OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC. v. WILLIAMS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
No. 00-1089. Argued November 7, 200l-Decided January 8, 2002
Claiming to be unable to perform her automobile assembly line
job because she was disabled by carpal tunnel syndrome and related
impairments, respondent sued petitioner, her former employer, for
failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required
by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. §
12112(b)(5)(A). The District Court granted petitioner summary
judgment, holding that respondent's impairment did not qualify as a
"disability" under the ADA because it had not "substantially
limit[ed]" any "major life activit[y]," § 12102(2)(A), and that
there was no evidence that respondent had had a record of a
substantially limiting impairment or that petitioner had regarded
her as having such an impairment. The Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding that the impairments substantially limited respondent in
the major life activity of performing manual tasks. In order to
demonstrate that she was so limited, said the court, respondent had
to show that her manual disability involved a "class" of manual
activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.
Respondent satisfied this test, according to the court, because her
ailments prevented her from doing the tasks associated with certain
types of manual jobs that require the gripping of tools and
repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder
levels for extended periods of time. In reaching this conclusion,
the court found that evidence that respondent could tend to her
personal hygiene and carry out personal or household chores did not
affect a determination that her impairments substantially limited
her ability to perform the range of manual tasks associated with an
assembly line job. The court granted respondent partial summary
judgment on the issue of whether she was disabled under the
ADA.
Held: The Sixth Circuit did not apply the proper standard in
determining that respondent was disabled under the ADA because it
analyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask
whether respondent's impairments prevented or restricted her from
performing tasks that are of central importance to most people's
daily lives. Pp. 193-203.
(a) The Court's consideration of what an individual must prove
to demonstrate a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of performing manual tasks is guided by the ADA's disability
definition.
185
"Substantially" in the phrase "substantially limits" suggests
"considerable" or "to a large degree," and thus clearly precludes
impairments that interfere in only a minor way with performing
manual tasks. Cf. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U. S. 555, 565.
Moreover, because "major" means important, "major life activities"
refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily
life. In order for performing manual tasks to fit into this
category, the tasks in question must be central to daily life. To
be substantially limited in the specific major life activity of
performing manual tasks, therefore, an individual must have an
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people's
daily lives. The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long
term. See 29 CFR §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii).
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove
disability status under this test to merely submit evidence of a
medical diagnosis of an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires them
to offer evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by their
impairment in terms of their own experience is substantial. 527 U.
S., at 567. That the ADA defines "disability" "with respect to an
individual," § 12102(2), makes clear that Congress intended the
existence of a disability to be determined in such a case-by-case
manner. See, e. g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U. S. 471, 483. An
individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is
particularly necessary when the impairment is one such as carpal
tunnel syndrome, in which symptoms vary widely from person to
person. Pp. 196-199.
(b) The Sixth Circuit erred in suggesting that, in order to
prove a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks, a plaintiff must show that her manual
disability involves a "class" of manual activities, and that those
activities affect the ability to perform tasks at work. Nothing in
the ADA's text, this Court's opinions, or the regulations suggests
that a class-based framework should apply outside the context of
the major life activity of working. While the Sixth Circuit
addressed the different major life activity of performing manual
tasks, its analysis erroneously circumvented Sutton, supra, at 491,
by focusing on respondent's inability to perform manual tasks
associated only with her job. Rather, the central inquiry must be
whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks
central to most people's daily lives. Also without support is the
Sixth Circuit's assertion that the question of whether an
impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered only by
analyzing the impairment's effect in the workplace. That the ADA's
"disability" definition applies not only to the portion of the ADA
dealing with employment, but also to the other provisions dealing
with public transportation and public accommoda-
186
tions, demonstrates that the definition is intended to cover
individuals with disabling impairments regardless of whether they
have any connection to a workplace. Moreover, because the manual
tasks unique to any particular job are not necessarily important
parts of most people's lives, occupation-specific tasks may have
only limited relevance to the manual task inquiry. In this case,
repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder
levels for extended periods, the manual task on which the Sixth
Circuit relied, is not an important part of most people's daily
lives. Household chores, bathing, and brushing one's teeth, in
contrast, are among the types of manual tasks of central importance
to people's daily lives, so the Sixth Circuit should not have
disregarded respondent's ability to do these activities. Pp.
199-203.
224 F.3d
840, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Jeffrey A. Savarise, John A. West,
and Katherine A. Hessenbruch.
Barbara B. McDowell argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae in support of petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor
General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy
Solicitor General Clement, Malcolm L. Stewart, Marleigh D. Dover,
and Charles W Scarborough.
Robert Leslie Rosenbaum argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent. *
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the
American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. by Evan M. Tager and
Miriam R. Nemetz; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al.
by Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Katherine Y. K. Cheung, Jan S. Amundson,
and Quentin Riegel; and for Levi Strauss & Co. by John C.
Burgin, Jr.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Michael H. Gottesman, and
Laurence Gold; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by
Jeffrey Robert White; for the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law et al. by John Townsend Rich; for the National
Council on Disability by Arlene Mayerson and Nancy L. Perkins; and
for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Noah D. Lebowitz
and Paula A. Brantner.
187
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat.
328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), a physical
impairment that "substantially limits one or more ... major life
activities" is a "disability." 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994
ed.). Respondent, claiming to be disabled because of her carpal
tunnel syndrome and other related impairments, sued petitioner, her
former employer, for failing to provide her with a reasonable
accommodation as required by the ADA. See § 12112(b)(5)(A). The
District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner, finding that
respondent's impairments did not substantially limit any of her
major life activities. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed, finding that the impairments substantially limited
respondent in the major life activity of performing manual tasks,
and therefore granting partial summary judgment to respondent on
the issue of whether she was disabled under the ADA. We conclude
that the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper standard in
making this determination because it analyzed only a limited class
of manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondent's impairments
prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives.
I
Respondent began working at petitioner's automobile
manufacturing plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, in August 1990. She
was soon placed on an engine fabrication assembly line, where her
duties included work with pneumatic tools. Use of these tools
eventually caused pain in respondent's hands, wrists, and arms. She
sought treatment at petitioner's in-house medical service, where
she was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and
bilateral tendinitis. Respondent consulted a personal physician who
placed her on permanent work restrictions that precluded her from
lifting more than 20 pounds or from "frequently lifting or
188
carrying ... objects weighing up to 10 pounds," engaging in
"constant repetitive ... flexion or extension of [her] wrists or
elbows," performing "overhead work," or using "vibratory or
pneumatic tools." Brief for Respondent 2; App. 45-46.
In light of these restrictions, for the next two years
petitioner assigned respondent to various modified duty jobs.
Nonetheless, respondent missed some work for medical leave, and
eventually filed a claim under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation
Act. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.0011 et seq. (1997 and Supp. 2000).
The parties settled this claim, and respondent returned to work.
She was unsatisfied by petitioner's efforts to accommodate her work
restrictions, however, and responded by bringing an action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
alleging that petitioner had violated the ADA by refusing to
accommodate her disability. That suit was also settled, and as part
of the settlement, respondent returned to work in December
1993.
Upon her return, petitioner placed respondent on a team in
Quality Control Inspection Operations (QCIO). QCIO is responsible
for four tasks: (1) "assembly paint"; (2) "paint second
inspection"; (3) "shell body audit"; and (4) "ED surface repair."
App. 19. Respondent was initially placed on a team that performed
only the first two of these tasks, and for a couple of years, she
rotated on a weekly basis between them. In assembly paint,
respondent visually inspected painted cars moving slowly down a
conveyor. She scanned for scratches, dents, chips, or any other
flaws that may have occurred during the assembly or painting
process, at a rate of one car every 54 seconds. When respondent
began working in assembly paint, inspection team members were
required to open and shut the doors, trunk, and/or hood of each
passing car. Sometime during respondent's tenure, however, the
position was modified to include only visual inspection with few or
no manual tasks. Paint second inspection required team members to
use their hands to wipe each
189
painted car with a glove as it moved along a conveyor. Id., at
21-22. The parties agree that respondent was physically capable of
performing both of these jobs and that her performance was
satisfactory.
