OCTOBER TERM, 1993
Syllabus
RIVERS ET AL. v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
No. 92-938. Argued October 13, 1993-Decided April 26, 1994
Petitioners filed a complaint under, inter alia, 42 U. S. C. §
1981, alleging that respondent, their employer, had fired them on
baseless charges because of their race and because they had
insisted on the same procedural protections in disciplinary
proceedings that were afforded white employees. Before the trial,
this Court issued Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U. S. 164, 171,
holding that § 1981's prohibition against racial discrimination in
the making and enforcement of contracts does not apply to conduct
that occurs after the formation of a contract and that does not
interfere with the right to enforce established contract
obligations. The District Court relied on Patterson in dismissing
petitioners' discriminatory discharge claims. While their appeal
was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act or Act) became
law, § 101 of which defines § 1981's "make and enforce contracts"
phrase to embrace all phases and incidents of the contractual
relationship, including discriminatory contract terminations. The
Court of Appeals ruled, among other things, that § 1981 as
interpreted in Patterson, not as amended by § 101, governed the
case.
Held: Section 101 does not apply to a case that arose before it
was enacted. Pp.303-314.
(a) Landgraf v. USI Film Products, ante, p. 244, in which this
Court concluded that § 102 of the 1991 Act does not apply to cases
arising before its enactment, requires rejection of two of
petitioners' submissions in this case: their negative implication
argument based on §§ 402(a), 109(c), and 402(b), see ante, at
257-263, and their argument that Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond,
416 U. S. 696,
controls here, rather than the presumption against statutory
retroactivity. Pp. 303-304.
(b) The fact that § 101 was enacted in response to Patterson
does not supply sufficient evidence of a clear congressional intent
to overcome the presumption against statutory retroactivity. Even
assuming that § 101 reflects disapproval of Patterson's § 1981
interpretation, and that most legislators believed that the case
was incorrectly decided and represented a departure from the
previously prevailing understanding of § 1981's reach, the Act's
text does not support petitioners' argument that § 101 was intended
to "restore" that prior understanding as to cases arising before
the Act's passage. In contrast to the 1990 civil rights
299
bill that was vetoed by the President, the 1991 Act neither
declares its intent to "restor[e]" protections that were limited by
Patterson and other decisions nor provides that its § 1981
amendment applies to all proceedings "pending on or commenced
after" the date Patterson was decided, but describes its function
as "expanding" the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order
to provide adequate protection to discrimination victims. Taken by
itself, the fact that § 101 is framed as a gloss on § 1981's
original "make and enforce contracts" language does not demonstrate
an intent to apply the new definition to past acts. Altering
statutory definitions, or adding new definitions of terms
previously undefined, is a common way of amending statutes, and
simply does not answer the retroactivity question. The 1991 Act's
legislative history does not bridge the textual gap, since the
statements that most strongly support retroactivity are found in
the debates on the 1990 bill, and the statements relating
specifically to § 101 are conflicting and unreliable. Pp.
304-309.
(c) Contrary to petitioners' argument, this Court's decisions do
not espouse a "presumption" in favor of the retroactive application
of restorative statutes even in the absence of clear congressional
intent. Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187, and Freeborn v. Smith, 2
Wall. 160, distinguished. A restorative purpose may be relevant to
whether Congress specifically intended a new statute to govern past
conduct, but an intent to act retroactively in such cases must be
based on clear evidence and may not be presumed. Since neither §
101 nor the statute of which it is a part contains such evidence,
and since the section creates substantive liabilities that had no
legal existence before the 1991 Act was passed, § 101 does not
apply to preenactment conduct. Rather, Patterson provides the
authoritative interpretation of the phrase "make and enforce
contracts" in § 1981 before the 1991 amendment went into effect.
Pp. 309-314.
973 F.2d
490, affirmed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined, ante, p. 286. BLACKMUN, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, post, p.314.
Eric Schnapper argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the
briefs were Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, Cornelia T.
L. Pillard, Kerry Scanlon, and Ellis Boal.
300
Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States et
al. as amici curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Acting
Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner,
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Robert A. Long, Jr., David K.
Flynn, Dennis
J. Dimsey, Rebecca K. Troth, and Donald R.
Livingston.
