OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
UNITED STATES
v. LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET
AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No.98-1701. Argued December 7, 1999-Decided March 6, 2000*
After the supertanker
Torrey Canyon spilled crude oil off
the coast of England in 1967, both Congress, in the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), and the State of Washington
enacted more stringent regulations for tankers and provided for
more comprehensive remedies in the event of an oil spill. The
ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State's laws was
addressed in
Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S.
151. In 1989, the supertanker
Exxon Valdez ran aground in
Alaska, causing the largest oil spill in United States history.
Again, both Congress and Washington responded. Congress enacted the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The State created a new agency and
directed it to establish standards to provide the "best achievable
protection" (BAP) from oil spill damages. That agency promulgated
tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements.
Petitioner International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, brought this
suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state and
local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations.
Upholding the regulations, the District Court rejected Intertanko's
arguments that the BAP standards invaded an area long pre-empted by
the Federal Government. At the appeal stage, the United States
intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District
Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial
foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Ninth
Circuit held that the State could enforce its laws, save one
requiring vessels to install certain navigation and towing
equipment, which was "virtually identical to" requirements declared
pre-empted in
Ray.
Held: Washington's regulations regarding general
navigation watch procedures, crew English language skills and
training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-empted by the
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers;
these cases are remanded so the
*Together with No. 98-1706, International Association of
Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, Governor of
Washington, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Syllabus
validity of other Washington regulations may be assessed in
light of the considerable federal interest at stake. Pp.
99-117.
(a) The State has enacted legislation in an area where the
federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of the
Republic and is now well established. Congress has, beginning with
the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, enacted a series of statutes
pertaining to maritime tanker transports. These include the PWSA,
Title I of which authorizes, but does not require, the Coast Guard
to enact measures for controlling vessel traffic or for protecting
navigation and the marine environment, 33 U. S. C. § 1223(a), and
Title II of which, as amended, requires the Coast Guard to issue
regulations addressing the design, construction, alteration,
repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification,
and manning of covered vessels, 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a). Congress
later enacted OPA, Title I of which, among other things, imposes
liability for both removal costs and damages on parties responsible
for an oil spill, 33 U. S. C. § 2702, and includes two saving
clauses preserving the States' authority to impose additional
liability, requirements, and penalties, §§ 2718(a) and (c).
Congress has also ratified international agreements in this area,
including the International Convention of Standards of Training
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). Pp.99-103.
(b) In
Ray, the Court held that the PWSA and Coast Guard
regulations promulgated under that Act pre-empted Washington's
pilotage requirement, limitation on tanker size, and tanker design
and construction rules. The
Ray Court's interpretation of
the PWSA is correct and controlling here. Its basic analytic
structure explains why federal preemption analysis applies to the
challenged regulations and allows scope and due recognition for the
traditional authority of the States and localities to regulate some
matters of local concern. In narrowing the preemptive effect given
the PWSA in
Ray, the Ninth Circuit placed more weight on
OPA's saving clauses than they can bear. Like Title I of OPA, in
which they are found, the saving clauses are limited to regulations
governing liability and compensation for oil pollution, and do not
extend to rules regulating vessel operation, design, or manning.
Thus, the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and its regulations is not
affected by OPA, and
Ray's holding survives OPA's enactment
undiminished. The
Ray Court's prefatory observation that an
"assumption" that the States' historic police powers were not to be
superseded by federal law unless that was the clear and manifest
congressional purpose does not mean that a presumption against
pre-emption aids the Court's analysis here. An assumption of
nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area
where there has been a history of significant federal presence. The
Ray Court held, among other things, that Con-
91
gress, in PWSA Title I, preserved state authority to regulate
the peculiarities of local waters, such as depth and narrowness, if
there is no conflict with federal regulatory determinations, see
435 U. S., at 171172, 178, but further held that Congress, in PWSA
Title II, mandated uniform federal rules on the subjects or matters
there specified,
id., at 168. Thus, under
Ray's
interpretation of the Title II provision now found at 46 U. S. C. §
3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the design,
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation,
equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of tankers. The
Court today reaffirms
Ray's holding on this point. Congress
has left no room for state regulation of these matters. See
Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn. v.
De la
Cuesta, 458 U. S.
141. Although the
Ray Court acknowledged that the
existence of some overlapping coverage between the two PWSA titles
may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question
is controlled by conflict pre-emption principles, applicable
generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable
generally to Title II, the Court declined to resolve every question
by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. Thus, conflict
pre-emption will be applicable in some, although not all, cases.
Useful inquiries in determining which title governs include whether
the regulation in question is justified by conditions unique to a
particular port or waterway, see
Ray, 435 U. S., at 175, or
whether it is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring the
tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the specific body of
water purported to justify the local rule, see
id., at
159-160, 171. Pp. 103-112.
(c) The field pre-emption rule surrounding PWSA Title II and 46
U. S. C. § 3703(a) and the superseding effect of additional federal
statutes are illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington's
tanker regulations, the attempted reach of which is well
demonstrated by the briefs and record. First, the imposition of a
series of training requirements on a tanker's crew does not address
matters unique to Washington waters, but imposes requirements that
control the staffing, operation, and manning of a tanker outside of
those waters. The training and drill requirements pertain to
"operation" and "personnel qualifications" and so are pre-empted by
§ 3703(a). That training is a field reserved to the Federal
Government is further confirmed by the circumstance that the STCW
Convention addresses crew "training" and "qualification"
requirements, and that the United States has enacted crew training
regulations. Second, the imposition of English language proficiency
requirements on a tanker's crew is not limited to governing local
traffic or local peculiarities. It is pre-empted by § 3703(a) as a
"personnel qualification" and by 33 U. S. C. § 1228(a)(7), which
requires that any vessel operating in United States waters have at
least one
92
Syllabus
licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge who is capable of
clearly understanding English. Third, Washington's general
requirement that the navigation watch consist of at least two
licensed deck officers, a helmsman, and a lookout is pre-empted as
an attempt to regulate a tanker's "operation" and "manning" under
46 U. S. C. § 3703(a). Fourth, the requirement that vessels in
Washington waters report certain marine casualties regardless of
where in the world they occurred cannot stand in light of Coast
Guard regulations on the same subject that Congress intended be the
sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations, see §§ 6101,
3717(a)(4). On remand, Washington may argue that certain of its
regulations, such as its watch requirement in times of restricted
visibility, are of limited extraterritorial effect, are necessary
to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound, and therefore are not
subject to Title II field pre-emption, but should instead be
evaluated under Title I conflict pre-emption analysis. Pp.
