OCTOBER TERM, 1993
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. ALVAREZ-SANCHEZ
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 92-1812. Argued March 1, 1994-Decided May 2,1994
Nearly three days after local law enforcement officers arrested
respondent on state narcotics charges, and while he was still in
the custody of those officers, respondent confessed to United
States Secret Service agents that he knew that Federal Reserve
Notes the local officers had discovered while searching his home
were counterfeit. The agents arrested him for possessing
counterfeit currency and presented him on a federal complaint the
following day. The Federal District Court refused to suppress the
confession, rejecting, inter alia, respondent's argument that the
delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on
the federal charge rendered the confession inadmissible under 18 U.
S. C. § 3501(c), which provides that a confession made while a
defendant is "under arrest or other detention in the custody of any
lawenforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be
inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before
[a judicial officer] empowered to commit persons charged with
offenses against the laws of the United States" if the confession
was made voluntarily and "within six hours" following the arrest or
other detention. Respondent was convicted. In vacating the
conviction, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, by negative
implication, § 3501(c) permits suppression in cases where a
confession is made outside the subsection's 6-hour post-arrest safe
harbor period. The court concluded that § 3501 (c) applied to
respondent's statement because respondent was in custody and had
not been presented to a magistrate at the time he confessed, and
held that the confession should have been suppressed.
Held: Section 3501(c) does not apply to statements made by a
person who is being held solely on state charges. Pp. 355-360.
(a) The subsection's text clearly indicates that its terms were
never triggered in this case. Respondent errs in suggesting that,
because the statute refers to a person in the custody of "any" law
enforcement officer or agency, the 6-hour time period begins to run
whenever a person is arrested by local, state, or federal officers.
The subsection can apply only when there is some "delay" in
presenting a person to a federal judicial officer. Because the term
delay presumes an obligation to act, there can be no "delay" in
bringing a person before a federal judicial officer until there is
some obligation to do so in the first place. Such a
351
duty does not arise until the person is arrested or detained for
a federal crime. Although a person arrested on a federal charge by
any officerlocal, state, or federal-is under "arrest or other
detention" for the purposes of § 3501(c) and its safe harbor
period, one arrested on state charges is not. This is true even if
the arresting officers believe or have cause to believe that
federal law also has been violated, because such a belief does not
alter the underlying basis for the arrest and subsequent custody.
Pp. 355-358.
(b) Respondent was under arrest on state charges when he made
his inculpatory statement to the Secret Service agents. Section
3501(c)'s terms thus did not come into play until he was arrested
on a federal charge-after he made the statement. That he was never
arraigned or prosecuted on the state charges does not alter this
conclusion. Finally, there is no need to consider the situation
that would arise if state or local authorities and federal officers
act in collusion to obtain a confession in violation of a
defendant's right to a prompt federal presentment, because in this
case there was no such collusive arrangement, only routine
cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Pp. 359-360.
975 F.2d
1396, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER,
and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 361. STEVENS, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 361.
Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant
Attorney General Harris, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson.
Carlton F. Gunn argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the scope of 18 U. S. C. § 3501, the statute
governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions.
Respondent contends that § 3501(c), which provides that a custodial
confession made by a person within six hours following his arrest
"shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such
person" before a
352
federal magistrate, rendered inadmissible the custodial
statement he made more than six hours after his arrest on state
criminal charges. We conclude, however, that § 3501(c) does not
apply to statements made by a person who is being held solely on
state charges. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
I
On Friday, August 5, 1988, officers of the Los Angeles Sheriff's
Department obtained a warrant to search respondent's residence for
heroin and other evidence of narcotics distribution. While
executing the warrant later that day, the officers discovered not
only narcotics, but $2,260 in counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes.
Respondent was arrested and booked on state felony narcotics
charges at approximately 5:40 p.m. He spent the weekend in
custody.
On Monday morning, August 8, the Sheriff's Department informed
the United States Secret Service of the counterfeit currency found
in respondent's residence. Two Secret Service agents arrived at the
Sheriff's Department shortly before midday to take possession of
the currency and to interview respondent. U sing a deputy sheriff
as an interpreter, the agents informed respondent of his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U. S. 436 (1966).
