Application to stay, pending review by certiorari, California
Superior Court proceedings in which applicant nonresident religious
organization is a defendant and in which the Superior Court had
denied applicant's motion to quash service of process for lack of
in personam jurisdiction is denied, where it appears
unlikely that four Justices of this Court will vote to grant
certiorari.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, Circuit Justice.
The General Council on Finance and Administration of the United
Methodist Church requests that proceedings in the Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of San Diego, in which it is
a defendant, be stayed as to it pending this Court's consideration
of its petition for a writ of certiorari. Applicant, an Illinois
not-for-profit corporation, is one of six defendants in a class
action seeking,
inter alia, damages for breach of
contract, fraud, and violations of state securities laws arising
out of the financial collapse of the Pacific Homes Corp., a
California nonprofit corporation that operated 14 retirement homes
and convalescent hospitals on the west coast.
Barr v. United
Methodist Church, No. 404611 (Cal.Super.Ct., San Diego County,
Mar. 20, 1978). Respondent real parties in interest (hereafter
respondents), some 1,950 present and former residents of the homes,
allege that Pacific Homes was the alter ego, agency, or
instrumentality of the United Methodist Church (Methodist Church),
applicant, and certain other defendants affiliated with the
Methodist Church. The judgment at issue is the Superior
Page 439 U. S. 1370
Court's denial of applicant's motion to quash service of process
for lack of
in personam jurisdiction. That court, in a
minute order decision, concluded that applicant was "doing
business" in the State of California and, therefore, was subject to
the jurisdiction of the California courts. Applicant's petition for
a writ of mandate to review the judgment of the Superior Court was
denied by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in
a one-sentence order, and the California Supreme Court summarily
denied applicant's petition for a hearing on the issue. Thereafter,
applicant was ordered by the Superior Court to respond to
respondents' complaint on or before August 28, 1978. I granted a
temporary stay of the proceedings below to permit consideration of
a response to the application.
Ante, p.
439 U. S.
1355.
Applicant challenges the Superior Court's order on three
grounds. First, citing this Court's decision in
Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.
S. 696 (1976), applicant maintains that the Superior
Court violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments in basing its
assertion of jurisdiction on respondents' characterization of
applicant's role in the structure of the Methodist Church and
rejecting contrary testimony of church officials and experts and
statements set forth in the Book of Discipline, which contains the
constitution and bylaws of the Methodist Church. Applicant's next
contention is that use of the "minimum contacts" standard of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 (1945), in determining jurisdiction over a
nonresident religious organization violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, applicant argues that, even under
the traditional minimum contacts mode of analysis, its connection
with the State of California is too attenuated, under the standards
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
justify imposing upon it the burden of a defense in California.
Because the Superior Court's order denied a pretrial motion,
Page 439 U. S. 1371
an initial question is whether the judgment below is "final"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which permits this Court to
review only "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had. . . ." Applicant
argues that it can preserve its jurisdictional argument only by
suffering a default judgment, since, under California law, in order
to defend on the merits, it must appear generally and, accordingly,
waive its objection to
in personam jurisdiction.
See
McCorkle v. Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d
252, 449 P.2d 453 (1969). It therefore finds itself between
Scylla and Charybdis, and, citing
Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U. S. 186
(1977), asserts that, under such circumstances the Superior Court's
judgment is final. In
Shaffer, this Court, taking a
"pragmatic approach" to the question of finality, held that a
Delaware court's pretrial decision to assert jurisdiction over the
defendants was final within the meaning of § 1257 because, under
Delaware law, the defendants' only choices were to incur default
judgments or to file general appearances and defend on the merits,
thereby submitting themselves to the court's jurisdiction. 433 U.S.
at
433 U. S.
195-196, n. 12. Respondents contest applicant's
interpretation of California procedural law. They claim that a
defendant can defend on the merits and still preserve his
jurisdictional objections so long as he seeks immediate appellate
review of an adverse decision on a motion to quash.
