OPINION OF THE COURT
ROCKWELL INT'L CORP. V. UNITED STATES
549 U. S. ____ (2007)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 05-1272
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., et al.,
PETITIONERS
v. UNITED STATES et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit
[March 27, 2007]
Justice Scalia delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The False Claims Act, 31 U.
S. C. §§3729–3733, eliminates federal-court jurisdiction over
actions under §3730 of the Act that are based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions “unless the action is
brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action
is an original source of the information.” §3730(e)(4)(A). We
decide whether respondent James Stone was an original source.
I
The mixture of concrete and pond
sludge that is the subject of this case has taken nearly two
decades to seep, so to speak, into this Court. Given the long
history and the complexity of this litigation, it is well to
describe the facts in some detail.
A
From 1975 through 1989,
petitioner Rockwell International Corp. was under a management and
operating contract with the Department of Energy (DOE) to run the
Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. The most significant
portion of Rockwell’s compensation came in the form of a semiannual
“ ‘award fee,’ ” the amount of which depended on DOE’s
evaluation of Rockwell’s performance in a number of areas,
including environmental, safety, and health concerns.
United
States ex rel. Stone v.
Rockwell Int’l, Corp., 92
Fed. Appx. 708, 714 (CA10 2004).
From November 1980 through March
1986, James Stone worked as an engineer at the Rocky Flats plant.
In the early 1980’s, Rockwell explored the possibility of disposing
of the toxic pond sludge that accumulated in solar evaporation
ponds at the facility, by mixing it with cement. The idea was to
pour the mixture into large rectangular boxes, where it would
solidify into “pondcrete” blocks that could be stored onsite or
transported to other sites for disposal.
Stone reviewed a proposed manufacturing
process for pondcrete in 1982. He concluded that the proposal
“would not work,” App. 175, and communicated that conclusion to
Rockwell management in a written “Engineering Order.” As Stone
would later explain, he believed “the suggested process would
result in an unstable mixture that would later deteriorate and
cause unwanted release of toxic wastes to the environment.”
Ibid. He believed this because he “foresaw that the piping
system” that extracted sludge from the solar ponds “would not
properly remove the sludge and would lead to an inadequate mixture
of sludge/waste and cement such that the ‘pond crete’ blocks would
rapidly disintegrate thus creating additional contamination
problems.”
Id., at 290.
Notwithstanding Stone’s prediction, Rockwell
proceeded with its pondcrete project and successfully manufactured
“concrete hard” pondcrete during the period of Stone’s employment
at Rocky Flats. It was only after Stone was laid off in March 1986
that what the parties have called “insolid” pondcrete blocks were
discovered. According to respondents, Rockwell knew by October 1986
that a substantial number of pondcrete blocks were insolid, but DOE
did not become aware of the problem until May 1988, when several
pondcrete blocks began to leak, leading to the discovery of
thousands of other insolid blocks. The media reported these
discoveries, 3 Appellants’ App. in Nos. 99–1351, 99–1352, 99–1353
(CA10), pp. 889–38 to 889–39; and attributed the malfunction to
Rockwell’s reduction of the ratio of concrete to sludge in the
mixture.
In June 1987, more than a year after he had
left Rockwell’s employ, Stone went to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) with allegations of environmental crimes at
Rocky Flats during the time of his employment. According to the
court below, Stone alleged that
“contrary to public knowledge, Rocky Flats accepted
hazardous and nuclear waste from other DOE facilities; that
Rockwell employees were ‘forbidden from discussing any
controversies in front of a DOE employee’; that although Rocky
Flats’ fluid bed incinerators failed testing in 1981, the pilot
incinerator remained on line and was used to incinerate wastes
daily since 1981, including plutonium wastes which were then sent
out for burial; that Rockwell distilled and fractionated various
oils and solvents although the wastes were geared for incineration;
that Stone believed that the ground water was contaminated from
previous waste burial and land application, and that hazardous
waste lagoons tended to overflow during and after ‘a good rain,’
causing hazardous wastes to be discharged without first being
treated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a.