After waiving these rights, respondent admitted that he had known
that the currency was counterfeit. The agents arrested respondent
shortly thereafter, took him to the Secret Service field office for
booking, and prepared a criminal complaint. Due to congestion in
the Federal Magistrate's docket, respondent was not presented on
the federal complaint until the following day.l
Respondent was indicted for unlawful possession of counterfeit
currency in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 472. Prior to trial, he
moved to suppress the statement he had made dur-
1 For reasons that are not apparent from the record, respondent
was never arraigned or prosecuted by the State of California on the
state drug charges.
353
ing his interview with the Secret Service agents. He argued that
his confession was made without a voluntary and knowing waiver of
his
Miranda rights, and that the delay between his arrest on
state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered
his confession inadmissible under 18 U. S. C. § 3501(c).2 The
District Court rejected
2 Title 18 U. S. C. § 3501 provides:
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or
by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection
(e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue
as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the
confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence
....
"(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the
giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between
arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if
it was made after arrest and before arraignment ....
"The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors
to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive
on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
"(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is
a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other
detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or
law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of
delay in bringing such person before a magistrate or other officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws
of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such
confession is found by the trial judge to have been made
voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to
the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person
within six hours immediately following his arrest or other
detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this
subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in
bringing such person before such magistrate or other officer beyond
such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable
considering the means of transportation and the distance to be
traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or other
officer.
"(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission
in evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any
person to any other person without interrogation by anyone, or at
any time at which
354
both contentions and denied the motion. Respondent subsequently
was convicted after a jury trial at which the statement was
admitted into evidence.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated
the conviction.
975 F.2d
1396 (1992). The court first outlined the exclusionary rule
developed by this Court in a line of cases including McNabb v.
United States,
318 U.
S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States,
354 U. S. 449 (1957). The
so-called McNabb-Mallory rule, adopted by this Court "[i]n the
exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts," McNabb, supra, at 341,
generally rendered inadmissible confessions made during periods of
detention that violated the prompt presentment requirement of Rule
5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Mallory,
supra, at 453. Rule 5(a) provides that a person arrested for a
federal offense shall be taken "without unnecessary delay" before
the nearest federal magistrate, or before a state or local judicial
officer authorized to set bail for federal offenses under 18 U. S.
C. § 3041, for a first appearance, or presentment.
The Ninth Circuit went on to discuss the interrelated provisions
of 18 U. S. C. § 3501 and the decisions of the Courts of Appeals
that have sought to discern the extent to which this statute
curtailed the McNabb-Mallory rule. Section 3501(a), the court
observed, states that a confession "shall be admitted in evidence"
if voluntarily made, and § 3501(b) lists several nonexclusive
factors that the trial judge should consider when making the
voluntariness determination, including "the time elapsing between
arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if
it was made after arrest and before arraignment." Section 3501(c)
provides
the person who made or gave such confession was not under arrest
or other detention.
"(e) As used in this section, the term 'confession' means any
confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any
self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in
writing."
355
that a confession made by a person within six hours following
his arrest or other detention "shall not be inadmissible" solely
because of delay in presenting the person to a federal magistrate.
The Ninth Circuit construed § 3501(c) as precluding suppression
under McNabb-Mallory of any confession made during this "safe
harbor" period following arrest. 975 F. 2d, at 1399. The court then
reasoned that, by negative implication, § 3501(c) must in some
circumstances allow suppression of a confession made more than six
hours after arrest solely on the basis of pre-presentment delay,
"regardless of the voluntariness of the confession." Id., at 1401.
The court thus concluded that the McNabb-Mallory rule, in either a
pure or slightly modified form, applies to confessions made after
the expiration of the safe harbor period.
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the court determined
that § 3501(c) applied to respondent's statement because respondent
was in custody and had not been presented to a magistrate at the
time of the interview. The court concluded that the statement fell
outside the subsection's safe harbor because it was not made until
Monday afternoon, nearly three days after respondent's arrest on
state charges. 975 F. 2d, at 1405, and n. 8 (citing United States
v. Fouche,
776 F.2d
1398, 1406 (CA9 1985)). Because the statement was not made
within the § 3501(c) safe harbor period, the court applied both its
pure and modified versions of the McNabb-Mallory rule and held
that, under either approach, the confession should have been
suppressed. 975 F. 2d, at 1405-1406.
