OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. KNIGHTS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 00-1260. Argued November 6, 200l-Decided December
10,2001
A California court's order sentencing respondent Knights to
probation for a drug offense included the condition that Knights
submit to search at anytime, with or without a search or arrest
warrant or reasonable cause, by any probation or law enforcement
officer. Subsequently, a sheriff's detective, with reasonable
suspicion, searched Knights' apartment. Based in part on items
recovered, a federal grand jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to
commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device,
and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In granting
Knights' motion to suppress, the District Court held that, although
the detective had "reasonable suspicion" to believe that Knights
was involved with incendiary materials, the search was for
"investigatory" rather than "probationary" purposes. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed.
Held: The warrantless search of Knights, supported by reasonable
suspicion and authorized by a probation condition, satisfied the
Fourth Amendment. As nothing in Knights' probation condition limits
searches to those with a "probationary" purpose, the question here
is whether the Fourth Amendment imposes such a limitation. Knights
argues that a warrantless search of a probationer satisfies the
Fourth Amendment only if it is just like the search at issue in
Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U. S. 868, i. e., a
"special needs" search conducted by a probation officer monitoring
whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions.
This dubious logic-that an opinion upholding the constitutionality
of a particular search implicitly holds unconstitutional any search
that is not like it-runs contrary to Griffin's express statement
that its "special needs" holding made it "unnecessary to consider
whether" warrantless searches of probationers were otherwise
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 878, 880. And this
Court need not decide whether Knights' acceptance of the search
condition constituted consent to a complete waiver of his Fourth
Amendment rights in the sense of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U. S. 218,
because the search here was reasonable under the Court's general
Fourth Amendment "totality of the circumstances" approach, Ohio v.
Robinette,
519 U. S.
33, 39, with the search condition being a salient circumstance.
The Fourth Amendment's touchstone is reasonableness, and a search's
reasonableness is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree
113
to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed to promote legitimate
governmental interests. Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U. S. 295, 300.
Knights' status as a probationer subject to a search condition
informs both sides of that balance. The sentencing judge reasonably
concluded that the search condition would further the two primary
goals of probation-rehabilitation and protecting society from
future criminal violations. Knights was unambiguously informed of
the search condition. Thus, Knights' reasonable expectation of
privacy was significantly diminished. In assessing the governmental
interest, it must be remembered that the very assumption of
probation is that the probationer is more likely than others to
violate the law. Griffin, supra, at 880. The State's interest in
apprehending criminal law violators, thereby protecting potential
victims, may justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it
does not on the ordinary citizen. On balance, no more than
reasonable suspicion was required to search this probationer's
house. The degree of individualized suspicion required is a
determination that a sufficiently high probability of criminal
conduct makes the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest
reasonable. Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires
probable cause, a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the
balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard
reasonable. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1. The same
circumstances that lead to the conclusion that reasonable suspicion
is constitutionally sufficient also render a warrant requirement
unnecessary. See Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U. S. 326, 330.
Because the Court's holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment
analysis that considers all the circumstances of a search, there is
no basis for examining official purpose. Pp. 116-122.
219 F.3d
1138, reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
SouTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 122.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States. With
him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney
General Chertoff, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.
Hilary A. Fox argued the cause for respondent. With her on the
brief was Barry
J. Portman.
*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State
of California by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R.
Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass and Dane
Gillette, Senior As-
114
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
A California court sentenced respondent Mark James Knights to
summary probation for a drug offense. The probation order included
the following condition: that Knights would "[s]ubmit his ...
person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to
search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of
arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law
enforcement officer." Knights signed the probation order, which
stated immediately above his signature that "I HAVE RECEIVED A COP~
READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AND
AGREE TO ABIDE BY SAME." App. 49. In this case, we decide whether a
search pursuant to this probation condition, and supported by
reasonable suspicion, satisfied the Fourth Amendment.
