OCTOBER TERM, 1993
Syllabus
SHANNON
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT
No. 92-8346. Argued March 22, 1994-Decided June 24,1994
In the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA or Act),
Congress made insanity an affirmative defense, created a special
verdict of "not guilty only by reason of insanity" (NGI), and
established a comprehensive civil commitment procedure. At his
trial on a federal criminal charge, petitioner Shannon raised the
insanity defense and asked the District Court to instruct the jury
that an NGI verdict would result in his involuntary commitment. The
court refused, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. In
affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that, under its pre-IDRA
precedent, juries were not to be instructed concerning the
consequences of an insanity acquittal. Because there was no
directive in the IDRA to the contrary, the court "adhere[d] to the
established axiom that it is inappropriate for a jury to consider
or be informed about the consequences of its verdict."
Held: A federal district court is not required to
instruct the jury regarding the consequences to the defendant of an
NGI verdict. Pp.579-588.
(a) The principle that juries are not to consider the
consequences of their verdicts is a reflection of the basic
division of labor between the judge as sentencer and the jury as
trier of fact. Providing jurors sentencing information invites them
to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts
them from their responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility
of confusion. Pp. 579-580.
(b) The IDRA does not require courts to depart from the
foregoing principle. The text of the Act gives no indication that
jurors are to be instructed regarding the consequences of an NGI
verdict. The Court rejects Shannon's contention that Congress, by
modeling the IDRA on D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301, impliedly adopted a
D. C. Circuit decision that endorsed the practice of giving the
instruction in question in the context of § 24-301. Because
Congress departed from the scheme embodied in § 24-301 in several
significant ways when it passed the IDRA, the canon of construction
urged by Shannon-that adoption of the wording of a statute from
another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the jurisdiction's
judicial interpretations of that wording-is not applicable. The
single passage in the legislative history endorsing the giving of
the instruction in question is in no way anchored in the IDRA's
text and is not entitled to authoritative weight. Pp. 580-584.
574
Syllabus
(c) The instruction in question is not required as a matter of
general federal criminal practice. Even if Shannon is correct that
some jurors may harbor the mistaken belief that defendants found
NGI will be released into society immediately, it must be assumed
that his jury followed its instructions to apply the law regardless
of the consequences and not to consider or discuss punishment. See
Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206. Also
unpersuasive is Shannon's contention that the instruction would
allay the fears of such misinformed jurors. Indeed, because the
only mandatory period of confinement under the IDRA is a maximum of
40 days between an NGI verdict and a required commitment hearing,
an instruction of the type at issue might incline jurors to convict
in order to eliminate the possibility that a dangerous defendant
could be released after 40 days or less. In any event, the
instruction would draw the jury's attention to the very thing-the
possible consequences of its verdict-that it should ignore.
Moreover, Shannon offers no principled way to limit the
availability of such instructions to cases involving NGI verdicts,
as opposed to the many other aspects of the criminal sentencing
process with which jurors may be unfamiliar. Given the
comprehensive nature of Congress' review of the insanity defense
during the enactment of the IDRA, the Court will not invoke its
supervisory powers to require an instruction that Congress chose
not to mandate. Pp.584-587.
(d) This decision should not be misunderstood as an absolute
prohibition on instructing the jury with regard to the consequences
of an NGI verdict. An instruction of some form may be necessary
under certain limited circumstances to remedy a misstatement or
error. That is not the case here, however, for there is no
indication that any improper statement was made in the presence of
the jury during Shannon's trial. Pp. 587-588.
981 F.2d
759, affirmed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BLACKMUN, J., joined,
post, p. 588.
Thomas R. Trout, by appointment of the Court, 510 U. S.
943, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Amy L. Wax argued the cause for the United States.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assist-
575
ant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson,
and Deborah Watson. *
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider whether a federal district court is
required to instruct the jury regarding the consequences to the
defendant of a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity,"
either under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 or as a matter
of general federal practice. We conclude that such an instruction
is not required, and therefore affirm.
I A
Prior to the enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984 (IDRA or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§ 17, 4241-4247, federal courts
generally did not recognize a verdict of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" (NGI). Defendants who mounted a successful insanity
defense-that is, those who raised a reasonable doubt as to their
sanity at the time of the offense-were simply found "not guilty."
See,
e. g., United States v.
McCracken, 488 F.2d
406, 409, 418 (CA5 1974);
Evalt v.