112-116.
(d) It is preferable that petitioners' substantial arguments as
to preemption of the remaining Washington regulations be considered
by the Ninth Circuit or by the District Court within the framework
this Court has herein discussed. The United States did not
participate in these cases until appeal, and resolution of the
litigation would benefit from the development of a full record by
all interested parties. If, pending adjudication on remand,
Washington threatens to begin enforcing its regulations, the lower
courts would weigh any stay application under the appropriate legal
standards in light of the principles discussed herein and with
recognition of the national interests at stake. Ultimately, it is
largely for Congress and the Coast Guard to confront whether their
regulatory scheme, which demands a high degree of uniformity, is
adequate. States, as well as environmental groups and local port
authorities, will participate in the process. See § 3703(a).
Pp.116-117.
148 F.3d
1053, reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States in No.
98-1701. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Michael Jay Singer, H. Thomas Byron
III, David R. Andrews, Judith Miller, Nancy E. McFadden,
Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, James S. Carmichael, Malcolm
J. Williams, Jr., and Paul M. Wasserman. C. Jonathan Benner
argued the
93
cause for petitioner in No. 98-1706. With him on the briefs were
Timi E. Nickerson and
Sean T. Connaughton.
William Berggren Collins, Senior Assistant Attorney
General of Washington, argued the cause for respondents in both
cases. With him on the brief for the state respondents were
Christine O.
Gregoire, Attorney General, and
Jay
D. Geck, Thomas C.
Morrill, and
Jerri Lynn
Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General.
Jeffrey L. Needle
filed a brief for respondent Washington Environmental Council et
al. With him on the brief was
John M. MacDonald.t
tBriefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the Government of Belgium et al. by
Alex Blanton and
Laurie C.
Sahatjian; for the American Waterways
Operators by
Eldon V. C.
Greenberg and
Barbara L.
Holland; for the Baltic and International Maritime Council et
al. by
Dennis L. Bryant, Charles L. Coleman III, Brian D.
Starer, and
Jovi Tenev; for the International Chamber of
Shipping et al. by
William F.
Sheehan, John Townsend
Rich, and
Heather H. Anderson; for the Maritime Law
Association of the United States by
Howard M. McCormack, James
Patrick Cooney, and
David J. Bederman; for
the National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. by F.
Edwin Froelich and
Charles T. Carroll, Jr.; for the
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., et al. by
Kenneth
S.
Geller, Charles Rothfeld, and
Robin S.
Conrad; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by
Daniel J. Popeo and
R. Shawn
Gunnarson.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the State of California et al. by
Bill Lockyer, Attorney
General of California,
Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant
Attorney General,
Mary E. Hackenbracht and
J.
Matthew Rodriquez, Assistant Attorneys General,
Dennis M.
Eagan and
Michael W Neville, Deputy Attorneys General,
Maya B. Kara, Acting Attorney General of the Northern
Mariana Islands, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows:
Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska,
Richard
Blumenthal of Connecticut,
Robert A. Butterworth of
Florida,
Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii,
James E. Ryan of
Illinois,
Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana,
Andrew
Ketterer of Maine,
Thomas F.
Reilly of
Massachusetts,
Mike Moore of Mississippi,
Frankie Sue Del
Papa of Nevada,
John J. Farmer, Jr., of
New Jersey,
Eliot Spitzer of New York,
Michael F.
Easley of North Carolina,
Betty D. Montgomery of
Ohio,
W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
Hardy Myers of
Oregon,
Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island,
Charlie
Condon of South Carolina, and
Jan Graham of Utah; for
San Juan County, Washington, et al. by
Randall K. Gaylord
and
Karen
94
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. The maritime
oil transport industry presents ever-present, all too real dangers
of oil spills from tanker ships, spills which could be catastrophes
for the marine environment. After the supertanker
Torrey
Canyon spilled its cargo of 120,000 tons of crude oil off the
coast of Cornwall, England, in 1967, both Congress and the State of
Washington enacted more stringent regulations for these tankers and
provided for more comprehensive remedies in the event of an oil
spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State's
laws was addressed by the Court in
Ray v.
Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978).
In 1989, the supertanker
Exxon Valdez ran aground in
Prince William Sound, Alaska, and its cargo of more than 53 million
gallons of crude oil caused the largest oil spill in United States
history. Again, both Congress and the State of Washington
responded. Congress enacted new statutory provisions, and
Washington adopted regulations governing tanker operations and
design. Today we must determine whether these more recent state
laws can stand despite the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme
governing oil tankers. Relying on the same federal statute that
controlled the analysis in
Ray, we hold that some of the
State's regulations are pre-empted; as to the balance of the
regulations, we remand the case so their validity may be assessed
in light of the considerable federal interest at stake and in
conformity with the principles we now discuss.
E. Vedder; and for the Steamship Association of Southern
California by
David E. R. Woolley and
Thomas A.
Russell.
Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for the Government of
Canada by
Margaret K. Pfeiffer; for the Pacific Coast
Federation of Fishermen's Associations et al. by
Bryan P.
Coluccio; for the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association by
Sam D. Delich and
James B. Nebel; for the Prince
William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council by
Avrum M.
Gross and
Susan A. Burke; and for the Puget Sound
Steamship Operators Association et al. by
Richard W Buchanan
and
Robert W Nolting.
95
I
The State of Washington embraces some of the Nation's most
significant waters and coastal regions. Its Pacific Ocean seacoast
consists, in large part, of wave-exposed rocky headlands separated
by stretches of beach. Washington borders as well on the Columbia
River estuary, dividing Washington from Oregon. Two other large
estuaries, Grays Harbor and Willapa Bay, are also within
Washington's waters. Of special significance in these cases is the
inland sea of Puget Sound, a 2,500 square mile body of water
consisting of inlets, bays, and channels. More than 200 islands are
located within the sound, and it sustains fisheries and plant and
animal life of immense value to the Nation and to the world.
