OCTOBER TERM, 1999
Syllabus
UNITED STATES
v. JOHNSON
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
No. 98-1696. Argued December 8, 1999-Decided March 1,2000
Respondent had been serving time in federal prison for multiple
drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were
declared invalid. As a result, he had served 2.5 years' too much
prison time and was at once set free, but a 3-year term of
supervised release was yet to be served on the remaining
convictions. He filed a motion to reduce his supervised release
term by the amount of extra prison time he served. The District
Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release
commenced upon respondent's actual release from incarceration, not
before. The Sixth Circuit reversed, accepting respondent's argument
that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left
prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.
Held: This Court is bound by the controlling statute, 18
U. S. C. § 3624(e), which, by its necessary operation, does not
reduce the length of a supervised release term by reason of excess
time served in prison. Under § 3624(e), a supervised release term
does not commence until an individual "is released from
imprisonment." The ordinary, commonsense meaning of "release" is to
be freed from confinement. To say respondent was released while
still imprisoned diminishes the concept the word intends to convey.
Section 3624(e) also provides that a supervised release term comes
"after imprisonment," once the prisoner is "released by the Bureau
of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer." Thus,
supervised release does not run while an individual remains in the
Bureau of Prisons' custody. The phrase "on the day the person is
released" in § 3624(e) suggests a strict temporal interpretation,
not some fictitious or constructive earlier time. Indeed, the
section admonishes that "supervised release does not run during any
period in which the person is imprisoned." The statute does provide
for concurrent running of supervised release in specific,
identified cases, but the Court infers that Congress limited §
3624(e) to the exceptions set forth. Finally, § 3583(e)(3) does not
have a substantial bearing on the interpretive issue, for this
directive addresses instances where conditions of supervised
release have been violated, and the court orders a revocation.
While the text of § 3624(e) resolves the case, the Court's
conclusion accords with the objectives of supervised release, which
include assisting individuals in their transition to community
life. Super-
54
vised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those
served by incarceration. The Court also observes that the statutory
structure provides a means to address the equitable concerns that
exist when an individual is incarcerated beyond the proper
expiration of his prison term. The trial court, as it sees fit, may
modify the individual's supervised release conditions, §
3583(e)(2), or it may terminate his supervised release obligations
after one year of completed service, § 3583(e)(1). Pp.56-60.
154 F.3d
569, reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States. With
her on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney
General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Richard A.
Friedman.
Kevin M. Schad argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent. *
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
An offender had been serving time in federal prison for multiple
felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. As a
result, he had served too much prison time and was at once set
free, but a term of supervised release was yet to be served on the
remaining convictions. The question becomes whether the excess
prison time should be credited to the supervised release term,
reducing its length. Bound by the text of the controlling statute,
18 U. S. C. § 3624(e), we hold that the supervised release term
remains unaltered.
Respondent Roy Lee Johnson was convicted in 1990 on two counts
of possession with an intent to distribute controlled substances,
84 Stat. 1260, 21 U. S. C. § 841(a), on two counts of use of a
firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime, 18 U. S. C. §
924(c) (1994 ed. and Supp. IV),
* Edward M. Chikofsky, Barbara E. Bergman, and
Henry J. Bemporad filed a brief for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
amici
curiae urging affirmance.
55
and on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, § 922(g). He received a sentence of 171 months'
imprisonment, consisting of three concurrent 51-month terms on the
§ 841(a) and § 922(g) counts, to be followed by two consecutive
60-month terms on the § 924(c) counts. In addition, the District
Court imposed a mandatory 3-year term of supervised release for the
drug possession offenses. See 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994 ed.,
Supp. III). The Court of Appeals, though otherwise affirming
respondent's convictions and sentence, concluded the District Court
erred in sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment for
the two § 924(c) firearm offenses.
United States v.
Johnson, 25 F.3d
1335, 1337-1338
(CA6 1994) (en banc). On remand the
District Court modified the prisoner's sentence to a term of 111
months.
After our decision in
Bailey v.