United States,
359 F.2d
534, 537 (CA9 1966). In addition, there was no general federal
civil commitment procedure available to ensure that an insanity
acquittee would receive proper care and treatment. Only in the
District of Columbia was a defendant who successfully presented an
insanity defense to a federal criminal charge subject to a federal
commitment process-a process governed by a 1955 congressional
enactment. See 69 Stat. 609, as amended, D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301
(1981).1 Elsewhere, federal authorities
*Peter Margulies filed a brief for the Coalition for the
Fundamental Rights of Ex-Patients urging reversal.
1 See also
United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d
969, 996 (CADC 1972) (en bane);
United States v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d
128, 129-131 (CADC 1984) (en bane);
United States v.
Thigpen, 4 F.3d
1573, 1576, and n. 1 (CAll 1993) (en bane), eert. pending, No.
93-6747.
576
were forced to rely on the willingness of state authorities to
institute civil commitment proceedings. Reliance on state
cooperation was "at best a partial solution to a serious problem,"
however, and federal courts "[t]ime and again ... decried this
gaping statutory hole."
McCracken, supra, at 417.
Before the IDRA was enacted, the Federal Courts of Appeals
generally disapproved of instructing the jury concerning the
post-trial consequences of an insanity acquittal. Thus, jurors
typically were given no information with regard to what would
happen to a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity. The courts
in general gave two reasons for disapproving such instructions.
First, they pointed out that, given the absence of a federal
commitment procedure, the consequences of an insanity acquittal
were far from certain. Second, they concluded that such
instructions would run afoul of the well-established principle that
a jury is to base its verdict on the evidence before it, without
regard to the possible consequences of the verdict. See,
e. g.,
McCracken, supra, at 423;
Evalt, supra, at 546;
United States v.
Borum, 464 F.2d
896, 900-901 (CAlO 1972).
The only Court of Appeals to endorse the practice of instructing
the jury regarding the consequences of an insanity acquittal was
the District of Columbia Circuit. See
Lyles v.
United
States, 254 F.2d
725 (1957) (en banc), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 961 (1958). In
Lyles, the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the jury
instruction question in the context of D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301
(1951 ed., Supp. V), which, unlike generally applicable federal
law, provided for a special verdict of NGI and, as noted above, a
civil commitment procedure. The
Lyles court recognized the
"well established and sound" doctrine "that the jury has no concern
with the consequences" of a verdict, but stated that the doctrine
"d[id] not apply" to the situation before it. 254 F. 2d, at 728.
According to the court, although jurors generally were "aware of
the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty," they
577
were unfamiliar with the meaning of an NGI verdict.
Ibid.
The court concluded that jurors had "a right to know" the meaning
of an NGI verdict "as accurately as [they] kno[w] by common
knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts."
Ibid.
The acquittal of John Hinckley on all charges stemming from his
attempt on President Reagan's life, coupled with the ensuing public
focus on the insanity defense, prompted Congress to undertake a
comprehensive overhaul of the insanity defense as it operated in
the federal courts. The result of this effort was the IDRA. In the
IDRA, Congress made insanity an affirmative defense to be proved by
the defendant by clear and convincing evidence, and created a
special verdict of "not guilty only by reason of insanity." 18 U.
S. C. §§ 17 and 4242(b). In addition, Congress filled the
"statutory hole" that had been identified by federal courts, see
McCracken, supra, by creating a comprehensive civil
commitment procedure. § 4243. Under that procedure, a defendant
found NGI is held in custody pending a court hearing, which must
occur within 40 days of the verdict. § 4243(c). At the conclusion
of the hearing, the court determines whether the defendant should
be hospitalized or released. §§4243(d), (e).
B
At about 4 a.m. on August 25,1990, a police officer stopped
petitioner Terry Lee Shannon, a convicted felon, on a street in
Tupelo, Mississippi. For reasons not explained in the record before
us, the officer asked Shannon to accompany him to the station house
to speak with a detective. After telling the officer that he did
not want to live anymore, Shannon walked across the street, pulled
a pistol from his coat, and shot himself in the chest.
Shannon survived his suicide attempt and was indicted for
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.
S. C. § 922(g)(1). At trial, he raised the insanity defense, and
asked the District Court to instruct the jury that he
578
would be involuntarily committed if the jury returned an NGI
verdict.2 The District Court refused to give Shannon's proposed
charge. Instead, it instructed the jury "to apply the law as
[instructed] regardless of the consequence," and that "punishment
... should not enter your consideration or discussion." App. A-27
to A-28. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Shannon's
conviction.