Passage from the Pacific Ocean to the quieter Puget Sound is
through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, a channel 12 miles wide and 65
miles long which divides Washington from the Canadian Province of
British Columbia. The international boundary is located midchannel.
Access to Vancouver, Canada's largest port, is through the strait.
Traffic inbound from the Pacific Ocean, whether destined to ports
in the United States or Canada, is routed through Washington's
waters; outbound traffic, whether from a port in Washington or
Vancouver, is directed through Canadian waters. The pattern had its
formal adoption in a 1979 agreement entered into by the United
States and Canada. Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel Traffic
Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region, 32 U. S. T. 377, T.
1. A. S. No. 9706.
In addition to holding some of our vital waters, Washington is
the site of major installations for the Nation's oil industry and
the destination or shipping point for huge volumes of oil and its
end products. Refineries and product terminals are located adjacent
to Puget Sound in ports including Cherry Point, Ferndale, Tacoma,
and Anacortes. Canadian refineries are found near Vancouver on
Burrard Inlet and the lower Fraser River. Crude oil is transported
by sea to
96
Puget Sound. Most is extracted from Alaska's North Slope reserve
and is shipped to Washington on United States flag vessels.
Foreign-flag vessels arriving from nations such as Venezuela and
Indonesia also call at Washington's oil installations.
The bulk of oil transported on water is found in tankers,
vessels which consist of a group of tanks contained in a shipshaped
hull, propelled by an isolated machinery plant at the stern. The
Court described the increase in size and numbers of these ships
close to three decades ago in
Askew v.
American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U. S. 325, 335
(1973), noting that the average vessel size increased from 16,000
tons during World War II to 76,000 tons in 1966. (The term "tons"
refers to "deadweight tons," a way of measuring the cargo-carrying
capacity of the vessels.) Between 1955 and 1968, the world tanker
fleet grew from 2,500 vessels to 4,300.
Ibid. By December
1973, 366 tankers in the world tanker fleet were in excess of
175,000 tons, see 1 M. Tusiani, The Petroleum Shipping Industry 79
(1996), and by 1998 the number of vessels considered "tankers" in
the merchant fleets of the world numbered 6,739, see U. S. Dept. of
Transp., Maritime Administration, Merchant Fleets of the World 1
(Oct. 1998).
The size of these vessels, the frequency of tanker operations,
and the vast amount of oil transported by vessels with but one or
two layers of metal between the cargo and the water present serious
risks. Washington's waters have been subjected to oil spills and
further threatened by near misses. In December 1984, for example,
the tanker ARCO Anchorage grounded in Port Angeles Harbor and
spilled 239,000 gallons of Alaskan crude oil. The most notorious
oil spill in recent times was in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
where the grounding of the
Exxon Valdez released more than
11 million gallons of crude oil and, like the
Torrey Canyon
spill before it, caused public officials intense concern over the
threat of a spill.
97
Washington responded by enacting the state regulations now in
issue. The legislature created the Office of Marine Safety, which
it directed to establish standards for spill prevention plans to
provide "the best achievable protection [BAP] from damages caused
by the discharge of oil." Wash. Rev. Code § 88.46.040(3) (1994).
The Office of Marine Safety then promulgated the tanker design,
equipment, reporting, and operating requirements now subject to
attack by petitioners. Wash. Admin. Code (WAC) § 317-21-130
et
seq. (1999). A summary of the relevant regulations, as
described by the Court of Appeals, is set out in the Appendix,
infra.
If a vessel fails to comply with the Washington rules, possible
sanctions include statutory penalties, restrictions of the vessel's
operations in state waters, and a denial of entry into state
waters. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 88.46.070, 88.46.080, 88.46.090
(1994).
Petitioner International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners (Intertanko) is a trade association whose 305 members own or
operate more than 2,000 tankers of both United States and foreign
registry. The organization represents approximately 80% of the
world's independently owned tanker fleet; and an estimated 60% of
the oil imported into the United States is carried on Intertanko
vessels. The association brought this suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against state and local officials responsible for
enforcing the BAP regulations. Groups interested in environmental
preservation intervened in defense of the laws. Intertanko argued
that Washington's BAP standards invaded areas long occupied by the
Federal Government and imposed unique requirements in an area where
national uniformity was mandated. Intertanko further contended that
if local political subdivisions of every maritime nation were to
impose differing regulatory regimes on tanker operations, the goal
of national governments to develop effective international
environmental and safety standards would be defeated.
98
Although the United States declined to intervene when the case
was in the District Court, the governments of 13 ocean-going
nations expressed concerns through a diplomatic note directed to
the United States. lntertanko lodged a copy of the note with the
District Court. The concerned governments represented that
"legislation by the State of Washington on tanker personnel,
equipment and operations would cause inconsistency between the
regulatory regime of the US Government and that of an individual
State of the US. Differing regimes in different parts of the US
would create uncertainty and confusion. This would also set an
unwelcome precedent for other Federally administered countries."
Note Verbale from the Royal Danish Embassy to the U. S. Dept. of
State 1 (June 14, 1996).
The District Court rejected all of lntertanko's arguments and
upheld the state regulations.
International Assn. of Independent
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v.
Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484
(WD Wash. 1996). The appeal followed, and at that stage the United
States intervened on lntertanko's behalf, contending that the
District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the
substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the State could enforce its laws, save the one requiring the
vessels to install certain navigation and towing equipment.
148 F.3d
1053 (1998). The Court of Appeals reasoned that this
requirement, found in WAC § 317-21-265, was "virtually identical
to" requirements declared pre-empted in
Ray v.
Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978). 148
F. 3d, at 1066. Over Judge Graber's dissent, the Court of Appeals
denied petitions for rehearing en banco
159 F.3d
1220 (1998). Judge Graber, although unwilling, without further
analysis, to conclude that the panel reached the wrong result,
argued that the opinion was "incorrect in two exceptionally
important respects: (1) The opinion places too much weight on two
clauses in Title I of OPA 90 [The Oil Pollution Act of 1990]
99
that limit OPA 90's preemptive effect. (2) Portions of the
opinion that discuss the Coast Guard regulations are inconsistent
with Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent."
Id., at
1221. We granted certiorari and now reverse. 527 U. S. 1063
(1999).
