OCTOBER TERM, 1996
Syllabus
UNITED STATES
v. HYDE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 96-667. Argued April 15, 1997-Decided May 27,1997
Respondent pleaded guilty to several federal fraud counts,
pursuant to a plea agreement in which the Government agreed to move
for dismissal of other charges. The District Court accepted the
plea but deferred decision on whether to accept the plea agreement,
pending completion of the presentence report. Before sentencing and
the court's decision on the plea agreement, respondent sought to
withdraw his plea. Finding that he had not provided a "fair and
just reason" for withdrawing the plea before sentencing, as
required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e), the court
denied respondent's request. The court then accepted the plea
agreement, entered judgment, and sentenced respondent. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that if a court defers acceptance of a
plea or of a plea agreement, a defendant may withdraw his plea for
any or no reason, until the court accepts both the plea and the
agreement.
Held: In the circumstances presented here, a defendant
may not withdraw his plea unless he shows a "fair and just reason"
under Rule 32(e). Nothing in the text of Rule 11, which sets out
the prerequisites to accepting a guilty plea and plea agreement,
supports the Court of Appeals' holding. That text shows that guilty
pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred and the
acceptance of the two can be separated in time. The Court of
Appeals' requirement that a district court shall not accept a
guilty plea without accepting the plea agreement is absent from the
list of prerequisites to accepting a plea set out in Rules l1(c)
and (d). If a court decides to reject a plea agreement such as the
one here, the defendant is given "the opportunity to then withdraw
the plea," Rule 11(e)(4), and he does not have to comply with Rule
32(e)'s "fair and just reason" requirement. This provision
implements the commonsense notion that a defendant can no longer be
bound by an agreement that the court has refused to sanction, and
its necessary implication is that if the court has neither rejected
nor accepted the agreement, the defendant is not granted the
"opportunity" to automatically withdraw his plea. The Court of
Appeals' holding contradicts this implication and thus strips Rule
11(e)(4) of any meaning. It also debases the judicial proceeding at
which a defendant pleads and the court accepts his plea by allowing
him to withdraw his plea simply on a lark.
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In addition, the holding would allow little, if any, time for
the "fair and just reason" standard to apply, for a court's
decision to accept a plea agreement is often made at the sentencing
hearing. Respondent's arguments-that the "fair and just reason"
standard was not meant to apply to guilty pleas conditioned on
acceptance of the plea agreement, and that the Advisory Committee's
Notes to Rule 32(b)(3) support the Court of Appeals' holding-are
rejected. Pp. 673-680.
92 F.3d
779, reversed.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United
States.
With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Richard, Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben, and Patty Merkamp Stemler.
Jonathan D. Soglin, by appointment of the Court, 519 U.
S. 1106, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. *
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states
that a district court may allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea before he is sentenced "if the defendant shows any fair and
just reason." After the defendant in this case pleaded guilty,
pursuant to a plea agreement, the District Court accepted his plea
but deferred decision on whether to accept the plea agreement. The
defendant then sought to withdraw his plea. We hold that in such
circumstances a defendant may not withdraw his plea unless he shows
a "fair and just reason" under Rule 32(e).
A federal grand jury indicted respondent Robert Hyde on eight
counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and other fraudrelated crimes. On
the morning of his trial, respondent indicated his desire to enter
plea negotiations with the Government. Those negotiations produced
a plea agreement
* Lisa Kemler filed a brief for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
amicus curiae
urging affirmance.
672
in which respondent agreed to plead guilty to four of the
counts. In exchange, the Government agreed to move to dismiss the
remaining four counts and not to bring further charges against
respondent for other allegedly fraudulent conduct.
That afternoon, the parties appeared again before the District
Court and submitted the plea agreement to the court, along with
respondent's "application for permission to enter [a] plea of
guilty." After placing respondent under oath, the court questioned
him extensively to ensure that his plea was knowing and voluntary,
and that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty,
including the possibility of a maximum sentence of 30 years. The
court asked respondent what he had done, and respondent admitted
committing the crimes set out in the four counts. The court then
asked the Government to set out what it was prepared to prove, and
the Government did so. The court asked respondent whether he was
pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty of the crimes set out
in the four counts. Respondent said that he was. Finally, the court
asked respondent how he pleaded to each count, and respondent
stated "guilty."