981 F.2d
759 (1993). The court noted that under its pre-IDRA precedent,
juries were not to be instructed concerning the consequences of an
insanity acquittal.
Id., at 761-762 (discussing
United
States v.
McCracken, 488 F.2d
406 (CA5 1974)). Turning to the text of the IDRA, the court
observed that Congress had "said nothing about informing juries of
the consequences" of an NGI verdict. 981 F. 2d, at 764. Because
there was no "statutory requirement" to the contrary, the court
"adhere[d] to the established axiom that it is inappropriate for a
jury to consider or be informed about the consequences of its
verdict."
Ibid.3
2 Shannon asked the court to give either of the two following
instructions: (1) "'In the event it is your verdict that [Shannon]
is not guilty only by reason of insanity, it is required that the
Court commit [him]'''; or (2) "'[Y]ou should know that it is
required that the Court commit [Shannon] to a suitable hospital
facility until such time as [he] does not pose a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another or serious damage to the property of
another.''' App. A-22.
3 In addition to the court below, the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits recently have reaffirmed their pre-IDRA holdings that
juries generally should not be instructed concerning the
consequences of an insanity acquittal. See
United States v.
Frank, 956 F.2d
872, 880-882
(CA9 1991), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 932
(1992);
Thigpen, 4 F. 3d, at 1578. The Third Circuit has
held that the decision to give such an instruction should be left
to "the sound discretion of the trial judge."
United States
v.
Fisher, 10 F.3d
115, 122 (1993), cert. pending, No. 93-7000. A panel of the
Second Circuit recently divided three ways on the issue. See
United States v. Blume,
967 F.2d
45, 50 (1992) (Newman, J., concurring) ("I believe the
instruction should always be given unless the defendant prefers its
omission. Judge Winter believes the instruction should normally not
be
579
We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 943 (1993), in order to
consider whether federal district courts are required to instruct
juries with regard to the consequences of an NGI verdict.
II
It is well established that when a jury has no sentencing
function,4 it should be admonished to "reach its verdict without
regard to what sentence might be imposed."
Rogers v.
United States, 422 U. S. 35, 40 (1975).5
The principle that juries are not to consider the consequences of
their verdicts is a reflection of the basic division of labor in
our legal system between judge and jury. The jury's function is to
find the facts and to decide whether, on those facts, the defendant
is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by contrast, imposes
sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at a guilty
verdict. Information regarding the consequences of a verdict is
therefore irrelevant to the jury's task. Moreover, providing jurors
sentencing information invites them to ponder matters that are not
within their province, distracts them from their factfinding
responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion.
See
Pope v.
United States, 298
F.2d 507,508 (CA5 1962); cf.
Rogers, supra, at 40.
Despite these familiar precepts, Shannon contends that an
instruction informing the jury of the consequences of an NGI
given. Judge Lumbard believes that the decision whether to give
the instruction should be left to the discretion of the trial
judge").
4 Particularly in capital trials, juries may be given sentencing
responsibilities. See,
e. g., Simmons v.
South Carolina,
ante, p. 154. It is undisputed that the jury had no such
responsibilities in Shannon's case.
5 In
Rogers, the jury had been deliberating for almost
two hours without reaching a verdict. After the trial court
informed the jury that it would accept a verdict of "Guilty as
charged with extreme mercy of the Court," the jury returned such a
verdict within minutes. 422 U. S., at 36-37 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We concluded that, instead of giving the jurors
information about sentencing (that is, that they could recommend
"extreme mercy"), the trial court should have "admoni[shed] [them]
that [they] had no sentencing function and should reach [their]
verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed."
Id., at 40.
580
verdict is required under the IDRA whenever requested by the
defendant. He also argues that such an instruction is required as a
matter of general federal criminal practice. We address each
argument in turn.
A
To determine whether Congress intended courts to depart from the
principle that jurors are not to be informed of the consequences of
their verdicts, we turn first, as always, to the text of the
statute. The IDRA refers to the subject of jury instructions only
once, and that reference occurs in its description of the possible
verdicts a jury may return. Under the Act, "the jury shall be
instructed to find ... the defendant-(l) guilty; (2) not guilty; or
(3) not guilty only by reason of insanity." 18 U. S. C. § 4242(b).