II
The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where
the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our
Republic and is now well established. The authority of Congress to
regulate interstate navigation, without embarrassment from
intervention of the separate States and resulting difficulties with
foreign nations, was cited in the Federalist Papers as one of the
reasons for adopting the Constitution.
E. g., The Federalist
Nos. 44, 12, 64. In 1789, the First Congress enacted a law by which
vessels with a federal certificate were entitled to "the benefits
granted by any law of the United States." Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch.
11, § 1, 1 Stat. 55. The importance of maritime trade and the
emergence of maritime transport by steamship resulted in further
federal licensing requirements enacted to promote trade and to
enhance the safety of crew members and passengers. See Act of July
7, 1838, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 304; Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 94, 5 Stat.
626. In 1871, Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of regulation
for steam powered vessels, including provisions for licensing
captains, chief mates, engineers, and pilots. Act of Feb. 28, 1871,
ch. 100, 16 Stat. 440.
The Court in
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens of Port of
Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12
How. 299 (1852), stated that there would be instances in which
state regulation of maritime commerce is inappropriate even absent
the exercise of federal authority, although in the case before it
the Court found the challenged state regulations were permitted in
light of local needs and conditions. Where Congress had acted,
however, the Court had little difficulty in finding state vessel
requirements were pre-
100
empted by federal laws which governed the certification of
vessels and standards of operation.
Gibbons v.
Ogden,
9 Wheat. 1 (1824), invalidated a New York law that attempted to
grant a monopoly to operate steamboats on the ground it was
inconsistent with the coasting license held by the vessel owner
challenging the exclusive franchise. And in
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859), the Court decided that the
federal license held by the vessel contained "the only guards and
restraints, which Congress has seen fit to annex to the privileges
of ships and vessels engaged in the coasting trade."
Id., at
241. The Court went on to explain that in such a circumstance,
state laws on the subject must yield:
"In every such case, the act of Congress or treaty is supreme;
and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers
not controverted, must yield to it."
Id., at 243.
Against this background, Congress has enacted a series of
statutes pertaining to maritime tanker transports and has ratified
international agreements on the subject. We begin by referring to
the principal statutes and international instruments discussed by
the parties.
1. The Tank Vessel Act.
The Tank Vessel Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1889, enacted specific
requirements for operation of covered vessels. The Act provided
that "[i]n order to secure effective provisions against the hazards
of life and property," additional federal rules could be adopted
with respect to the "design and construction, alteration, or repair
of such vessels," "the operation of such vessels," and "the
requirements of the manning of such vessels and the duties and
qualifications of the officers and crews thereof." The purpose of
the Act was to establish "a reasonable and uniform set of rules and
regulations concerning ... vessels carrying the type of cargo
deemed dangerous." H. R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2
(1936). The Tank Vessel Act was the primary source for
regulating
101
tank vessels for the next 30 years, until the
Torrey
Canyon grounding led Congress to take new action.
2. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
Responding to the
Torrey Canyon spill, Congress enacted
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA). The Act, as
amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1471,
contains two somewhat overlapping titles, both of which may, as the
Ray Court explained, preclude enforcement of state laws,
though not by the same pre-emption analysis. Title I concerns
vessel traffic "in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the
United States." 110 Stat. 3934, 33 U. S. C. § 1223(a)(1) (1994 ed.,
Supp. III). Under Title I, the Coast Guard may enact measures for
controlling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the
marine environment, but it is not required to do so.
Ibid.
Title II does require the Coast Guard to issue regulations,
regulations addressing the "design, construction, alteration,
repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification,
and manning of vessels ... that may be necessary for increased
protection against hazards to life and property, for navigation and
vessel safety, and for enhanced protection of the marine
environment." 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a).
The critical provisions of the PWSA described above remain
operative, but the Act has been amended, most significantly by the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 104 Stat. 484. OPA, enacted in
response to the
Exxon Valdez spill, requires separate
discussion.
3. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
The OPA contains nine titles, two having the most significance
for these cases. Title I is captioned "Oil Pollution Liability, and
Compensation" and adds extensive new provisions to the United
States Code. See 104 Stat. 2375, 33 U. S. C. § 2701
et seq.
(1994 ed. and Supp. III). Title I imposes liability (for both
removal costs and damages) on parties re-
102
sponsible for an oil spill. § 2702. Other provisions provide
defenses to, and limitations on, this liability. 33 U. S. C. §§
2703,2704. Of considerable importance to these cases are OP A's
saving clauses, found in Title I of the Act, § 2718, and to be
discussed below.
Title IV of OPA is entitled "Prevention and Removal."
For the most part, it amends existing statutory provisions or
instructs the Secretary of Transportation (whose departments
include the Coast Guard) to take action under previous grants of
rulemaking authority. For example, Title IV instructs the Coast
Guard to require reporting of marine casualties resulting in a
"significant harm to the environment." 46 U. S. C. § 6101(a)(5)
(1994 ed. and Supp. V). Title IV further requires the Secretary to
issue regulations to define those areas, including Puget Sound, on
which single hulled tankers shall be escorted by other vessels. 104
Stat. 523. By incremental dates specified in the Act, all covered
tanker vessels must have a double hull. 46 U. S. C. § 3703a .
.1,. Treaties and International Agreements.
The scheme of regulation includes a significant and intricate
complex of international treaties and maritime agreements bearing
upon the licensing and operation of vessels. We are advised by the
United States that the international regime depends upon the
principle of reciprocity. That is to say, the certification of a
vessel by the government of its own flag nation warrants that the
ship has complied with international standards, and vessels with
those certificates may enter ports of the signatory nations. Brief
for United States 3.
Illustrative of treaties and agreements to which the United
States is a party are the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea, 1974, 32 U. S. T. 47, T. 1. A. S. No. 9700, the
International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973, S. Exec. Doc. C, 93-1, 12 1. L. M. 1319, as amended by 1978
Protocol, S. Exec. Doc. C, 96-1, 17
103
1. L. M. 546, and the International Convention of Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, With Annex,
1978 (STCW), S. Exec. Doc. EE, 96-1, C. T. 1. A. No. 7624.