Three days after Knights was placed on probation, a Pacific Gas
& Electric (PG&E) power transformer and adjacent Pacific
Bell telecommunications vault near the Napa County Airport were
pried open and set on fire, causing an estimated $1.5 million in
damage. Brass padlocks had been removed and a gasoline accelerant
had been used to ignite the fire. This incident was the latest in
more than 30 recent acts of vandalism against PG&E facilities
in Napa County. Suspicion for these acts had long focused on
Knights and his friend, Steven Simoneau. The incidents began after
PG&E
sistant Attorneys General, and Laurence K. Sullivan, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the Center
for Community Interest by Andrew N. Vollmer and Steven Rosen.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
California Public Defenders Association et al. by Kenneth I.
Clayman; for the N ational Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
by John Wesley Hall, Jr., and Lisa B. Kemler; and for the
Rutherford Institute by James Joseph Lynch, Jr., John W Whitehead,
and Steven H. Aden.
115
had filed a theft-of-services complaint against Knights and
discontinued his electrical service for failure to pay his bill.
Detective Todd Hancock of the Napa County Sheriff's Department had
noticed that the acts of vandalism coincided with Knights' court
appearance dates concerning the theft of PG&E services. And
just a week before the arson, a sheriff's deputy had stopped
Knights and Simoneau near a PG&E gas line and observed pipes
and gasoline in Simoneau's pickup truck.
After the PG&E arson, a sheriff's deputy drove by Knights'
residence, where he saw Simoneau's truck parked in front. The
deputy felt the hood of the truck. It was warm. Detective Hancock
decided to set up surveillance of Knights' apartment. At about 3:10
the next morning, Simoneau exited the apartment carrying three
cylindrical items. Detective Hancock believed the items were pipe
bombs. Simoneau walked across the street to the bank of the Napa
River, and Hancock heard three splashes. Simoneau returned without
the cylinders and drove away in his truck. Simoneau then stopped in
a driveway, parked, and left the area. Detective Hancock entered
the driveway and observed a number of suspicious objects in the
truck: a Molotov cocktail and explosive materials, a gasoline can,
and two brass padlocks that fit the description of those removed
from the PG&E transformer vault.
After viewing the objects in Simoneau's truck, Detective Hancock
decided to conduct a search of Knights' apartment. Detective
Hancock was aware of the search condition in Knights' probation
order and thus believed that a warrant was not necessary.l The
search revealed a detonation cord, ammunition, liquid chemicals,
instruction manuals on chemistry and electrical circuitry, bolt
cutters, telephone poleclimbing spurs, drug paraphernalia, and a
brass padlock stamped "PG&E."
1 Hancock had seen a copy of the probation order when he was
checking Knights' file in the Sheriff's Department office.
116
Knights was arrested, and a federal grand jury subsequently
indicted him for conspiracy to commit arson, for possession of an
unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in
possession of ammunition. Knights moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the search of his apartment. The District Court
held that Detective Hancock had "reasonable suspicion" to believe
that Knights was involved with incendiary materials. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 30a. The District Court nonetheless granted the motion to
suppress on the ground that the search was for "investigatory"
rather than "probationary" purposes. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.
219 F.3d
1138 (2000). The Court of Appeals relied on its earlier
decisions holding that the search condition in Knights' probation
order "must be seen as limited to probation searches, and must stop
short of investigation searches." Id., at 1142-1143 (citing
United States v.
Ooley, 116 F.3d
370, 371
(CA9 1997)).
The Supreme Court of California has rejected this distinction
and upheld searches pursuant to the California probation condition
"whether the purpose of the search is to monitor the probationer or
to serve some other law enforcement purpose."
People v.
Woods, 21 Cal. 4th 668, 681, 981 P. 2d 1019, 1027 (1999),
cert. denied, 529 U. S. 1023 (2000). We granted certiorari, 532 U.
S. 1018 (2001), to assess the constitutionality of searches made
pursuant to this common California probation condition.
Certainly nothing in the condition of probation suggests that it
was confined to searches bearing upon probationary status and
nothing more. The search condition provides that Knights will
submit to a search "by any probation officer or law enforcement
officer" and does not mention anything about purpose. App. 49. The
question then is whether the Fourth Amendment limits searches
pursuant to this probation condition to those with a "probationary"
purpose.