Stone provided the FBI with 2,300 pages of
documents, buried among which was his 1982 engineering report
predicting that the pondcrete-system design would not work. Stone
did not discuss his pondcrete allegations with the FBI in their
conversations.[
Footnote 1]
Based in part on information allegedly learned
from Stone, the Government obtained a search warrant for Rocky
Flats, and on June 6, 1989, 75 FBI and Environmental Protection
Agency agents raided the facility. The affidavit in support of the
warrant included allegations (1) that pondcrete blocks were insolid
“due to an inadequate waste-concrete mixture,” App. 429, (2) that
Rockwell obtained award fees based on its alleged
“ ‘excellent’ ” management of Rocky Flats,
id.,
at 98, and (3) that Rockwell made false statements and concealed
material facts in violation of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2811, 42 U. S. C. §6928,
and 18 U. S. C. §1001. Newspapers published these allegations.
In March 1992, Rockwell pleaded guilty to 10 environmental
violations, including the knowing storage of insolid pondcrete
blocks in violation of RCRA. Rockwell agreed to pay $18.5 million
in fines.
B
In July 1989, Stone filed a
qui tam suit under the False Claims Act.[
Footnote 2] That Act prohibits false or
fraudulent claims for payment to the United States, 31 U.
S. C. §3729(a), and authorizes civil actions to remedy such
fraud to be brought by the Attorney General, §3730(a), or by
private individuals in the Government’s name, §3730(b)(1). The Act
provides, however, that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an
action under this section based upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions … from the news media, unless the
action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing
the action is an original source of the information.”
§3730(e)(4)(A). An “original source” is “an individual who has
direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information
to the Government before filing an action under this section which
is based on the information.” §3730(e)(4)(B).
Stone’s complaint alleged that
Rockwell was required to comply with certain federal and state
environmental laws and regulations, including RCRA; that Rockwell
committed numerous violations of these laws and regulations
throughout the 1980’s[
Footnote
3]; and that, in order to induce the Government to make
payments or approvals under Rockwell’s contract, Rockwell knowingly
presented false and fraudulent claims to the Government in
violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §3729(a). As
required under the Act, Stone filed his complaint under seal and
simultaneously delivered to the Government a confidential
disclosure statement describing “substantially all material
evidence and information” in his possession, §3730(b)(2). The
statement identified 26 environmental and safety issues, only one
of which involved pondcrete. With respect to that issue, Stone
explained in his statement that he had reviewed the design for the
pondcrete system and had foreseen that the piping mechanism would
not properly remove the sludge, which in turn would lead to an
inadequate mixture of sludge and cement.
In December 1992, Rockwell moved to dismiss
Stone’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing
that the action was based on publicly disclosed allegations and
that Stone was not an original source. The District Court denied
the motion because, in its view, “Stone had direct and independent
knowledge that Rockwell’s compensation was linked to its compliance
with environmental, health and safety regulations and that it
allegedly concealed its deficient performance so that it would
continue to receive payments.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a.
The Government initially declined to intervene
in Stone’s action, but later reversed course, and in November 1996,
the District Court granted the Government’s intervention. Several
weeks later, at the suggestion of the District Court, the
Government and Stone filed a joint amended complaint. As relevant
here, the amended complaint alleged that Rockwell violated RCRA by
storing leaky pondcrete blocks, but did not allege that any defect
in the piping system (as predicted by Stone) caused insolid
pondcrete.[
Footnote 4]
Respondents clarified their allegations even further in a statement
of claims which became part of the final pretrial order and which
superseded their earlier pleadings. This said that the pondcrete’s
insolidity was due to “an incorrect cement/sludge ratio used in
pondcrete operations, as well as due to inadequate process controls
and inadequate inspection procedures.” App. 470. It continued:
“During the winter of 1986, Rockwell replaced its
then pondcrete foreman, Norman Fryback, with Ron Teel. Teel
increased pondcrete production rates in part by, among other
things, reducing the amount of cement added to the blocks.