The text of the Act gives no indication that jurors are to be
instructed regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict. As the
court below observed, the Act "leaves the jury solely with its
customary determination of guilt or innocence." 981 F. 2d, at 763.
The Act's text thus gives no support to Shannon's contention that
an instruction informing the jury of the consequences of an NGI
verdict is required.
Shannon asserts, however, that an express statutory directive is
not necessary because, by modeling the IDRA on D. C. Code Ann. §
24-301 (1981),6 Congress impliedly adopted the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in
Lyles and the practice endorsed by
that decision of instructing the jury as to the consequences of an
NGI verdict. For this argument he relies on
Capital Traction
Co. v.
Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 36 (1899), in
which we stated:
6 District of Columbia Code Ann. § 24-301 continued to govern
the operation of the insanity defense in federal criminal
prosecutions in the District of Columbia until the passage of the
IDRA. Cf.
United States v.
Crutchfield, 893 F.2d
376, 377-379 (CADC 1990) (holding that the IDRA applies
prospectively to insanity acquittees committed after its
enactment).
581
"By a familiar canon of interpretation, heretofore applied by
this court whenever Congress ... has borrowed from the statutes of
a State provisions which had received in that State a known and
settled construction before their enactment by Congress, that
construction must be deemed to have been adopted by Congress
together with the text which it expounded, and the provisions must
be construed as they were understood at the time in the State."
See also
Carolene Products Co. v.
United States,
323 U. S. 18, 26
(1944) ("[T]he general rule [is] that adoption of the wording of a
statute from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the
previous judicial interpretations of the wording");
Cathcart
v.
Robinson, 5 Pet. 264, 280 (1831). The canon of
interpretation upon which Shannon relies, however, is merely a
"presumption of legislative intention" to be invoked only "under
suitable conditions."
Carolene Products, supra, at 26. We
believe that the "conditions" are not "suitable" in this case.
Indeed, although Congress may have had the District of Columbia
Code in mind when it passed the IDRA, see
United States v.
Crutchfield, 893 F.2d
376, 378 (CADC 1990), it did not, in the language of
Hof, "borrow" the terms of the IDRA from the District of
Columbia Code. Rather, Congress departed from the scheme embodied
in D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301 in several significant ways.
The IDRA, for example, requires a defendant at trial to prove
insanity by clear and convincing evidence, 18 U. S. C. § 17(b); the
District of Columbia statute, by contrast, employs a preponderance
standard, D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301(j). A commitment hearing must be
held under the IDRA within 40 days of an NGI verdict, 18 U. S. C. §
4243(c); the period is 50 days under the District of Columbia
scheme, D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301(d)(2)(A). Under the IDRA, a
defendant whose offense involved bodily injury to another or
serious damage to another's property, or the substantial risk
thereof, must demonstrate at the hearing by clear and convincing
evi-
582
dence that he is entitled to release, 18 U. S. C. § 4243(d);
under the District of Columbia scheme, an acquittee, regardless of
the character of his offense, need only meet the preponderance
standard, D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301(k)(3). The IDRA provides that an
acquittee, once committed, may be released when he no longer
presents a substantial risk of harm to others or to their property,
18 U. S. C. § 4243(f); an acquittee under the District of Columbia
system may be released from commitment when he "will not in the
reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others," D. C. Code
Ann. § 24-301(e). Finally, in the IDRA, Congress rejected the broad
test for insanity that had been utilized under the District of
Columbia provision,7 and instead adopted a more restrictive
formulation under which a person is deemed insane if he is unable
"to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts." 18 U. S. C. § 17(a). We believe that these significant
differences between the IDRA and D. C. Code Ann. § 24-301 render
the canon upon which Shannon relies inapplicable in this case.8
7 Under the District of Columbia system, the courts had defined
insanity as either the lack of substantial capacity to conform
one's conduct to the requirements of the law
or the lack of
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's acts.
See
Brawner, 471 F. 2d, at 973-995.
8 In addition, we note that the canon upon which Shannon relies
is a canon of
statutory construction. It stems from the
notion that a court, in interpreting "borrowed" statutory language,
should apply the same construction to that language that was placed
upon it by the courts in the jurisdiction from which it was
borrowed. In this case, however, the court in the jurisdiction from
which the statutory text was supposedly borrowed-that is, the
Lyles court-did not purport to construe the language of the
District of Columbia Code provision; rather, in holding that jurors
should be informed of the consequences of an NGI verdict, the court
appears to have relied on its supervisory power over the Federal
District Courts in the District of Columbia. Cf.
infra, at
584. Thus, we conclude that the canon is also inapplicable in this
case because there was no "known and settled construction,"
Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 36 (1899), of
the statute that Congress could have adopted by virtue of borrowing
language from the District of Columbia statutory scheme.
