OPINION OF THE COURT
TAPIA V. UNITED STATES
564 U. S. ____ (2011)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 10-5400
ALEJANDRA TAPIA, PETITIONER
v. UNITED
STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 16, 2011]
Justice Kagan delivered the
opinion of the Court.
We consider here whether the
Sentencing Reform Act pre-cludes federal courts from imposing or
lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal
defendant’s rehabilitation. We hold that it does.
I
Petitioner Alejandra Tapia was
convicted of,
inter alia, smuggling unauthorized aliens
into the United States, in violation of 8 U. S. C.
§§1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii). At sen-tencing, the District Court
determined that the United States Sentencing Guidelines recommended
a prison term of between 41 and 51 months for Tapia’s offenses. The
court decided to impose a 51-month term, followed by three years of
supervised release. In explaining its reasons, the court referred
several times to Tapia’s need for drug treatment, citing in
particular the Bureau of Prison’s Residential Drug Abuse Program
(known as RDAP or the 500 Hour Drug Program). The court indicated
that Tapia should serve a prison term long enough to qualify for
and complete that program:
“The sentence has to be
sufficient to provide needed correctional treatment, and here I
think the needed correctional treatment is the 500 Hour Drug
Program.
. . . . .
“Here I have to say that one of the factors that—I am going to
impose a 51-month sentence, … and one of the factors that affects
this is the need to provide treatment. In other words, so she is in
long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one.” App.
27.
(“Number two” was “to deter her from committing
other criminal offenses.”
Ibid.) The court “strongly
recommend[ed]” to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that Tapia
“participate in [RDAP] and that she serve her sentence at” the
Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California (FCI
Dublin), where “they have the appropriate tools … to help her, to
start to make a recovery.”
Id., at 29. Tapia did not
object to the sentence at that time.
Id., at 31.
On appeal, however, Tapia argued that the
District Court had erred in lengthening her prison term to make her
eligible for RDAP. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2. In Tapia’s view, this
action violated 18 U. S. C. §3582(a), which instructs
sentencing courts to “recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an
appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, 376
Fed. Appx. 707 (2010), relying on its prior decision in
United
States v.
Duran, 37 F. 3d 557 (1994). The Ninth
Circuit had held there that §3582(a) distinguishes between deciding
to impose a term of imprisonment and determining its length. See
id., at 561. According to
Duran, a sentencing
court cannot impose a prison term to assist a defendant’s
rehabilitation. But “[o]nce imprisonment is chosen as a
punishment,” the court may consider the defendant’s need for
rehabilitation in setting the length of the sentence.
Ibid.
We granted certiorari to consider whether
§3582(a) permits a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison
term in order to foster a defendant’s rehabilitation. 562 U. S. ___
(2010). That question has divided the Courts of Appeals.[
Footnote 1] Because the United States
agrees with Tapia’s interpretation of the statute, we appointed an
amicus curiae to defend the judgment below.[
Footnote 2] We now reverse.
II
We begin with statutory
background—how the relevant sentencing provisions came about and
what they say. Aficionados of our sentencing decisions will
recognize much of the story line.
“For almost a century, the
Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of
indeterminate sentencing.”
Mistretta v.
United
States,
488 U.
S. 361, 363 (1989). Within “customarily wide” outer boundaries
set by Congress, trial judges exercised “almost unfettered
discretion” to select prison sentences for federal offenders.
Id., at 364. In the usual case, a judge also could reject
prison time altogether, by imposing a “suspended” sentence. If the
judge decided to impose a prison term, discretionary authority
shifted to parole officials: Once the defendant had spent a third
of his term behind bars, they could order his release. See K. Stith
& J. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts 18–20 (1998).
This system was premised on a faith in
rehabilitation. Discretion allowed “the judge and the parole
officer to [base] their respective sentencing and release decisions
upon their own assessments of the offender’s amenability to
rehabilitation.”
Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 363. A convict,
the theory went, should generally remain in prison only until he
was able to reenter society safely. His release therefore often
coincided with “the successful completion of certain vocational,
educational, and counseling programs within the prisons.”
S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 40 (1983) (hereinafter S. Rep.).
At that point, parole officials could “determin[e] that [the]
prisoner had become rehabilitated and should be released from
confinement.” Stith & Cabranes,
supra, at 18.[
Footnote 3]
But this model of indeterminate sentencing
eventually fell into disfavor. One concern was that it produced
“[s]eri-ous disparities in [the] sentences” imposed on simi- larly
situated defendants.
Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 365. Another
was that the system’s attempt to “achieve rehabilitation of
offenders had failed.”