The United States argues that these treaties, as the supreme law
of the land, have pre-emptive force over the state regulations in
question here. We need not reach that issue at this stage of the
case because the state regulations we address in detail below are
pre-empted by federal statute and regulations. The existence of the
treaties and agreements on standards of shipping is of relevance,
of course, for these agreements give force to the longstanding rule
that the enactment of a uniform federal scheme displaces state law,
and the treaties indicate Congress will have demanded national
uniformity regarding maritime commerce. See
Ray, 435 U. S.,
at 166 (recognizing Congress anticipated "arriving at international
standards for building tank vessels" and understanding "the Nation
was to speak with one voice" on these matters). In later
proceedings, if it is deemed necessary for full disposition of the
case, it should be open to the parties to argue whether the
specific international agreements and treaties are of binding,
pre-emptive force. We do not reach those questions, for it may be
that pre-emption principles applicable to the basic federal
statutory structure will suffice, upon remand, for a complete
determination.
III
In
Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield, supra, the Court was
asked to review, in light of an established federal and
international regulatory scheme, comprehensive tanker regulations
imposed by the State of Washington. The Court held that the PWSA
and Coast Guard regulations promulgated under that Act pre-empted a
state pilotage requirement, Washington's limitation on tanker size,
and tanker design and construction rules.
104
In these cases, petitioners relied on
Ray to argue that
Washington's more recent state regulations were preempted as well.
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that
Ray retained
little validity in light of subsequent action by Congress. We
disagree. The
Ray Court's interpretation of the PWSA is
correct and controlling. Its basic analytic structure explains why
federal pre-emption analysis applies to the challenged regulations
and allows scope and due recognition for the traditional authority
of the States and localities to regulate some matters of local
concern.
At the outset, it is necessary to explain that the essential
framework of
Ray, and of the PWSA which it interpreted, are
of continuing force, neither having been superseded by subsequent
authority relevant to these cases. In narrowing the pre-emptive
effect given the PWSA in
Ray, the Court of Appeals relied
upon OPA's saving clauses, finding in their language a return of
authority to the States. Title I of OPA contains two saving
clauses, stating:
"(a) Preservation of State authorities ...
"Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall-
"(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the
authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from
imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect
to-
"(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such
State ....
"(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties "Nothing
in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U. S. C. 183 et seq.), or
section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U. S. C.
9509)], shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the
authority of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof-
105
"(1) to impose additional liability or additional
requirements
"relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a
discharge, of oil." 33 U. S. C. § 2718.
The Court of Appeals placed more weight on the saving clauses
than those provisions can bear, either from a textual standpoint or
from a consideration of the whole federal regulatory scheme of
which OPA is but a part.
The saving clauses are found in Title I of OPA, captioned Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation and creating a liability
scheme for oil pollution. In contrast to the Washington rules at
issue here, Title I does not regulate vessel operation, design, or
manning. Placement of the saving clauses in Title I of OP A
suggests that Congress intended to preserve state laws of a scope
similar to the matters contained in Title I of OPA, not all state
laws similar to the matters covered by the whole of OP A or to the
whole subject of maritime oil transport. The evident purpose of the
saving clauses is to preserve state laws which, rather than
imposing substantive regulation of a vessel's primary conduct,
establish liability rules and financial requirements relating to
oil spills. See
Gutierrez v.
Ada, 528 U. S. 250, 255 (2000)
(words of a statute should be interpreted consistent with their
neighbors to avoid giving unintended breadth to an Act of
Congress).
Our conclusion is fortified by Congress' decision to limit the
saving clauses by the same key words it used in declaring the scope
of Title I of OP A. Title I of OP A permits recovery of damages
involving vessels "from which oil is discharged, or which pos[e]
the substantial threat of a discharge of oil." 33 U. S. C. §
2702(a). The saving clauses, in parallel manner, permit States to
impose liability or requirements "relating to the discharge, or
substantial threat of a discharge, of oil." § 2718(c). In its
titles following Title I, OPA addresses matters including licensing
and certificates of registry, 104 Stat.
106
509; duties of senior licensed officers to relieve the master,
id., at 511; manning standards for foreign vessels,
id., at 513; reporting of marine casualties,
ibid.;
minimum standards for plating thickness,
id., at 515; tank
vessel manning requirements,
id., at 517; and tank vessel
construction standards,
id., at 517-518, among other
extensive regulations. If Congress had intended to disrupt national
uniformity in all of these matters, it would not have done so by
placement of the saving clauses in Title I.
The saving clauses are further limited in effect to "this Act,
the Act of March 3, 1851 ... , or section 9509 of [the Internal
Revenue Code]." §§ 2718(a) and (c). These explicit qualifiers are
inconsistent with interpreting the saving clauses to alter the
pre-emptive effect of the PWSA or regulations promulgated
thereunder. The text of the statute indicates no intent to allow
States to impose wide-ranging regulation of the at-sea operation of
tankers. The clauses may preserve a State's ability to enact laws
of a scope similar to Title I, but do not extend to subjects
addressed in the other titles of the Act or other acts.
Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined respects the
established federal-state balance in matters of maritime commerce
between the subjects as to which the States retain concurrent
powers and those over which the federal authority displaces state
control. We have upheld state laws imposing liability for pollution
caused by oil spills. See
Askew v.
American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U. S., at 325. Our view of OPA's saving
clauses preserves this important role for the States, which is
unchallenged here. We think it quite unlikely that Congress would
use a means so indirect as the saving clauses in Title I of OPA to
upset the settled division of authority by allowing States to
impose additional unique substantive regulation on the atsea
conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect to saving
clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme
established by federal law. See,
e. g., Morales
107
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U. S. 374, 385
(1992); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office
Telephone, Inc.,
524
U. S. 214, 227-228 (1998).
From the text of OPA and the long-established understanding of
the appropriate balance between federal and state regulation of
maritime commerce, we hold that the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA
and regulations promulgated under it are not affected by OPA. We
doubt Congress will be surprised by our conclusion, for the
Conference Report on OPA shared our view that the statute "does not
disturb the Supreme Court's decision in
Ray v.
Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978)." H.
R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-653, p. 122 (1990). The holding in
Ray
also survives the enactment of OPA undiminished, and we turn to a
detailed discussion of that case.
As we mentioned above, the
Ray Court confronted a claim
by the operator of a Puget Sound refinery that federal law
precluded Washington from enforcing laws imposing certain
substantive requirements on tankers. The
Ray Court prefaced
its analysis of the state regulations with the following
observation:
"The Court's prior cases indicate that when a State's exercise
of its police power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, 'we
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230
(1947)." 435 U. S., at 157.
