OCTOBER TERM, 1998
Syllabus
SUTTON ET AL.
v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 97-1943. Argued April 28, 1999-Decided June 22, 1999
Petitioners, severely myopic twin sisters, have uncorrected
visual acuity of 20/200 or worse, but with corrective measures,
both function identically to individuals without similar
impairments. They applied to respondent, a major commercial airline
carrier, for employment as commercial airline pilots but were
rejected because they did not meet respondent's minimum requirement
of uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better. Consequently,
they filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), which prohibits covered employers from discriminating
against individuals on the basis of their disabilities. Among other
things, the ADA defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more ... major life
activities," 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A), or as "being regarded as
having such an impairment," § 12102(2)(C). The District Court
dismissed petitioners' complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The court held that petitioners were
not actually disabled under subsection (A) of the disability
definition because they could fully correct their visual
impairments. The court also determined that petitioners were not
"regarded" by respondent as disabled under subsection
(C) of
this definition. Petitioners had alleged only that respondent
regarded them as unable to satisfy the requirements of a particular
job, global airline pilot. These allegations were insufficient to
state a claim that petitioners were regarded as substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. Employing similar
logic, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Petitioners have not alleged that they are
"disabled" within the ADA's meaning. Pp. 477-494.
(a) No agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term
"disability" as it is used in the ADA. The EEOC has, nevertheless,
issued regulations that, among other things, define "physical
impairment" to mean "[a]ny physiological disorder ... affecting ...
special sense organs," "substantially limits" to mean "[u]nable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform," and "[m]ajor [l]ife [a]ctivities
[to] mea[n] functions such as ... working." Because both parties
accept these regulations as valid, and determining their validity
is not necessary to decide this
472
Syllabus
case, the Court has no occasion to consider what deference they
are due, if any. The EEOC and the Justice Department have also
issued interpretive guidelines providing that the determination
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to
mitigating measures such as assistive or prosthetic devices.
Although the parties dispute the guidelines' persuasive force, the
Court has no need in this case to decide what deference is due.
Pp.477-480.
(b) Petitioners have not stated a § 12102(2)(A) claim that they
have an actual physical impairment that substantially limits them
in one or more major life activities. Three separate ADA
provisions, read in concert, lead to the conclusion that the
determination whether an individual is disabled should be made with
reference to measures, such as eyeglasses and contact lenses, that
mitigate the individual's impairment, and that the approach adopted
by the agency guidelines is an impermissible interpretation of the
ADA. First, because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in
subsection (A) in the present indicative verb form, the language is
properly read as requiring that a person be presently-not
potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to
demonstrate a disability. A "disability" exists only where an
impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity, not where
it "might," "could," or "would" be substantially limiting if
corrective measures were not taken. Second, because subsection (A)
requires that disabilities be evaluated "with respect to an
individual" and be determined based on whether an impairment
substantially limits the individual's "major life activities," the
question whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an
individualized inquiry. See
Bragdon v.
Abbott,
524 U. S. 624,
641-642. The guidelines' directive that persons be judged in their
uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to this
mandated individualized inquiry. The former would create a system
in which persons would often be treated as members of a group
having similar impairments, rather than as individuals. It could
also lead to the anomalous result that courts and employers could
not consider any negative side effects suffered by the individual
resulting from the use of mitigating measures, even when those side
effects are very severe. Finally, and critically, the congressional
finding that 43 million Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities, see § 12101(a)(1), requires the conclusion
that Congress did not intend to bring under the ADA's protection
all those whose uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities. That
group would include more than 160 million people. Because
petitioners allege that with corrective measures their vision is
20/20 or better, they are not actually disabled under subsection
(A). Pp. 481-489.
473
(c) Petitioners have also failed to allege properly that they
are "regarded as," see §
12102(2)(C), having an impairment
that "substantially limits" a major life activity, see §
12102(2)(A). Generally, these claims arise when an employer
mistakenly believes that an individual has a substantially
limiting impairment. To support their claims, petitioners allege
that respondent has an impermissible vision requirement that is
based on myth and stereotype and that respondent mistakenly
believes that, due to their poor vision, petitioners are unable to
work as "global airline pilots" and are thus substantially limited
in the major life activity of working. Creating physical criteria
for a job, without more, does not violate the ADA. The ADA allows
employers to prefer some physical attributes over others, so long
as those attributes do not rise to the level of substantially
limiting impairments. An employer is free to decide that physical
characteristics or medical conditions that are not impairments are
preferable to others, just as it is free to decide that some
limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make
individuals less than ideally suited for a job. In addition,
petitioners have not sufficiently alleged that they are regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. When
the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the
ADA requires, at least, that one's ability to work be significantly
reduced. The EEOC regulations similarly define "substantially
limits" to mean significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes
as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities. The Court assumes without deciding that work
is a major life activity and that this regulation is reasonable. It
observes, however, that defining "major life activities" to include
work has the potential to make the ADA circular. Assuming work is a
major life activity, the Court finds that petitioners' allegations
are insufficient because the position of global airline pilot is a
single job. Indeed, a number of other positions utilizing
petitioners' skills, such as regional pilot and pilot instructor,
are available to them. The Court also rejects petitioners' argument
that they would be substantially limited in their ability to work
if it is assumed that a substantial number of airlines have vision
requirements similar to respondent's. This argument is flawed
because it is not enough to say that if the otherwise permissible
physical criteria or preferences of a single employer were
imputed to all similar employers one would be regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working
only
as a result of this imputation. Rather, an employer's physical
criteria are permissible so long as they do not cause the employer
to make an employment decision based on an impairment, real or
imagined, that it regards as
substantially limiting a
major
474
Syllabus
life activity. Petitioners have not alleged, and cannot
demonstrate, that respondent's vision requirement reflects a belief
that their vision substantially limits them. pp. 489-494.
130 F.3d
893, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p. 494. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BREYER, J., joined,
post, p. 495. BREYER, J., filed a
dissenting opinion,
post, p. 513.
Van Aaron Hughes argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Tucker K. Trautman and Shawn D.
Mitchell.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the briefs were
Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Lee,
Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, James A. Feldman, Jessica
Dunsay Silver, Seth M. Galanter, Philip B. Sklover, and Carolyn L.
Wheeler.
Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Lisa Hogan and Patrick F. Carrigan.
*
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
AIDS Action et al. by
Claudia Center and
Guy Wallace;
for the American Civil Liberties Union by
Louis M. Bograd, Chai
R. Feldblum, Steven R. Shapiro, and
Matthew A. Coles;
for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations by
Jonathan P. Hiatt, Marsha S.
Berzon,
and
Laurence Gold; and for the National Employment Lawyers
Association by
Gary Phelan and
Paula A. Brantner.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the Air Transport Association of America, Inc., by
John
J. Gallagher, Neal D. Mollen, and
Margaret H.
Spurlin; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al.
by
Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Corrie L. Fischel, Stephen A. Bokat,
Robin S.
Conrad, and
J. Walker Henry.
Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for LPA, Inc., by
Daniel V. Yager; for the Society for Human Resource
Management by
Peter J. Petesch, Thomas
J. Walsh, Jr., Timothy S.
Bland, and
David S.
Harvey, Jr.; and for Senator Tom Harkin et
al. by
Arlene B. Mayerson.
475
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat.
328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101
et seq., prohibits certain
employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of
their disabilities. See § 12112(a). Petitioners challenge the
dismissal of their ADA action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. We conclude that the complaint was
properly dismissed. In reaching that result, we hold that the
determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made
with reference to measures that mitigate the individual's
impairment, including, in this instance, eyeglasses and contact
lenses. In addition, we hold that petitioners failed to allege
properly that respondent "regarded" them as having a disability
within the meaning of the ADA.
I
Petitioners' amended complaint was dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we accept the allegations
contained in their complaint as true for purposes of this case. See
United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 327
(1991).
Petitioners are twin sisters, both of whom have severe myopia.
Each petitioner's uncorrected visual acuity is 20/ 200 or worse in
her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye, but "[w]ith the
use of corrective lenses, each ... has vision that is 20/20 or
better." App. 23. Consequently, without corrective lenses, each
"effectively cannot see to conduct numerous activities such as
driving a vehicle, watching television or shopping in public
stores,"
id., at 24, but with corrective measures, such as
glasses or contact lenses, both "function identically to
individuals without a similar impairment,"
ibid.