Glen D. Nager argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
brief were John T. Landwehr and Thomas J. Gibney. *
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 101
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071,
defines the term "make and enforce contracts" as used in § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, to
include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,
and conditions of the contractual relationship." We granted
certiorari to decide whether § 101 applies to a case that arose
before it was enacted. We hold that it does not.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Asian
American Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Denny Chin,
Doreena Wong, and Angelo N Ancheta; and for the National Women's
Law Center et al. by Judith E. Schaeffer and Ellen
J.
Vargyas.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
American Trucking Associations et al. by James D. Holzhauer, Andrew
L. Frey, Kenneth S. Geller, Javier H. Rubinstein, Daniel R. Barney,
and Kenneth
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Equal Employment
Advisory Council et al. by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell,
and Mona C. Zeiberg; for the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People et al. by Marc L. Fleischaker, David
L. Kelleher, Steven S. Zaleznick, Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, Steven M.
Freeman, Michael Lieberman, Dennis Courtland Hayes, Willie Abrams,
Samuel Rabinove, and Richard Foltin; and for Wards Cove Packing Co.
by Douglas M. Fryer, Douglas M. Duncan, and Richard L.
Phillips.
301
I
Petitioners Rivers and Davison were employed by respondent
Roadway Express, Inc., as garage mechanics. On the morning of
August 22, 1986, a supervisor directed them to attend disciplinary
hearings later that day. Because they had not received the proper
notice guaranteed by their collective-bargaining agreement,
petitioners refused to attend. They were suspended for two days,
but filed grievances and were awarded two days' backpay. Respondent
then held another disciplinary hearing, which petitioners also
refused to attend, again on the ground that they had not received
proper notice. Respondent thereupon discharged them.
On December 22, 1986, petitioners filed a complaint alleging
that respondent had discharged them because of their race in
violation of 42 U. s. C. § 1981.1 They claimed, inter alia, that
they had been fired on baseless charges because of their race and
because they had insisted on the same procedural protections
afforded white employees.
On June 15, 1989, before the trial commenced, this Court
announced its decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U. S. 164.
Patterson held that § 1981 "does not apply to conduct which occurs
after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with
the right to enforce established contract obligations." Id., at
171. Relying on Patterson, the District Court held that none of
petitioners' discriminatory discharge claims were covered by §
1981, and dismissed their claims under that section. After a bench
trial on petitioners' Title VII claims, the District Court found
that petitioners had been discharged for reasons other than their
race, and entered judgment for respondent.
1 Petitioners' amended complaint also alleged claims against
respondent under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat.
157, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a), and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e
et seq., as well as claims against their union. Those claims are
not before us.
302
On appeal, petitioners contended that the District Court had
misconstrued their complaint: They had not merely claimed
discriminatory discharge, but more specifically had alleged that
respondent had retaliated against them, because of their race, for
attempting to enforce their procedural rights under the
collective-bargaining agreement. Because that allegation related to
"enforcement" of the labor contract, petitioners maintained, it
stated a § 1981 claim even under Patterson's construction of the
statute. While petitioners' appeal was pending, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 (1991 Act or Act) became law. Section 101 of that Act
provides that § 1981's prohibition against racial discrimination in
the making and enforcement of contracts applies to all phases and
incidents of the contractual relationship, including discriminatory
contract terminations.2 Petitioners accordingly filed
2 The full text of § 101, which is entitled "Prohibition Against
All Racial Discrimination in the Making And Enforcement of
Contracts," reads as follows:
"Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U. S. C. 1981) is
amended"(1) by inserting '(a)' before 'All persons within'; and
"(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
"(b) For purposes of this section, the term 'make and enforce
contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
"(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under
color of State law."
Prior to the 1991 amendment, § 1981 provided:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
The history of § 1981, which is sometimes cited as § 1977 of the
Revised Statutes, is set forth in Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U. S. 160, 168-170,
and n. 8 (1976).
303
a supplemental brief advancing the argument that the new statute
applied in their case. The Court of Appeals agreed with
petitioners' first contention but not the second. Accordingly, it
ruled that § 1981 as interpreted in Patterson, not as amended by §
101, governed the case and remanded for a jury trial limited to
petitioners' discrimination-incontract-enforcement claim. See
Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
973 F.2d
490 (CA6 1992).