Following the May 23, 1988 spill, Rockwell acknowledged that this
reduced cement-to-sludge ratio was a major contributor to the
existence of insufficiently solid pondcrete blocks on the storage
pads.”
Id., at 476–477.
The statement of claims again did not mention the
piping problem asserted by Stone years earlier.
Respondents’ False Claims Act claims went to
trial in 1999. None of the witnesses Stone had identified during
discovery as having relevant knowledge testified at trial. And none
of the documents Stone provided to the Government with his
confidential disclosure statement was introduced in evidence at
trial. Nor did respondents allege at trial that the defect in the
piping system predicted by Stone caused insolid pondcrete. To the
contrary, during closing arguments both Stone’s counsel and the
Government’s counsel repeatedly explained to the jury that the
pondcrete failed because Rockwell’s new foreman used an
insufficient cement-to-sludge ratio in an effort to increase
pondcrete production.
The verdict form divided the False Claims Act
count into several different claims corresponding to different
award-fee periods. The jury found in favor of respondents for the
three periods covering the pondcrete allegations (April 1, 1987, to
September 30, 1988), and found for Rockwell as to the remaining
periods. The jury awarded damages of $1,390,775.80, which the
District Court trebled pursuant to 31 U. S. C. §3729(a).
Rockwell filed a postverdict motion to dismiss
Stone’s claims under §3730(e)(4), arguing that the claims were
based on publicly disclosed allegations and that Stone was not an
original source. In response, Stone acknowledged that his
successful claims were based on publicly disclosed allegations, but
asserted original-source status. The District Court agreed with
Stone. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed in relevant part, but remanded the case for the District
Court to determine whether Stone had disclosed his information to
the Government before filing his
qui tam action, as
§3730(e)(4)(B) required. On remand, the District Court found that
Stone had produced the 1982 engineering order to the Government,
but that the order was insufficient to communicate Stone’s
allegations. The District Court also found that Stone had not
carried his burden of proving that he orally informed the FBI about
his allegations before filing suit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion and held (over the
dissent of Judge Briscoe) that the 1982 engineering order sufficed
to carry Stone’s burden of persuasion. 92 Fed. Appx. 708. We
granted certiorari, 548 U. S. ____ (2006), to decide whether Stone
was an original source.
II
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides
that
“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action
under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations
or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in
a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.”
(Footnote omitted.)
As discussed above, §3730(e)(4)(B) defines
“original source” as “an individual who [1] has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations
are based and [2] has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action under this section which is
based on the information.” As this case comes to the Court, it is
conceded that the claims on which Stone prevailed were based upon
publicly disclosed allegations within the meaning of
§3730(e)(4)(A). The question is whether Stone qualified under the
original-source exception to the public-disclosure bar.
We begin with the possibility that little
analysis is required in this case, for Stone asserts that Rockwell
conceded his original-source status. Rockwell responds that it
conceded no such thing and that, even had it done so, the
concession would have been irrelevant because §3730(e)(4) is
jurisdictional. We agree with the latter proposition. It is true
enough that the word “jurisdiction” does not in every context
connote subject-matter jurisdiction. Noting that “jurisdiction” is
“ ‘a word of many, too many, meanings,’ ” we concluded in
Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U. S. 83
(1998), that establishing the elements of an offense was not made a
jurisdictional matter merely because the statute creating the cause
of action was phrased as providing for “jurisdiction” over such
suits.
Id., at 90 (quoting
United States v.
Vanness, 85 F. 3d 661, 663, n. 2 (CADC
1996))
. Here, however, the issue is not whether casting
the creation of a cause of action in jurisdictional terms somehow
limits the general grant of jurisdiction under which that cause of
action would normally be brought, but rather whether a clear and
explicit
withdrawal of jurisdiction withdraws
jurisdiction. It undoubtedly does so. Just last Term we stated
that, “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold
limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, the
courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left
to wrestle with the issue.”
