PER CURIAM
SWARTHOUT V. COOKE
562 U. S. ____ (2011)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GARY SWARTHOUT, WARDEN
v. DAMON COOKE
MATTHEW CATE, SECRETARY, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
AND REHABILITATION
v. ELIJAH CLAY
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 10–333. Decided January 24, 2011
Per Curiam.
I
California’s parole statute
provides that the Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release date
unless it determines that … consideration of the public safety
requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code
Ann. §3041(b) (West Supp. 2010). If the Board denies parole, the
prisoner can seek judicial review in a state habeas petition. The
California Supreme Court has explained that “the standard of review
properly is characterized as whether ‘some evidence’ supports the
conclusion that the inmate is unsuitable for parole because he or
she currently is dangerous.”
In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.
4th 1181, 1191, 190 P. 3d 535, 539 (2008). See also
In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241, 1253–1254, 190
P. 3d 573, 580 (2008);
In re Rosenkrantz, 29
Cal. 4th 616, 625–626, 59 P. 3d 174, 183 (2002).
A
Respondent Damon Cooke was
convicted of attempted first-degree murder in 1991, and a
California court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of seven
years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. In November
2002, the board determined that Cooke was not yet suitable for
parole, basing its decision on the “especially cruel and callous
manner” of his commitment offense, App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a; his
failure to participate fully in rehabilitative programs; his
failure to develop marketable skills; and three incidents of
misconduct while in prison. The board admitted that Cooke had
received a favorable psychological report, but it dismissed the
report as not credible because it included several inconsistent and
erroneous statements.
Cooke filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in State Superior Court. The court denied his
petition. “The record indicates,” it said, “that there was some
evidence, including but certainly not limited to the life offense,
to support the board’s denial.”
Id., at 42a. Cooke
subsequently filed a habeas petition with the California Court of
Appeal and a petition for direct review by the California Supreme
Court. Both were denied.
In October 2004, Cooke filed a federal habeas
petition pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2254 challenging the parole
board’s determination. The District Court denied his petition. The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that California’s parole statute
created a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and
that “California’s ‘some evidence’ requirement” was a “component”
of that federally protected liberty interest.
Cooke v.
Solis, 606 F. 3d 1206, 1213 (2010). It then concluded
that the state court had made an “unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence” under §2254(d)(2) by finding any
evidence at all that Cooke would pose a threat to public safety if
released.
Id., at 1215.
B
Respondent Elijah Clay was
convicted of first-degree murder in 1978, and a California court
sentenced him to imprisonment for seven years to life with the
possibility of parole. In 2003, the board found Clay suitable for
parole, but the Governor exercised his authority to review the case
and found Clay unsuitable for parole. See Cal. Const., Art. 5,
§8(b); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3041.2 (West 2000). The Governor cited
the gravity of Clay’s crime; his extensive criminal history, which
reflected “the culmination of a life of crime,” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 116a; his failure to participate fully in self-help programs;
and his unrealistic plans for employment and housing after being
paroled. Regarding the last factor, the Governor concluded that
Clay would be likely to return to crime, given his propensity for
substance abuse and lack of a viable means of employment.
Clay filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in State Superior Court. That court denied Clay’s
petition, as did the California Court of Appeal. The California
Supreme Court denied review.
Clay subsequently filed a federal petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, which the District Court granted. The
District Court concluded that the Governor’s reliance on the nature
of Clay’s long-past commitment offense vio-lated Clay’s right to
due process, and dismissed each of the other factors the Governor
cited as unsupported by the record. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
agreeing with the District Court’s conclusion that “the Governor’s
decision was an unreasonable application of California’s ‘some
evidence’ rule and was an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented.”
Clay v.
Kane, 384 Fed. Appx. 544, 546 (2010).
II
In granting habeas relief based
on its conclusion that the state courts had misapplied California’s
“some evidence” rule, the Ninth Circuit must have assumed either
that federal habeas relief is available for an error of state law,
or that correct application of the State’s “some evidence” standard
is required by the federal Due Process Clause. Neither assumption
is correct.
As to the first: The habeas
statute “unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a
writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.’ ”
Wilson v.
Corcoran, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2010)
(per curiam)
(slip op., at 4) (quoting 28 U. S. C. §2254(a)). “We have
stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie
for errors of state law.’ ”
Estelle v.
McGuire,
502
U. S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting
Lewis v.
Jeffers,
497 U. S. 764, 780
(1990)).
As for the Due Process Clause, standard
analysis under that provision proceeds in two steps: We first ask
whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a
person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures
followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient.
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v.
Thompson,
490 U. S. 454,
460 (1989). Here, the Ninth Circuit held that California law
creates a liberty interest in parole, see 606 F. 3d, at 1213.