We granted the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari in
order to consider the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 3501. 510
U. S. 912 (1993).
II
The parties argue at some length over the proper interpretation
of subsections (a) and (c) of 18 U. S. C. § 3501, and, in
particular, over the question whether § 3501(c) requires
356
suppression of a confession that is made by an arrestee prior to
presentment and more than six hours after arrest, regardless of
whether the confession was voluntarily made. The Government
contends that through § 3501, Congress repudiated the
McNabb-Mallory rule in its entirety. Under this theory, § 3501(c)
creates a safe harbor that prohibits suppression on grounds of
pre-presentment delay if a confession is made within six hours
following arrest, but says nothing about the admissibility of a
confession given beyond that 6-hour period. The admissibility of
such a confession, the Government argues, is controlled by §
3501(a), which provides that voluntary confessions "shall be
admitted in evidence."
Largely agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, respondent contends
that § 3501(c) codified a limited form of the McNabbMallory
rule-one that requires the suppression of a confession made before
presentment but after the expiration of the safe harbor period. A
contrary interpretation of § 3501(c), respondent argues, would
render that subsection meaningless in the face of § 3501(a).
As the parties recognize, however, we need not address subtle
questions of statutory construction concerning the safe harbor set
out in § 3501(c), or resolve any tension between the provisions of
that subsection and those of § 3501(a), if we determine that the
terms of § 3501(c) were never triggered in this case. We turn,
then, to that threshold inquiry.
When interpreting a statute, we look first and foremost to its
text. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain,
503 U. S. 249, 253-254
(1992). Section 3501(c) provides that in any federal criminal
prosecution,
"a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant
therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in
the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement
agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in
bringing such person before a
357
magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons charged
with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the
District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge
to have been made voluntarily and if ... such confession was made
or given by such person within six hours immediately following his
arrest or other detention."
Respondent contends that he was under "arrest or other
detention" for purposes of § 3501(c) during the interview at the
Sheriff's Department, and that his statement to the Secret Service
agents constituted a confession governed by this subsection. In
respondent's view, it is irrelevant that he was in the custody of
the local authorities, rather than that of the federal agents, when
he made the statement. Because the statute applies to persons in
the custody of "any" law enforcement officer or law enforcement
agency, respondent suggests that the § 3501(c) 6-hour time period
begins to run whenever a person is arrested by local, state, or
federal officers.
We believe respondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the
broad statutory reference to "any" law enforcement officer or
agency without considering the rest of the statute. Section 3501(c)
provides that, if certain conditions are met, a confession made by
a person under "arrest or other detention" shall not be
inadmissible in a subsequent federal prosecution "solely because of
delay in bringing such person before a magistrate or other officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws
of the United States or of the District of Columbia." 18 U. S. C. §
3501(c) (emphasis added). Clearly, the terms of the subsection can
apply only when there is some "delay" in presentment. Because
"delay" is not defined in the statute, we must construe the term
"in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v.
Meyer,
510 U. S.
471, 476 (1994). To delay is "[t]o postpone until a later time"
or to "put off an action"; a delay is a "postponement." American
Heritage Dictionary
358
493 (3d ed. 1992). The term presumes an obligation to act. Thus,
there can be no "delay" in bringing a person before a federal
magistrate until, at a minimum, there is some obligation to bring
the person before such a judicial officer in the first place.
Plainly, a duty to present a person to a federal magistrate does
not arise until the person has been arrested for a federal offense.
See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(a) (requiring initial appearance before
a federal magistrate).3 Until a person is arrested or detained for
a federal crime, there is no duty, obligation, or reason to bring
him before a judicial officer "empowered to commit persons charged
with offenses against the laws of the United States," and
therefore, no "delay" under § 3501(c) can occur.