During the fall of 1996, petitioner announced that it wanted
QCIO employees to be able to rotate through all four of the QCIO
processes. Respondent therefore received training for the shell
body audit job, in which team members apply a highlight oil to the
hood, fender, doors, rear quarter panel, and trunk of passing cars
at a rate of approximately one car per minute. The highlight oil
has the viscosity of salad oil, and employees spread it on cars
with a sponge attached to a block of wood. After they wipe each car
with the oil, the employees visually inspect it for flaws. Wiping
the cars required respondent to hold her hands and arms up around
shoulder height for several hours at a time.
A short while after the shell body audit job was added to
respondent's rotations, she began to experience pain in her neck
and shoulders. Respondent again sought care at petitioner's
in-house medical service, where she was diagnosed with
myotendinitis bilateral periscapular, an inflammation of the
muscles and tendons around both of her shoulder blades;
myotendinitis and myositis bilateral forearms with nerve
compression causing median nerve irritation; and thoracic outlet
compression, a condition that causes pain in the nerves that lead
to the upper extremities. Respondent requested that petitioner
accommodate her medical conditions by allowing her to return to
doing only her original two jobs in QCIO, which respondent claimed
she could still perform without difficulty.
The parties disagree about what happened next. According to
respondent, petitioner refused her request and forced her to
continue working in the shell body audit job, which caused her even
greater physical injury. According to petitioner, respondent simply
began missing work on a regular basis. Regardless, it is clear that
on December 6, 1996, the
190
last day respondent worked at petitioner's plant, she was placed
under a no-work-of-any-kind restriction by her treating physicians.
On January 27, 1997, respondent received a letter from petitioner
that terminated her employment, citing her poor attendance
record.
Respondent filed a charge of disability discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After receiving a
right to sue letter, respondent filed suit against petitioner in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky. Her complaint alleged that petitioner had violated the
ADA and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
344.010 et seq. (1997 and Supp. 2000), by failing to reasonably
accommodate her disability and by terminating her employment.
Respondent later amended her complaint to also allege a violation
of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 107 Stat. 6, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V).
Respondent based her claim that she was "disabled" under the ADA
on the ground that her physical impairments substantially limited
her in (1) manual tasks; (2) housework; (3) gardening; (4) playing
with her children; (5) lifting; and (6) working, all of which, she
argued, constituted major life activities under the Act. Respondent
also argued, in the alternative, that she was disabled under the
ADA because she had a record of a substantially limiting impairment
and because she was regarded as having such an impairment. See 42
U. S. C. §§ 12102(2)(B)-(C) (1994 ed.).
After petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and
respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her
disability claims, the District Court granted summary judgment to
petitioner. Civ. A. No. 97-135 (Jan. 26, 1999), App. to Pet. for
Cert. A-23. The court found that respondent had not been disabled,
as defined by the ADA, at the time of petitioner's alleged refusal
to accommodate her, and that she had therefore not been covered by
the Act's protections or by the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, which is
con-
191
strued consistently with the ADA. Id., at A-29, A-34 to A-47.
The District Court held that respondent had suffered from a
physical impairment, but that the impairment did not qualify as a
disability because it had not "substantially limit[ed]" any "major
life activit[y]," 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A). App. to Pet. for Cert.
A-34 to A-42. The court rejected respondent's arguments that
gardening, doing housework, and playing with children are major
life activities. Id., at A-35 to A-36. Although the court agreed
that performing manual tasks, lifting, and working are major life
activities, it found the evidence insufficient to demonstrate that
respondent had been substantially limited in lifting or working.