In 1992, petitioners applied to respondent for employment as
commercial airline pilots. They met respondent's basic age,
education, experience, and Federal Aviation Adminis-
476
tration certification qualifications. After submitting their
applications for employment, both petitioners were invited by
respondent to an interview and to flight simulator tests. Both were
told during their interviews, however, that a mistake had been made
in inviting them to interview because petitioners did not meet
respondent's minimum vision requirement, which was uncorrected
visual acuity of 20/100 or better. Due to their failure to meet
this requirement, petitioners' interviews were terminated, and
neither was offered a pilot position.
In light of respondent's proffered reason for rejecting them,
petitioners filed a charge of disability discrimination under the
ADA with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After
receiving a right to sue letter, petitioners filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging
that respondent had discriminated against them "on the basis of
their disability, or because [respondent] regarded [petitioners] as
having a disability" in violation of the ADA. App. 26.
Specifically, petitioners alleged that due to their severe myopia
they actually have a substantially limiting impairment or are
regarded as having such an impairment, see
id., at 23-26,
and are thus disabled under the Act.
The District Court dismissed petitioners' complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Civ. A.
No. 96-5-121 (Aug. 28, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27. Because
petitioners could fully correct their visual impairments, the court
held that they were not actually substantially limited in any major
life activity and thus had not stated a claim that they were
disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
Id., at A-32 to
A-36. The court also determined that petitioners had not made
allegations sufficient to support their claim that they were
"regarded" by respondent as having an impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity.
Id., at A-36 to A-37. The
court observed that "[t]he statutory reference to a substantial
limi-
477
tation indicates ... that an employer regards an employee as
handicapped in his or her ability to work by finding the employee's
impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment involved."
Ibid. But petitioners had alleged only that respondent
regarded them as unable to satisfy the requirements of a particular
job, global airline pilot. Consequently, the court held that
petitioners had not stated a claim that they were regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
Employing similar logic, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's judgment.
130 F.3d
893 (1997).
The Tenth Circuit's decision is in tension with the decisions of
other Courts of Appeals. See,
e. g., Bartlett v.
New York
State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d
321, 329
(CA2 1998) (holding self-accommodations cannot
be considered when determining a disability), cert. pending, No.
98
1285; Baert v.
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d
626, 629-630
(CA7 1998) (holding disabilities should be
determined without reference to mitigating measures);
Matczak v.
Frankford Candy &
Chocolate
Co., 136 F.3d
933, 937-938
(CA3 1997) (same);
Arnold v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d
854,
859-866 (CA1 1998) (same); see also
Washington v.
HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc.,
152 F.3d
464, 470-471
(CA5 1998) (holding that only some
impairments should be evaluated in their uncorrected state), cert.
pending, No. 98-1365. We granted certiorari, 525 U. S. 1063 (1999),
and now affirm.
II
The ADA prohibits discrimination by covered entities, including
private employers, against qualified individuals with a disability.
Specifically, it provides that no covered employer "shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges
478
of employment." 42 U. S. C. § 12112(a); see also § 12111(2)
("The term 'covered entity' means an employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee"). A
"qualified individual with a disability" is identified as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires." §
12111(8). In turn, a "disability" is defined as:
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
"(B) a record of such an impairment; or
"(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." §
12102(2).
Accordingly, to fall within this definition one must have an
actual disability (subsection (A)), have a record of a disability
(subsection (B)), or be regarded as having one (subsection
(C)).
The parties agree that the authority to issue regulations to
implement the Act is split primarily among three Government
agencies. According to the parties, the EEOC has authority to issue
regulations to carry out the employment provisions in Title I of
the ADA, §§ 12111-12117, pursuant to § 12116 ("Not later than 1
year after [the date of enactment of this Act], the Commission
shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this
subchapter in accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title
5"). The Attorney General is granted authority to issue regulations
with respect to Title II, subtitle A, §§ 12131-12134, which relates
to public services. See § 12134 ("Not later than 1 year after [the
date of enactment of this Act], the Attorney General shall
promulgate regulations in an accessible format that implement this
part"). Finally, the Secretary of Transportation has authority to
issue regulations pertaining to the transportation provisions of
Titles II and III. See § 12149(a)
479
("Not later than 1 year after [the date of enactment of this
Act], the Secretary of Transportation shall issue regulations, in
an accessible format, necessary for carrying out this subpart
(other than section 12143 of this title)"); § 12164 (substantially
same); § 12186(a)(1) (substantially same); § 12143(b) ("Not later
than one year after [the date of enactment of this Act], the
Secretary shall issue final regulations to carry out this
section"). See also § 12204 (granting authority to the
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to issue
minimum guidelines to supplement the existing Minimum Guidelines
and Requirements for Accessible Design). Moreover, each of these
agencies is authorized to offer technical assistance regarding the
provisions they administer. See § 12206(c)(1) ("Each Federal agency
that has responsibility under paragraph (2) for implementing this
chapter may render technical assistance to individuals and
institutions that have rights or duties under the respective
subchapter or subchapters of this chapter for which such agency has
responsibility").
No agency, however, has been given authority to issue
regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the
ADA, see §§ 12101-12102, which fall outside Titles I-V: Most
notably, no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the
term "disability." § 12102(2). JUSTICE BREYER'S contrary,
imaginative interpretation of the Act's delegation provisions, see
post, at 514-515 (dissenting opinion), is belied by the
terms and structure of the ADA. The EEOC has, nonetheless, issued
regulations to provide additional guidance regarding the proper
interpretation of this term. After restating the definition of
disability given in the statute, see 29 CFR § 1630.2(g) (1998), the
EEOC regulations define the three elements of disability: (1)
"physical or mental impairment," (2) "substantially limits," and
(3) "major life activities." See §§ 1630.2(h)-(j). Under the
regulations, a "physical impairment" includes "[a]ny physiological
disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
480
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine." § 1630.2(h)(1). The term "substantially limits"
means, among other things, "[u]nable to perform a major life
activity that the average person in the general population can
perform"; or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity." § 1630.2(j).
Finally, "[m]ajor [l]ife [a]ctivities means functions such as
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." § 1630.2(i).
Because both parties accept these regulations as valid, and
determining their validity is not necessary to decide this case, we
have no occasion to consider what deference they are due, if
any.
The agencies have also issued interpretive guidelines to aid in
the implementation of their regulations. For instance, at the time
that it promulgated the above regulations, the EEOC issued an
"Interpretive Guidance," which provides that "[t]he determination
of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices." 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998) (describing §
1630.2(j)). The Department of Justice has issued a similar
guideline. See 28 CFR pt. 35, App. A, § 35.104 ("The question of
whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard
to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable
modification or auxiliary aids and services"); pt. 36, App. B, §
36.104 (same). Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of
these interpretive guidelines, we have no need in this case to
decide what deference is due.
481
III
With this statutory and regulatory framework in mind, we turn
first to the question whether petitioners have stated a claim under
subsection (A) of the disability definition, that is, whether they
have alleged that they possess a physical impairment that
substantially limits them in one or more major life activities. See
42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A). Because petitioners allege that with
corrective measures their vision "is 20/20 or better," App. 23,
they are not actually disabled within the meaning of the Act if the
"disability" determination is made with reference to these
measures. Consequently, with respect to subsection (A) of the
disability definition, our decision turns on whether disability is
to be determined with or without reference to corrective
measures.
Petitioners maintain that whether an impairment is substantially
limiting should be determined without regard to corrective
measures. They argue that, because the ADA does not directly
address the question at hand, the Court should defer to the agency
interpretations of the statute, which are embodied in the agency
guidelines issued by the EEOC and the Department of Justice. These
guidelines specifically direct that the determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity be
made without regard to mitigating measures. See 29 CFR pt. 1630,
App. § 1630.2(j); 28 CFR pt. 35, App. A § 35.104 (1998); 28 CFR pt.
36, App. B § 36.104.