In short, it is evident "from the context in which [the phrase]
is used," Deal v. United States,
508 U. S. 129, 132
(1993), that the "arrest or other detention" of which the
subsection speaks must be an "arrest or other detention" for a
violation of federal law. If a person is arrested and held on a
federal charge by "any" law enforcement officer-federal, state, or
local-that person is under "arrest or other detention" for purposes
of § 3501(c) and its 6-hour safe harbor period. If, instead, the
person is arrested and held on state charges, § 3501(c) does not
apply, and the safe harbor is not implicated. This is true even if
the arresting officers (who, when the arrest is for a violation of
state law, almost certainly will be agents of the State or one of
its subdivisions) believe or have cause to believe that the person
also may have violated federal law. Such a belief, which may not be
uncommon given that many activities are criminalized under both
state and federal law, does not alter the underlying basis for the
arrest and subsequent custody. As long as a person is arrested and
held only on state charges by state or local authorities, the
provisions of § 3501(c) are not triggered.
3 As we observed in Mallory v. United States,
354 U. S. 449 (1957),
Rule 5(a) is part of "[t]he scheme for initiating a federal
prosecution." Id., at 454 (emphasis added).
359
In this case, respondent was under arrest on state narcotics
charges at the time he made his inculpatory statement to the Secret
Service agents. The terms of § 3501(c) thus did not come into play
until respondent was arrested by the agents on a federal
charge-after he made the statement. Because respondent's statement
was made voluntarily, as the District Court found, see App. to Pet.
for Cert. 45a, nothing in § 3501 authorized its suppression. See 18
U. S. C. §§ 3501(a), (d). The State's failure to arraign or
prosecute respondent does not alter this conclusion. Although
Congress could have provided that the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion by the State in this scenario retroactively transforms
time spent in the custody of state or local officers into time
spent under "arrest or other detention" for purposes of § 3501(c),
it did not do so in the statute as written. Cf. Germain, 503 U. S.,
at 253-254.
Although we think proper application of § 3501(c) will be as
straightforward in most cases as it is here, the parties identify
one presumably rare scenario that might present some potential for
confusion; namely, the situation that would arise if state or local
authorities, acting in collusion with federal officers, were to
arrest and detain someone in order to allow the federal agents to
interrogate him in violation of his right to a prompt federal
presentment. Long before the enactment of § 3501, we held that a
confession obtained during such a period of detention must be
suppressed if the defendant could demonstrate the existence of
improper collaboration between federal and state or local officers.
See Anderson v. United States,
318 U. S. 350 (1943).4 In
this
4 In Anderson, a local sheriff, acting without authority under
state law, arrested several men suspected of dynamiting federally
owned power lines during the course of a labor dispute and allowed
them to be interrogated for several days by agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Only after the suspects made confessions
were they arrested by the federal agents and arraigned before a
United States Commissioner. We held the confessions to be
inadmissible as the "improperly" secured product of an
impermissible "working arrangement" between state and federal
officers. 318 U. S., at 356.
360
case, however, we need not address § 3501's effect, if any, on
the rule announced in Anderson. The District Court concluded that
there was "no evidence" that a "collusive arrangement between state
and federal agents ... caused [respondent's] confession to be
made," App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a, and we see no reason to disturb
that factual finding. It is true that the Sheriff's Department
informed the Secret Service agents that counterfeit currency had
been found in respondent's possession, but such routine cooperation
between local and federal authorities is, by itself, wholly
unobjectionable: "Only by such an interchange of information can
society be adequately protected against crime." United States v.
Coppola,
281 F.2d
340, 344 (CA2 1960) (en bane), aff'd,
365 U. S. 762 (1961). Cf.
Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U. S. 121, 123
(1959).5
III
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
5 Respondent urges that the judgment below should be affirmed on
an alternative ground. Although he was initially arrested on state
charges on a Friday afternoon and held in local custody until
Monday afternoon, respondent was not brought before a magistrate
during this period. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U. S. 44, 57 (1991),
we held that the Fourth Amendment generally requires a judicial
determination of probable cause within 48 hours of a warrantless
arrest. Relying on McLaughlin and Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U. S. 103 (1975),
respondent now asserts that his confession was obtained during an
ongoing violation of his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt
determination of probable cause. Respondent, however, did not raise
a Fourth Amendment claim in the District Court or the Court of
Appeals; he argued for suppression based only on the Fifth
Amendment and § 3501. Finding no exceptional circumstances that
would warrant reviewing a claim that was waived below, we adhere to
our general practice and decline to address respondent's Fourth
Amendment argument. See Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg,
492 U. S. 33, 38-39
(1989); Heckler v. Campbell,
461 U. S. 458, 468-469,
n. 12 (1983).