583
Alternatively, Shannon contends that a provision explicitly
requiring the instruction is unnecessary for a different reason:
namely, that Congress made its intention to adopt the
Lyles
practice crystal clear in the IDRA's legislative history. In
particular, Shannon points to the following statement in the Senate
Report:
"The Committee endorses the procedure used in the District of
Columbia whereby the jury, in a case in which the insanity defense
has been raised, may be instructed on the effect of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity. If the defendant requests that
the instruction not be given, it is within the discretion of the
court whether to give it or not." S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 240 (1983)
(footnotes omitted).
Members of this Court have expressed differing views regarding
the role that legislative history should play in statutory
interpretation. Compare
County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452
U. S. 161, 182 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[I]t [is]
well settled that the legislative history of a statute is a useful
guide to the intent of Congress"), with
Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 617 (1991)
(SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (legislative history is
"unreliable ... as a genuine indicator of congressional intent").
We are not aware of any case, however (and Shannon does not bring
one to our attention), in which we have given authoritative weight
to a single passage of legislative history that is in no way
anchored in the text of the statute. On its face, the passage
Shannon identifies does not purport to explain or interpret any
provision of the IDRA. Rather, it merely conveys the Committee's
"endorsement" of the
Lyles "procedure"-a procedure that
Congress did not include in the text of the Act. To give effect to
this snippet of legislative history, we would have to abandon
altogether the text of the statute as a guide in the interpretative
process. We agree with the District of Columbia Circuit that
584
"courts have no authority to enforce [a] principl[e] gleaned
solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference
point."
International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local Union
No. 474,
AFL-CIO v.
NLRB, 814
F.2d 697,712 (1987) (emphasis deleted). We thus conclude that
there is no support in the Act for the instruction Shannon
seeks.9
B
Setting the Act aside, Shannon argues that the instruction he
proposes is required as a matter of general federal criminal
practice. Presumably, Shannon asks us to invoke our supervisory
power over the federal courts. According to Shannon, the
instruction is necessary because jurors are generally unfamiliar
with the consequences of an NGI verdict, and may erroneously
believe that a defendant who is found NGI will be immediately
released into society. Jurors who are under this mistaken
impression, Shannon continues, may also fear that the defendant, if
released, would pose a danger to the community. Shannon concludes
that such jurors, in order to ensure that the defendant will not be
released, may be tempted to return a guilty verdict in a case in
which an NGI verdict would be appropriate.
Even assuming Shannon is correct that some jurors will harbor
the mistaken belief that defendants found NGI will be released into
society immediately-an assumption that is
9 In the court below, Shannon made the additional argument that
because Congress filled the "gap" that had been identified by the
Federal Courts of Appeals prior to the IDRA with a general federal
civil commitment procedure, "the practice announced in
Lyles
must now be applied nationwide."
981 F.2d
759, 763 (CA5 1993). We find this argument (which Shannon makes
only implicitly before this Court) unpersuasive. As noted above,
although the lack of a federal commitment procedure before the
passage of the IDRA was one reason for rejecting a
Lyles-type instruction, courts generally, and properly,
relied additionally on the principle that juries are not to be
concerned with the consequences of their verdicts. This principle
is not altered by the fact that Congress established a civil
commitment procedure. See Thigpen, 4 F. 3d, at 1577.
585
open to debate 1°-the jury in his case was instructed "to apply
the law as [instructed] regardless of the consequence," and that
"punishment ... should not enter your consideration or discussion."
App. A-27 to A-28. That an NGI verdict was an option here gives us
no reason to depart from "the almost invariable assumption of the
law that jurors follow their instructions."
Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.
S. 200, 206 (1987). Indeed, although it may take effort on a
juror's part to ignore the potential consequences of the verdict,
the effort required in a case in which an NGI defense is raised is
no different from that required in many other situations. For
example, if the Government fails to meet its burden of proof at
trial, our judicial system necessarily assumes that a juror will
vote to acquit, rather than to convict, even if he is convinced the
defendant is highly dangerous and should be incarcerated. We do not
believe that the situation involving an NGI verdict should be
treated any differently.