United States,
516 U. S. 137
(1995), respondent filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to
vacate his § 924(c) convictions, and the Government did not oppose.
On May 2, 1996, the District Court vacated those convictions,
modifying respondent's sentence to 51 months. He had already served
more than that amount of time, so the District Court ordered his
immediate release. His term of supervised release then went into
effect. This dispute concerns its length.
In June 1996, respondent filed a motion requesting the District
Court to reduce his supervised release term by 2.5 years, the extra
time served on the vacated § 924(c) convictions. The District Court
denied relief, explaining that pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3624(e)
the supervised release commenced upon respondent's actual release
from incarceration, not before. Granting respondent credit, the
court observed, would undermine Congress' aim of using supervised
release to assist convicted felons in their transitions to
community life.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed.
154 F.3d
569 (CA6 1998). The court accepted respondent's argument
that his
56
term of supervised release commenced not on the day he left
prison confines but earlier, when his lawful term of imprisonment
expired.
Id., at 571. Awarding respondent credit for the
extra time served, the court further concluded, would provide
meaningful relief because supervised release, while serving
rehabilitative purposes, is also "punitive in nature."
Ibid.
Judge Gilman dissented, agreeing with the position of the District
Court.
Id., at 572-573.
The Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions on the
question presented. Compare
United States v.
Blake,
88 F.3d
824, 825
(CA9 1996) (supervised release commences on the
date defendants "should have been released, rather than on the
dates of their actual release"), with
United States v.
Jeanes, 150 F.3d
483, 485
(CA5 1998) (supervised release cannot run
during any period of imprisonment);
United States v.
Joseph, 109 F.3d
34 (CA1 1997) (same);
United States v.
Douglas, 88 F.3d
533, 534
(CA8 1996) (same). We granted certiorari to
resolve the question, 527 U. S. 1062 (1999), and we now
reverse.
Section 3583(a) of Title 18 authorizes, and in some instances
mandates, sentencing courts to order supervised release terms
following imprisonment. On the issue presented for review-whether a
term of supervised release begins on the date of actual release
from incarceration or on an earlier date due to a mistaken
interpretation of federal law-the language of § 3624(e) controls.
The statute provides in relevant part:
"A prisoner whose sentence includes a term of supervised release
after imprisonment shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons to
the supervision of a probation officer who shall, during the term
imposed, supervise the person released to the degree warranted by
the conditions specified by the sentencing court. The term of
supervised release commences on the day the person is released from
imprisonment and runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or
local term of probation or super-
57
vised release or parole for another offense to which the person
is subject or becomes subject during the term of supervised
release. A term of supervised release does not run during any
period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a
conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the
imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."
The quoted language directs that a supervised release term does
not commence until an individual "is released from imprisonment."
There can be little question about the meaning of the word
"release" in the context of imprisonment. It means "[t]o loosen or
destroy the force of; to remove the obligation or effect of; hence
to alleviate or remove; ... [t]o let loose again; to set free from
restraint, confinement, or servitude; to set at liberty; to let
go." Webster's New International Dictionary 2103 (2d ed. 1949). As
these definitions illustrate, the ordinary, commonsense meaning of
release is to be freed from confinement. To say respondent was
released while still imprisoned diminishes the concept the word
intends to convey.
The first sentence of § 3624(e) supports our construction.
A term of supervised release comes "after imprisonment," once
the prisoner is "released by the Bureau of Prisons to the
supervision of a probation officer." Supervised release does not
run while an individual remains in the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons. The phrase "on the day the person is released," in the
second sentence of § 3624(e), suggests a strict temporal
interpretation, not some fictitious or constructive earlier time.
The statute does not say "on the day the person is released or on
the earlier day when he should have been released." Indeed, the
third sentence admonishes that "supervised release does not run
during any period in which the person is imprisoned."