Arbaugh v.
Y & H
Corp.,
546 U.
S. 500, 515–516 (2006) (footnote omitted). Here the
jurisdictional nature of the original-source requirement is clear
ex visceribus verborum. Indeed, we have already stated
that §3730(e)(4) speaks to “the power of a particular court” as
well as “the substantive rights of the parties.”
Hughes
Aircraft Co. v.
United States ex rel. Schumer,
520 U. S. 939,
951 (1997).
Stone’s contrary position rests entirely on
dicta from a single Court of Appeals decision, see
United
States ex rel. Fallon v.
Accudyne Corp., 97
F. 3d 937, 940–941 (CA7 1996).
Accudyne thought it
significant that jurisdiction over False Claims Act cases is
conferred by 28 U. S. C. §§1331 and 1345 (the federal-question
and United-States-as-plaintiff provisions of the Judicial Code) and
31 U. S. C. §3732(a) (the provision of the False Claims Act
establishing federal-court venue and conferring federal-court
jurisdiction over related state-law claims), rather than §3730,
which is the “section” referenced in §3730(e)(4). To eliminate
jurisdiction, the court believed, it is those
jurisdiction-conferring sections that would have to be referenced.
We know of nothing in logic or authority to support this. The
jurisdiction-removing provision here does not say “no court shall
have
jurisdiction under this section,” but rather “no
court shall have jurisdiction
over an action under this
section.” That is surely the most natural way to achieve the
desired result of eliminating jurisdiction over a category of False
Claims Act actions—rather than listing all the conceivable
provisions of the United States Code whose conferral of
jurisdiction is being eliminated. (In addition to the provisions
cited by the
Accudyne court, one might also have to
mention the diversity-jurisdiction provision, 28 U. S. C.
§1332, and the supplemental-jurisdiction provision, §1367.)
Accudyne next observed that the public-disclosure bar
limits only
who may speak for the United States on a
subject and
who if anyone gets a financial reward, not the
“categories of disputes that may be resolved (a real
‘jurisdictional’ limit).” 97 F. 3d, at 941. But this is a
classic begging of the question, which is precisely whether there
has been removed from the courts’ jurisdiction that category of
disputes consisting of False Claims Act
qui tam suits
based on publicly disclosed allegations as to which the relator is
not an original source of the information. Nothing prevents
Congress from defining the “category” of excluded suits in any
manner it wishes. See,
e.g., 28 U. S. C. §1500 (no
jurisdiction over “any claim for or in respect to which the
plaintiff . . . has pending in any other court any suit … against
the United States”). Lastly,
Accudyne asserted that “the
Supreme Court had held that a similar reference to jurisdiction in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. §§101, 104, limits
remedies rather than subject-matter jurisdiction.” 97 F. 3d,
at 941 (citing
Burlington Northern R. Co. v.
Maintenance of Way Employes,
481 U. S. 429, 444–446
(1987)). But the language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is in fact
not similar. It provides that “[n]o court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute … .” 29 U. S. C. §104
(emphasis added). It is facially a limitation upon the relief that
can be accorded, not a removal of jurisdiction over “any case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute.” Here, by contrast,
the text says “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action
under this section.”
Whether the point was conceded or not,
therefore, we may, and indeed must, decide whether Stone met the
jurisdictional requirement of being an original source.
III
We turn to the first requirement
of original-source status, that the relator have “direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations
are based.” 31 U. S. C. §3730(e)(4)(B). Because we have not
previously addressed this provision, several preliminary questions
require our attention.
A
First, does the phrase
“information on which the allegations are based” refer to the
information on which the
relator’s allegations are based
or the information on which the
publicly disclosed
allegations that triggered the public-disclosure bar are
based? The parties agree it is the former. See Brief for
Petitioners 26, n. 13; Brief for United States 24, and
n. 8; Brief for Respondent Stone 15, 21. But in view of our
conclusion that §3730(e)(4) is jurisdictional, we must satisfy
ourselves that the parties’ position is correct.