Respondent, in turn, maintains that an impairment does not
substantially limit a major life activity if it is corrected. It
argues that the Court should not defer to the agency guidelines
cited by petitioners because the guidelines conflict with the plain
meaning of the ADA. The phrase "substantially limits one or more
major life activities," it explains, requires that the substantial
limitations actually and presently exist. Moreover, respondent
argues, disregarding mitigating measures taken by an individual
defies the statu-
482
tory command to examine the effect of the impairment on the
major life activities "of such individual." And even if the statute
is ambiguous, respondent claims, the guidelines' directive to
ignore mitigating measures is not reasonable, and thus this Court
should not defer to it.
We conclude that respondent is correct that the approach adopted
by the agency guidelines-that persons are to be evaluated in their
hypothetical uncorrected state-is an impermissible interpretation
of the ADA. Looking at the Act as a whole, it is apparent that if a
person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical
or mental impairment, the effects of those measures-both positive
and negativemust be taken into account when judging whether that
person is "substantially limited" in a major life activity and thus
"disabled" under the Act. JUSTICE STEVENS relies on the legislative
history of the ADA for the contrary proposition that individuals
should be examined in their uncorrected state. See
post, at
499-501 (dissenting opinion). Because we decide that, by its terms,
the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we have no reason to
consider the ADA's legislative history.
Three separate provisions of the ADA, read in concert, lead us
to this conclusion. The Act defines a "disability" as "a physical
or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities" of an individual. § 12102(2)(A)
(emphasis added). Because the phrase "substantially limits" appears
in the Act in the present indicative verb form, we think the
language is properly read as requiring that a person be
presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited
in order to demonstrate a disability. A "disability" exists only
where an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity,
not where it "might," "could," or "would" be substantially limiting
if mitigating measures were not taken. A person whose physical or
mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does
not have an impairment that presently "sub-
483
stantially limits" a major life activity. To be sure, a person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating
measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is
corrected it does not "substantially limi[t]" a major life
activity.
The definition of disability also requires that disabilities be
evaluated "with respect to an individual" and be determined based
on whether an impairment substantially limits the "major life
activities of such individual." § 12102(2). Thus, whether a person
has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. See
Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 641-642
(1998) (declining to consider whether HIV infection is a
per
se disability under the ADA); 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)
("The determination of whether an individual has a disability is
not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment
the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the
life of the individual").
The agency guidelines' directive that persons be judged in their
uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the
individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA. The agency approach
would often require courts and employers to speculate about a
person's condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a
disability determination based on general information about how an
uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on
the individual's actual condition. For instance, under this view,
courts would almost certainly find all diabetics to be disabled,
because if they failed to monitor their blood sugar levels and
administer insulin, they would almost certainly be substantially
limited in one or more major life activities. A diabetic whose
illness does not impair his or her daily activities would therefore
be considered disabled simply because he or she has diabetes. Thus,
the guidelines approach would create a system in which persons
often must be treated as members of a group of people with similar
impairments, rather than
484
as individuals. This is contrary to both the letter and the
spirit of the ADA.
The guidelines approach could also lead to the anomalous result
that in determining whether an individual is disabled, courts and
employers could not consider any negative side effects suffered by
an individual resulting from the use of mitigating measures, even
when those side effects are very severe. See,
e. g.,
Johnson, Antipsychotics: Pros and Cons of Antipsychotics, RN (Aug.
1997) (noting that antipsychotic drugs can cause a variety of
adverse effects, including neuroleptic malignant syndrome and
painful seizures); Liver Risk Warning Added to Parkinson's Drug,
FDA Consumer (Mar. 1, 1999) (warning that a drug for treating
Parkinson's disease can cause liver damage); Curry & Kulling,
Newer Antiepileptic Drugs, American Family Physician (Feb. 1, 1998)
(cataloging serious negative side effects of new antiepileptic
drugs). This result is also inconsistent with the individualized
approach of the ADA.
Finally, and critically, findings enacted as part of the ADA
require the conclusion that Congress did not intend to bring under
the statute's protection all those whose uncorrected conditions
amount to disabilities. Congress found that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and
this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing
older." § 12101(a)(1). This figure is inconsistent with the
definition of disability pressed by petitioners.
Although the exact source of the 43 million figure is not clear,
the corresponding finding in the 1988 precursor to the ADA was
drawn directly from a report prepared by the N ational Council on
Disability. See Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Analysis and Implications of a SecondGeneration Civil Rights
Statute, 26 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 413, 434, n. 117
(1991) (reporting, in an article authored by the drafter of the
original ADA bill introduced in Congress in 1988, that the report
was the source for a
485
figure of 36 million disabled persons quoted in the versions of
the bill introduced in 1988). That report detailed the difficulty
of estimating the number of disabled persons due to varying
operational definitions of disability. National Council on
Disability, Toward Independence 10 (1986). It explained that the
estimates of the number of disabled Americans ranged from an
overinclusive 160 million under a "health conditions approach,"
which looks at all conditions that impair the health or normal
functional abilities of an individual, to an underinclusive 22.7
million under a "work disability approach," which focuses on
individuals' reported ability to work.
Id., at 10-11. It
noted that "a figure of 35 or 36 million [was] the most commonly
quoted estimate."
I d., at 10. The 36 million number
included in the 1988 bill's findings thus clearly reflects an
approach to defining disabilities that is closer to the work
disabilities approach than the health conditions approach.
This background also provides some clues to the likely source of
the figure in the findings of the 1990 Act. Roughly two years after
issuing its 1986 report, the National Council on Disability issued
an updated report. See On the Threshold of Independence (1988).
This 1988 report settled on a more concrete definition of
disability. It stated that 37.3 million individuals have
"difficulty performing one or more basic physical activities,"
including "seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, using stairs,
lifting or carrying, getting around outside, getting around inside,
and getting into or out of bed."
Id., at 19. The study from
which it drew this data took an explicitly functional approach to
evaluating disabilities. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
Census, Disability, Functional Limitation, and Health Insurance
Coverage: 1984/85, p. 2 (1986). It measured 37.3 million persons
with a "functional limitation" on performing certain basic
activities when using, as the questionnaire put it, "special aids,"
such as glasses or hearing aids, if the person usually used such
aids.
Id., at 1, 47. The number of dis-
486
abled provided by the study and adopted in the 1988 report,
however, includes only noninstitutionalized persons with physical
disabilities who are over age 15. The 5.7 million gap between the
43 million figure in the ADA's findings and the 37.3 million figure
in the report can thus probably be explained as an effort to
include in the findings those who were excluded from the National
Council figure. See,
e. g., National Institute on
Disability and Rehabilitation Research, Data on Disability from the
National Health Interview Survey 1983-1985, pp. 61-62 (1988)
(finding approximately 943,000 noninstitutionalized persons with an
activity limitation due to mental illness; 947,000
noninstitutionalized persons with an activity limitation due to
mental retardation; 1,900,000 noninstitutionalized persons under 18
with an activity limitation); U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 106 (1989)
(Table 168) (finding 1,553,000 resident patients in nursing and
related care facilities (excluding hospital-based nursing homes) in
1986).
Regardless of its exact source, however, the 43 million figure
reflects an understanding that those whose impairments are largely
corrected by medication or other devices are not "disabled" within
the meaning of the ADA. The estimate is consistent with the numbers
produced by studies performed during this same time period that
took a similar functional approach to determining disability. For
instance, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., drawing on data from
the National Center for Health Statistics, issued an estimate of
approximately 31.4 million civilian noninstitutionalized persons
with "chronic activity limitation status" in 1979. Digest of Data
on Persons with Disabilities 25 (1984). The 1989 Statistical
Abstract offered the same estimate based on the same data, as well
as an estimate of 32.7 million noninstitutionalized persons with
"activity limitation" in 1985. Statistical Abstract,
supra,
at 115 (Table 184). In both cases, individuals with "activity
limitations" were those who,
487
relative to their age-sex group could not conduct "usual"
activities:
e. g., attending preschool, keeping
house, or living independently. See National Center for Health
Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Vital and
Health Statistics, Current Estimates from the National Health
Interview Survey, 1989, Series 10, pp. 7-8 (1990).
By contrast, nonfunctional approaches to defining disability
produce significantly larger numbers. As noted above, the 1986
National Council on Disability report estimated that there were
over 160 million disabled under the "health conditions approach."