See
Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Ann. § 418.10 (West 1973). As noted above,
applicant did avail itself of this procedure.
If the views of the respective parties are each to be credited,
California law may not be clear on this issue, and it certainly is
not within my province to resolve their differences with respect to
it.
* If California
procedural law is as applicant
Page 439 U. S. 1372
describes it, I am convinced that this Court would find the
Superior Court's judgment to be "final" within the meaning of §
1257.
See Shaffer v. Heitner, supra; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
(1975). I need not resolve this issue, however, since I have
concluded that, even if the Superior Court's order were a final
judgment under § 1257, a stay is nonetheless not warranted in this
case.
Any intrusion into state court proceedings at an interlocutory
stage must be carefully considered, and will be granted only upon a
showing of compelling necessity.
Bateman v. Arizona, 429
U.S. 1302, 1305 (1976) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers). Those
proceedings are presumptively valid.
See Whalen v. Roe,
423 U. S. 1313,
423 U. S.
1316 (1975) (MARSHALL, J., in chambers). A party seeking
a stay of a state court judgment or proceeding must first
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that four
Justices will consider the issues sufficiently meritorious to vote
to grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction.
Bateman v.
Arizona, supra at 1305. Applicant has failed to clear this
first hurdle.
In my view, applicant plainly is wrong when it asserts that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent a civil court from
independently examining, and making the ultimate decision
regarding, the structure and actual operation of a hierarchical
church and its constituent units in an action such as this. There
are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil court
may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance
and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes.
See Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich. But this Court never
has suggested that those constraints similarly apply outside the
context of such intraorganization disputes. Thus,
Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese and the other cases cited by
applicant are not in point.
Page 439 U. S. 1373
Those cases are premised on a perceived danger that, in
resolving intrachurch disputes, the State will become entangled in
essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of
groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. 426 U.S. at
426 U. S.
709-710. Such considerations are not applicable to
purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular
defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which
fraud, breach of contract, and statutory violations are alleged. As
the Court stated in another context: "Nothing we have said is
intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion,
persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the public."
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
310 U. S. 306
(1940). Nor is it entirely clear that the Superior Court's
determination of the jurisdictional question was based upon its
interpretation of Methodist polity; it is equally likely that the
court's decision was founded on the related but separate issue of
applicant's contacts with the State of California.
Likewise untenable, in my view, is applicant's claim that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments somehow forbid resort to
traditional minimum contacts analysis in determining the existence
of
in personam jurisdiction over a defendant that is
affiliated with an organized religion. Not surprisingly, applicant
has failed to cite any authority in support of this novel
proposition.
The only remaining issue presented by applicant is whether the
quality and nature of its contacts with the State of California are
such that "maintenance of the suit [in the forum state] does not
offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
at 326 U. S. 316,
quoting, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.
S. 457, 311 U. S. 463
(1940). Such questions generally tend to depend on the particular
facts of each case, Kulko v. California Superior Court,
436 U. S. 84
(1978), and I believe that only a marked departure by a lower court
in the application of established law would persuade four Justices
to grant certiorari. While
Page 439 U. S. 1374
the Superior Court's decision does not purport to resolve all of
the factual disputes between the parties, there is no indication
that it failed to apply the due process standards enunciated in
International Shoe, and cases which have followed it, to
the circumstances presented, and, therefore, I believe it unlikely
that this issue would command the votes necessary for
certiorari.
Accordingly, the application for a stay pending review on
certiorari is denied. The temporary stay I previously entered is
hereby terminated.
* I recognize that, in determining whether to grant a stay,
Members of this Court may hold differing views on the weight to be
accorded any doubt as to the finality of a state court judgment.
See New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, ante, p.
439 U. S. 1331
(MARSHALL, J., in chambers);
New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich,
ante p.
439 U. S. 1317
(WHITE, J., in chambers);
Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S.
1302, 1306 (1976) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers). It is not necessary
to explore that issue in this case.
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