Though the question is hardly
free from doubt,[
Footnote 5] we
agree that the “information” to which subparagraph (B) speaks is
the information upon which the relators’ allegations are based. To
begin with, subparagraph (B) standing on its own suggests that
disposition. The relator must have “direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based,”
and he must “provid[e] the information to the Government before
filing an action under this section which is based on the
information.” Surely the information one would expect a relator to
“provide to the Government before filing an action … based on the
information” is the information underlying the relator’s
claims.
Subparagraph (A) complicates matters. As
described earlier, it bars actions based on the “public disclosure
of allegations or transactions” and provides an exception for cases
brought by “an original source of the information.” If the
allegations referred to in subparagraph (B)’s phrase requiring
“direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based,” are the same “allegations” referred to in
subparagraph (A), then original-source status would depend on
knowledge of information underlying the publicly disclosed
allegations. The principal textual difficulty with that
interpretation is that subparagraph (A) does not speak simply of
“allegations,” but of “allegations or transactions.” Had Congress
wanted to link original-source status to information underlying the
public disclosure, it would surely have used the identical phrase,
“allegations or transactions”; there is no conceivable reason to
require direct and independent knowledge of publicly disclosed
allegations but not of publicly disclosed transactions.
The sense of the matter offers strong
additional support for this interpretation. Section 3730(e)(4)(A)
bars actions based on publicly disclosed allegations whether or not
the information on which those allegations are based has been made
public. It is difficult to understand why Congress would care
whether a relator knows about the information underlying a publicly
disclosed allegation (
e.g., what a confidential source
told a newspaper reporter about insolid pondcrete) when the relator
has direct and independent knowledge of different information
supporting the same allegation (
e.g., that a defective
process would inevitably lead to insolid pondcrete). Not only would
that make little sense, it would raise nettlesome procedural
problems, placing courts in the position of comparing the relator’s
information with the often
unknowable information on which
the public disclosure was based. Where that latter information has
not been disclosed (by reason, for example, of a reporter’s desire
to protect his source), the relator would presumably be out of
court. To bar a relator with direct and independent knowledge of
information underlying his allegations just because no one can know
what information underlies the similar allegations of some other
person simply makes no sense.
The contrary conclusion of some lower courts
rests on the following logic: The term “information” in
subparagraph (B) must be read in tandem with the term “information”
in subparagraph (A), and the term “information” in subparagraph (A)
refers to the information on which the publicly disclosed
allegations are based. See,
e.g., United States ex
rel. Laird v.
Lockheed Martin Eng. & Science Servs.
Co., 336 F. 3d 346
, 354 (CA5 2003). The major
premise of this reasoning seems true enough: “information” in (A)
and (B) means the same thing. The minor premise, however—that
“information” in (A) refers to the information underlying the
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions—is highly
questionable. The complete phrase at issue is “unless … the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.” It
seems to us more likely (in light of the analysis set forth above)
that the information in question is the information
underlying
the action referred to a few words earlier, to-wit, the action
“based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions”
referred to at the beginning of the provision. On this
interpretation, “information” in subparagraph (A) and “information
on which the allegations are based” in subparagraph (B) are one and
the same, viz., information underlying the allegations of the
relator’s action.
B
Having determined that the phrase
“information on which the allegations are based” refers to the
relator’s allegations and not the publicly disclosed allegations,
we confront more textual ambiguity:
Which of the relator’s
allegations are the relevant ones? Stone’s allegations changed
during the course of the litigation, yet he asks that we look only
to his original complaint. Rockwell argues that Stone must satisfy
the original-source exception through all stages of the
litigation.