While we have no need to review that holding here, it is a
reasonable application of our cases. See
Board of Pardons
v.
Allen,
482 U. S. 369, 373–381
(1987);
Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal and
Correctional Complex,
442 U. S. 1, 12
(1979).
Whatever liberty interest exists is, of
course, a
state interest created by California law. There
is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally
released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States
are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.
Id.,
at 7. When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due
Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication—and
federal courts will review the application of those
constitutionally required procedures. In the context of parole, we
have held that the procedures required are minimal. In
Greenholtz, we found that a prisoner subject to a parole
statute similar to California’s received adequate process when he
was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement
of the reasons why parole was denied. 442 U. S., at 16. “The
Constitution,” we held, “does not require more.”
Ibid.
Cooke and Clay received at least this amount of process: They were
allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the
evidence against them, were afforded access to their records in
advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was denied.
606 F. 3d, at 1208–1212; App. to Pet. for Cert. 69a–80a; Cal.
Penal Code Ann. §§3041, 3041.5 (West Supp. 2010).
That should have been the beginning and the
end of the federal habeas courts’ inquiry into whether Cooke and
Clay received due process. Instead, however, the Court of Appeals
reviewed the state courts’ decisions on the merits and concluded
that they had unreasonably determined the facts in light of the
evidence. See 606 F. 3d, at 1213–1216; 384 Fed. Appx., at
545–546. Other Ninth Circuit cases have done the same. See,
e.g.,
Pearson v.
Muntz, 606 F. 3d
606, 611 (2010). No opinion of ours supports converting
California’s “some evidence” rule into a substantive federal
requirement. The liberty interest at issue here is the interest in
receiving parole when the California standards for parole have been
met, and the minimum procedures adequate for due-process protection
of that interest are those set forth in
Greenholtz.* See
Hayward v.
Marshall, 603 F. 3d 546, 559 (CA9
2010) (en banc).
Greenholtz did not inquire into whether
the constitutionally requisite procedures provided by Nebraska
produced the result that the evidence required;
a fortiori
it is no federal concern here whether California’s “some evidence”
rule of judicial review (a procedure beyond what the Constitution
demands) was correctly applied.
It will not do to pronounce California’s “some
evidence” rule to be “a component” of the liberty interest, 606
F. 3d, at 1213. Such reasoning would subject to federal-court
merits review the application of all state-prescribed procedures in
cases involving liberty or property interests, including (of
course) those in criminal prosecutions. That has never been the
law. To the contrary, we have long recognized that “a ‘mere error
of state law’ is not a denial of due process.”
Engle v.
Isaac,
456
U. S. 107, 121, n. 21 (1982); see also
Estelle,
502 U. S., at 67–68. Because the only federal right at issue is
procedural, the relevant inquiry is what process Cooke and Clay
received, not whether the state court decided the case
correctly.
The Ninth Circuit’s questionable finding that
there was
no evidence in the record supporting the parole
denials is irrelevant unless there is a federal right at stake, as
§2254(a) requires. See
id., at 67. The short of the matter
is that the responsibility for assuring that the constitutionally
adequate procedures governing California’s parole system are
properly applied rests with California courts, and is no part of
the Ninth Circuit’s business.
The petition for a writ of certiorari and
respondents’ motions for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis are granted.
The judgments below are
Reversed.
* Cooke and Clay argue that the greater
protections afforded to the revocation of good-time credits should
apply, citing
In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616,
657–658, 59 P. 3d 174, 205 (2002), a California Supreme Court
case that refers to our good-time-credits decision in
Superintendent,
Mass. Correctional Institution at
Walpole v.
Hill,
472 U. S. 445 (1985).
But
Rosenkrantz did not purport to equate California’s
parole system with good-time credits. It cites
Hill twice.
The first citation merely observes that the court relied upon
Hill in an earlier opinion adopting the “some evidence”
test for decisions to
revoke parole that had previously
been granted. 29 Cal. 4th, at 656, 59 P. 3d, at 204. The
second citation, which does occur in the part of the opinion
discussing the need for “some evidence” review in parole decisions,
simply borrows language from
Hill to support the
proposition that “ ‘[r]equiring a modicum of evidence’ ”
can “ ‘help to prevent arbitrary deprivations.’ ” 29 Cal.
4th, at 658, 59 P. 3d, at 205 (quoting
Hill, 472 U.
S., at 455). In any event, the question of which due process
requirements apply is one of federal law, not California law; and
neither of these citations comes close to addressing that question.
Any doubt on that score is resolved by a subsequent footnote
stating that the court’s decision is premised only on state law. 29
Cal. 4th, at 658, n. 12, 59 P. 3d, at 205,
n. 12.
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