Id., at A-36 to A-42. The court found respondent's claim that she
was substantially limited in performing manual tasks to be
"irretrievably contradicted by [respondent's] continual insistence
that she could perform the tasks in assembly [paint] and paint
[second] inspection without difficulty." Id., at A-36. The court
also found no evidence that respondent had had a record of a
substantially limiting impairment,
id., at A-43, or that
petitioner had regarded her as having such an impairment,
id., at A-46 to A-47.
The District Court also rejected respondent's claim that her
termination violated the ADA and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The
court found that even if it assumed that respondent was disabled at
the time of her termination, she was not a "qualified individual
with a disability," 42 U. S. C. § 12111(8) (1994 ed.), because, at
that time, her physicians had restricted her from performing work
of any kind, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-47 to A-50. Finally, the
court found that respondent's FMLA claim failed, because she had
not presented evidence that she had suffered any damages available
under the FMLA. Id., at A-50 to A-54.
Respondent appealed all but the gardening, housework, and
playing-with-children rulings. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the District Court's ruling on whether respondent
was disabled at the time she sought an
192
accommodation, but affirmed the District Court's rulings on
respondent's FMLA and wrongful termination claims.
224 F.3d
840 (2000). The Court of Appeals held that in order for
respondent to demonstrate that she was disabled due to a
substantial limitation in the ability to perform manual tasks at
the time of her accommodation request, she had to "show that her
manual disability involve[d] a 'class' of manual activities
affecting the ability to perform tasks at work." Id., at 843.
Respondent satisfied this test, according to the Court of Appeals,
because her ailments "prevent[ed] her from doing the tasks
associated with certain types of manual assembly line jobs, manual
product handling jobs and manual building trade jobs (painting,
plumbing, roofing, etc.) that require the gripping of tools and
repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder
levels for extended periods of time." Ibid. In reaching this
conclusion, the court disregarded evidence that respondent could
"ten[d] to her personal hygiene [and] carr[y] out personal or
household chores," finding that such evidence "does not affect a
determination that her impairment substantially limit[ed] her
ability to perform the range of manual tasks associated with an
assembly line job," ibid. Because the Court of Appeals concluded
that respondent had been substantially limited in performing manual
tasks and, for that reason, was entitled to partial summary
judgment on the issue of whether she was disabled under the Act, it
found that it did not need to determine whether respondent had been
substantially limited in the major life activities of lifting or
working, ibid., or whether she had had a "record of" a disability
or had been "regarded as" disabled,
id., at 844.
We granted certiorari, 532 U. S. 970 (2001), to consider the
proper standard for assessing whether an individual is
substantially limited in performing manual tasks. We now reverse
the Court of Appeals' decision to grant partial summary judgment to
respondent on the issue of whether she was substantially limited in
performing manual tasks at the
193
time she sought an accommodation. We express no opinion on the
working, lifting, or other arguments for disability status that
were preserved below but which were not ruled upon by the Court of
Appeals.
II
The ADA requires covered entities, including private employers,
to provide "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship." 42 U. S. C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994 ed.); see also §
12111(2) ("The term 'covered entity' means an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee").
The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires." §
12111(8). In turn, a "disability" is:
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
"(B) a record of such an impairment; or
"(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." §
12102(2).
There are two potential sources of guidance for interpreting the
terms of this definition-the regulations interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 361, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §
706(8)(B) (1988 ed.), and the EEOC regulations interpreting the
ADA. Congress drew the ADA's definition of disability almost
verbatim from the definition of "handicapped individual" in the
Rehabilitation Act, § 706(8)(B), and Congress' repetition of a
well-established term generally implies that Congress intended the
term to be construed
194
in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.
Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U. S. 624, 631
(1998); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.,
476 U. S. 426, 437-438
(1986); ICC v. Parker,
326 U. S. 60, 65 (1945).
As we explained in Bragdon v. Abbott, supra, at 631, Congress did
more in the ADA than suggest this construction; it adopted a
specific statutory provision directing as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(29 U. S. C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such title." 42 U. S. C. § 12201(a) (1994
ed.).
The persuasive authority of the EEOC regulations is less clear.