The District Court concluded that respondent was pleading guilty
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and that there was a
factual basis for the plea. The court therefore stated that it was
accepting respondent's guilty plea. It also stated that it was
deferring decision on whether to accept the plea agreement, pending
completion of the presentence report.
One month later, before sentencing and the District Court's
decision about whether to accept the plea agreement, respondent
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. His motion alleged that
he had pleaded guilty under duress from the Government and that his
admissions to the District Court had in fact been false. After
holding an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that there was
no evidence to support respondent's claim of duress, and that
respondent
673
had not provided a "fair and just reason" for withdrawing his
guilty plea, as required by Rule 32(e). The court therefore refused
to let respondent withdraw his guilty plea. The court then accepted
the plea agreement, entered judgment against respondent on the
first four counts, dismissed the indictment's remaining four counts
on the Government's motion, and sentenced respondent to a prison
term of 2lf2 years.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that respondent had an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea
before the District Court accepted the plea agreement.
92 F.3d
779, 781 (1996). The court reasoned as follows: First, before a
district court has accepted a defendant's guilty plea, the
defendant has an absolute right to withdraw that plea.
Id.,
at 780 (citing
United States v.
Washman, 66 F. 3d
210, 212-213 (CA9 1995)). Second, the guilty plea and the plea
agreement are" 'inextricably bound up together,'" such that the
court's deferral of the decision whether to accept the plea
agreement also constitutes an automatic deferral of its decision
whether to accept the guilty plea, even if the court explicitly
states that it is accepting the guilty plea. 92 F. 3d, at 780
(quoting
United States v.
Cordova-Perez, 65 F. 3d
1552, 1556 (CA9 1995)). Combining these two propositions, the Court
of Appeals held that "[i]f the court defers acceptance of the plea
or of the plea agreement, the defendant may withdraw his plea for
any reason or for no reason, until the time that the court does
accept both the plea and the agreement." 92 F. 3d, at 781.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have
reached the opposite conclusion on this issue.
United States
v.
Ewing, 957 F.2d
115, 118-119 (CA4 1992);
United States v.
Ellison, 798 F.2d
1102, 1106 (CA7 1986). We granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict, 519 U. S. 1086 (1997), and now reverse.
To understand why we hold that Rule 32(e) governs here, we must
go back to Rule 11, the principal provision in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure dealing with the sub-
674
ject of guilty pleas and plea agreements. The Court of Appeals
equated acceptance of the guilty plea with acceptance of the plea
agreement, and deferral of the plea agreement with deferral of the
guilty plea. Nothing in the text of Rule 11 supports these
conclusions. In fact, the text shows that the opposite is true:
Guilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred,
and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time.
The prerequisites to accepting a guilty plea are set out in
subdivisions (c) and (d) of Rule 11. Subdivision (c) says:
"Before accepting a plea of guilty ... , the court must address
the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of,
and determine that the defendant understands," numerous
consequences of pleading guilty. For example, the court must ensure
the defendant understands the maximum possible penalty that he may
face by pleading guilty, Rule l1(c)(l), and the important
constitutional rights he is waiving, including the right to a
trial, Rules 11(c)(3), (4). Subdivision (d) says: "The court shall
not accept a plea of guilty ... without first, by addressing the
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is
voluntary." 1 The opening words of these two subdivisions are
important: Together, they speak of steps a district court must take
"[b]efore accepting a plea of guilty," and without which it "shall
not accept a plea of guilty." Based on this language, we conclude
that once the court has taken these steps, it may, in its
discretion, accept a defendant's guilty plea. The Court of Appeals
would read an additional prerequisite into this list: A district
court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first accepting the
plea agreement. But that "prerequisite" is absent from the list set
out in subdivisions (c) and (d), strongly suggesting that no such
addition is warranted.
1 See also Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(f) (court should not enter
judgment on an accepted guilty plea without confirming that the
plea has a factual basis).
675
Subdivision (e), which covers plea agreements, also contradicts
the Court of Appeals' holding. That subdivision divides plea
agreements into three types, based on what the Government agrees to
do: In type A agreements, the Government agrees to move for
dismissal of other charges; in type B, it agrees to recommend (or
not oppose the defendant's request for) a particular sentence; and
in type C, it agrees that the defendant should receive a specific
sentence. As to type A and type C agreements, the Rule states that
"the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its
decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an
opportunity to consider the presentence report." 2 Rule 11(e)(2).