The fragmentary quote from
Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U. S.
218 (1947), does not support the scope given to it by the Court
of Appeals or by respondents.
Ray quoted but a fragment of a much longer paragraph
found in
Rice. The quoted fragment is followed by extensive
and careful qualifications to show the different ap-
108
proaches taken by the Court in various contexts. We need not
discuss that careful explanation in detail, however. To explain the
full intent of the
Rice quotation, it suffices to quote in
full the sentence in question and two sentences preceding it. The
Rice opinion stated: "The question in each case is what the
purpose of Congress was. Congress legislated here in a field which
the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." 331 U. S., at 230 (citations
omitted).
The qualification given by the word "so" and by the preceding
sentences in
Rice are of considerable consequence. As
Rice indicates, an "assumption" of nonpre-emption is not
triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been
a history of significant federal presence. See also
Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977)
("assumption" is triggered where "the field which Congress is said
to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States");
Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996)
(citing
Rice in case involving medical negligence, a subject
historically regulated by the States). In
Ray, and in the
case before us, Congress has legislated in the field from the
earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal
statutory and regulatory scheme.
The state laws now in question bear upon national and
international maritime commerce, and in this area there is no
beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a
valid exercise of its police powers. Rather, we must ask whether
the local laws in question are consistent with the federal
statutory structure, which has as one of its objectives a
uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce. No artificial
presumption aids us in determining the scope of appropriate local
regulation under the PWSA, which, as we discuss below, does
preserve, in Title I of that Act, the historic role of the States
to regulate local ports and waters
109
under appropriate circumstances. At the same time, as we also
discuss below, uniform, national rules regarding general tanker
design, operation, and seaworthiness have been mandated by Title II
of the PWSA.
The
Ray Court confirmed the important proposition that
the subject and scope of Title I of the PWSA allows a State to
regulate its ports and waterways, so long as the regulation is
based on "the peculiarities of local waters that call for special
precautionary measures." 435 U. S., at 171. Title I allows state
rules directed to local circumstances and problems, such as water
depth and narrowness, idiosyncratic to a particular port or
waterway.
Ibid. There is no preemption by operation of Title
I itself if the state regulation is so directed and if the Coast
Guard has not adopted regulations on the subject or determined that
regulation is unnecessary or inappropriate. This principle is
consistent with recognition of an important role for States and
localities in the regulation of the Nation's waterways and ports.
E. g.,
Cooley, 12 How., at 319 (recognizing state
authority to adopt plans "applicable to the local peculiarities of
the ports within their limits"). It is fundamental in our federal
structure that States have vast residual powers. Those powers,
unless constrained or displaced by the existence of federal
authority or by proper federal enactments, are often exercised in
concurrence with those of the National Government.
McCulloch
v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
As
Ray itself made apparent, the States may enforce rules
governed by Title I of the PWSA unless they run counter to an
exercise of federal authority. The analysis under Title I of the
PWSA, then, is one of conflict pre-emption, which occurs "when
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when
the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress.'"
California v.
ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 100-101
(1989) (citations omitted). In this context, Coast Guard
regulations are to be given pre-
110
emptive effect over conflicting state laws.
City of New
York v.
FCC, 486 U. S. 57, 63-64 (1988)
(" '[A] federal agency acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation'
and hence render unenforceable state or local laws that are
otherwise not inconsistent with federal law").
Ray defined
the relevant inquiry for Title I pre-emption as whether the Coast
Guard has promulgated its own requirement on the subject or has
decided that no such requirement should be imposed at all. 435 U.
S., at 171-172; see also
id., at 178 (" '[W]here failure of
... federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full
authority takes on the character of a ruling that no such
regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the
statute,' States are not permitted to use their police power to
enact such a regulation.
Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
New York
State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767, 774
(1947)").
Ray also recognized that, even in the context of a
regulation related to local waters, a federal official with an
overview of all possible ramifications of a particular requirement
might be in the best position to balance all the competing
interests.
Id., at 177.
While
Ray explained that Congress, in Title I of the
PWSA, preserved state authority to regulate the peculiarities of
local waters if there was no conflict with federal regulatory
determinations, the Court further held that Congress, in Title II
of the PWSA, mandated federal rules on the subjects or matters
there specified, demanding uniformity.
Id., at 168 ("Title
II leaves no room for the States to impose different or stricter
design requirements than those which Congress has enacted with the
hope of having them internationally adopted or has accepted as the
result of international accord. A state law in this area ... would
frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform,
international standards"). Title II requires the Coast Guard to
impose national regulations governing the general seaworthiness of
tankers and their crews.
Id., at 160. Under
Ray's
inter-
111
pretation of the Title II PWSA provision now found at 46 U. S.
C. § 3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the "design,
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation,
equipping, personnel qualification, and manning" of tanker
vessels.
In
Ray, this principle was applied to hold that
Washington's tanker design and construction rules were pre-empted.
Those requirements failed because they were within a field reserved
for federal regulation under 46 U. S. C. § 391a (1982 ed.), the
predecessor to § 3703(a). We reaffirm
Ray's holding on this
point. Contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeals, the
field of pre-emption established by § 3703(a) cannot be limited to
tanker "design" and "construction," terms which cannot be read in
isolation from the other subjects found in that section. Title II
of the PWSA covers "design, construction, alteration, repair,
maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and
manning" of tanker vessels.
Ibid. Congress has left no room
for state regulation of these matters. See
Fidelity Fed.
Sav. &
Loan Assn. v.
De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982)
(explaining field pre-emption). As the
Ray Court stated:
"[T]he Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment that a
vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail over the
contrary state judgment. Enforcement of the state requirements
would at least frustrate what seems to us to be the evident
congressional intention to establish a uniform federal regime
controlling the design of oil tankers." 435 U. S., at 165.