Id., at 366. Lawmakers and others
increasingly doubted that prison programs could “rehabilitate
individuals on a routine basis”—or that parole officers could
“determine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner ha[d]
been rehabilitated.” S. Rep., at 40.
Congress accordingly enacted the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987 (SRA or Act), to overhaul federal
sentencing practices. The Act abandoned indeterminate sentencing
and parole in favor of a system in which Sentencing Guidelines,
promulgated by a new Sentencing Commission, would provide courts
with “a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses
and defendants.”
Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 368. And the Act
further channeled judges’ discretion by establishing a framework to
govern their consideration and imposition of sentences.
Under the SRA, a judge sentencing a federal
offender must impose at least one of the following sanctions:
imprisonment (often followed by supervised release), probation, or
a fine. See §3551(b). In determining the appropriate sentence from
among these options, §3553(a)(2) requires the judge to consider
specified factors, including:
“the need for the sentence imposed—
“(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
“(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
“(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
“(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner.”
These four considerations—retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes of
sentencing generally, and a court must fashion a sentence “to
achieve the[se] purposes … to the extent that they are applicable”
in a given case. §3551(a).
The SRA then provides additional guidance
about how the considerations listed in §3553(a)(2) pertain to each
of the Act’s main sentencing options—imprisonment, supervised
release, probation, and fines. See §3582(a); §3583; §3562(a);
§3572(a). These provisions make clear that a particular purpose may
apply differently, or even not at all, depending on the kind of
sentence under consideration. For example, a court may
not
take account of retribution (the first purpose listed in
§3553(a)(2)) when imposing a term of supervised release. See
§3583(c).
Section 3582(a), the provision at issue here,
specifies the “factors to be considered” when a court orders
imprisonment. That section provides:
“The court, in determining whether to impose a term
of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed,
in determining the length of the term, shall consider the factors
set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate
means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”
A similar provision addresses the Sentencing
Commission in its capacity as author of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The SRA instructs the Commission to:
“insure that the guidelines reflect the
inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment
for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment.” 28 U. S. C.
§994(k).
With this statutory background established, we turn
to the matter of interpretation.
III
A
Our consideration of Tapia’s
claim starts with the text of 18 U. S. C. §3582(a)—and given
the clarity of that provi- sion’s language, could end there as
well. As just noted, that section instructs courts to “recogniz[e]
that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting
correction and rehabilitation.” A common—and in context the most
natural—definition of the word “recognize” is “to ac-knowledge or
treat as valid.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language
1611 (2d ed. 1987). And a thing that is not “appropriate” is not
“suitable or fitting for a particular purpose.”
Id., at
103. Putting these two definitions together, §3582(a) tells courts
that they should acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for
the purpose of promoting rehabilitation. And when should courts
acknowledge this? Section §3582(a) answers: when “determining
whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of
imprisonment is to be imposed, [when] determining the length of the
term.” So a court making these decisions should consider the
specified rationales of punishment
except for
rehabilitation, which it should ac-knowledge as an unsuitable
justification for a prison term.
As against this understanding,
amicus argues that §3582(a)’s “recognizing” clause is not
a flat prohibition but only a “reminder” or a “guide [for]
sentencing judges’ cognitive processes.” Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 23–24
(hereinafter
Amicus Brief) (emphasis deleted).
Amicus supports this view by offering a string of other
definitions of the word “recognize”: “ ‘recall to mind,’
‘realize,’ or ‘perceive clearly.’ ”
Id., at 24
(quoting dictionary definitions). Once these are plugged in,
amicus suggests, §3582(a) reveals itself as a kind of
loosey-goosey caution not to put
too much faith in the
capacity of prisons to rehabilitate.
But we do not see how these alternative
meanings of “recognize” help
amicus’s cause. A judge who
“perceives clearly” that imprisonment is not an appropriate means
of promoting rehabilitation would hardly incarcerate someone for
that purpose. Ditto for a judge who “realizes” or “recalls” that
imprisonment is not a way to rehabilitate an offender. To be sure,
the drafters of the “recognizing” clause could have used still more
commanding language: Congress could have inserted a “thou shalt
not” or equivalent phrase to convey that a sentencing judge may
never, ever, under any circumstances consider rehabilitation in
imposing a prison term. But when we interpret a statute, we cannot
allow the perfect to be the enemy of the merely excellent. Congress
expressed itself clearly in §3582(a), even if armchair legislators
might come up with something even better. And what Congress said
was that when sentencing an offender to prison, the court shall
consider all the purposes of punishment except
rehabilitation—because imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
pursuing that goal.