Toward Independence,
supra, at 10; see also Mathematica
Policy Research,
supra, at 3 (arriving at similar estimate
based on same Census Bureau data). Indeed, the number of people
with vision impairments alone is 100 million. See National Advisory
Eye Council, U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Vision
Research-A National Plan: 1999-2003, p. 7 (1998) ("[M]ore than 100
million people need corrective lenses to see properly"). "It is
estimated that more than 28 million Americans have impaired
hearing." National Institutes of Health, National Strategic
Research Plan: Hearing and Hearing Impairment v (1996). And there
were approximately 50 million people with high blood pressure
(hypertension). Tindall, Stalking a Silent Killer; Hypertension,
Business & Health 37 (August 1998) ("Some 50 million Americans
have high blood pressure").
Because it is included in the ADA's text, the finding that 43
million individuals are disabled gives content to the ADA's terms,
specifically the term "disability." Had Congress intended to
include all persons with corrected physicallimitations among those
covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher
number of disabled persons in the findings. That it did not is
evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only those whose
impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.
The dissents suggest that viewing individuals in their corrected
state will exclude from the definition of "disab[led]"
488
those who use prosthetic limbs, see
post, at 497-498
(opinion of STEVENS, J.),
post, at 513 (opinion of BREYER,
J.), or take medicine for epilepsy or high blood pressure, see
post, at 507, 509 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). This suggestion
is incorrect. The use of a corrective device does not, by itself,
relieve one's disability. Rather, one has a disability under
subsection (A) if, notwithstanding the use of a corrective device,
that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.
For example, individuals who use prosthetic limbs or wheelchairs
may be mobile and capable of functioning in society but still be
disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability to
walk or run. The same may be true of individuals who take medicine
to lessen the symptoms of an impairment so that they can function
but nevertheless remain substantially limited. Alternatively, one
whose high blood pressure is "cured" by medication may be regarded
as disabled by a covered entity, and thus disabled under subsection
(C) of the definition. The use or nonuse of a corrective
device does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that
determination depends on whether the limitations an individual with
an impairment
actually faces are in fact substantially
limiting.
Applying this reading of the Act to the case at hand, we
conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly resolved the issue of
disability in respondent's favor. As noted above, petitioners
allege that with corrective measures, their visual acuity is 20/20,
App. 23, Amended Complaint ~ 36, and that they "function
identically to individuals without a similar impairment,"
id., at 24, Amended Complaint ~ 37e. In addition,
petitioners concede that they "do not argue that the use of
corrective lenses in itself demonstrates a substantially limiting
impairment." Brief for Petitioners 9, n. 11. Accordingly, because
we decide that disability under the Act is to be determined with
reference to corrective measures, we agree with the courts below
that petitioners have not stated
489
a claim that they are substantially limited in any major life
activity.
IV
Our conclusion that petitioners have failed to state a claim
that they are actually disabled under subsection (A) of the
disability definition does not end our inquiry. Under subsection
(C), individuals who are "regarded as" having a disability
are disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See § 12102(2)(C).
Subsection
(C) provides that having a disability includes
"being regarded as having," § 12102(2)(C), "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual," § 12102(2)(A). There are two
apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory
definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person
has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or
more major life activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a
covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual-it
must believe either that one has a substantially limiting
impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially
limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so
limiting. These misperceptions often "resul[t] from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of ... individual ability." See 42
U. S. C. § 12101(7). See also
School Bd. of Nassau
Cty. v.
Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 284 (1987)
("By amending the definition of 'handicapped individual' to include
not only those who are actually physically impaired, but also those
who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are
substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress
acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment"); 29 CFR pt. 1630,
App. § 1630.2(1) (explaining that the purpose of the regarded as
prong is to cover individuals "re-
490
jected from a job because of the 'myths, fears and stereotypes'
associated with disabilities").
There is no dispute that petitioners are physically impaired.
Petitioners do not make the obvious argument that they are regarded
due to their impairments as substantially limited in the major life
activity of seeing. They contend only that respondent mistakenly
believes their physical impairments substantially limit them in the
major life activity of working. To support this claim, petitioners
allege that respondent has a vision requirement that is allegedly
based on myth and stereotype. Further, this requirement
substantially limits their ability to engage in the major life
activity of working by precluding them from obtaining the job of
global airline pilot, which they argue is a "class of employment."
See App. 24-26, Amended Complaint ~ 38. In reply, respondent argues
that the position of global airline pilot is not a class of jobs
and therefore petitioners have not stated a claim that they are
regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.
Standing alone, the allegation that respondent has a vision
requirement in place does not establish a claim that respondent
regards petitioners as substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. See Post-Argument Brief for Respondent 2-3
(advancing this argument); Post-Argument Brief for United States et
al. as
Amici Curiae 5-6 ("[U]nder the EEOC's regulations, an
employer may make employment decisions based on physical
characteristics"). By its terms, the ADA allows employers to prefer
some physical attributes over others and to establish physical
criteria. An employer runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an
employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real
or imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major
life activity. Accordingly, an employer is free to decide that
physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to
the level of an impairment-such as one's height, build, or singing
voice-are preferable to others, just as it is free to
491
decide that some limiting, but not
substantially
limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for
a job.
Considering the allegations of the amended complaint in tandem,
petitioners have not stated a claim that respondent regards their
impairment as
substantially limiting their ability to work.
The ADA does not define "substantially limits," but "substantially"
suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." See
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining
"substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial" as
"considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified
to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English
Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "[r]elating to or
proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or
considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). The EEOC has
codified regulations interpreting the term "substantially limits"
in this manner, defining the term to mean "[u]nable to perform" or
"[s]ignificantly restricted." See 29 CFR §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii)
(1998).
When the major life activity under consideration is that of
working, the statutory phrase "substantially limits" requires, at a
minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad
class of jobs. Reflecting this requirement, the EEOC uses a
specialized definition of the term "substantially limits" when
referring to the major life activity of working:
"significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills
and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job
does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working." § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should
consider when determining whether an individual is
492
substantially limited in the major life activity of working,
including the geographical area to which the individual has
reasonable access, and "the number and types of jobs utilizing
similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the
geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified."
§§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B). To be substantially limited in the
major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from
more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job
of choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps
not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded
from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different
types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad
range of jobs.
Because the parties accept that the term "major life activities"
includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited
regulations. We note, however, that there may be some conceptual
difficulty in defining "major life activities" to include work, for
it seems "to argue in a circle to say that if one is excluded, for
instance, by reason of [an impairment, from working with others]
... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the
question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by
reason of handicap." Tr. of Oral Arg. in
School Bd. of Nassau
Co. v.
Arline, O. T. 1986, No. 85-1277, p. 15 (argument
of Solicitor General). Indeed, even the EEOC has expressed
reluctance to define "major life activities" to include working and
has suggested that working be viewed as a residual life activity,
considered, as a last resort,
only "[i]f an individual is
not substantially limited with respect to
any other major
life activity." 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998) (emphasis
added) ("If an individual is substantially limited in
any
other major life activity, no determination should be made as
to whether the individual is substantially limited in working"
(emphasis added)).
Assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity
and that the EEOC regulations interpreting the term "substantially
limits" are reasonable, petitioners have
493
failed to allege adequately that their poor eyesight is regarded
as an impairment that substantially limits them in the major life
activity of working. They allege only that respondent regards their
poor vision as precluding them from holding positions as a "global
airline pilot." See App. 25-26, Amended Complaint ~ 38f. Because
the position of global airline pilot is a single job, this
allegation does not support the claim that respondent regards
petitioners as having a
substantially limiting impairment.
See 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998) ("The inability to perform a
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation
in the major life activity of working"). Indeed, there are a number
of other positions utilizing petitioners' skills, such as regional
pilot and pilot instructor to name a few, that are available to
them. Even under the EEOC's Interpretative Guidance, to which
petitioners ask us to defer, "an individual who cannot be a
commercial airline pilot because of a minor vision impairment, but
who can be a commercial airline copilot or a pilot for a courier
service, would not be substantially limited in the major life
activity of working." 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2 (1998).