The existence of some overlapping coverage between the two
titles of the PWSA may make it difficult to determine whether a
pre-emption question is controlled by conflict preemption
principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by field
pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II. The
Ray
Court acknowledged the difficulty, but declined to resolve every
question by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. We follow
the same approach, and conflict pre-emption under
112
Title I will be applicable in some, although not all, cases. We
recognize that the terms used in § 3703(a) are quite broad. In
defining their scope, and the scope of the resulting field
pre-emption, it will be useful to consider the type of regulations
the Secretary has actually promulgated under the section, as well
as the section's list of specific types of regulation that must be
included. Useful inquiries include whether the rule is justified by
conditions unique to a particular port or waterway. See
id.,
at 175 (a Title I regulation is one "based on water depth in Puget
Sound or on other local peculiarities"). Furthermore, a regulation
within the State's residual powers will often be of limited
extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its
primary conduct outside the specific body of water purported to
justify the local rule. Limited extraterritorial effect explains
why
Ray upheld a state rule requiring a tug escort for
certain vessels,
id., at 171, and why state rules requiring
a registered vessel (i.
e., one involved in foreign trade)
to take on a local pilot have historically been allowed,
id., at 159-160. Local rules not pre-empted under Title II
of the PWSA pose a minimal risk of innocent noncompliance, do not
affect vessel operations outside the jurisdiction, do not require
adjustment of systemic aspects of the vessel, and do not impose a
substantial burden on the vessel's operation within the local
jurisdiction itself.
IV
The field pre-emption rule surrounding Title II and § 3703(a)
and the superseding effect of additional federal statutes are
illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington's tanker
regulations. We address these because the attempted reach of the
state rules is well demonstrated by the briefs and record before
us; other parts of the state regulatory scheme can be addressed on
remand.
First, Washington imposes a series of training requirements on a
tanker's crew. WAC § 317-21-230; see also Appendix,
infra,
at 118. A covered vessel is required to certify
113
that its crew has "complete[d] a comprehensive training program
approved by the [State]." The State requires the vessel's master to
"be trained in shipboard management" and licensed deck officers to
be trained in bridge resource management, automated radar plotting
aids, shiphandling, crude oil washing, inert gas systems, cargo
handling, oil spill prevention and response, and shipboard fire
fighting. The state law mandates a series of "weekly," "monthly,"
and "quarterly" drills.
This state requirement under WAC § 317-21-230 does not address
matters unique to the waters of Puget Sound. On the contrary, it
imposes requirements that control the staffing, operation, and
manning of a tanker outside of Washington's waters. The training
and drill requirements pertain to "operation" and "personnel
qualifications" and so are pre-empted by 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a). Our
conclusion that training is a field reserved to the Federal
Government receives further confirmation from the circumstance that
the STCW Convention addresses "training" and "qualification"
requirements of the crew, Art. VI, and that the United States has
enacted crew training requirements.
E. g., 46
CFR pts. 10, 12, 13, 15 (1999).
The second Washington rule we find pre-empted is WAC §
317-21-250; see also Appendix,
infra, at 119. Washington
imposes English language proficiency requirements on a tanker's
crew. This requirement will dictate how a tanker operator staffs
the vessel even from the outset of the voyage, when the vessel may
be thousands of miles from Puget Sound. It is not limited to
governing local traffic or local peculiarities. The State's
attempted rule is a "personnel qualification" pre-empted by §
3703(a) of Title II. In addition, there is another federal statute,
33 U. S. C. § 1228(a)(7), on the subject. It provides: "[N]o vessel
... shall operate in the navigable waters of the United States ...
, if such vessel ... while underway, does not have at least one
licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge
114
who is capable of clearly understanding English." The statute
may not be supplemented by laws enacted by the States without
compromising the uniformity the federal rule itself achieves.
The third Washington rule we find invalid under field preemption
is a navigation watch requirement in WAC § 317-21200; see also
Appendix,
infra, at 118. Washington has different rules for
navigation watch, depending on whether the tanker is operating in
restricted visibility or not. We mention the restricted visibility
rule below, but now evaluate the requirement which applies in
general terms and reads: "[T]he navigation watch shall consist of
at least two licensed deck officers, a helmsman, and a lookout."
The general watch requirement is not tied to the peculiarities of
Puget Sound; it applies throughout Washington's waters and at all
times. It is a general operating requirement and is preempted as an
attempt to regulate a tanker's "operation" and "manning" under 46
U. S. C. § 3703(a).
We have illustrated field pre-emption under § 3703(a) by
discussing three of Washington's rules which, under the current
state of the record, we can determine cannot be enforced due to the
assertion of federal authority found in that section. The parties
discuss other federal statutory provisions and international
agreements which also govern specific aspects of international
maritime commerce. In appropriate circumstances, these also may
have pre-emptive effect.
For example, the record before us reveals that a fourth state
rule cannot stand in light of other sources of federal regulation
of the same subject. Washington requires vessels that ultimately
reach its waters to report certain marine casualties. WAC §
317-21-130; see also Appendix,
infra, at 117-118. The
requirement applies to incidents (defined as a "collision,"
"allision," "near-miss incident," "marine casualty" of listed
kinds, "accidental or intentional grounding," "failure of the
propulsion or primary steering systems,"
115
"failure of a component or control system," "fire, flood, or
other incident that affects the vessel's seaworthiness," and
"spills of oil"), regardless of where in the world they might have
occurred. A vessel operator is required by the state regulation to
make a detailed report to the State on each incident, listing the
date, location, and weather conditions. The report must also list
the government agencies to whom the event was reported and must
contain a "brief analysis of any known causes" and a "description
of measures taken to prevent a reoccurrence." WAC § 317-21-130.
The State contends that its requirement is not pre-empted
because it is similar to federal requirements. This is an incorrect
statement of the law. It is not always a sufficient answer to a
claim of pre-emption to say that state rules supplement, or even
mirror, federal requirements. The Court observed this principle
when Commerce Clause doctrine was beginning to take shape, holding
in
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859), that
Alabama could not require vessel owners to provide certain
information as a condition of operating in state waters even though
federal law also required the owner of the vessel "to furnish,
under oath, ... all the information required by this State law."
Id., at 242. The appropriate inquiry still remains whether
the purposes and objectives of the federal statutes, including the
intent to establish a workable, uniform system, are consistent with
concurrent state regulation. On this point, Justice Holmes' later
observation is relevant: "When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition,
and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to
go farther than Congress has seen fit to go."
Charleston
&
Western Carolina R. Co. v.
Varnville Furniture
Co., 237 U. S.
597, 604 (1915).