In our view, the term
“allegations” is not limited to the allegations of the original
complaint. It includes (at a minimum) the allegations in the
original complaint
as amended. The statute speaks not of
the allegations in the “original complaint” (or even the
allegations in the “complaint”), but of the relator’s “allegations”
simpliciter. Absent some limitation of §3730(e)(4)’s
requirement to the relator’s
initial complaint, we will
not infer one. Such a limitation would leave the relator free to
plead a trivial theory of fraud for which he had some direct and
independent knowledge and later amend the complaint to include
theories copied from the public domain or from materials in the
Government’s possession. Even the Government concedes that new
allegations regarding a fundamentally different fraudulent scheme
require reevaluation of the court’s jurisdiction. See Brief for
United States 40; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.
The rule that subject-matter jurisdiction
“depends on the state of things at the time of the action brought,”
Mollan v.
Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539 (1824),
does not suggest a different interpretation. The state of things
and the originally alleged state of things are not synonymous;
demonstration that the original allegations were false will defeat
jurisdiction.
Anderson v.
Watt,
138 U. S. 694, 701
(1891);
Morris v.
Gilmer,
129 U. S. 315, 326
(1889). So also will the withdrawal of those allegations, unless
they are replaced by others that establish jurisdiction.
Thus, when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and
then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended
complaint to determine jurisdiction. See Wellness
Community-Nat. v. Wellness House, 70 F. 3d 46,
49 (CA7 1995); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759
F. 2d 504, 508 (CA5 1984).[Footnote 6]
Here, we have not only an amended
complaint, but a final pretrial order that superseded all prior
pleadings and “controll[ed] the subsequent course of the action,”
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 16(e). See Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 190, n. 1
(1974) (where a claim was not included in the complaint, but was
included in the pretrial order, “it is irrelevant that the
pleadings were never formally amended” (citing Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc. 15(b), 16)); Wilson v. Muckala, 303
F. 3d 1207, 1215 (CA10 2002) (“[C]laims, issues, defenses, or
theories of damages not included in the pretrial order are waived
even if they appeared in the complaint and, conversely, the
inclusion of a claim in the pretrial order is deemed to amend any
previous pleadings which did not include that claim”);
Syrie v. Knoll Int’l, 748 F. 2d 304, 308
(CA5 1984) (“[I]ncorporation of a [new] claim into the pre-trial
order … amends the previous pleadings to state [the new] claim”).
In these circumstances, we look to the allegations as amended—here,
the statement of claims in the final pretrial order—to determine
original-source status.
The Government objects that this
approach risks driving a wedge between the Government and relators.
It worries that future relators might decline to “acquiesc[e]” in
the Government’s tactical decision to narrow the claims in a case
if that would eliminate jurisdiction with respect to the relator.
Brief for United States 44. Even if this policy concern were valid,
it would not induce us to determine jurisdiction on the basis of
whether the relator is an original source of information underlying
allegations that he no longer makes.
IV
Judged according to
the principles set forth above, Stone’s knowledge falls short. The
only false claims ultimately found by the jury (and hence the only
ones to which our jurisdictional inquiry is pertinent to the
outcome) involved false statements with respect to environmental,
safety, and health compliance over a one-and-a-half-year period
between April 1, 1987, and September 30, 1988. As described by
Stone and the Government in the final pretrial order, the only
pertinent problem with respect to this period of time for which
Stone claimed to have direct and independent knowledge was insolid
pondcrete. Because Stone was no longer employed by Rockwell at the
time, he did not know that the pondcrete was insolid; he did not
know that pondcrete storage was even subject to RCRA; he did not
know that Rockwell would fail to remedy the defect; he did not know
that the insolid pondcrete leaked while being stored onsite; and,
of course, he did not know that Rockwell made false statements to
the Government regarding pondcrete storage.
Stone’s prediction
that the pondcrete would be insolid because of a flaw in the piping
system does not qualify as “direct and independent knowledge” of
the pondcrete defect. Of course a qui tam relator’s
misunderstanding of why a concealed defect occurred would
normally be immaterial as long as he knew the defect actually
existed. But here Stone did not know that the pondcrete
failed; he predicted it. Even if a prediction can qualify
as direct and independent knowledge in some cases (a point we need
not address), it assuredly does not do so when its premise of cause
and effect is wrong. Stone’s prediction was a failed prediction,
disproved by Stone’s own allegations. As Stone acknowledged,
Rockwell was able to produce “concrete hard” pondcrete using the
machinery Stone said was defective. According to respondents’
allegations in the final pretrial order, the insolidity problem was
caused by a new foreman’s reduction of the cement-to-sludge ratio
in the winter of 1986, long after Stone had left Rocky
Flats.
Stone counters that his
original-source status with respect to his spray-irrigation claim
(which related to a time period different from that for his
pondcrete claim, App. 492) provided jurisdiction with respect to
all of his claims. We disagree. Section 3730(e)(4) does not permit
jurisdiction in gross just because a relator is an original source
with respect to some claim. We, along with every court to have
addressed the question, conclude that §3730(e)(4) does not permit
such claim smuggling. See United States ex rel. Merena v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 205 F. 3d 97, 102
(CA3 2000); Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F. 3d 982,
990 (CA8 2003); Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC
Corp., 975 F. 2d 1412, 1415–1416, 1420 (CA9 1992). As
then-Judge Alito explained, “[t]he plaintiff’s decision to join all
of his or her claims in a single lawsuit should not rescue claims
that would have been doomed by section (e)(4) if they had been
asserted in a separate action. And likewise, this joinder should
not result in the dismissal of claims that would have otherwise
survived.” SmithKline Beecham, supra, at
102.
Because Stone did not have direct
and independent knowledge of the information upon which his
allegations were based, we need not decide whether Stone met the
second requirement of original-source status, that he have
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before
filing his action.
V
Respondents contend
that even if Stone failed the original-source test as to his
pondcrete allegations, the Government’s intervention in his case
provided an independent basis of jurisdiction. Section
3730(e)(4)(A) permits jurisdiction over an action based on publicly
disclosed allegations or transactions if the action is “brought by
the Attorney General.” Respondents say that any inquiry into
Stone’s original-source status with respect to amendments to the
complaint was unnecessary because the Government had intervened,
making this an “action brought by the Attorney General.”[Footnote 7] Even assuming that Stone
was an original source of allegations in his initial complaint, we
reject respondents’ “intervention” argument.
The False Claims Act
contemplates two types of actions. First, under §3730(a), “[i]f the
Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is violating
section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under
this section against the person.” Second, under §3730(b), “[a]
person may bring an action for a violation of section 3729 for the
person and for the United States Government.” When a private person
brings an action under §3730(b), the Government may elect to
“proceed with the action,” §3730(b)(4)(A), or it may “declin[e] to
take over the action, in which case the person bringing the action
shall have the right to conduct the action,” §3730(b)(4)(B). The
statute thus draws a sharp distinction between actions brought by
the Attorney General under §3730(a) and actions brought by a
private person under §3730(b). An action brought by a private
person does not become one brought by the Government just because
the Government intervenes and elects to “proceed with the action.”
Section 3730 elsewhere refers to the Government’s “proceed[ing]
with an action brought by a person under subsection (b)”—which
makes crystal clear the distinction between actions brought by the
Government and actions brought by a relator where the Government
intervenes but does not oust the relator.
Does this conclusion cast into
doubt the courts’ jurisdiction with respect to the Government as
well? After all, §3730(e)(4)(A) bars jurisdiction over any action
brought under §3730, as this one was, unless the action is brought
(1) by the Attorney General or (2) by an original source; and we
have concluded that this is brought by neither. Not even
petitioners have suggested the bizarre result that the Government’s
judgment must be set aside. It is readily enough avoided, as common
sense suggests it must be, by holding that an action originally
brought by a private person, which the Attorney General has joined,
becomes an action brought by the Attorney General once the private
person has been determined to lack the jurisdictional prerequisites
for suit. The outcome would be similar to that frequently produced
in diversity-jurisdiction cases, where the “courts of appeals …
have the authority to cure a jurisdictional defect by dismissing a
dispensable nondiverse party.” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas
Global Group, L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 573
(2004) (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v.
Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 837
(1989)); see United States Steel Corp. v. EPA,
614 F. 2d 843, 845 (CA3 1979) (“[T]here are instances when an
intervenor’s claim does not rise and fall with the claim of the
original party”); 7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure §1920, p. 491 (2d ed. 1986) (“[A]n
intervenor can proceed to decision after a dismissal of the
original action … if there are independent grounds for jurisdiction
of the intervenor’s claim”). What is cured here, by the
jurisdictional ruling regarding Stone’s claim, is the
characterization of the action as one brought by an original
source. The elimination of Stone leaves in place an action pursued
only by the Attorney General, that can reasonably be regarded as
being “brought” by him for purposes of §3730(e)(4)(A).
* * *
We hold that the
District Court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment in favor of
Stone. We reverse the Tenth Circuit’s judgment to the
contrary.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer took
no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Footnote 1
Stone claimed the contrary, but
the District Court found that he had failed to establish that
fact.
Footnote 2
Qui tam is short for
“qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur,” which means “who pursues this action on our Lord
the King’s behalf as well as his own.”
Footnote 3
The laws and regulations
allegedly violated included DOE Order Nos. 5480.2 (Dec. 1982),
5483.1 as superseded by 5483.1A (June 22, 1983), and 6430.1 (Dec.
12, 1983) (DOE General Design Criteria Manual); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§25–5–501 et seq. (1982) (Hazardous Substances), 25–7–101
et seq. (1982 and Supp. 1988) (Air Quality Control
Program), 25–7–501 et seq. (Asbestos Control), 25–15–101
(Hazardous Waste Management Act, 25–8–201 (1982) (Water Quality
Control Act), 25–11–101 (1982 and Supp. 1988) (Radiation Control),
29–22–101 (Hazardous Substance Incidents), 25–5–503 (1982),
25–8–506, 25–8–608, 25–15–308 through 25–15–310, and 29–22–108; the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. §651
et seq.; the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.
S. C. §2011 et seq.; the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, 42 U. S. C. §5801 et seq.; the Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Act, 33 U. S. C. §1251 et
seq.; the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. §7401 et
seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. §300f
et seq.; and regulations promulgated under these
statutes.
Footnote 4
In addition to the pondcrete
allegations, respondents charged Rockwell with concealing problems
with “saltcrete” (a mixture of cement and salt from liquid waste
treatment processes) and “spray irrigation” (a method of disposing
of waste water generated by the sewage treatment plant at Rocky
Flats).
Footnote 5
The Courts of Appeals have
divided over the question. See United States ex rel. Laird
v. Lockheed Martin Eng. & Science Servs. Co., 336 F.
3d 346, 353–355 (CA5 2003) (describing the Courts of Appeals’
divergent approaches). Only by demoting the actual text of
§3730(e)(4) to a footnote and then paraphrasing the statute in a
way that assumes his conclusion can Justice Stevens assert (without
further analysis) that the statute’s meaning is “plain.” See
post, at 1, 2 (dissenting opinion).
Footnote 6
It is true that, when a defendant
removes a case to federal court based on the presence of a federal
claim, an amendment eliminating the original basis for federal
jurisdiction generally does not defeat jurisdiction. See
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 346, 357
(1988); St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U. S.
283, 293 (1938). But removal cases raise forum-manipulation
concerns that simply do not exist when it is the plaintiff
who chooses a federal forum and then pleads away jurisdiction
through amendment.
Footnote 7
The Government includes a
significant caveat: In its view, intervention does not cure any
pre-existing defects in Stone’s initial complaint; it only cures
defects resulting from amendments to the pleadings.
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