We also are not persuaded that the instruction Shannon proposes
would allay the fears of the misinformed juror about whom Shannon
is concerned. "[I]f the members of a jury are so fearful of a
particular defendant's release that they would violate their oaths
by convicting [the defendant] solely in order to ensure that he is
not set free, it is questionable whether they would be reassured by
anything short of an instruction strongly suggesting that the
defendant, if found NGI, would very likely be civilly committed for
a
lOWe are not convinced that jurors are as unfamiliar with the
consequences of an NGI verdict as Shannon suggests. It may have
been the case in 1957 that, in contrast to verdicts of guilty and
not guilty, "a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity ha[d] no
... commonly understood meaning."
Lyles v.
United
States, 254 F.2d
725, 728 (CADC 1957) (en bane), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 961
(1958). Today, however, there is no reason to assume that jurors
believe that defendants found NGI are immediately set free. See
Fisher, 10 F. 3d, at 122 ("[H]ighly publicized cases, such
as that involving John Hinckley, have dramatized the possibility of
civil commitment following an NGI verdict"). See also Blume, 967 F.
2d, at 54 (Winter, J., concurring in result).
586
lengthy period."
United States v.
Fisher,
10 F.3d
115, 122 (CA3 1993), cert. pending, No. 93-7000. An accurate
instruction about the consequences of an NGI verdict, however,
would give no such assurance. Under the IDRA, a postverdict hearing
must be held within 40 days to determine whether the defendant
should be released immediately into society or hospitalized. See 18
U. S. C. §§ 4243(c), (d). Thus, the only mandatory period of
confinement for an insanity acquittee is the period between the
verdict and the hearing. Instead of encouraging a juror to return
an NGI verdict, as Shannon predicts, such information might have
the opposite effect-that is, a juror might vote to convict in order
to eliminate the possibility that a dangerous defendant could be
released after 40 days or less.ll Whether the instruction works to
the advantage or disadvantage of a defendant is, of course,
somewhat beside the point. Our central concern here is that the
inevitable result of such an instruction would be to draw the
jury's attention toward the very thing-the possible consequences of
its verdictit should ignore.
Moreover, Shannon offers us no principled way to limit the
availability of instructions detailing the consequences of a
verdict to cases in which an NGI defense is raised. Jurors may be
as unfamiliar with other aspects of the criminal sentencing process
as they are with NGI verdicts. But, as a general matter, jurors are
not informed of mandatory minimum or maximum sentences, nor are
they instructed regard-
11 As the court below observed, "a jury could assume that due to
overcrowded mental hospitals, strapped social services budgets,
sympathetic judges, etc., a defendant will be released after only a
short period of commitment. To combat the prospect of early
release, the jury could simply opt to find him guilty." 981 F. 2d,
at 763, n. 6. Indeed, depending upon the content of the
instruction, information regarding the consequences of an NGI
verdict could influence a juror's decision in countless-and
unpredictable-ways. See,
e. g., Fisher, supra, at 121-122,
and n. 7 (describing various scenarios in which sentencing
information could induce compromise verdicts in the NGI
context).
587
ing probation, parole, or the sentencing range accompanying a
lesser included offense. See
United States v.
Thigpen, 4 F.3d
1573, 1578 (CAll 1993) (en banc), cert. pending, No.
93-6747; United States v.
Frank, 956 F.2d
872, 879 (CA9 1991), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 932 (1992).
Because it is conceivable that some jurors might harbor
misunderstandings with regard to these sentencing options, a
district court, under Shannon's reasoning, might be obligated to
give juries information regarding these possibilities as well. In
short, if we pursue the logic of Shannon's position, the rule
against informing jurors of the consequences of their verdicts
would soon be swallowed by the exceptions.
Finally, Congress' recent action in this area counsels
hesitation in invoking our supervisory powers. As noted above, the
IDRA was the product of a thorough and exhaustive review of the
insanity defense as used in the federal courts. Given the
comprehensive nature of the task before it, Congress certainly
could have included a provision requiring the instruction Shannon
seeks. For whatever reason, Congress chose not to do so. Under
these circumstances, we are reluctant to depart from
well-established principles of criminal practice without more
explicit guidance from Congress.
III
Although we conclude that the IDRA does not require an
instruction concerning the consequences of an NGI verdict, and that
such an instruction is not to be given as a matter of general
practice, we recognize that an instruction of some form may be
necessary under certain limited circumstances. If, for example, a
witness or prosecutor states in the presence of the jury that a
particular defendant would "go free" if found NGI, it may be
necessary for the district court to intervene with an instruction
to counter such a misstatement. The appropriate response, of
course, will vary as is necessary to remedy the specific
misstatement or error. We note this possibility merely so that our
decision will not be
588
misunderstood as an absolute prohibition on instructing the jury
with regard to the consequences of an NGI verdict. Our observations
in this regard are not applicable to Shannon's situation, however,
for there is no indication that any improper statement was made in
the presence of the jury during his trial.
***
Because the District Court properly refused to give the
instruction Shannon requested, we affirm.
So ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
dissenting.
A rule that has minimized the risk of injustice for almost 40
years should not be abandoned without good reason. In 1957, shortly
after Congress enacted the statute providing for civil commitment
of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity in trials
conducted in the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals,
sitting in bane, considered whether juries should be instructed
about the significance of that provision. Recognizing that an
uninformed jury might erroneously find an insane defendant guilty
to avoid the risk that a dangerous individual would otherwise go
free, the court held that such an instruction should be given.
Lyles v.
United States, 254 F.2d
725 (CADC 1957), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 961 (1958). In an
opinion jointly authored by Judge Prettyman and then-Judge Warren
Burger, the court explained that the doctrine that the jury has no
concern with the consequences of a verdict "does not apply in the
problem before us":
"The issue of insanity having been fairly raised, the jury may
return one of three verdicts, guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by
reason of insanity. Jurors, in common with people in general, are
aware of the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty .... But
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly
understood meaning .... It means neither freedom nor
589
punishment. It means the accused will be confined in a hospital
for the mentally ill until the superintendent of such hospital
certifies, and the court is satisfied, that such person has
recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be
dangerous to himself or others. We think the jury has a right to
know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows
by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible
verdicts." Lyles, 254 F. 2d, at 728.
Concurring with this part of the foregoing opinion, Judge
Bazelon acknowledged that "[t]he false assumption that acquittal by
reason of insanity, like outright acquittal, frees the accused to
walk out on the streets may lead juries to convict, despite strong
evidence of insanity at the time of the crime."
Id., at 734.
Trial courts in the District of Columbia have used a pattern
instruction-approved by prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial
judges-ever since.1
Other federal courts did not give a comparable instruction prior
to 1984 because no federal statute authorized civil commitment for
insanity acquittees except in the District of Columbia. In those
courts, an instruction advising the jury about the consequences of
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity-often that such a
defendant would, indeed, go free-would have tended to increase the
risk of improper convictions. It was therefore appropriate for
federal judges to adhere to the general rule that the jury should
be instructed to base its decision on the evidence before it,
with-
1 Instruction 5.11 in the 1978 edition of the District of
Columbia Criminal Jury Instructions reads:
"If the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity it
becomes the duty of the court to commit him to St. Elizabeths
Hospital. There will be a hearing within 50 days to determine
whether the defendant is entitled to release. In that hearing the
defendant has the burden of proof. The defendant will remain in
custody, and will be entitled to release from custody only if the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not
likely to injure himself or other persons due to mental
illness."
590
out regard to the possible consequences of its verdict. That
rule, of course, was primarily designed to protect defendants from
the risk that jurors might otherwise improperly rely on matters
such as sympathy for the victim, arguments of counsel, or
inadmissible comments in the courtroom.
When Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984
(Act), 18 U. S. C. §§ 17, 4241-4247, it established a civil
commitment process for the entire federal system, thus making the
basis for the District of Columbia Circuit's holding in
Lyles applicable to all federal courts. The Act's
legislative history unmistakably demonstrates that the Act's
sponsors assumed that the
Lyles precedent would thereafter
be followed nationwide. See
ante, at 583. That assumption
does not have the force of a statutory mandate, but it verifies
that thoughtful legislators familiar with the issue believed that
precedent to be entirely sound. That this Court should now decide
to change an established rule that Congress accepted and that
protects defendants meaningfully against an obvious risk of
injustice is startling-particularly when that change is for no
reason other than a perceived inconsistency with another rule that
is generally protective of defendants' rights. A far wiser
disposition would allow the defendant to choose between the two
rules, rather than tilt the scales to favor the prosecutor in every
case.
The incongruity of the Court's holding is compounded by its
selection of
Rogers v.