Amicus also claims, echoing the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in
Duran, that §3582(a)’s
“recognizing” clause bars courts from considering rehabilitation
only when imposing a prison term, and not when deciding on its
length. The argument goes as follows. Section 3582(a) refers to two
decisions: “The court, [1] in determining whether to impose a term
of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed,
[2] in determining the length of the term” must consider the
purposes of punishment listed in §3553(a)(2), subject to the caveat
of the “recognizing” clause. But that clause says only that
“imprisonment” is not an appropriate means of rehabilitation.
Because the “primary meaning of ‘imprisonment’ is ‘the act of
confining a person,’ ”
amicus argues, the clause
relates only to [1] the decision to incarcerate, and not to
[2] the separate determination of the sentence’s length.
Amicus Brief 52.
We again disagree. Under standard rules of
grammar, §3582(a) says: A sentencing judge shall recognize that
imprisonment is not appropriate to promote rehabilita-tion when the
court considers the applicable factors of §3553(a)(2); and a court
considers these factors when determining
both whether to
imprison an offender
and what length of term to give him.
The use of the word “imprisonment” in the “recognizing” clause does
not destroy—but instead fits neatly into—this construction.
“Imprisonment” as used in the clause most naturally means “[t]he
state of being confined” or “a period of confinement.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 825 (9th ed. 2009); see also Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1137 (1993) (the “state of being
imprisoned”). So the word does not distinguish between the
defendant’s initial placement behind bars and his continued stay
there. As the D. C. Circuit noted in rejecting an identical
argument, “[a] sentencing court deciding to keep a defendant locked
up for an additional month is, as to that month, in fact choosing
imprisonment over release.”
In re Sealed Case, 573
F. 3d 844, 850 (2009).[
Footnote 4] Accordingly, the word “imprisonment” does not
change the function of the “recognizing” clause—to constrain a
sentencing court’s decision both to impose and to lengthen a prison
term.[
Footnote 5]
The context of §3582(a) puts an exclamation
point on this textual conclusion. As noted earlier,
supra,
at 6, another provision of the SRA restates §3582(a)’s message, but
to a different audience. That provision, 28 U. S. C. §994(k),
directs the Sentencing Commission to ensure that the Guidelines
“reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of
imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or
providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” In this
way, Congress ensured that all sentencing officials would work in
tandem to implement the statutory determination to “rejec[t]
imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation.”
Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 367 (citing 28 U. S. C.
§994(k)). Section 994(k) bars the Commission from recommending a
“term of imprisonment”—a phrase that again refers both to the fact
and to the length of incarceration—based on a defendant’s
rehabilitative needs. And §3582(a) prohibits a court from
considering those needs to impose or lengthen a period of
confinement when selecting a sentence from within, or choosing to
depart from, the Guidelines range. Each actor at each stage in the
sentencing process receives the same message: Do not think about
prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.
Equally illuminating here is a statutory
silence—the absence of any provision granting courts the power to
ensure that offenders participate in prison rehabilitation
programs. For when Congress wanted sentencing courts to take
account of rehabilitative needs, it gave courts the authority to
direct appropriate treatment for offenders. Thus, the SRA instructs
courts, in deciding whether to impose probation or supervised
release, to consider whether an offender could benefit from
training and treatment programs. See 18 U. S. C. §3562(a);
§3583(c). And so the SRA
also authorizes courts, when
imposing those sentences, to order an offender’s participation in
cer- tain programs and facilities. §3563(b)(9); §3563(b)(11);
§3563(a)(4); §3583(d). As a condition of probation, for example,
the court may require the offender to “undergo available medical,
psychiatric, or psychological treatment, including treatment for
drug or alcohol dependency, as specified by the court, and [to]
remain in a specified institution if required for that purpose.”
§3563(b)(9).
If Congress had similarly meant to allow
courts to base prison terms on offenders’ rehabilitative needs, it
would have given courts the capacity to ensure that offenders
participate in prison correctional programs. But in fact, courts do
not have this authority. When a court sentences a federal offender,
the BOP has plenary control, subject to statutory constraints, over
“the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment,” §3621(b), and the
treatment programs (if any) in which he may participate, §§3621(e),
(f); §3624(f). See also 28 CFR pt. 544 (2010) (BOP regulations for
administering inmate educational, recreational, and vocational
programs); 28 CFR pt. 550, subpart F (drug abuse treatment
programs). A sentencing court can
recommend that the BOP
place an offender in a particular facility or program. See
§3582(a). But decisionmaking authority rests with the BOP.