Petitioners also argue that if one were to assume that a
substantial number of airline carriers have similar vision
requirements, they would be substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. See Brief for Petitioners 44-45. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that the adoption of similar vision
requirements by other carriers would represent a substantial
limitation on the major life activity of working, the argument is
nevertheless flawed. It is not enough to say that if the physical
criteria of a single employer were
imputed to all similar
employers one would be regarded as substantially limited in the
major life activity of working
only as a result of this
imputation. An otherwise valid job requirement, such as a
height requirement, does not become invalid simply because it
would limit a person's employment opportunities in a
substantial way
if it were
494
adopted by a substantial number of employers. Because
petitioners have not alleged, and cannot demonstrate, that
respondent's vision requirement reflects a belief that petitioners'
vision substantially limits them, we agree with the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of petitioners' claim that
they are regarded as disabled.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.
I agree that 42 U. s. C. § 12102(2)(A) does not reach the
legions of people with correctable disabilities. The strongest
clues to Congress' perception of the domain of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), as I see it, are legislative
findings that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities," § 12101(a)(1), and that "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority," persons
"subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,"
§ 12101(a)(7). These declarations are inconsistent with the
enormously embracing definition of disability petitioners urge. As
the Court demonstrates, see
ante, at 483-487, the inclusion
of correctable disabilities within the ADA's domain would extend
the Act's coverage to far more than 43 million people. And persons
whose uncorrected eyesight is poor, or who rely on daily medication
for their well-being, can be found in every social and economic
class; they do not cluster among the politically powerless, nor do
they coalesce as historical victims of discrimination. In short, in
no sensible way can one rank the large numbers of diverse
individuals with corrected disabilities as a "discrete and insular
minority." I do not mean to suggest that any of the constitutional
presumptions or doctrines that may apply to "discrete and insular"
minorities in other contexts are relevant here; there is no
con-
495
stitutional dimension to this case. Congress' use of the phrase,
however, is a telling indication of its intent to restrict the
ADA's coverage to a confined, and historically disadvantaged,
class.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, dissenting.
When it enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA
or Act), Congress certainly did not intend to require United Air
Lines to hire unsafe or unqualified pilots. Nor, in all likelihood,
did it view every person who wears glasses as a member of a
"discrete and insular minority." Indeed, by reason of legislative
myopia it may not have foreseen that its definition of "disability"
might theoretically encompass, not just "some 43,000,000
Americans," 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(1), but perhaps two or three
times that number. Nevertheless, if we apply customary tools of
statutory construction, it is quite clear that the threshold
question whether an individual is "disabled" within the meaning of
the Act-and, therefore, is entitled to the basic assurances that
the Act affords-focuses on her past or present physical condition
without regard to mitigation that has resulted from rehabilitation,
self-improvement, prosthetic devices, or medication. One might
reasonably argue that the general rule should not apply to an
impairment that merely requires a nearsighted person to wear
glasses. But I believe that, in order to be faithful to the
remedial purpose of the Act, we should give it a generous, rather
than a miserly, construction.
There are really two parts to the question of statutory
construction presented by this case. The first question is whether
the determination of disability for people that Congress
unquestionably intended to cover should focus on their unmitigated
or their mitigated condition. If the correct answer to that
question is the one provided by eight of the
496
nine Federal Courts of Appeals to address the issue,l and by all
three of the Executive agencies that have issued regulations or
interpretive bulletins construing the statutenamely, that the
statute defines "disability" without regard to ameliorative
measures-it would still be necessary to decide whether that general
rule should be applied to what might be characterized as a "minor,
trivial impairment."
Arnold v.
United Parcel Service,
Inc., 136 F.3d
854, 866, n. 10
(CA1 1998) (holding that unmitigated
state is determinative but suggesting that it "might reach a
different result" in a case in which "a simple, inexpensive
remedy," such as eyeglasses, is available "that can provide total
and relatively permanent control of all symptoms"). See also
Washington v.
HCA Health Servs. of Texas, 152 F.3d
464 (CA5 1998) (same), cert. pending, No. 98-1365. I
shall therefore first consider impairments that Congress surely had
in mind before turning to the special facts of this case.
I
"As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to
interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes
Congress sought to serve."
Chapman v.
Houston Welfare
Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 608
(1979). Congress
1 See
Bartlett v.
New York State Bd. of Law
Examiners, 156 F.3d
321, 329
(CA2 1998), cert. pending, No. 98-1285;
Washington v.
HCA Health Servs. of Texas, 152 F.3d
464, 470-471
(CA5 1998), cert. pending, No. 98-1365;
Baert v.
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149
F.3d 626, 629-630
(CA7 1998);
Arnold v.
United
Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d
854, 859-866
(CA1 1998);
Matcza v.
Frankford
Candy &
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d
933, 937-938
(CA3 1997);
Doane v.
Omaha,
115 F.3d
624, 627
(CA8 1997); Harris v.
H &
W
Contracting Co., 102 F.3d
516, 520-521 (CAll 1996);
Holihan v.
Lucky Stores,
Inc., 87 F.3d
362, 366
(CA9 1996). While a Sixth Circuit decision
could be read as expressing doubt about the majority rule, see
Gilday v.
Mecosta County, 124 F.3d
760, 766-768 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part);
id., at 768 (Guy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), the sole holding contrary to this
line of authority is the Tenth Circuit's opinion that the Court
affirms today.
497
expressly provided that the "purpose of [the ADA is] to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U. s. C.
§ 12101(b)(1). To that end, the ADA prohibits covered employers
from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual
with a
disability because of the disability" in regard to the terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U. s. C. § 12112(a)
(emphasis added).
The Act's definition of disability is drawn "almost verbatim"
from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. s. C. § 706(8)(B).
Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 631
(1998). The ADA's definition provides:
"The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
"(B) a record of such an impairment; or
"(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.
S. C. § 12102(2).
The three parts of this definition do not identify mutually
exclusive, discrete categories. On the contrary, they furnish three
overlapping formulas aimed at ensuring that individuals who now
have, or ever had, a substantially limiting impairment are covered
by the Act.
An example of a rather common condition illustrates this point:
There are many individuals who have lost one or more limbs in
industrial accidents, or perhaps in the service of their country in
places like Iwo Jima. With the aid of prostheses, coupled with
courageous determination and physical therapy, many of these hardy
individuals can perform all of their major life activities just as
efficiently as an average couch potato. If the Act were just
concerned with their present ability to participate in society,
many of these individuals' physical impairments would not be viewed
as dis-
498
abilities. Similarly, if the statute were solely concerned with
whether these individuals viewed themselves as disabled-or with
whether a majority of employers regarded them as unable to perform
most jobs-many of these individuals would lack statutory protection
from discrimination based on their prostheses.
The sweep of the statute's three-pronged definition, however,
makes it pellucidly clear that Congress intended the Act to cover
such persons. The fact that a prosthetic device, such as an
artificial leg, has restored one's ability to perform major life
activities surely cannot mean that subsection (A) of the definition
is inapplicable. Nor should the fact that the individual considers
himself (or actually is) "cured," or that a prospective employer
considers him generally employable, mean that subsections (B) or
(C) are inapplicable. But under the Court's emphasis on "the
present indicative verb form" used in subsection (A),
ante,
at 482, that subsection presumably would not apply. And under the
Court's focus on the individual's "presen[t]-not potentia[l] or
hypothetica[l]"-condition,
ibid., and on whether a person is
"precluded from a broad range of jobs,"
ante, at 492,
subsections (B) and
(C) presumably would not apply.
In my view, when an employer refuses to hire the individual
"because of" his prosthesis, and the prosthesis in no way affects
his ability to do the job, that employer has unquestionably
discriminated against the individual in violation of the Act.
Subsection (B) of the definition, in fact, sheds a revelatory light
on the question whether Congress was concerned only about the
corrected or mitigated status of a person's impairment. If the
Court is correct that "[a] 'disability' exists only where" a
person's "present" or "actual" condition is substantially impaired,
ante, at 482, there would be no reason to include in the
protected class those who were once disabled but who are now fully
recovered. Subsection (B) of the Act's definition, however, plainly
covers a person who previously had a serious hearing impair-
499
ment that has since been completely cured. See
School Bd. of
Nassau Cty. v.
Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 281
(1987). Still, if I correctly understand the Court's opinion, it
holds that one who
continues to wear a hearing aid that she
has worn all her life might not be covered-fully cured impairments
are covered, but merely treatable ones are not. The text of the Act
surely does not require such a bizarre result.
The three prongs of the statute, rather, are most plausibly read
together not to inquire into whether a person is currently
"functionally" limited in a major life activity, but only into the
existence of an impairment-present or past-that substantially
limits, or did so limit, the individual before amelioration. This
reading avoids the counterintuitive conclusion that the ADA's
safeguards vanish when individuals make themselves more employable
by ascertaining ways to overcome their physical or mental
limitations.
To the extent that there may be doubt concerning the meaning of
the statutory text, ambiguity is easily removed by looking at the
legislative history. As then-JusTIcE REHNQUIST stated for the Court
in
Garcia v.
United States, 469 U. S. 70 (1984): "In
surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the
authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in
the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen
involved in drafting and studying the proposed legislation.'''
Id., at 76 (quoting
Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 186
(1969)). The Committee Reports on the bill that became the ADA make
it abundantly clear that Congress intended the ADA to cover
individuals who could perform all of their major life activities
only with the help of ameliorative measures.
The ADA originated in the Senate. The Senate Report states that
"whether a person has a disability should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as
reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."
500
S. Rep. No. 101-116, p. 23 (1989). The Report further explained,
in discussing the "regarded as" prong:
"[An] important goal of the third prong of the [disability]
definition is to ensure that persons with medical conditions that
are under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major
life activities, are not discriminated against on the basis of
their medical conditions. For example, individuals with controlled
diabetes or epilepsy are often denied jobs for which they are
qualified. Such denials are the result of negative attitudes and
misinformation." Id., at 24.
When the legislation was considered in the House of
Representatives, its Committees reiterated the Senate's basic
understanding of the Act's coverage, with one minor modification:
They clarified that "correctable" or "controllable" disabilities
were covered in the first definitional prong as well. The Report of
the House Committee on the Judiciary states, in discussing the
first prong, that, when determining whether an individual's
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, "[t]he
impairment should be assessed without considering whether
mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable
accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial
limitation." H. R. Rep. No. 101485, pt. III, p. 28 (1990). The
Report continues that "a person with epilepsy, an impairment which
substantially limits a major life activity, is covered under this
test,"
ibid., as is a person with poor hearing, "even if the
hearing loss is corrected by the use of a hearing aid,"
id.,
at 29.
The Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor
likewise states that "[w]hether a person has a disability should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures,
such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."
Id.,
pt. II, at 52. To make matters perfectly plain, the Report
adds:
"For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially
limited in the major life activity of hearing,
501
even though the loss may be corrected through the use of a
hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as
epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life
activity are covered under the first prong of the definition of
disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled
by medication." Ibid. (emphasis added).
All of the Reports, indeed, are replete with references to the
understanding that the Act's protected class includes individuals
with various medical conditions that ordinarily are perfectly
"correctable" with medication or treatment. See
id., at 74
(citing with approval
Straithe v.
Department of
Transportation, 716 F.2d
227 (CA3 1983), which held that an individual with poor
hearing was "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act even though
his hearing could be corrected with a hearing aid); H. R. Rep. No.
101-485, pt. III, at 51 ("[t]he term" disability includes
"epilepsy, ... heart disease, diabetes");
id., pt. III, at
28 (listing same impairments); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 22
(same).2
In addition, each of the three Executive agencies charged with
implementing the Act has consistently interpreted the Act as
mandating that the presence of disability turns on an individual's
uncorrected state. We have traditionally accorded respect to such
views when, as here, the agencies "played a pivotal role in setting
[the statutory] machinery in motion."
Ford Motor Credit Co.
v.
Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 566 (1980)
(brackets in original; internal quotation marks and
2 The House's decision to cover correctable impairments under
subsection (A) of the statute seems, in retrospect, both deliberate
and wise. Much of the structure of the House Reports is borrowed
from the Senate Report; thus it appears that the House Committees
consciously decided to move the discussion of mitigating measures.
This adjustment was prudent because in a case in which an employer
refuses, out of animus or fear, to hire an individual who has a
condition such as epilepsy that the employer knows is controlled,
it may be difficult to determine whether the employer is viewing
the individual in her uncorrected state or "regards" her as
substantially limited.
502
citation omitted). At the very least, these interpretations
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
[we] may properly resort" for additional guidance.
Skidmore
v.
Swift &
Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140
(1944). See also
Bragdon, 524 U. S., at 642 (invoking this
maxim with regard to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
(EEOC) interpretation of the ADA).
The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provides that "[t]he
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or
prosthetic devices." 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1998). The
EEOC further explains:
"[A]n individual who uses artificial legs would ... be
substantially limited in the major life activity of walking because
the individual is unable to walk without the aid of prosthetic
devices. Similarly, a diabetic who without insulin would lapse into
a coma would be substantially limited because the individual cannot
perform major life activities without the aid of medication."
Ibid.
The Department of Justice has reached the same conclusion. Its
regulations provide that "[t]he question of whether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of
mitigating measures, such as reasonable modification or auxiliary
aids and services." 28 CFR pt. 35, App. A, § 35.104 (1998). The
Department of Transportation has issued a regulation adopting this
same definition of "disability." See 49 CFR pt. 37.3 (1998).
In my judgment, the Committee Reports and the uniform agency
regulations merely confirm the message conveyed by the text of the
Act-at least insofar as it applies to impairments such as the loss
of a limb, the inability to hear, or any condition such as diabetes
that is substantially limiting without medication. The Act
generally protects individuals who have "correctable" substantially
limiting impairments
503
from unjustified employment discrimination on the basis of those
impairments. The question, then, is whether the fact that Congress
was specifically concerned about protecting a class that included
persons characterized as a "discrete and insular minority" and that
it estimated that class to include "some 43,000,000 Americans"
means that we should construe the term "disability" to exclude
individuals with impairments that Congress probably did not have in
mind.
II
The EEOC maintains that, in order to remain allegiant to the
Act's structure and purpose, courts should always answer "the
question whether an individual has a disability ... without regard
to mitigating measures that the individual takes to ameliorate the
effects of the impairment." Brief for United States et al. as
Amici Curiae 6. "[T]here is nothing about poor vision," as
the EEOC interprets the Act, "that would justify adopting a
different rule in this case."
Ibid.
If a narrow reading of the term "disability" were necessary in
order to avoid the danger that the Act might otherwise force United
to hire pilots who might endanger the lives of their passengers, it
would make good sense to use the "43,000,000 Americans" finding to
confine its coverage. There is, however, no such danger in this
case. If a person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act, she
still cannot prevail on a claim of discrimination unless she can
prove that the employer took action "because of" that impairment,
42 U. S. C. § 12112(a), and that she can, "with or without
reasonable accommodation, ... perform the essential functions" of
the job of a commercial airline pilot. See § 12111(8). Even then,
an employer may avoid liability if it shows that the criteria of
having uncorrected visual acuity of at least 20/100 is "job-related
and consistent with business necessity" or if such vision (even if
correctable to 20/20) would pose a health or safety hazard. §§
12113(a) and (b).
504
This case, in other words, is not about whether petitioners are
genuinely qualified or whether they can perform the job of an
airline pilot without posing an undue safety risk. The case just
raises the threshold question whether petitioners are members of
the ADA's protected class. It simply asks whether the ADA lets
petitioners in the door in the same way as the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 does for every person who is at least 40
years old, see 29 U. s. C. § 631(a), and as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does for every single individual in the work
force. Inside that door lies nothing more than basic protection
from irrational and unjustified discrimination because of a
characteristic that is beyond a person's control. Hence, this
particular case, at its core, is about whether, assuming that
petitioners can prove that they are "qualified," the airline has
any duty to come forward with some legitimate explanation for
refusing to hire them because of their uncorrected eyesight, or
whether the ADA leaves the airline free to decline to hire
petitioners on this basis even if it is acting purely on the basis
of irrational fear and stereotype.
I think it quite wrong for the Court to confine the coverage of
the Act simply because an interpretation of "disability" that
adheres to Congress' method of defining the class it intended to
benefit may also provide protection for "significantly larger
numbers" of individuals,
ante, at 487, than estimated in the
Act's findings. It has long been a "familiar canon of statutory
construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes."
