300
to 475.346 (1999); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 69.51A.005 to 69.51A.902
(1997 and Supp. 2000-2001).
503
Substances Act by a seriously ill patient for whom the drug may
be a necessity. Whether it would be an abuse of discretion for the
District Court to refuse to enjoin those sorts of violations, and
whether the District Court may consider the availability of the
necessity defense for that sort of violator, are questions that
should be decided on the authority of cases such as
Hecht
Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944), and
Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305 (1982), and
that properly should be left "open" by this case.
I join the Court's judgment of reversal because I agree that a
distributor of marijuana does not have a medical necessity defense
under the Controlled Substances Act. I do not, however, join the
dicta in the Court's opinion.
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