117
Knights argues that this limitation follows from our decision in
Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U. S. 868 (1987).
Brief for Respondent 14. In Griffin, we upheld a search of a
probationer conducted pursuant to a Wisconsin regulation permitting
"any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a
warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as long as there are
'reasonable grounds' to believe the presence of contraband," 483 U.
S., at 870-871. The Wisconsin regulation that authorized the search
was not an express condition of Griffin's probation; in fact, the
regulation was not even promulgated at the time of Griffin's
sentence.2 The regulation applied to all Wisconsin probationers,
with no need for a judge to make an individualized determination
that the probationer's conviction justified the need for
warrantless searches. We held that a State's operation of its
probation system presented a "special need" for the "exercise of
supervision to assure that [probation] restrictions are in fact
observed." Id., at 875. That special need for supervision justified
the Wisconsin regulation and the search pursuant to the regulation
was thus reasonable. Id., at 875-880.
In Knights' view, apparently shared by the Court of Appeals, a
warrantless search of a probationer satisfies the Fourth Amendment
only if it is just like the search at issue in Griffin-i. e., a
"special needs" search conducted by a probation officer monitoring
whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions.
This dubious logic-that an opinion upholding the constitutionality
of a particular search implicitly holds unconstitutional any search
that is not like it-runs contrary to Griffin's express statement
that its "special needs" holding made it "unnecessary to consider
whether" warrantless searches of probationers were other-
2 Griffin was placed on probation in September 1980, 483 U. S.,
at 870, and the regulation was not promulgated until December 1981,
id., at 871.
118
wise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.3
Id., at 878, 880.
We now consider that question in assessing the constitutionality
of the search of Knights' apartment. The Government, advocating the
approach of the Supreme Court of California, see Woods, supra,
contends that the search satisfied the Fourth Amendment under the
"consent" rationale of cases such as Zap v. United States,
328 U. S. 624 (1946), and
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U. S. 218 (1973). In
the Government's view, Knights' acceptance of the search condition
was voluntary because he had the option of rejecting probation and
going to prison instead, which the Government argues is analogous
to the voluntary decision defendants often make to waive their
right to a trial and accept a plea bargain.4
We need not decide whether Knights' acceptance of the search
condition constituted consent in the Schneckloth sense of a
complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights, however, because we
conclude that the search of Knights was reasonable under our
general Fourth Amendment approach of "examining the totality of the
circumstances," Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U. S. 33, 39 (1996),
with the probation search condition being a salient
circumstance.
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and
the reasonableness of a search is determined "by
3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held in
Griffin that
"probation diminishes a probationer's reasonable expectation of
privacy-so that a probation officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, search a probationer's home without a warrant, and with
only 'reasonable grounds' (not probable cause) to believe that
contraband is present." Id., at 872.
4 The Government sees our unconstitutional conditions doctrine
as a limitation on what a probationer may validly consent to in a
probation order. The Government argues that the search condition is
not an unconstitutional condition because waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights "directly furthers the State's interest in the
effective administration of its probation system." Brief for United
States 22.
119
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon
an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U. S. 295, 300
(1999). Knights' status as a probationer subject to a search
condition informs both sides of that balance. "Probation, like
incarceration, is 'a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court
upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.'"
Griffin, supra, at 874 (quoting G. Killinger, H. Kerper, & P.
Cromwell, Probation and Parole in the Criminal Justice System 14
(1976)). Probation is "one point ... on a continuum of possible
punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security
facility to a few hours of mandatory community service." 483 U. S.,
at 874. Inherent in the very nature of probation is that
probationers "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled.'" Ibid. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. S. 471,480
(1972)). Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail
an offender's freedoms, a court granting probation may impose
reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.