Tcherepnin v.
Knight,
389 U. S. 332,
336 (1967). Congress sought, in enacting the ADA, to "provide a ...
comprehensive national mandate for the discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." 42 U. S. C. § 12101(b)(1). The ADA,
following the lead of the Rehabilitation Act before it, seeks to
implement this mandate by encouraging employers "to replace ...
reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions
based on medically sound judg-
505
ments."
Arline, 480 U. S., at 284-285. Even if an
authorized agency could interpret this statutory structure so as to
pick and choose certain correctable impairments that Congress meant
to exclude from this mandate, Congress surely has not authorized us
to do so.
When faced with classes of individuals or types of
discrimination that fall outside the core prohibitions of
antidiscrimination statutes, we have consistently construed those
statutes to include comparable evils within their coverage, even
when the particular evil at issue was beyond Congress' immediate
concern in passing the legislation. Congress, for instance, focused
almost entirely on the problem of discrimination against
African-Americans when it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See,
e. g., Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.
S. 193, 202-203 (1979). But that narrow focus could not
possibly justify a construction of the statute that excluded
Hispanic-Americans or AsianAmericans from its protection-or as we
later decided (ironically enough, by relying on legislative history
and according "great deference" to the EEOC's "interpretation"),
Caucasians. See
McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U. S.
273, 279-280 (1976).
We unanimously applied this well-accepted method of
interpretation last Term with respect to construing Title VII to
cover claims of same-sex sexual harassment.
Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75 (1998). We
explained our holding as follows:
"As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in
the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed. Title VII prohibits 'discriminat[ion] ... because of
... sex' in the 'terms' or 'conditions'
506
of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment
must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the
statutory requirements."
Id., at 79-80.
This approach applies outside of the discrimination context as
well. In
H. J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229 (1989), we
rejected the argument that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) should be construed to cover only
"organized crime" because Congress included findings in the Act's
preamble emphasizing only that problem. See Pub. L. 91-452 § 1, 84
Stat. 941. After surveying RICO's legislative history, we concluded
that even though "[t]he occasion for Congress' action was the
perceived need to combat organized crime, ... Congress for cogent
reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although
it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application
to organized crime." 492 U. S., at 248.3
Under the approach we followed in
Oncale and
H. J.
Inc., visual impairments should be judged by the same standard as
hearing impairments or any other medically controllable condition.
The nature of the discrimination alleged is of the same character
and should be treated accordingly.
Indeed, it seems to me eminently within the purpose and policy
of the ADA to require employers who make hiring and firing
decisions based on individuals' uncorrected vision to clarify why
having, for example, 20/100 uncorrected vision
3 The one notable exception to our use of this method of
interpretation occurred in the decision in
General Elec. Co.
v.
Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976), in
which the majority rejected an EEOC guideline and the heavy weight
of authority in the federal courts of appeals in order to hold that
Title VII did not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy-related conditions. Given the fact that Congress swiftly
"overruled" that decision in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(k), I submit that the
views expressed in the dissenting opinions in that case, 429 U. S.,
at 146 (opinion of Brennan, J.), and
id., at 160 (opinion of
STEVENS, J.), should be followed today.
507
or better is a valid job requirement. So long as an employer
explicitly makes its decision based on an impairment that in some
condition is substantially limiting, it matters not under the
structure of the Act whether that impairment is widely shared or so
rare that it is seriously misunderstood. Either way, the individual
has an impairment that is covered by the purpose of the ADA, and
she should be protected against irrational stereotypes and
unjustified disparate treatment on that basis.
I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the ADA should be read
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of, say, blue eyes,
deformed fingernails, or heights of less than six feet. Those
conditions, to the extent that they are even "impairments," do not
substantially limit individuals in any condition and thus are
different in kind from the impairment in the case before us. While
not all eyesight that can be enhanced by glasses is substantially
limiting, having 20/200 vision in one's better eye is, without
treatment, a significant hindrance. Only two percent of the
population suffers from such myopia.4 Such acuity precludes a
person from driving, shopping in a public store, or viewing a
computer screen from a reasonable distance. Uncorrected vision,
therefore, can be "substantially limiting" in the same way that
unmedicated epilepsy or diabetes can be. Because Congress obviously
intended to include individuals with the latter impairments in the
Act's protected class, we should give petitioners the same
protection.
III
The Court does not disagree that the logic of the ADA requires
petitioners' visual impairments to be judged the same as other
"correctable" conditions. Instead of including petitioners within
the Act's umbrella, however, the Court
4J. Roberts, Binocular Visual Acuity of Adults, United States,
19601962, p. 3 (National Center for Health Statistics, Series 11,
No. 30, Department of Health and Welfare, 1968).
508
decides, in this opinion and its companion, to expel all
individuals who, by using "measures [to] mitigate [their]
impairment[s],"
ante, at 475, are able to overcome
substantial limitations regarding major life activities. The Court,
for instance, holds that severe hypertension that is substantially
limiting without medication is not a "disability,"
Murphy v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., post, p. 516, and-perhaps even
more remarkably-indicates (directly contrary to the Act's
legislative history, see
supra, at 500-501) that diabetes
that is controlled only with insulin treatments is not a
"disability" either,
ante, at 483-484.
The Court claims that this rule is necessary to avoid requiring
courts to "speculate" about a person's "hypothetical" condition and
to preserve the Act's focus on making "individualized inquiries"
into whether a person is disabled.
Ante, at 483. The Court
also asserts that its rejection of the general rule of viewing
individuals in their unmitigated state prevents distorting the
scope of the Act's protected class to cover a "much higher number"
of persons than Congress estimated in its findings. And, I suspect,
the Court has been cowed by respondent's persistent argument that
viewing all individuals in their unmitigated state will lead to a
tidal wave of lawsuits. None of the Court's reasoning, however,
justifies a construction of the Act that will obviously deprive
many of Congress' intended beneficiaries of the legal protection it
affords.
The agencies' approach, the Court repeatedly contends, "would
create a system in which persons often must be treated as members
of a group of people with similar impairments, rather than
individuals, [which] is both contrary to the letter and spirit of
the ADA."
Ante, at 483-484. The Court's mantra regarding the
Act's "individualized approach," however, fails to support its
holding. I agree that the letter and spirit of the ADA is designed
to deter decisionmaking based on group stereotypes, but the
agencies' interpretation of the Act does not lead to this result.
Nor does it require courts to "speculate" about people's
"hypothetical"
509
conditions. Viewing a person in her "unmitigated" state simply
requires examining that individual's abilities in a different
state, not the abilities of every person who shares a similar
condition. It is just as easy individually to test petitioners'
eyesight with their glasses on as with their glasses off.5
Ironically, it is the Court's approach that actually condones
treating individuals merely as members of groups. That misdirected
approach permits any employer to dismiss out of hand every person
who has uncorrected eyesight worse than 20/100 without regard to
the specific qualifications of those individuals or the extent of
their abilities to overcome their impairment. In much the same way,
the Court's approach would seem to allow an employer to refuse to
hire every person who has epilepsy or diabetes that is controlled
by medication, or every person who functions efficiently with a
prosthetic limb.
Under the Court's reasoning, an employer apparently could not
refuse to hire persons with these impairments who are substantially
limited even with medication, see
ante, at 487-488, but that
group-based "exception" is more perverse still. Since the purpose
of the ADA is to dismantle employment barriers based on society's
accumulated myths
5 For much the same reason, the Court's concern that the
agencies' approach would "lead to the anomalous result" that courts
would ignore "negative side effects suffered by an individual
resulting from the use of mitigating measures,"
ante, at
484, is misplaced. It seems safe to assume that most individuals
who take medication that itself substantially limits a major life
activity would be substantially limited in some other way if they
did not take the medication. The Court's examples of psychosis,
Parkinson's disease, and epilepsy certainly support this
presumption. To the extent that certain people may be substantially
limited only when taking "mitigating measures," it might fairly be
said that just as contagiousness is symptomatic of a disability
because an individual's "contagiousness and her physical impairment
each [may result] from the same underlying condition,"
School
Bd. of Nassau Cty. v.
Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 282
(1987), side effects are symptomatic of a disability because side
effects and a physical impairment may flow from the same underlying
condition.