As we have previously noted, see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U. S. 471,
479 (1999), no agency has been given authority to issue regulations
interpreting the term "disability" in the ADA. Nonetheless, the
EEOC has done so. See 29 CFR §§ 1630.2(g)-(j) (2001). Because both
parties accept the EEOC regulations as reasonable, we assume
without deciding that they are, and we have no occasion to decide
what level of deference, if any, they are due. See Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 480; Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U. S. 555,
563, n. 10 (1999).
To qualify as disabled under subsection (A) of the ADA's
definition of disability, a claimant must initially prove that he
or she has a physical or mental impairment. See 42 U. S. C. §
12102(2)(A). The Rehabilitation Act regulations issued by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1977, which
appear without change in the current regulations issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services, define "physical
impairment," the type of impairment relevant to this case, to mean
"any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological;
195
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." 45 CFR §
84.3(j)(2)(i) (2001). The HEW regulations are of particular
significance because at the time they were issued, HEW was the
agency responsible for coordinating the implementation and
enforcement of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794
(1994 ed. and Supp. V), which prohibits discrimination against
individuals with disabilities by recipients of federal financial
assistance. Bragdon v. Abbott, supra, at 632 (citing Consolidated
Rail Corporation v. Darrone,
465 U. S. 624, 634
(1984)).
Merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for
purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need to demonstrate that the
impairment limits a major life activity. See 42 U. S. C. §
12102(2)(A) (1994 ed.). The HEW Rehabilitation Act regulations
provide a list of examples of "major life activities" that includes
"walking, seeing, hearing," and, as relevant here, "performing
manual tasks." 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2001).
To qualify as disabled, a claimant must further show that the
limitation on the major life activity is "substantia[!]." 42 U. S.
C. § 12102(2)(A). Unlike "physical impairment" and "major life
activities," the HEW regulations do not define the term
"substantially limits." See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from
Federal Financial Assistance, 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22685 (1977)
(stating HEW's position that a definition of "substantially limits"
was not possible at that time). The EEOC, therefore, has created
its own definition for purposes of the ADA. According to the EEOC
regulations, "substantially limit[ed]" means "[u]nable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform"; or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform
a particular major life activity as compared to
196
the condition, manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform that same major life
activity." 29 CFR § 1630.2(j) (2001). In determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, the
regulations instruct that the following factors should be
considered: "[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he
duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he
permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or
long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment." §§
1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
III
The question presented by this case is whether the Sixth Circuit
properly determined that respondent was disabled under subsection
(A) of the ADA's disability definition at the time that she sought
an accommodation from petitioner. 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A). The
parties do not dispute that respondent's medical conditions, which
include carpal tunnel syndrome, myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet
compression, amount to physical impairments. The relevant question,
therefore, is whether the Sixth Circuit correctly analyzed whether
these impairments substantially limited respondent in the major
life activity of performing manual tasks. Answering this requires
us to address an issue about which the EEOC regulations are silent:
what a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish a substantial
limitation in the specific major life activity of performing manual
tasks.
Our consideration of this issue is guided first and foremost by
the words of the disability definition itself. "[S]ubstantially" in
the phrase "substantially limits" suggests "considerable" or "to a
large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary
2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner"
and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and
"being that specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also
17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial":
"[r]elating to
197
or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "[o]f
ample or considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions"). The word
"substantial" thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in
only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from
qualifying as disabilities. Cf. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U. S., at 565 (explaining that a "mere difference" does not
amount to a "significant restric[tion]" and therefore does not
satisfy the EEOC's interpretation of "substantially limits").
"Major" in the phrase "major life activities" means important.
See Webster's, supra, at 1363 (defining "major" as "greater in
dignity, rank, importance, or interest"). "Major life activities"
thus refers to those activities that are of central importance to
daily life. In order for performing manual tasks to fit into this
category-a category that includes such basic abilities as walking,
seeing, and hearing-the manual tasks in question must be central to
daily life. If each of the tasks included in the major life
activity of performing manual tasks does not independently qualify
as a major life activity, then together they must do so.