The statute does provide for concurrent running of supervised
release in specific cases. After the operative phrase "released
from imprisonment," § 3624(e) requires the con-
58
current running of a term of supervised release with terms of
probation, parole, or with other, separate terms of supervised
release. The statute instructs that concurrency is permitted not
for prison sentences but only for those other types of sentences
given specific mention. The next sentence in the statute does
address a prison term and does allow concurrent counting, but only
for prison terms less than 30 days in length. When Congress
provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts
have authority to create others. The proper inference, and the one
we adopt here, is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions
and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth. The
30-day exception finds no application in this case; each of
respondent's sentences, to which the term of supervised release
attached, exceeded that amount of time. Finally, § 3583(e)(3) does
not have a substantial bearing on the interpretive issue, for this
directive addresses instances where conditions of supervised
release have been violated, and the court orders a revocation.
Our conclusion finds further support in 18 U. S. C. § 3583(a),
which authorizes the imposition of "a term of supervised release
after imprisonment." This provision, too, is inconsistent with
respondent's contention that confinement and supervised release can
run at the same time. The statute's direction is clear and precise.
Release takes place on the day the prisoner in fact is freed from
confinement.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that reduction of respondent's
supervised release term was a necessary implementation of §
3624(a), which provides that "[a] prisoner shall be released by the
Bureau of Prisons on the date of the expiration of the prisoner's
term of imprisonment .... " All concede respondent's term of
imprisonment should have ended earlier than it did. It does not
follow, however, that the term of supervised release commenced, as
a matter of law, once he completed serving his lawful sentences. It
is true the prison term and the release term are related, for the
latter cannot begin until the former expires. Though inter-
59
related, the terms are not interchangeable. The Court of Appeals
was mistaken in holding otherwise, and the text of § 3624(e) cannot
accommodate the rule the Court of Appeals derived. Supervised
release has no statutory function until confinement ends. Cf.
United States v.
Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 50 (1994)
(observing that "terms of supervised release ... follow up prison
terms"). The rule of lenity does not alter the analysis. Absent
ambiguity, the rule of lenity is not applicable to guide statutory
interpretation. Cf.
Gozlon-Peretz v.
United States,
498 U. S. 395,
410 (1991).
While the text of § 3624(e) resolves the case, we observe that
our conclusion accords with the statute's purpose and design. The
objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess
prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release.
Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their
transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills
rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.
See § 3553(a)(2)(D); United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual §§ 5D1.3(c), (d), (e) (Nov. 1998); see also S.
Rep. No. 98-225, p. 124 (1983) (declaring that "the primary goal
[of supervised release] is to ease the defendant's transition into
the community after the service of a long prison term for a
particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a
defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for
punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and
training programs after release"). Sentencing courts, in
determining the conditions of a defendant's supervised release, are
required to consider, among other factors, "the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant," "the need ... to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; ... to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and ... to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other cor-
60
rectional treatment." 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a). In the instant
case, the transition assistance ordered by the trial court required
respondent, among other conditions, to avoid possessing or
transporting firearms and to participate in a drug dependency
treatment program. These conditions illustrate that supervised
release, unlike incarceration, provides individuals with
postconfinement assistance. Cf.
Gozlon-Peretz, supra, at 407
(describing "[s]upervised release [a]s a unique method of
postconfinement supervision invented by the Congress for a series
of sentencing reforms"). The Court of Appeals erred in treating
respondent's time in prison as interchangeable with his term of
supervised release.
There can be no doubt that equitable considerations of great
weight exist when an individual is incarcerated beyond the proper
expiration of his prison term. The statutory structure provides a
means to address these concerns in large part. The trial court, as
it sees fit, may modify an individual's conditions of supervised
release. § 3583(e)(2). Furthermore, the court may terminate an
individual's supervised release obligations "at any time after the
expiration of one year ... if it is satisfied that such action is
warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest
of justice." § 3583(e)(1). Respondent may invoke § 3583(e)(2) in
pursuit of relief; and, having completed one year of supervised
release, he may also seek relief under § 3583(e)(1).
The statute, by its own necessary operation, does not reduce the
length of a supervised release term by reason of excess time served
in prison. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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