We hold that Congress intended that the Coast Guard regulations
be the sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations with respect
to the matters covered by the challenged state statute. Under 46 U.
S. C. § 6101, the Coast Guard "shall
116
prescribe regulations on the marine casualties to be reported
and the manner of reporting," and the statute lists the kinds of
casualties that the regulations must cover. See also § 3717(a)(4)
(requiring the Secretary of Transportation to "establish a marine
safety information system"). Congress did not intend its reporting
obligations to be cumulative to those enacted by each political
subdivision whose jurisdiction a vessel enters. The State's
reporting requirement is a significant burden in terms of cost and
the risk of innocent noncompliance.
The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185, 195 (1903)
(the master of a vessel is in a position "such that it is almost
impossible for him to acquaint himself with the laws of each
individual State he may visit"). Furthermore, it affects a vessel
operator's out-of-state obligations and conduct, where a State's
jurisdiction and authority are most in doubt. The state reporting
requirement under WAC § 317-21-130 is pre-empted.
v
As to conflict pre-emption under Title I, Washington argues that
certain of its regulations, such as its watch requirement in times
of restricted visibility, are of limited extraterritorial effect
and necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound. On
remand, the Court of Appeals or District Court should consider
whether the remaining regulations are pre-empted under Title I
conflict pre-emption or Title II field pre-emption, or are
otherwise pre-empted by these titles or under any other federal law
or international agreement raised as possible sources of
pre-emption.
We have determined that Washington's regulations regarding
general navigation watch procedures, English language skills,
training, and casualty reporting are preempted. Petitioners make
substantial arguments that the remaining regulations are pre-empted
as well. It is preferable that the remaining claims be considered
by the Court of Appeals or by the District Court within the
framework we have discussed. The United States did not participate
in
117
these cases until appeal. Resolution of these cases would
benefit from the development of a full record by all interested
parties.
We infer from the record that Washington is not now enforcing
its regulations. If, pending adjudication of these cases on remand,
a threat of enforcement emerges, the Court of Appeals or the
District Court would weigh any application for stay under the
appropriate legal standards in light of the principles we have
discussed and with recognition of the national interests at
stake.
When one contemplates the weight and immense mass of oil ever in
transit by tankers, the oil's proximity to coastal life, and its
destructive power even if a spill occurs far upon the open sea,
international, federal, and state regulation may be insufficient
protection. Sufficiency, however, is not the question before us.
The issue is not adequate regulation but political responsibility;
and it is, in large measure, for Congress and the Coast Guard to
confront whether their regulatory scheme, which demands a high
degree of uniformity, is adequate. States, as well as environmental
groups and local port authorities, will participate in the process.
See 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a) (requiring the Coast Guard to consider
the views of "officials of State and local governments,"
"representative of port and harbor authorities," and
"representatives of environmental groups" in arriving at national
standards).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and these
cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
"1. Event Reporting-WAC 317-21-130. Requires operators to report
all events such as collisions, allisions and near-miss incidents
for the five years preceding filing of a
118
Appendix to opinion of the Court
prevention plan, and all events that occur thereafter for
tankers that operate in Puget Sound.
"2. Operating Procedures-Watch Practices-[W AC 31721-200].
Requires tankers to employ specific watch and lookout practices
while navigating and when at anchor, and requires a bridge resource
management system that is the 'standard practice throughout the
owner's or operator's fleet,' and which organizes responsibilities
and coordinates communication between members of the bridge.
"3. Operating Procedures-Navigation-WAC 317-21205. Requires
tankers in navigation in state waters to record positions every
fifteen minutes, to write a comprehensive voyage plan before
entering state waters, and to make frequent compass checks while
under way.
"4. Operating Procedures-Engineering-WAC 317-21210. Requires
tankers in state waters to follow specified engineering and
monitoring practices.
"5. Operating Procedures-Prearrival Tests and Inspections-WAC
317-21-215. Requires tankers to undergo a number of tests and
inspections of engineering, navigation and propulsion systems
twelve hours or less before entering or getting underway in state
waters.
"6. Operating Procedures-Emergency ProceduresWAC 317-21-220.
Requires tanker masters to post written crew assignments and
procedures for a number of shipboard emergencies.
"7. Operating Procedures-Events-WAC 317-21-225.
Requires that when an event transpires in state waters, such as
a collision, allision or near-miss incident, the operator is
prohibited from erasing, discarding or altering the position
plotting records and the comprehensive written voyage plan.
"8. Personnel Policies-Training-WAC 317-21-230. Requires
operators to provide a comprehensive training program for personnel
that goes beyond that necessary to obtain a license or merchant
marine document, and which includes instructions on a number of
specific procedures.
119
"9. Personnel Policies-Illicit Drugs and Alcohol UseWAC
317-21-235. Requires drug and alcohol testing and reporting.
"10. Personnel Policies-Personnel Evaluation-WAC 317-21-240.
Requires operators to monitor the fitness for duty of crew members,
and requires operators to at least annually provide a job
performance and safety evaluation for all crew members on vessels
covered by a prevention plan who serve for more than six months in
a year.
"11. Personnel Policies-Work Hours-WAC 317-21-245.
Sets limitations on the number of hours crew members may
work.
"12. Personnel Policies-Language-WAC 317-21-250.
Requires all licensed deck officers and the vessel master to be
proficient in English and to speak a language understood by
subordinate officers and unlicensed crew. Also requires all written
instruction to be printed in a language understood by the licensed
officers and unlicensed crew.
"13. Personnel Policies-Record Keeping-WAC 317-21255. Requires
operators to maintain training records for crew members assigned to
vessels covered by a prevention plan.
"14. Management-WAC 317-21-260. Requires operators to implement
management practices that demonstrate active monitoring of vessel
operations and maintenance, personnel training, development, and
fitness, and technological improvements in navigation.
"15. Technology-WAC 317-21-265. Requires tankers to be equipped
with global positioning system receivers, two separate radar
systems, and an emergency towing system.
"16. Advance Notice of Entry and Safety Reports-WAC 317-21-540.
Requires at least twenty-four hours notice prior to entry of a
tanker into state waters, and requires that the notice report any
conditions that pose a hazard to the vessel or the marine
environment." 148 F. 3d, at 10571058 (footnote omitted).
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