United States, 422 U. S. 35 (1975), as
its authority for what it calls the "principle" that juries should
not consider the consequences of their verdict.
Ante, at
579. It is worth noting that the writer of the Court's opinion in
Rogers-Chief Justice Burger-was also one of the authors of
Lyles. In
Rogers, the jury had sent the judge a note
asking whether he would accept a verdict of "Guilty as charged with
extreme mercy of the Court"; when the court answered yes, the jury
returned five minutes later with that verdict.
Rogers, 422
U. S., at 36-37. What
Rogers held is
591
that the guilty verdict had to be set aside because the court
had violated Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by
responding to an inquiry from the jury without advising defense
counsel.
Id., at 40-41. The Court also considered the
judge's response to be misleading because it did not advise the
jury that their recommendation of mercy would not be binding on the
court.
Ibid. In that context, the failure to admonish the
jury that it should reach its verdict without regard to what
sentence might be imposed was prejudicial to the defendant. Instead
of supporting the majority's view, the case is more relevant for
its illustration of how concerned juries are about the actual
consequences of their verdicts. When there is a realistic danger
that jurors' deliberations may be distorted by an incorrect
assumption about those consequences, elementary notions of fairness
demand that a clarifying instruction be given.
The Court suggests that the instruction might actually prejudice
the defendant.
Ante, at 585-586. That argument lacks merit,
as there is no need to give the instruction unless the defendant
requests it. Alternatively, the Court advances the tired argument
that if we followed the practice approved in
Lyles, "the
rule against informing jurors of the consequences of their verdicts
would soon be swallowed by the exceptions,"
ante, at 587.
Given that the
Lyles rule has survived in the District since
1957 without such consequences, this concern is illusory. Some
courts have assumed that the instruction would help jurors focus on
issues of guilt instead of punishment. "Freed from confusion and
fear as to the practical effect of a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity, jurors should be able to decide the insanity
issue solely on the evidence and law governing the defense."
State v.
Shickles, 760 P. 2d 291, 298 (Utah 1988).
Rather than relying on a totally unsubstantiated qualm belied by
history, it would be far wiser for the Court simply to recognize
both the seriousness of the harm that may result from
592
the refusal to give the instruction and the absence of any
identifiable countervailing harm that may result from giving
it.
The Court also contends that jurors today are more familiar with
the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
than they were in 1957 when
Lyles was decided.
Ante,
at 584, n. 9. No one has suggested, however, that the level of
understanding even approximates that of the conventional choice
between "guilty" and "not guilty." Indeed, one recent study
concluded that "the public overestimates the extent to which
insanity acquittees are released upon acquittal and underestimates
the extent to which they are hospitalized as well as the length of
confinement of insanity acquittees who are sent to mental
hospitals." 2 As long as significant numbers of potential jurors
believe that an insanity acquittee will be released at once, the
instruction serves a critical purpose. Yet even if, as the Court
seems prepared to assume, all jurors are already knowledgeable
about the issue, surely telling them what they already know can do
no harm.
An increasing number of States that have considered the question
endorses use of the instruction,3 as has the American Bar
Association.4 Judge Newman's succinct assessment
2 Silver, Cirincione, and Steadman, Demythologizing Inaccurate
Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 Law and Human Behavior 63,
68 (Feb. 1994).
3 See,
e. g., Erdman v.
State, 315 Md. 46, 553 A.
2d 244 (1989);
State v.
Shickles, 760 P. 2d 291 (Utah 1988);
People v.
Young, 189 Cal. App. 3d 891, 234 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987);
People v.
Thomson, 197 Colo. 232, 591 P. 2d 1031
(1979); Commonwealth v.
Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.
2d 349 (1977);
Roberts v.
State, 335 So. 2d 285 (Fla.
1976);
Commonwealth v.
Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 323 N.
E. 2d 294 (1975);
State v.
Babin, 319 So. 2d 367 (La.
1975). See also Fleming, Instructions in State Criminal Case in
Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in Event
of Acquittal, 81 A. L. R. 4th 659, 667 (1990) (noting "an apparent
trend toward requiring or authorizing a jury instruction on the
legal consequences of an insanity acquittal").
4 ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards § 7-6.8
(1989).
593
of the pros and cons is exactly right: "There is no reason to
keep this information from the jurors and every reason to make them
aware of it."
United States v.
Blume, 967 F.2d
45, 52 (CA2 1992) (concurring opinion).
I respectfully dissent.
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