510
and fears, see 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(8);
Arline, 480 U.
S., at 283-284, it is especially ironic to deny protection for
persons with substantially limiting impairments that, when
corrected, render them fully able and employable. Insofar as the
Court assumes that the majority of individuals with impairments
such as prosthetic limbs or epilepsy will still be covered under
its approach because they are substantially limited
"notwithstanding the use of a corrective device,"
ante, at
488, I respectfully disagree as an empirical matter. Although it is
of course true that some of these individuals are substantially
limited in any condition, Congress enacted the ADA in part because
such individuals are
not ordinarily substantially limited in
their mitigated condition, but rather are often the victims of
"stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society." 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(7).
It has also been suggested that if we treat as "disabilities"
impairments that may be mitigated by measures as ordinary and
expedient as wearing eyeglasses, a flood of litigation will ensue.
The suggestion is misguided. Although vision is of critical
importance for airline pilots, in most segments of the economy
whether an employee wears glasses-or uses any of several other
mitigating measures-is a matter of complete indifference to
employers. It is difficult to envision many situations in which a
qualified employee who needs glasses to perform her job might be
fired-as the statute requires-"because of," § 12112, the fact that
she cannot see well without them. Such a proposition would be
ridiculous in the garden-variety case. On the other hand, if an
accounting firm, for example, adopted a guideline refusing to hire
any incoming accountant who has uncorrected vision of less than
20/100-or, by the same token, any person who is unable without
medication to avoid having seizures-such a rule would seem to be
the essence of invidious discrimination.
In this case the quality of petitioners' uncorrected vision is
relevant only because the airline regards the ability to see
511
without glasses as an employment qualification for its pilots.
Presumably it would not insist on such a qualification unless it
has a sound business justification for doing so (an issue we do not
address today). But if United regards petitioners as unqualified
because they cannot see well without glasses, it seems eminently
fair for a court also to use uncorrected vision as the basis for
evaluating petitioners' life activity of seeing.
Under the agencies' approach, individuals with poor eyesight and
other correctable impairments will, of course, be able to file
lawsuits claiming discrimination on that basis. Yet all of those
same individuals can already file employment discrimination claims
based on their race, sex, or religion, and-provided they are at
least 40 years old-their age. Congress has never seen this as
reason to restrict classes of antidiscrimination coverage. Indeed,
it is hard to believe that providing individuals with one more
antidiscrimination protection will make any more of them file
baseless or vexatious lawsuits. To the extent that the Court is
concerned with requiring employers to answer in litigation for
every employment practice that draws distinctions based on physical
attributes, that anxiety should be addressed not in this case, but
in one that presents an issue regarding employers' affirmative
defenses.
In the end, the Court is left only with its tenacious grip on
Congress' finding that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities," 42 U. s. C. § 12101(a)(1)-and
that figure's legislative history extrapolated from a law review
"article authored by the drafter of the original ADA bill
introduced in Congress in 1988."
Ante, at 484. We previously
have observed that a "statement of congressional findings is a
rather thin reed upon which to base" a statutory construction.
National Organization for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler,
510 U. S. 249,
260 (1994). Even so, as I have noted above, I readily agree that
the agencies' approach to the Act would extend coverage to more
than that number of people (although the Court's lofty esti-
512
mates, see
ante, at 487, may be inflated because they do
not appear to exclude impairments that are not substantially
limiting). It is equally undeniable, however, that "43 million" is
not a fixed cap on the Act's protected class: By including the
"record of" and "regarded as" categories, Congress fully expected
the Act to protect individuals who lack, in the Court's words,
"actual" disabilities, and therefore are not counted in that
number.
What is more, in mining the depths of the history of the 43
million figure-surveying even agency reports that predate the
drafting of any of this case's controlling legislation-the Court
fails to acknowledge that its narrow approach may have the perverse
effect of denying coverage for a sizeable portion of the core group
of 43 million. The Court appears to exclude from the Act's
protected class individuals with controllable conditions such as
diabetes and severe hypertension that were expressly understood as
substantially limiting impairments in the Act's Committee Reports,
see
supra, at 500-501-and even, as the footnote in the
margin shows, in the studies that produced the 43 million figure. 6
Given the inability to make the 43 million figure fit any
consistent method of interpreting the word "disabled," it would be
far wiser for the Court to follow-or at least to mentionthe
documents reflecting Congress' contemporaneous understanding of the
term: the Committee Reports on the actual legislation.
6 See National Council on Disability, Toward Independence 12
(1986) (hypertension); U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Disability, Functional Limitation, and Health Insurance Coverage:
1984/85, p. 51 (1986) (hypertension, diabetes); National Institute
on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, Data on Disability from
the National Health Interview Survey 1983-1985, p. 33 (1988)
(epilepsy, diabetes, hypertension); U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau
of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 114-115 (1989)
(Tables 114 and 115) (diabetes, hypertension); Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., Digest of Data on Persons with Disabilities 3
(1984) (hypertension, diabetes).
513
IV
Occupational hazards characterize many trades. The farsighted
pilot may have as much trouble seeing the instrument panel as the
nearsighted pilot has in identifying a safe place to land. The
vision of appellate judges is sometimes subconsciously obscured by
a concern that their decision will legalize issues best left to the
private sphere or will magnify the work of an already-overburdened
judiciary. See
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 326,
337-339 (1979) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Although these concerns
may help to explain the Court's decision to chart its own
course-rather than to follow the one that has been well marked by
Congress, by the overwhelming consensus of circuit judges, and by
the Executive officials charged with the responsibility of
administering the ADA-they surely do not justify the Court's
crabbed vision of the territory covered by this important
statute.
Accordingly, although I express no opinion on the ultimate
merits of petitioners' claim, I am persuaded that they have a
disability covered by the ADA. I therefore respectfully
dissent.
JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting.
We must draw a statutory line that either (1) will include
within the category of persons authorized to bring suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 some whom Congress may not
have wanted to protect (those who wear ordinary eyeglasses), or (2)
will exclude from the threshold category those whom Congress
certainly did want to protect (those who successfully use
corrective devices or medicines, such as hearing aids or prostheses
or medicine for epilepsy). Faced with this dilemma, the statute's
language, structure, basic purposes, and history require us to
choose the former statutory line, as JUSTICE STEVENS (whose opinion
I join) well explains. I would add that, if the more generous
choice of threshold led to too many lawsuits that ultimately
proved
514
without merit or otherwise drew too much time and attention away
from those whom Congress clearly sought to protect, there is a
remedy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), through
regulation, might draw finer definitional lines, excluding some of
those who wear eyeglasses (say, those with certain vision
impairments who readily can find corrective lenses), thereby
cabining the overly broad extension of the statute that the
majority fears.
The majority questions whether the EEOC could do so, for the
majority is uncertain whether the EEOC possesses typical agency
regulation-writing authority with respect to the statute's
definitions. See
ante, at 479-480. The majority poses this
question because the section of the statute, 42 U. S. C. § 12116,
that says the EEOC "shall issue regulations" also says these
regulations are "to carry out
this subchapter" (namely, §
12111 to § 12117, the employment subchapter); and the section of
the statute that contains the three-pronged definition of
"disability" precedes
"this subchapter," the employment
subchapter, to which § 12116 specifically refers. (Emphasis
added.)
Nonetheless, the employment subchapter, i.
e., "this
subchapter," includes other provisions that use the defined terms,
for example a provision that forbids "discriminat[ing] against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability."
§ 12112(a). The EEOC might elaborate, through regulations, on the
meaning of "disability" in this lastmentioned provision, if
elaboration is needed in order to "carry out" the substantive
provisions of "this subchapter." An EEOC regulation that elaborated
on the meaning of this use of the word "disability" would fall
within the scope
both of the basic definitional provision
and also the substantive provisions of
"this" later
subchapter, for the word "disability" appears in both places.
There is no reason to believe that Congress would have wanted to
deny the EEOC the power to issue such a regulation, at least if the
regulation is consistent with the earlier
515
statutory definition and with the relevant interpretations by
other enforcement agencies. The physical location of the
definitional section seems to reflect only drafting or stylistic,
not substantive, objectives. And to pick and choose among which of
"this subchapter['sJ" words the EEOC has the power to
explain would inhibit the development of law that coherently
interprets this important statute.
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