361
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
concurring.
When Alvarez-Sanchez was arrested by the Los Angeles Sheriff's
Department, 18 U. S. C. § 3501(c) was not triggered. As the Court
explains, an arrest by state or local law enforcement authorities
on state criminal charges is not an "arrest or other detention"
within the meaning of § 3501(c), and there is no evidence in this
case of any "improper collaboration," ante, at 359, or "working
arrangement," Anderson v. United States,
318 U. S. 350, 356
(1943), between local and federal authorities. See ante, at
357-360, and n. 4. I write separately only to emphasize that we do
not decide today a question on which the Courts of Appeals remain
divided: the effect of § 3501(c) on confessions obtained more than
six hours after an arrest on federal charges. See ante, at 356,
359-360. *
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
The Court holds that § 3501(c) "does not apply to statements
made by a person who is being held solely on state charges." Ante,
at 352. While I agree with the Court's answer to the narrow
question the petition for certiorari presents,l I write separately
to emphasize the importance of the factual premise underlying that
answer.
*Compare, e.
g., 975 F.2d
1396, 1402-1403 (1992) (decision below), and United States v.
Perez,
733 F.2d
1026, 1031 (CA2 1984) ("[§]3501 leaves the McNabb-Mallory rule
intact with regard to confessions obtained after a six hour delay
not found to be reasonable"); United States v. Robinson,
439 F.2d
553, 563-564 (CADC 1970) (same), with United States v.
Christopher,
956 F.2d
536, 538-539 (CA6 1991) (under § 3501, unnecessary delay of
more than six hours, "standing alone, is not sufficient to justify
the suppression of an otherwise voluntary confession"), cert.
denied, 505 U. S. 1207 (1992); United States v. Beltran,
761 F.2d
1, 8 (CA1 1985) (same).
1 The question presented is ''Whether a confession given to
federal authorities while a suspect is in state custody awaiting
arraignment on state charges must be suppressed as a result of
delay between the suspect's original arrest by state authorities
and his eventual presentment on the federal crime to which he
confessed." Pet. for Cert. I.
362
As the case comes to us, it is undisputed that respondent
confessed while he was being held on state charges alone.
975 F.2d
1396, 1398 (CA9 1992). Accepting that, the Court of Appeals
held that the confession nevertheless must be suppressed because it
read the phrase "detention in the custody of any law-enforcement
officer or law-enforcement agency" in 18 U. S. C. § 3501(c) to
include custody solely on state charges. 975 F. 2d, at 1405. The
Court of Appeals therefore had no occasion to consider whether the
state police officers' awareness of respondent's probable
involvement in two federal crimes 2 might indicate that the state
charges were not the sole basis for his detention.
In its petition for certiorari the Government correctly advised
us that "[r]eversal of the Ninth Circuit's erroneous conclusion
that the relevant arrest was effected by California authorities
will obviate the need to consider" additional issues. Pet. for
Cert. 13. Accordingly, what sort of cooperation between federal and
local authorities would remove a case from the category in which
the custody is decidedly on state charges alone is a question not
before us, and the Court correctly declines to address the matter.
Surely, however, cases in which cooperation between state and
federal authorities requires compliance with the terms of § 3501(c)
are not merely hypothetical examples of a "presumably rare
scenario," ante, at 359. And I definitely would not assume that §
3501(c) will never "come into play" until a suspect is arrested on
a federal charge. Ibid.
The Court also has no reason to comment on the District Court's
finding that respondent's confession was not the product of
collusion between state and federal agents.
2 Los Angeles police officers took respondent into custody on a
Friday.
975 F.2d
1396, 1397-1398
(CA9 1992). At the time of arrest, those
officers discovered that respondent possessed two kinds of
contraband-narcotics and counterfeit money,
id., at 1398-and
they presumably realized that he was guilty of at least two federal
offenses as well as the state-law violation for which he was
arrested.
363
Ante, at 360. The Court of Appeals' construction of the statute
made review of that finding unnecessary. Thus while the Court
rightly declines to "disturb" the factual finding,
ibid., it
should likewise stop short of suggesting that anyone on this Court
has determined that the finding is either correct or incorrect.
For these reasons, I concur in the Court's judgment but do not
join its opinion.
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