This case well illustrates the point. As noted
earlier, the District Court “strongly recommend[ed]” that Tapia
participate in RDAP, App. 29, and serve her sentence at FCI Dublin,
“where they have the facilities to really help her,”
id.,
at 28. But the court’s recommendations were only
recommendations—and in the end they had no effect. See
Amicus Brief 42 (“[Tapia] was not admitted to RDAP, nor
even placed in the prison recommended by the district court”);
Reply Brief for United States 8, n. 1 (“According to BOP
records, [Tapia] was encouraged to enroll [in RDAP] during her
psychology intake screening at [the federal prison], but she stated
that she was not interested, and she has not volunteered for the
program”). The sentencing court may have had plans for Tapia’s
rehabilitation, but it lacked the power to implement them. That
incapacity speaks volumes. It indicates that Congress did not
intend that courts consider offenders’ rehabilitative needs when
imposing prison sentences.
Finally, for those who consider legislative
history useful, the key Senate Report concerning the SRA provides
one last piece of corroborating evidence. According to that Report,
decades of experience with indeterminate sentencing, resulting in
the release of many inmates after they completed correctional
programs, had left Congress skeptical that “rehabilitation can be
induced reliably in a prison setting.” S. Rep., at 38.
Although some critics argued that “rehabilitation should be
eliminated completely as a purpose of sentencing,” Congress
declined to adopt that categorical position.
Id., at 76.
Instead, the Report explains, Congress barred courts from
considering rehabilitation in imposing prison terms,
ibid., and n. 165, but not in ordering other kinds of
sentences,
ibid., and n. 164. “[T]he purpose of
rehabilitation,” the Report stated, “is still important in
determining whether a sanction
other than a term of
imprisonment is appropriate in a particular case.” See
id., at 76–77 (emphasis added).
And so this is a case in which text, context,
and history point to the same bottom line: Section 3582(a)
precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison
term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.
B
With all these sources of
statutory meaning stacked against him,
amicus
understandably tries to put the SRA’s view of rehabilitation in a
wholly different frame.
Amicus begins by conceding that
Congress, in enacting the SRA, rejected the old “[r]ehabilitation
[m]odel.”
Amicus Brief 1. But according to
amicus, that model had a very limited focus: It was the
belief that “isolation and prison routine” could alone produce
“penitence and spiritual renewal.”
Id., at 1, 11. What the
rehabilitation model did
not include—and the SRA therefore
did not reject—was prison treatment programs (including for drug
addiction) targeted to offenders’ particular needs. See
id., at 21, 25, 27–28. So even after the passage of
§3582(a),
amicus argues, a court may impose or lengthen a
prison sentence to promote an offender’s participation in a
targeted treatment program. The only thing the court may not do is
to impose a prison term on the ground that confinement itself—its
inherent solitude and routine—will lead to rehabilitation.
We think this reading of the SRA
is too narrow. For one thing, the relevant history shows that at
the time of the SRA’s enactment, prison rehabilitation efforts
focused on treatment, counseling, and training programs, not on
seclusion and regimentation. See Rotman, The Failure of Reform:
United States, 1865–1965, in Oxford History of the Prison: The
Practice of Punishment in Western Society 169, 189–190 (N. Morris
& D. Rothman eds. 1995) (describing the pre-SRA “therapeutic
model of rehabilitation” as characterized by “individualized
treatment” and “vocational training and group counseling
programs”); see also n. 3,
supra (noting pre-SRA
statutes linking the confinement of drug addicts to the completion
of treatment programs). Indeed, Congress had in mind precisely
these programs when it prohibited consideration of rehabilitation
in imposing a prison term. See 28 U. S. C. §994(k)
(instructing the Sentencing Commission to prevent the use of
imprisonment to “provid[e] the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training … or other correctional treatment”);
S. Rep., at 40 (rejecting the “model of ‘coercive’
rehabilitation—the theory of correction that ties prison release
dates to the successful completion of certain vocational,
educational, and counseling programs within the prisons”). Far from
falling outside the “rehabilitation model,” these programs
practically defined it.
It is hardly surprising, then, that
amicus’s argument finds little support in the statutory
text. Read most naturally, 18 U. S. C. §3582(a)’s prohibition
on “promoting correction and rehabilitation” covers efforts to
place offenders in rehabilitation programs. Indeed, §3582(a)’s
lan-guage recalls the SRA’s description of the rehabilitative
purpose of sentencing—“provid[ing] the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment.” §3553(a)(2)(D). That description makes
clear that, under the SRA, treatment, training, and like programs
are rehabilitation’s sum and substance. So
amicus’s
efforts to exclude rehabilitation programs from the “recognizing”
clause’s reach do not succeed. That section prevents a sentencing
court from imposing or lengthening a prison term because the court
thinks an offender will benefit from a prison treatment
program.