The plea agreement in this case is a type A agreement: The
Government agreed to move to dismiss four counts, did not agree to
recommend a particular sentence, and did not agree that a specific
sentence was the appropriate disposition. The District Court
deferred its decision about whether to accept or reject the
agreement.
If the court had decided to reject the plea agreement, it would
have turned to subdivision (e)(4) of Rule 11. That subdivision, a
critical one for our purposes, provides:
"If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall ...
advise the defendant personally ... that the court is not bound by
the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then
withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant that if the
defendant persists in a guilty plea ... the disposition of the case
may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by
the plea agreement." Rule 11(e)(4) (emphasis added).
2 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court is
required to defer its decision about whether to accept a
type A or type C agreement until after it has reviewed the
presentence report, unless the court believes that a presentence
report is not required. United States Sentencing Commission,
Guidelines Manual § 6Bl.l(c) (Nov. 1995) (USSG).
676
Thus, if the court rejects the agreement, the defendant can
"then" withdraw his plea for any reason and does not have to comply
with Rule 32(e)'s "fair and just reason" requirement. This
provision implements the commonsense notion that a defendant can no
longer be bound by an agreement that the court has refused to
sanction.
Under the Court of Appeals' holding, however, the defendant can
withdraw his plea "for any reason or for no reason" even if the
district court does not reject the plea agreement, but merely
defers decision on it. Thus, for the Court of Appeals, the
rejection of the plea agreement has no significance:
Before rejection, the defendant is free to withdraw his plea;
after rejection, the same is true. But the text of Rule 11(e)(4)
gives the rejection of the agreement a great deal of significance.
Only "then" is the defendant granted "the opportunity" to withdraw
his plea. The necessary implication of this provision is that if
the court has neither rejected nor accepted the agreement, the
defendant is not granted "the opportunity to then withdraw" his
plea. The Court of Appeals' holding contradicts this implication,
and thus strips subdivision (e)(4) of any meaning.
Not only is the Court of Appeals' holding contradicted by the
very language of the Rules, it also debases the judicial proceeding
at which a defendant pleads and the court accepts his plea. After
the defendant has sworn in open court that he actually committed
the crimes, after he has stated that he is pleading guilty because
he is guilty, after the court has found a factual basis for the
plea, and after the court has explicitly announced that it accepts
the plea, the Court of Appeals would allow the defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea simply on a lark. The Advisory Committee,
in adding the "fair and just reason" standard to Rule 32(e) in
1983, explained why this cannot be so:
"Given the great care with which pleas are taken under [the]
revised Rule 11, there is no reason to view pleas so taken as
merely 'tentative,' subject to withdrawal be-
677
fore sentence whenever the government cannot establish
prejudice. 'Were withdrawal automatic in every case where the
defendant decided to alter his tactics and present his theory of
the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere gesture,
a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant's
whim. In fact, however, a guilty plea is no such trifle, but a
"grave and solemn act," which is "accepted only with care and
discernment."'" Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
32, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 794 (quoting United States v.
Barker, 514 F.2d
208, 221 (CADC 1975), in turn quoting Brady v. United
States, 397 U. S.
742, 748 (1970)).
We think the Court of Appeals' holding would degrade the
otherwise serious act of pleading guilty into something akin to a
move in a game of chess.
The basis for the Court of Appeals' decision was its prior
statement in
Cordova-Perez that "[t]he plea agreement and
the [guilty] plea are inextricably bound up together." 65 F. 3d, at
1556 (internal quotation marks omitted). This statement, on its
own, is not necessarily incorrect. The guilty plea and the plea
agreement are "bound up together" in the sense that a rejection of
the agreement simultaneously frees the defendant from his
commitment to plead guilty. See Rule 11(e)(4). And since the guilty
plea is but one side of the plea agreement, the plea is obviously
not wholly independent of the agreement.
But the Rules nowhere state that the guilty plea and the plea
agreement must be treated identically. Instead, they explicitly
envision a situation in which the defendant performs his side of
the bargain (the guilty plea) before the Government is required to
perform its side (here, the motion to dismiss four counts). If the
court accepts the agreement and thus the Government's promised
performance, then the contemplated agreement is complete and the
defendant gets the benefit of his bargain. But if the court rejects
the Gov-
678
ernment's promised performance, then the agreement is terminated
and the defendant has the right to back out of his promised
performance (the guilty plea), just as a binding contractual duty
may be extinguished by the nonoccurrence of a condition subsequent.