That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the
first section of the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings
and purposes that motivate the Act. See 42 U. S. C. § 12101. When
it enacted the ADA in 1990, Congress found that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities." §
12101(a)(1). If Congress intended everyone with a physical
impairment that precluded the performance of some isolated,
unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as
disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been
much higher. Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S., at
487 (finding that because more than 100 million people need
corrective lenses to see properly, "[h]ad Congress intended to
include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those
covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much
198
higher number [than 43 million] disabled persons in the
findings").
We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing
manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents
or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are
of central importance to most people's daily lives. The
impairment's impact must also be permanent or long term. See 29 CFR
§§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001).
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove
disability status under this test to merely submit evidence of a
medical diagnosis of an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires those
"claiming the Act's protection ... to prove a disability by
offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by
their impairment] in terms of their own experience ... is
substantial." Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, supra, at 567
(holding that monocular vision is not invariably a disability, but
must be analyzed on an individual basis, taking into account the
individual's ability to compensate for the impairment). That the
Act defines "disability" "with respect to an individual," 42 U. S.
C. § 12102(2), makes clear that Congress intended the existence of
a disability to be determined in such a case-by-case manner. See
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 483; Albertson's, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, supra, at 566; cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S., at
641-642 (relying on unchallenged testimony that the respondent's
HIV infection controlled her decision not to have a child, and
declining to consider whether HIV infection is a per se disability
under the ADA); 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (2001) ("The
determination of whether an individual has a disability is not
necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the
person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life
of the individual"); ibid. ("The determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must
be made on a case-by-case basis").
199
An individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is
particularly necessary when the impairment is one whose symptoms
vary widely from person to person. Carpal tunnel syndrome, one of
respondent's impairments, is just such a condition. While cases of
severe carpal tunnel syndrome are characterized by muscle atrophy
and extreme sensory deficits, mild cases generally do not have
either of these effects and create only intermittent symptoms of
numbness and tingling. Carniero, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome:
The Cause Dictates the Treatment, 66 Cleveland Clinic J.
Medicine 159, 161-162 (1999). Studies have further shown that, even
without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpal tunnel cases
resolve in one month, but that in 22 percent of cases, symptoms
last for eight years or longer. See DeStefano, Nordstrom, &
Uierkant, Long-term Symptom Outcomes of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and
its Treatment, 22A J. Hand Surgery 200, 204-205 (1997). When
pregnancy is the cause of carpal tunnel syndrome, in contrast, the
symptoms normally resolve within two weeks of delivery. See
Ouellette, Nerve Compression Syndromes of the Upper Extremity in
Women, 17 J. of Musculoskeletal Medicine 536 (2000). Given these
large potential differences in the severity and duration of the
effects of carpal tunnel syndrome, an individual's carpal tunnel
syndrome diagnosis, on its own, does not indicate whether the
individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
IV
The Court of Appeals' analysis of respondent's claimed
disability suggested that in order to prove a substantiallimitation
in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, a "plaintiff
must show that her manual disability involves a 'class' of manual
activities," and that those activities "affec[t] the ability to
perform tasks at work." See 224 F. 3d, at 843. Both of these ideas
lack support.
The Court of Appeals relied on our opinion in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., for the idea that a "class" of
manual
200
activities must be implicated for an impairment to substantially
limit the major life activity of performing manual tasks. 224 F.
3d, at 843. But Sutton said only that "[w]hen the major life
activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory
phrase 'substantially limits' requires ... that plaintiffs allege
they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs." 527 U. S., at
491 (emphasis added). Because of the conceptual difficulties
inherent in the argument that working could be a major life
activity, we have been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not
decide this difficult question today. In Sutton, we noted that even
assuming that working is a major life activity, a claimant would be
required to show an inability to work in a "broad range of jobs,"
rather than a specific job. Id., at 492. But Sutton did not suggest
that a class-based analysis should be applied to any major life
activity other than working. Nor do the EEOC regulations. In
defining "substantially limits," the EEOC regulations only mention
the "class" concept in the context of the major life activity of
working. 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3) (2001) ("With respect to the major
life activity of working[,] [t]he term substantially limits means
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to
the average person having comparable training, skills and
abilities"). Nothing in the text of the Act, our previous opinions,
or the regulations suggests that a class-based framework should
apply outside the context of the major life activity of
working.