IV
In this case, the sentencing
transcript suggests the possibility that Tapia’s sentence was based
on her rehabilitative needs.
We note first what we do
not disapprove about Tapia’s sentencing. A court commits
no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within
prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.
To the contrary, a court properly may address a person who is about
to begin a prison term about these important matters. And as noted
earlier, a court may urge the BOP to place an offender in a prison
treatment program. See
supra, at 11. Section 3582(a)
itself provides, just after the clause at issue here, that a court
may “make a recommendation concerning the type of prison facility
appropriate for the defendant”; and in this calculus, the presence
of a rehabilitation program may make one facility more appropriate
than another. So the sentencing court here did nothing wrong—and
probably something very right—in trying to get Tapia into an
effective drug treatment program.
But the record indicates that the court may
have done more—that it may have selected the length of the sentence
to ensure that Tapia could complete the 500 Hour Drug Program. “The
sentence has to be sufficient,” the court explained, “to provide
needed correctional treatment, and here I think the needed
correctional treatment is the 500 Hour Drug Program.” App. 27; see
supra, at 1–2. Or again: The “number one” thing “is the
need to provide treatment. In other words, so she is in long enough
to get the 500 Hour Drug Program.” App. 27; see
supra, at
2
. These statements suggest that the court may have
calculated the length of Tapia’s sentence to ensure that she
receive certain rehabilitative services. And that a sentencing
court may not do. As we have held, a court may not impose or
lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a
treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Consistent with our
practice, see,
e.g., United States v.
Marcus, 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 8), we
leave it to the Court of Appeals to consider the effect of Tapia’s
failure to object to the sentence when imposed. See Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 52(b);
United States v.
Olano,
507 U. S. 725, 731
(1993).
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1
Three Circuits have held that §3582(a) allows
a court to lengthen, although not to impose, a prison term based on
the need for rehabilitation. See
United States v.
Duran, 37 F. 3d 557 (CA9 1994);
United
States v.
Hawk Wing, 433 F. 3d 622 (CA8 2006);
United States v.
Jimenez,
605
F. 3d 415 (CA6 2010). Two Courts of Appeals have ruled that
§3582(a) bars a court from either imposing or increasing a period
of confinement for rehabilitative reasons. See United
States v. Manzella, 475 F. 3d 152 (CA3 2007);
In re Sealed Case, 573 F. 3d 844 (CADC
2009).
Footnote 2
We appointed Stephanos Bibas to
brief and argue the case, 562 U. S. ___ (2011), and he has ably
discharged his responsibilities.
Footnote 3
The statutes governing punishment
of drug-addicted offenders (like Tapia) provide an example of this
system at work. If a court concluded that such an offender was
“likely to be rehabilitated through treatment,” it could order
confinement “for treatment … for an indeterminate period of time”
not to exceed the lesser of 10 years or the statutory maximum for
the offender’s crime. 18 U. S. C. §4253(a) (1982 ed.); see
also §4251(c) (“ ‘Treatment’ includes confinement and
treatment in an institution … and includes, but is not limited to,
medical, educational, social, psychological, and vocational
services, corrective and preventive guidance and training, and
other rehabilitative services”). Once the offender had undergone
treatment for six months, the Attorney General could recommend that
the Board of Parole release him from custody, and the Board could
then order release “in its discretion.” §4254.
Footnote 4
Indeed, we can scarcely imagine a
reason why Congress would have wanted to draw the distinction that
amicus urges on us. That distinction would prevent a court
from considering rehabilitative needs in imposing a 1-month
sentence rather than probation, but not in choosing a 60-month
sentence over a 1-month term. The only policy argument
amicus can offer in favor of this result is that “[t]he
effects of imprisonment plateau a short while after the
incarceration” and “ ‘[t]he dif-ference in harm between longer
and shorter prison terms is smaller than typically assumed.’ ”
Amicus Brief 56. But nothing in the SRA indicates that
Congress is so indifferent to the length of prison
terms.
Footnote 5
The Government argues that
“Congress did not intend to prohibit courts from imposing
less imprisonment in order to promote a defendant’s
rehabilitation.” Brief for United States 40 (emphasis added). This
case does not require us to address that question, and nothing in
our decision expresses any views on it.
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