We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. 908 (1993), on the sole
question whether § 101 of the 1991 Act applies to cases pending
when it was enacted and set the case for argument with Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, ante, p. 244.
II
In Landgraf, we concluded that § 102 of the 1991 Act does not
apply to cases that arose before its enactment. The reasons
supporting that conclusion also apply to § 101, and require
rejection of two of petitioners' submissions in this case. First,
these petitioners, like the petitioner in Landgraf, rely heavily on
a negative implication argument based on §§ 402(a), 109(c), and
402(b) of the Act. That argument, however, is no more persuasive as
to the application of § 101 to pre enactment conduct than as to
that of § 102. See ante, at 257-263.
Second, petitioners argue that the case is governed by Bradley
v. School Bd. of Richmond,
416 U. S. 696 (1974),
rather than the presumption against statutory retroactivity. We are
persuaded, however, that the presumption is even more clearly
applicable to § 101 than to § 102. Section 102 altered the
liabilities of employers under Title VII by subjecting them to
expanded monetary liability, but it did not alter the normative
scope of Title VII's prohibition on workplace discrimination. In
contrast, because § 101 amended § 1981 to embrace all aspects of
the contractual relationship, including contract terminations, it
enlarged the category of conduct that is subject to § 1981
liability.
304
Moreover, § 1981 (and hence § 101) is not limited to employment;
because it covers all contracts, see, e. g., Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U. S. 160
(1976), Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc.,
410 U. S. 431 (1973), a
substantial part of § 101's sweep does not overlap Title VII. In
short, § 101 has the effect not only of increasing liability but
also of establishing a new standard of conduct.3 Accordingly, for
reasons we stated in Landgraf, the important new legal obligations
§ 101 imposes bring it within the class of laws that are
presumptively prospective.
III
Petitioners rely heavily on an argument that was not applicable
to § 102 of the 1991 Act, the section at issue in Landgraf They
contend that § 101 should apply to their case because it was
"restorative" of the understanding of § 1981 that prevailed before
our decision in Patterson. Petitioners advance two variations on
this theme: Congress' evident purpose to "restore" pre-Patterson
law indicates that it affirmatively intended § 101 to apply to
cases arising before its enactment; 4 moreover, there is a
"presumption in favor of application of restorative statutes" to
cases arising before their enactment. Brief for Petitioners 37.
A
Congress' decision to alter the rule of law established in one
of our cases-as petitioners put it, to "legislatively overrul[e],"
see
id., at 38-does not, by itself, reveal whether Congress
intends the "overruling" statute to apply retroac-
3 Even in the employment context, § 1981's coverage is broader
than Title VII's, for Title VII applies only to employers with 15
or more employees, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b), whereas § 1981 has
no such limitation. 4 See Brief for Petitioners 35 ("Congress
sought to restore what it and virtually all the lower courts
thought had been the reach of § 1981 prior to Patterson").
305
tively to events that would otherwise be governed by the
judicial decision.5 A legislative response does not necessarily
indicate that Congress viewed the judicial decision as "wrongly
decided" as an interpretive matter. Congress may view the judicial
decision as an entirely correct reading of prior law-or it may be
altogether indifferent to the decision's technical merits-but may
nevertheless decide that the old law should be amended, but only
for the future. Of course, Congress may also decide to announce a
new rule that operates retroactively to govern the rights of
parties whose rights would otherwise be subject to the rule
announced in the judicial decision. Because retroactivity raises
special policy concerns, the choice to enact a statute that
responds to a judicial decision is quite distinct from the choice
to make the responding statute retroactive.
Petitioners argue that the structure and legislative history of
§ 101 indicate that Congress specifically intended to "restore"
prior law even as to parties whose rights would otherwise have been
determined according to Patterson's interpretation of § 1981. Thus,
§ 101 operates as a gloss on the terms "make and enforce
contracts," the original language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
that was before this Court in Patterson. Petitioners also point to
evidence in the 1991 Act's legislative history indicating
legislators' distress with Patterson's construction of § 1981 and
their view that our decision had narrowed a previously established
understand-
5 Congress frequently "responds" to judicial decisions
construing statutes, and does so for a variety of reasons.
According to one commentator, between 1967 and 1990, the
Legislature "overrode" our decisions at an average of "ten per
Congress." Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L. J. 331,338 (1991). Seldom if
ever has Congress responded to so many decisions in a single piece
of legislation as it did in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See
Landgrafv. USI Film Products, ante, at 250-251.
306
ing of that provision.6 Taken together, petitioners argue, this
evidence shows that it was Congress' sense that Patterson had cut
back the proper scope of § 1981, and that the new legislation would
restore its proper scope. Regardless of whether that sense was
right or wrong as a technical legal matter, petitioners maintain,
we should give it effect by applying § 101's broader definition of
what it means to "make and enforce" a contract, rather than
Patterson's congressionally disapproved reading, to cases pending
upon § 101's enactment.
We may assume, as petitioners argue, that § 101 reflects
congressional disapproval of Patterson's interpretation of
6 Thus, for example, the Senate Report on the 1990 civil rights
bill that was passed by Congress but vetoed by the President
stated:
"The Patterson decision sharply cut back on the scope and
effectiveness of section 1981, with profoundly negative
consequences both in the employment context and elsewhere. As a
result of the decision, the more than 11 million employees in firms
that are not covered by Title VII lack
any protection
against racial harassment and other forms of race discrimination on
the job.
"Since Patterson was announced, more than 200 claims of race
discrimination have been dismissed by federal courts as a result of
the decision. Statement of Julius Le Vonne Chambers,
Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
(March 9, 1990). Many persons subjected to blatant bigotry lack any
means to obtain relief.
"The Committee finds that there is a compelling need for
legislation to overrule the Patterson decision and ensure that
federal law prohibits all race discrimination in contracts." S.
Rep. No. 101-315, pp. 12-14 (1990). Congress' concern with the
effects of the Patterson decision in specific cases, including
cases in which plaintiffs had won judgments only to have them
reversed after Patterson came down, see S. Rep. No. 315, at 13-14,
doubtless explains why the 1990 legislation contained a special
provision for the reopening of judgments. See Civil Rights Act of
1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 15(b)(3) (1990); see also
Landgraf, ante, at 255-256, n. 8. Petitioners do not argue that the
1991 Act should be read to reach cases finally decided.
307
§ 1981. We may even assume that many or even most legislators
believed that Patterson was not only incorrectly decided but also
represented a departure from the previously prevailing
understanding of the reach of § 1981. Those assumptions would
readily explain why Congress might have wanted to legislate
retroactively, thereby providing relief for the persons it believed
had been wrongfully denied a § 1981 remedy. Even on those
assumptions, however, we cannot find in the 1991 Act any clear
expression of congressional intent to reach cases that arose before
its enactment.
The 1990 civil rights bill that was vetoed by the President
contained an amendment to § 1981, identical to § 101 of the 1991
Act, that assuredly would have applied to pending cases. See Civil
Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 12 (1990).
See also Landgraf, ante, at 255-256, n. 8. In its statement of
purposes, the bill unambiguously declared that it was intended to
"respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the
civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those
decisions," S. 2104, § 2(b)(1) (emphasis added), and the section
responding to Patterson was entitled "Restoring Prohibition Against
All Racial Discrimination in the Making and Enforcement of
Contracts." Id., § 12 (emphasis added).7 More directly, § 15(a)(6)
of the 1990 bill expressly provided that the
7We do not suggest that Congress' use of the word "restore"
necessarily bespeaks an intent to restore retroactively. For
example, Congress might, in response to a judicial decision that
construed a criminal statute narrowly, amend the legislation to
broaden its scope; the preamble or legislative history of the
amendment might state that it was intended to "restore" the statute
to its originally intended scope. In such a situation, there would
be no need to read Congress' use of the word "restore" as an
attempt to circumvent the Ex Post Facto Clause. Instead, "to
restore" might sensibly be read as meaning "to correct, from now
on." The 1990 bill did not suffer from such ambiguity, however, for
it contained other provisions that made pellucidly clear that
Congress contemplated the broader, retroactive kind of
"restoration."
308
amendment to § 1981 "shall apply to all proceedings pending on
or commenced after" the date of the Patterson decision.
The statute that was actually enacted in 1991 contains no
comparable language. Instead of a reference to "restoring"
pre-existing rights, its statement of purposes describes the Act's
function as "expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes
in order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination." 1991 Act, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (emphasis added).
Consistently with that revised statement of purposes, the Act lacks
any direct reference to cases arising before its enactment, or to
the date of the Patterson decision. Taken by itself, the fact that
§ 101 is framed as a gloss on § 1981's original "make and enforce
contracts" does not demonstrate an intent to apply the new
definition to past acts. Altering statutory definitions, or adding
new definitions of terms previously undefined, is a common way of
amending statutes, and simply does not answer the retroactivity
question. Thus, the text of the Act does not support the argument
that § 101 of the 1991 Act was intended to "restore" prior
understandings of § 1981 as to cases arising before the 1991 Act's
passage.
The legislative history of the 1991 Act does not bridge the gap
in the text. The statements that most strongly support such
coverage are found in the debates on the 1990 bill. See n. 6,
supra. Such statements are of questionable relevance to the 1991
Act, however, because the 1990 provision contained express
retroactivity provisions that were omitted from the 1991
legislation. The statements relating specifically to § 101 of the
1991 Act do not provide reliable evidence on whether Congress
intended to "restore" a broader meaning of § 1981 with respect to
pending cases otherwise governed by Patterson's construction of the
scope of the phrase "make and enforce contracts."8 Thus, the fact
that § 101
8The legislative history of the 1991 Act reveals conflicting
views about whether § 101 would "restore" or instead "enlarge" the
original scope
309
was enacted in response to Patterson does not supply sufficient
evidence of a clear congressional intent to overcome the
presumption against statutory retroactivity.
B
A lack of clear congressional intent would not be dispositive
if, as petitioners argue, § 101 is the kind of restorative statute
that should presumptively be applied to pending cases. Petitioners
maintain that restorative statutes do not implicate fairness
concerns relating to retroactivity at least when, as is the case in
this litigation, the new statute simply enacts a rule that the
parties believed to be the law when they acted.9 Indeed, amici in
support of petitioners contend, fairness concerns positively favor
application of § 101 to pending cases because the effect of the
Patterson decision
of § 1981. Compare, e.
g., 137 Congo Rec. H9526 (Nov. 7,
1991) (remarks of Rep. Edwards), with
id., at H9543 (Nov. 7,
1991) (remarks of Rep. Hyde). The history also includes some debate
over the proper test for courts to apply-specifically, the
"Bradley" presumption or the "Bowen" presumption, see Landgraf,
ante, at 263-265-to determine the applicability of the various
provisions of the Act to pending cases. Compare, e.
g., 137
Congo Rec. 30340 (1991) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (citing Bradley
test), with id., at 29043-29044 (remarks of Sen. Danforth)
(favoring Bowen test). As we noted in Landgraf, ante, at 262-263,
the legislative history reveals that retroactivity was recognized
as an important and controversial issue, but that history falls far
short of providing evidence of an agreement among legislators on
the subject.
9 They point out that respondent has no persuasive claim to
unfair surprise, because, at the time the allegedly discriminatory
discharge occurred, the Sixth Circuit precedent held that § 1981
could support a claim for discriminatory contract termination. See,
e. g., Cooper V. North Olmstead,
795 F.2d
1265, 1270, n. 3 (1986); Leonard V. City of Frankfort Elec. and
Water Plant Bd.,
752 F.2d
189, 195 (1985). See also Mozee V. American Commercial Marine
Service Co.,
963 F.2d
929, 941 (CA7 1992) (Cudahy, J., dissenting); Gersman V. Group
Health Assn., Inc.,
975 F.2d
886, 907-908 (CADC 1992) (Wald, J., dissenting), cert. pending,
No. 92-1190. We note, however, that this argument would not apply
to any cases arising after Patterson was decided but before the
1991 Act's enactment.
310
was to cut off, after the fact, rights of action under § 1981
that had been widely recognized in the lower courts, and under
which many victims of discrimination had won damages judgments
prior to Patterson. See Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae
7-14.
Notwithstanding the equitable appeal of petitioners' argument,
we are convinced that it cannot carry the day. Our decisions simply
do not support the proposition that we have espoused a
"presumption" in favor of retroactive application of restorative
statutes. Petitioners invoke Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187
(1870), which involved a federal statute that enabled Frisbie and
others to acquire property they had occupied and thought they owned
prior to 1862, when, in another case, this Court held that the
original grant of title by the Mexican Government was void.10 The
new law in effect "restored" rights that Frisbie reasonably and in
good faith thought he possessed before the surprising announcement
of our decision. In the Frisbie case, however, the question was
whether Congress had the power to enact legislation that had the
practical effect of restoring the status quo retroactively. As the
following passage from Frisbie demonstrates, there was no question
about Congress' actual intent:
"We say the benefits it designed to confer, because we entertain
no doubt of the intention of Congress to secure to persons situated
as Frisbie was, the title to their lands, on compliance with the
terms of the act, and if this has not been done it is solely
because Congress
10 See United States v. Vallejo, 1 Black 541 (1862). In his
dissent in that case, Justice Grier stated that he could not "agree
to confiscate the property of some thousand of our fellow-citizens,
who have purchased under this title and made improvements to the
value of many millions, on suspicions first raised here as to the
integrity of a grant universally acknowledged to be genuine in the
country where it originated." Id., at 555-556 (emphasis in
original).
311
had no power to enact the law in question." Id., at 192
(emphasis in original).
Petitioners also point to Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160 (1865).
There, a statute admitting Nevada to the Union had failed to
provide for jurisdiction over cases arising from Nevada Territory
that were pending before this Court when Nevada achieved statehood.
We upheld against constitutional attack a subsequent statute
explicitly curing the "accidental impediment" to our jurisdiction
over such cases. See
id., at 173-175.
In the case before us today, however, we do not question the
power of Congress to apply its definition of the term "make and
enforce contracts" to cases arising before the 1991 Act became
effective, or, indeed, to those that were pending on June 15, 1989,
when Patterson was decided. The question is whether Congress has
manifested such an intent. Unlike the narrow error-correcting
statutes at issue in Frisbie and Freeborn, § 101 is plainly not the
sort of provision that must be read to apply to pending cases
"because a contrary reading would render it ineffective." Landgraf,
ante, at 286. Section 101 is readily comprehensible, and entirely
effective, even if it applies only to conduct occurring after its
effective date. A restorative purpose may be relevant to whether
Congress specifically intended a new statute to govern past
conduct, but we do not "presume" an intent to act retroactively in
such cases.ll We still require clear evidence of intent to impose
the restorative statute "retroactively." Section 101, and the
statute of which it is a part, does not contain such evidence.
"The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while
judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to
11 See N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 27.04,
p. 472 (5th ed. 1993) ("The usual purpose of a special interpretive
statute is to correct a judicial interpretation of a prior law
which the legislature considers inaccurate. Where such statutes are
given any effect, the effect is prospective only").
312
every law student," United States v. Security Industrial Bank,
459 U. S. 70, 79
(1982), and this case illustrates the second half of that principle
as well as the first. Even though applicable Sixth Circuit
precedents were otherwise when this dispute arose, the District
Court properly applied Patterson to this case. See Harper v.
Virginia Dept. of Taxation,
509 U. S. 86, 97 (1993)
("When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether
such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule"). See
also Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
215 U. S. 349, 372 (1910)
("Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a
thousand years") (Holmes, J., dissenting). The essence of judicial
decisionmaking-applying general rules to particular
situations-necessarily involves some peril to individual
expectations because it is often difficult to predict the precise
application of a general rule until it has been distilled in the
crucible of litigation. See L. Fuller, Morality of Law 56 (1964)
("No system of law-whether it be judge-made or legislatively
enacted-can be so perfectly drafted as to leave no room for
dispute").
Patterson did not overrule any prior decision of this Court;
rather, it held and therefore established that the prior decisions
of the Courts of Appeals which read § 1981 to cover discriminatory
contract termination were incorrect. They were not wrong according
to some abstract standard of interpretive validity, but by the
rules that necessarily govern our hierarchical federal court
system. Cf. Brown v. Allen,
344 U. S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring in result). It is this Court's
responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has
spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that
understanding of the governing rule of law. A judicial construction
of a statute is an authoritative state-
313
ment of what the statute meant before as well as after the
decision of the case giving rise to that construction.12 Thus,
Patterson provides the authoritative interpretation of the phrase
"make and enforce contracts" in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 before
the 1991 amendment went into effect on November 21, 1991. That
interpretation provides the baseline for our conclusion that the
1991 amendment would be "retroactive" if applied to cases arising
before that date.
Congress, of course, has the power to amend a statute that it
believes we have misconstrued. It may even, within broad
constitutional bounds, make such a change retroactive and thereby
undo what it perceives to be the undesirable past consequences of a
misinterpretation of its work product. No such change, however, has
the force of law unless it is implemented through legislation. Even
when Congress intends to supersede a rule of law embodied in one of
our decisions with what it views as a better rule established in
earlier decisions, its intent to reach conduct preceding the
"corrective" amendment must clearly appear. We cannot say that such
an intent clearly appears with respect to § 101. For this reason,
and because it creates liabilities that had no legal existence
before the Act was passed, § 101 does not apply to preenactment
conduct.
12 When Congress enacts a new statute, it has the power to
decide when the statute will become effective. The new statute may
govern from the date of enactment, from a specified future date, or
even from an expressly announced earlier date. But when this Court
construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the
statute has meant continuously since the date when it became law.
In statutory cases the Court has no authority to depart from the
congressional command setting the effective date of a law that it
has enacted. Thus, it is not accurate to say that the Court's
decision in Patterson "changed" the law that previously prevailed
in the Sixth Circuit when this case was filed. Rather, given the
structure of our judicial system, the Patterson opinion finally
decided what § 1981 had always meant and explained why the Courts
of Appeals had misinterpreted the will of the enacting
Congress.
314
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[For opinion of JUSTICE SCALIA concurring in the judgment, see
ante, p. 286.]
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissent in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, ante, p. 294, I also dissent in this case. Here, just as
in Landgraf, the most natural reading of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 105 Stat. 1071, and this Court's precedents is that § 101
applies to cases pending on appeal on the statute's enactment date,
at least where application of the new provision would not disturb
the parties' vested rights or settled expectations. This is such a
case.
In 1986, when respondent Roadway Express, Inc., discharged
petitioners Maurice Rivers and Robert C. Davison from their jobs as
garage mechanics, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, which gives all persons the
same right to "make and enforce contracts," 1 was widely understood
to apply to the discriminatory enforcement and termination of
employment contracts. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U. S. 454,
459-460 (1975) ("Although this Court has not specifically so held,
it is well settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals-and we now
join them-that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race"). This
understanding comports with § 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
105 Stat. 1072, providing that "the term 'make and enforce
contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and
1 Until the 1991 amendment, § 1981 stated: "All persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens .... "
315
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions
of the contractual relationship." The majority seemingly accepts
petitioners' argument that if this Court were to apply § 101 to
their case, "respondent has no persuasive claim to unfair surprise,
because, at the time the allegedly discriminatory discharge
occurred, the Sixth Circuit precedent held that § 1981 could
support a claim for discriminatory contract termination." Ante, at
309, n. 9.
Nonetheless, applying a new, supercharged version of our
traditional presumption against retroactive legislation, the Court
concludes that petitioners, whose claim was pending when this Court
announced Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U. S. 164 (1989), are
bound by that decision, which limited § 1981 to contract formation.
Patterson's tenure was-or surely should have been-brief, as § 101
was intended to overrule Patterson and to deny it further effect.
The Court's holding today, however, prolongs the life of that
congressionally repudiated decision. See Estate of Reynolds v.
Martin,
985 F.2d
470, 475-476 (CA9 1993) (denying application of § 101 to cases
pending at its enactment would allow repudiated decisions,
including Patterson, to "live on in the federal courts for ...
years").