While the Court of Appeals in this case addressed the different
major life activity of performing manual tasks, its analysis
circumvented Sutton by focusing on respondent's inability to
perform manual tasks associated only with her job. This was error.
When addressing the major life activity of performing manual tasks,
the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to
perform the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives,
not whether the
201
claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated with her
specific job. Otherwise, Sutton's restriction on claims of
disability based on a substantial limitation in working will be
rendered meaningless because an inability to perform a specific job
always can be recast as an inability to perform a "class" of tasks
associated with that specific job.
There is also no support in the Act, our previous opinions, or
the regulations for the Court of Appeals' idea that the question of
whether an impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered
only by analyzing the effect of the impairment in the workplace.
Indeed, the fact that the Act's definition of "disability" applies
not only to Title I of the Act, 42 U. s. C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994
ed.), which deals with employment, but also to the other portions
of the Act, which deal with subjects such as public transportation,
§§ 12141-12150, 42 U. s. C. §§ 12161-12165 (1994 ed. and Supp. V),
and privately provided public accommodations, §§ 12181-12189,
demonstrates that the definition is intended to cover individuals
with disabling impairments regardless of whether the individuals
have any connection to a workplace.
Even more critically, the manual tasks unique to any particular
job are not necessarily important parts of most people's lives. As
a result, occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance
to the manual task inquiry. In this case, "repetitive work with
hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended
periods of time," 224 F. 3d, at 843, the manual task on which the
Court of Appeals relied, is not an important part of most people's
daily lives. The court, therefore, should not have considered
respondent's inability to do such manual work in her specialized
assembly line job as sufficient proof that she was substantially
limited in performing manual tasks.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals appears to have
disregarded the very type of evidence that it should have focused
upon. It treated as irrelevant "[t]he fact that [respondent] can
... ten[d] to her personal hygiene [and] carr[y]
202
out personal or household chores." Ibid. Yet household chores,
bathing, and brushing one's teeth are among the types of manual
tasks of central importance to people's daily lives, and should
have been part of the assessment of whether respondent was
substantially limited in performing manual tasks.
The District Court noted that at the time respondent sought an
accommodation from petitioner, she admitted that she was able to do
the manual tasks required by her original two jobs in QCIO. App. to
Pet. for Cert. A-36. In addition, according to respondent's
deposition testimony, even after her condition worsened, she could
still brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower
garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the house.
App. 32-34. The record also indicates that her medical conditions
caused her to avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to occasionally seek
help dressing, and to reduce how often she plays with her children,
gardens, and drives long distances. Id., at 32, 38-39. But these
changes in her life did not amount to such severe restrictions in
the activities that are of central importance to most people's
daily lives that they establish a manual task disability as a
matter of law. On this record, it was therefore inappropriate for
the Court of Appeals to grant partial summary judgment to
respondent on the issue of whether she was substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, and its decision to do so must be
reversed.
In its brief on the merits, petitioner asks us to reinstate the
District Court's grant of summary judgment to petitioner on the
manual task issue. In its petition for certiorari, however,
petitioner did not seek summary judgment; it argued only that the
Court of Appeals' reasons for granting partial summary judgment to
respondent were unsound. This Court's Rule 14.1(a) provides: "Only
the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein,
will be considered by the Court." The question of whether
petitioner was entitled to summary judgment on the manual task
issue is
203
therefore not properly before us. See Irvine v. California,
347 U. S. 128,
129-130 (1954).
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment granting
partial summary judgment to respondent and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
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