See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Law of Contracts § 11-7, p. 441
(3d ed. 1987); 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 628, p. 17
(1960).3
If the Court of Appeals' holding were correct, it would also be
difficult to see what purpose Rule 32(e) would serve. Since 1983,
that Rule has provided: "If a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
... is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit the
plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just
reason." Under the Court of Appeals' holding, the "fair and just
reason" standard would only be applicable between the time that the
plea agreement is accepted and the sentence is imposed. Since the
decision whether to accept the plea agreement will often be
deferred until the sentencing hearing, see Rule 11(e)(2); USSG §
6B1.1(c), at which time the presentence report will have been
submitted to the parties, objected to, revised, and filed with the
court, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32(b)(6), the decision whether to
accept the plea agreement will often be made at the same time that
the defendant is sentenced. This leaves little, if any, time in
which the "fair and just
3 Respondent argues that it is unfair to bind the defendant to
the terms of the plea agreement before the Government is so bound.
He therefore argues that, as a policy matter, an interpretation of
the Rules that results in such a differential treatment should be
rejected. Even if respondent were correct in arguing that the
defendant is bound before the Government is bound (a point we do
not decide), the fact remains that our task here is not to act as
policymaker, deciding how to make the Rules as fair as possible,
but rather to determine what the Rules actually provide. Cf.
Carlisle v.
United States, 517 U. S. 416, 444-445
(1996) (district court may not use "inherent supervisory power" to
correct perceived unfairness in application of Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 29(a)'s 7-day time limit for filing motions for judgment of
acquittal, if use of the power would "circumvent or conflict with
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure").
679
reason" standard would actually apply. We see no indication in
the Rules to suggest that Rule 32(e) can be eviscerated in this
manner, and the Court of Appeals did not point to one.
Respondent defends this cramped understanding of Rule 32(e) by
arguing that the "fair and just reason" standard was meant to apply
only to "fully accepted" guilty pleas, as opposed to "conditionally
accepted" pleas-i.
e., pleas that are accepted but later
withdrawn under Rule 11(e)(4) if the plea agreement is rejected. He
points out that the "fair and just reason" standard was derived
from dictum in our pre-Rules opinion in
Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U. S. 220, 224
(1927), see Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 32, 18 U. S. C.
App., p. 794, and that
Kercheval spoke of a guilty plea as a
final, not a conditional, act, see 274 U. S., at 223 ("A plea of
guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an
extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a
verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court
has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence"). He then argues
that since the Rule 32(e) standard was derived from
Kercheval, the Rule must also have incorporated the
Kercheval view that a guilty plea is a final, unconditional
act. Thus, since his guilty plea was conditioned on the District
Court accepting the plea agreement, the Rule simply does not
apply.
We reject this somewhat tortuous argument. When the "fair and
just reason" standard was added in 1983, the Rules already provided
that the district court could defer decision on whether to accept
the plea agreement, that it could then reject the agreement, and
that the defendant would then be able to withdraw his guilty plea.
Guilty pleas made pursuant to plea agreements were thus already
subject to this sort of condition subsequent. Yet neither the new
Rule 32(e) nor the Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying it
attempted to draw a distinction between "fully accepted" and
"conditionally accepted" guilty pleas. Instead, the Rule simply
680
says that the standard applies to motions to withdraw a guilty
plea "made before sentence is imposed." Respondent's speculation
that the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress had the
Kercheval view of a guilty plea in mind when Rule 32(e) was
amended in 1983 is thus contradicted by the Rules themselves.
Respondent's only other substantial argument in defense of the
Court of Appeals' holding relies on an interpretation of the
Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 32(b)(3). That Rule, concerning
presentence reports, provides: "The report must not be submitted to
the court or its contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant
has consented in writing, has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, or
has been found guilty." This Rule obviously does not deal at all
with motions to withdraw guilty pleas, and any comments in the
Advisory Committee's Notes to this Rule dealing with plea
withdrawal could not alter the meaning of Rules 11 and 32(e) as we
have construed them.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
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