A cause may be transferred by an act of Congress from one
inferior tribunal to another.
The Justices of the Supreme Court having, by practice and
acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing
with the organization of the judicial system, sat as circuit
judges, this practical exposition of the Constitution is too strong
to be shaken or controlled.
Page 5 U. S. 300
A judgment was obtained by the defendant in error in the Court
of the United States for the Middle Circuit, in the Virginia
District, in an action instituted in that court in January, 1801,
for a debt due by the plaintiff in error to him for and on behalf
of Laird & Robertson of Port Glasgow, Great Britain.
The Middle Circuit Court in the Virginia District was
established by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and continued until 13
February, 1801, when an act was passed, entitled "an act to provide
for the more convenient organization of the courts of the United
States." 1 Story's L.U.S. 797.
By the twenty-first section of that act, all cases depending in
the Middle Circuit Court in Virginia were transferred to other
circuit courts established by that law, and by the "act to repeal
certain acts respecting the organization of the courts of the
United States, and for other purposes," passed 8 March 1802, the
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as to the Middle Circuit
Court of Virginia were revised and reenacted.
The case in the middle circuit court went from that court in
February, 1801, to the court established by the Act of 13 February,
1801, and it afterwards, on the repeal of that law, returned to the
court in which it was originally commenced. While it was pending in
the court established in February, 1801, certain proceedings were
had which were brought up with the record, and to which the
exceptions were taken by the defendant below, and were presented
for the consideration of this Court.
The exceptions before this Court were 1. that Congress could not
transfer causes from one circuit court to another, and therefore
all the proceedings in the court established by the Act of February
13, 1801, were void; 2. that the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States could not by an act of Congress be assigned to
hold circuit courts.
Page 5 U. S. 308
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE Marshall having tried the cause in the court
below, declined giving an opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PATERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
On an action instituted by John Laird against Hugh Stuart, a
judgment was entered in a Court for the Fourth Circuit in the
Eastern District of Virginia, in December term, 1801. On this
judgment, an execution was issued, returnable to April term, 1802,
in the same court. In the term of December, 1802, John Laird
obtained judgment at a Court for the Fifth Circuit in the Virginia
District against Hugh Stuart and Charles L. Carter upon their bond
for the forthcoming and delivery of certain property therein
mentioned, which had been levied upon by virtue of the above
execution against the said Hugh Stuart.
Two reasons have been assigned by counsel for reversing the
judgment on the forthcoming bond. 1. That as the bond was given for
the delivery of property levied on by virtue of an execution
issuing out of, and returnable to a court for the Fourth Circuit,
no other court could legally
Page 5 U. S. 309
proceed upon the said bond. This is true if there be no
statutable provision to direct and authorize such proceeding.
Congress has constitutional authority to establish from time to
time such inferior tribunals as they may think proper and to
transfer a cause from one such tribunal to another. In this last
particular, there are no words in the Constitution to prohibit or
restrain the exercise of legislative power.
The present is a case of this kind. It is nothing more than the
removal of the suit brought by Stuart against Laird from the Court
of the Fourth Circuit to the Court of the Fifth Circuit, which is
authorized to proceed upon and carry it into full effect. This is
apparent from the ninth section of the act entitled "An act to
amend the judicial system of the United States," passed 29 April,
1802. The forthcoming bond is an appendage to the cause, or rather
a component part of the proceedings.
2. Another reason for reversal is that the judges of the Supreme
Court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed
as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct
commissions for that purpose. To this objection, which is of recent
date, it is sufficient to observe that practice and acquiescence
under it for a period of several years, commencing with the
organization of the judicial system, afford an irresistible answer
and have indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary
interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical
exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.
Of course the question is at rest, and ought not now to be
disturbed.
Judgment affirmed.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment