Rehearing Denied June 5, 1978. See 436 U.S. 951.
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of
Illinois, First District.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
I dissent from the denial of certiorari. Petitioner was 16 years
old at the time of his arrest in connection with three homicides.
[
Footnote 1] After being held
for an hour and a half in a police car at the cemetery where the
bodies were found, petitioner was taken to the police station,
where his shoes, trousers, and shirt were removed 2 and he was
given a blanket and placed in a cell. An hour or two later, after
being advised
Page 435 U.S.
1000 , 1001
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and consult with
an attorney, petitioner asked to speak to his father, who had come
to the police station when he learned of his son's arrest; 3 this
request was ignored by the police. Petitioner then confessed to the
crimes, and later that evening repeated the confession to a
prosecuting attorney, without having consulted with the parent whom
he had asked to see or with any other friendly adult. The
confession was introduced over objection at petitioner's trial,
which led to his conviction for murder and to sentences of 75 to
225 years. [
Footnote 4]
The Illinois courts considered and rejected petitioner's
argument, made initially in support of his motion to suppress the
confession, that " the request of a juvenile defendant to see a
parent is tantamount to an adult's request for an attorney" and
should terminate police interrogation . 49 Ill.App.3d 304, 308, 7
Ill.Dec. 145, 148, 364 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1977). 5 It is this
argument that petitioner presses here.
I have recently expressed my view that this Court should decide
whether a juvenile's waiver of rights is valid in the absence of "
competent advice from an adult who does not have significant
conflicts of interest." Little v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 957, at 1591, 55
L. Ed. 2d 809 (1978) (opinion dissenting from denial of
certiorari). The instant case presents a related but less difficult
issue, for we need not consider here whether the Constitution
requires that
Page 435 U.S.
1000 , 1002
a juvenile always receive adult advice before making a
confession. Compare id., at 958-959-1592, and nn. 5-6. Nor need we
decide whether adult advice tainted by conflict of interest is
nevertheless sufficient for constitutional purposes. See id., at
959-960-1593. The narrow question presented here is simply whether
an accused child's request to see a parent must be honored by the
police before they continue interrogation, at least when the parent
is available at the police station and interested in speaking to
his child.
There is a conflict of authority on this question that indicates
a need for this Court to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction. See
Sup.Ct. Rule 19. The Supreme Court of California has held:
"[W]hen . . . a minor is taken into custody and is subjected to
interrogation, without the presence of an attorney, his request to
see one of his parents . . . must . . . be construed to indicate
that the minor suspect desires to invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege. The police must cease custodial interrogation
immediately upon exercise of the privilege." People v. Burton,
6 Cal. 3d 375,
383- 384, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6, 491 P.2d 793, 798 (1971).
Other state courts have gone further, requiring that a juvenile
always receive adult advice before the police may accept his
confession, regardless of whether he asks to speak to an adult.
See, e. g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 436-440,
288 N.E.2d
138, 141-143 (1972); In re K. W. B.,
500
S.W.2d 275, 279-283 (Mo.App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Webster,
466 Pa. 314, 320-328,
353 A.2d
372, 376-379 (1975); Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90,
343 A.2d
669 (1975). On the other hand, at least two courts in addition
to the court below have upheld the admission of confessions
obtained after juveniles' requests to see parents had been ignored
by the police. Chaney v. Wainwright,
561 F.2d
1129 (CA5 1977) (2-1 decision); State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541,
555,
552 P.2d 905,
916 (1976) (noting that honoring juvenile's request to see
Page 435 U.S.
1000 , 1003
parent would be the "better police practice," although not
constitutionally required).6
In In re Gault,
387
U.S. 1 (1967), this Court emphasized that "the greatest care
must be taken to assure that [ a juvenile's] admission was
voluntary . . . [and] that it was not the product of ignorance of
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair ." Id., at 55,
87 S. Ct. at 1458. In light of this dmonition, there is an obvious
incongruity in requiring the police to honor an adult's request for
an attorney while allowing them to ignore a juvenile's request to
speak to a parent:
"[T]he state readily concedes that the police would have been
required to accede to a request for an attorney. The accused who
requests his mother rather than his ever-available attorney is the
less knowledgeable, more easily coerced person most in need of
protection from police overreaching. It makes no sense to protect
the knowledgeable accused from stationhouse coercion while
abandoning the young person who knows no more than to ask for the
one person he trusts, his mother." Chaney v. Wainwright, supra, at
1134 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
These considerations at the very least indicate that the issue
presented here is a substantial one. For this reason, and because
of the conflict among state and federal courts on the question, I
would grant the petition for certiorari.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 All facts are
taken from the opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court. 49
Ill.App.3d 304, 7 Ill.Dec. 145, 364 N.E.2d 306 (1977). It appears
that petitioner first told the police that he was 17 years old, but
it is here undisputed that petitioner was 16 at the time of the
events in question. See id., at 306, 310, 7 Ill.Dec. at 146-147,
149, 364 N.E.2d, at 307-308, 310; Brief for Respondent in
Opposition to Petition for Certiorari 2.
Footnote 2 This clothing was
apparently removed for evidentiary purposes. See 49 Ill.App.3d, at
306, 7 Ill.Dec., at 146, 364 N.E.2d, at 307.
Footnote 3 Police testimony
conflicted with both petitioner's claim that he had asked to see
his father and the father's claim that he had asked repeatedly to
see his son. There is no dispute, however, about the father's
presence at the police station that evening, and the trial court
assumed, in ruling on petitioner's suppression motion, that
petitioner had made the request to see his father. Id., at 306-307,
310, 7 Ill.Dec., at 147, 149, 364 N.E.2d, at 308, 310.
Footnote 4 Petitioner was
convicted of two counts of murder, for which he received concurrent
sentences of 75 to 225 years. He was also convicted of one count of
involuntary manslaughter, for which he received a sentence of 3 to
10 years.
Footnote 5 The Illinois
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Pet. for Cert. App. B.
Footnote 6 The Illinois
court in the instant case similarly indicated that " 'it would be
preferable to make sure, whenever possible, that a parent or
guardian is present when a juvenile waives his rights.' " 49
Ill.App.3d, at 311, 7 Ill.Dec., at 150, 364 N.E.2d, at 311, quoting
In re Stiff, 32 Ill.App.3d 971, 978, 336 N.E.2d 619, 625
(1975).
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