The judge who sentenced Knights to probation determined that it
was necessary to condition the probation on Knights' acceptance of
the search provision. It was reasonable to conclude that the search
condition would further the two primary goals of
probation-rehabilitation and protecting society from future
criminal violations.5 The probation order clearly expressed the
search condition and Knights was unambiguously informed of it. The
probation condition
5 Under California law, a probation condition is invalid if it
(1) has no relationship to the crime of which defendant was
convicted; (2) relates to conduct which in itself is not criminal;
and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related
to future criminality. People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 485-486, 541
P. 2d 545, 548 (1975).
120
thus significantly diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of
privacy.6
In assessing the governmental interest side of the balance, it
must be remembered that "the very assumption of the institution of
probation" is that the probationer "is more likely than the
ordinary citizen to violate the law." Griffin, 483 U. S., at 880.
The recidivism rate of probationers is significantly higher than
the general crime rate. See U. S. Dept. of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of
Felons on Probation, 1986-89, pp. 1, 6 (Feb. 1992) (reporting that
43% of 79,000 felons placed on probation in 17 States were
rearrested for a felony within three years while still on
probation); U. S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Violators in
State Prison, 1991, p. 3 (Aug. 1995) (stating that in 1991, 23% of
state prisoners were probation violators). And probationers have
even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activities and
quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the ordinary
criminal because probationers are aware that they may be subject to
supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible
incarceration, in proceedings in which the trial rights of a jury
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, do not
apply, see Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 U. S. 420, 435, n.7
(1984) ("[T]here is no right to a jury trial before probation may
be revoked"); 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e).
The State has a dual concern with a probationer. On the one hand
is the hope that he will successfully complete pro-
6We do not decide whether the probation condition so diminished,
or completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable expectation of
privacy (or constituted consent, see supra, at 118) that a search
by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion
would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. The terms of the probation condition permit such a
search, but we need not address the constitutionality of a
suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported
by reasonable suspicion.
121
bation and be integrated back into the community. On the other
is the concern, quite justified, that he will be more likely to
engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the
community. The view of the Court of Appeals in this case would
require the State to shut its eyes to the latter concern and
concentrate only on the former. But we hold that the Fourth
Amendment does not put the State to such a choice. Its interest in
apprehending violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting
potential victims of criminal enterprise, may therefore justifiably
focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary
citizen.
We hold that the balance of these considerations requires no
more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this
probationer's house. The degree of individualized suspicion
required of a search is a determination of when there is a
sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to
make the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable.
See United States v. Cortez,
449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981)
(individualized suspicion deals "with probabilities"). Although the
Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability
embodied in the term "probable cause," a lesser degree satisfies
the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private
interests makes such a standard reasonable. See, e. g., Terry v.
Ohio,
392 U. S. 1
(1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U. S. 873 (1975).
Those interests warrant a lesser than probablecause standard here.
When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject
to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is
enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an
intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy
interests is reasonable.
The same circumstances that lead us to conclude that reasonable
suspicion is constitutionally sufficient also render a warrant
requirement unnecessary. See Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U. S. 326, 330 (2001)
(noting that general
122
or individual circumstances, including "diminished expectations
of privacy," may justify an exception to the warrant
requirement).
Because our holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis
that considers all the circumstances of a search, there is no basis
for examining official purpose. With the limited exception of some
special needs and administrative search cases, see Indianapolis v.
Edmond,
531 U. S.
32, 45 (2000), "we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth
Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual
officers." Whren v. United States,
517 U. S. 806, 813
(1996).
The District Court found, and Knights concedes, that the search
in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion. We therefore
hold that the warrantless search of Knights, supported by
reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation,
was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring.
As this case was originally presented to us, the dispute
centered on whether Knights's agreement to the search condition
included in his terms of probation covered only those searches with
a probation-related purpose, or rather extended to searches with an
investigatory or law-enforcement purpose. At that time, the
Government argued that Whren v. United States,
517 U. S. 806 (1996),
precluded any enquiry into the motives of the individual officers
conducting the search. We now hold that law-enforcement searches of
probationers who have been informed of a search condition are
permissible upon individualized suspicion of criminal behavior
committed during the probationary period, thus removing any issue
of the subjective intention of the investi-
123
gating officers from the case. I would therefore reserve the
question whether Whren's holding, that "[sJubjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis,"
id., at 813, should extend to searches based only
upon reasonable suspicion.
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