Although the Court's opinions in this case and in Landgraf do
bring needed clarity to our retroactivity jurisprudence, they do so
only at the expense of stalling the intended application of
remedial and restorative legislation. In its effort to reconcile
the "apparent tension," Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Corp.
v. Bonjorno,
494 U.
S. 827, 837 (1990), between Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond,
416 U. S. 696
(1974), and Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital,
488 U. S. 204 (1988), the
Court loses sight of the core purpose of its retroactivity
doctrine, namely, to respect and effectuate new laws to the extent
consistent with congressional intent and with the vested rights and
settled expectations of the parties. In Bradley, a unanimous Court
applied an intervening statute allowing reasonable attorney's fees
for school-
316
desegregation plaintiffs to a case pending on appeal on the
statute's effective date. The Court observed that the statute
merely created an "additional basis or source for the Board's
potential obligation to pay attorneys' fees." 416 U. S., at 721.2
Just as the school board in Bradley was on notice that it could be
liable for attorney's fees, the employer in this case was on
notice-from the prevailing interpretation of § 1981-that it could
be liable for damages for a racially discriminatory contract
termination. Indeed, in this case, the employer's original
liability stemmed from the very provision that petitioners now seek
to enforce.
In Bowen, by contrast, the Court unanimously interpreted
authorizing statutes not to permit the Secretary of Health and
Human Services retroactively to change the rules for calculating
hospitals' reimbursements for past services provided under
Medicare. Although Bowen properly turned on the textual analysis of
the applicable statutes, neither citing Bradley nor resorting to
presumptions on retroactivity, its broad dicta disfavored the
retroactive application of congressional enactments and
administrative rules. See 488 U. S., at 208. Bowen is consistent,
however, with the Court's analysis in Bennett v. New Jersey,
470 U. S. 632
(1985), appraising the "[p]ractical considerations,"
id., at
640, that counsel against retroactive changes in federal grant
programs and noting that such changes would deprive recipients of
"fixed, predictable standards." Ibid. Bowen also accords with
Bradley's concern for preventing the injustice that would result
from the disturbance of the parties' reasonable reliance. Thus,
properly understood, Bradley establishes a pre sump-
2 Here, of course, § 101 creates a basis or source-in addition
to Title VII-for the prohibition on racial discrimination in the
enforcement of employment contracts. Title VII makes it illegal for
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
317
tion that new laws apply to pending cases in the absence of
manifest injustice, and Bowen and Bennett stand for the
corresponding presumption against applying new laws when doing so
would cause the very injustice Bradley is designed to avoid.3
Applying these principles here, "[w]hen a law purports to
restore the status quo in existence prior to an intervening Supreme
Court decision, the application of that law to conduct occurring
prior to the decision would obviously not frustrate the
expectations of the parties concerning the legal consequences of
their actions at that time." Gersman v. Group Health Assn., Inc.,
975 F.2d
886, 907 (CADC 1992) (dissenting opinion). While § 101
undoubtedly expands the scope of § 1981 to prohibit conduct that
was not illegal under Patterson,4 in the present context § 101
provides a remedy for conduct that was recognized as illegal when
it occurred, both under § 1981 and under Title VII. Thus, as far as
respondent is concerned, the law in effect when it dismissed
petitioners' claim differs little from the law as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and application of § 101 in this case
would neither alter the expectations of the parties nor disturb
previously vested rights. Because I believe that the most faithful
reading of our precedents makes this the appropriate inquiry, I
would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the
case for further proceedings.
3 An inquiry into the vested rights and settled expectations of
the parties is fairer and more sensitive than a mechanical reliance
on a substance/ procedure dichotomy. See Gersman v. Group Health
Assn., Inc.,
975 F.2d
886, 906 (CADC 1992) (Wald, J., dissenting); Mozee v. American
Commercial Marine Service Co.,
963 F.2d
929, 940-941 (CA7 1992) (Cudahy, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing).
4 Not all conduct proscribed by § 101 was also unlawful under
Title VII or other civil rights laws. For example, § 101, unlike
Title VII, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b), applies to small employers,
and even outside the employment context, see, e. g., Runyon v.
McCrary,
427 U. S.
160 (1976).
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment