OCTOBER TERM, 1993
Syllabus
REED
v. FARLEY, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIANA STATE PRISON, ET
AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT
No. 93-5418. Argued March 28, 1994-Decided June 20,1994
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (lAD), a compact among
48 States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government,
provides that the trial of a prisoner transferred from one
participating jurisdiction to another shall commence within 120
days of the prisoner's arrival in the receiving State, Article
IV(c), and directs dismissal with prejudice when trial does not
occur within the time prescribed, Article V(c). Petitioner Reed was
transferred in April 1983 from a federal prison in Indiana to state
custody pursuant to an lAD detainer lodged by Indiana officials.
Trial on the state charges was originally set for a date 19 days
beyond the 120-day lAD period and was subsequently postponed for an
additional 35 days. Although Reed's many and wide-ranging pretrial
motions contained a few general references to the lAD time limit,
he did not specifically object to his trial date until four days
after the 120-day period expired. The trial court denied Reed's
petition for discharge on the grounds that the judge had previously
been unaware of the 120-day limitation and that Reed had not
earlier objected to the trial date or requested a speedier trial.
Reed then successfully moved for a continuance to enable him to
prepare his defense. After his trial and conviction in October
1983, Reed unsuccesfully pursued an appeal and sought
postconviction relief in Indiana's courts. He then petitioned for a
federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254. The
District Court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
984
F.2d 209, affirmed.
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, III, and all but the final paragraph of Part IV,
concluding that a state court's failure to observe lAD Article
IV(c)'s 120-day rule is not cognizable under § 2254 when the
defendant registered no objection to the trial date at the time it
was set, and suffered no prejudice attributable to the delayed
commencement. Because Reed failed to make the requisite showing of
prejudice, he cannot tenably maintain that his Sixth Amendment
speedy trial right was violated. See
Barker v.
Wingo,
407 U. S. 514,
530. Reed's petition is properly considered under the "fundamental
defect" standard set forth in
Hill v.
United
340
Syllabus
States, 368
U. S. 424, 428. Reed urges that the
Hill standard
applies only to
federal prisoners under § 2255, not to
state prisoners under § 2254. This Court's decisions have
recognized, however, that, at least where only statutory violations
are at issue, §§ 2254 and 2255 mirror each other in operative
effect, see
Davis v.
United States, 417 U. S. 333,
344;
Hill controls collateral review-under both §§ 2254 and
2255-when a federal statute, but not the Constitution, is the basis
for the postconviction attack. See,
e. g.,
Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.
S. 465, 477, n. 10. There is no reason to afford habeas review
to a state prisoner like Reed, who let a time clock run without
alerting the trial court, yet deny collateral review to a federal
prisoner similarly situated. Pp. 341-346, 353-355.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
O'CONNOR, concluded in Part II and the final paragraph of Part IV
that habeas review is not available to check the trial court's
failure to comply with Article IV(c). That failure does not qualify
as a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice, [o]r an omission inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure."
Hill, 368 U. S., at
428. When a defendant obscures Article IV(c)'s time prescription
and avoids clear objection until the clock has run, an unwitting
judicial slip of the kind involved here ranks with similar
nonconstitutional lapses that are not cognizable in a
postconviction proceeding. See,
e. g., id., at 429. Because
Reed did not alert the trial judge to the 120-day period until four
days after the period expired, the Court has no cause to consider
whether an omission of the kind contemplated in
Hill would
occur if a state court, presented with a timely request to set a
trial date within the lAD's 120-day period, nonetheless refused to
comply with Article IV(c). The reservation of that question,
together with the lAD's status as both federal law and the law of
Indiana, mutes Reed's concern that state courts might be hostile to
the federal law here at stake. Pp. 347-352,355.
JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by JUSTICE THOMAS, agreed that the
"fundamental defect" test of
Hill v.
United States,
368 U. S. 424,
428, is the appropriate standard for evaluating alleged statutory
violations under both §§ 2254 and 2255, but concluded that the
standard's application is broader than the principal opinion
suggests. The class of nonconstitutional procedural rights that are
inherently necessary to avoid "a complete miscarriage of justice,"
or numbered among "the rudimentary demands of fair procedure," is
no doubt a small one, if it is not a null set. H there was ever a
technical rule, it is the 120-day limit set forth in Article IV(c)
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Declining to state the
obvious produces confusion: Violation of that technicality, whether
intentional or unintentional, is no basis for federal habeas
relief. Pp. 355-358.
341
GINSBURG, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and all but
the final paragraph of Part IV, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and
O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with
respect to Part II and the final paragraph of Part IV, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
THOMAS, J., joined,
post, p. 355. BLACKMUN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.,
joined,
post, p. 359.
Jerold S. Solovy argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were Barry Levenstam, Ellen R. Kordik, and Douglas A.
Graham.
Arend J.
Abel, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana,
argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were
Pamela Carter, Attorney General, and
Matthew R. Gutwein,
Wayne E. Uhl, and
Suzann Weber Lupton, Deputy Attorneys
General. *
JUSTICE GINSBURG announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III,
and all but the final paragraph of Part IV, and an opinion with
respect to Part II and the final paragraph of Part IV; in which THE
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (lAD), 18 U. S. C.
App. § 2, is a compact among 48 States, the District of Columbia,
and the Federal Government. It enables a participating State to
gain custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction, in
order to try him on criminal charges. Article IV(c) of the lAD
provides that trial of a transferred prisoner "shall be commenced
within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner
in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open court, ...
the court
*Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris,
Depnty Solicitor General Bryson, and Richard H. Seamon filed a
brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
342
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance." lAD Article V(c) states that when trial
does not occur within the time prescribed, the charges shall be
dismissed with prejudice.
The petitioner in this case, Orrin Scott Reed, was transferred
in April 1983 from a federal prison in Indiana to state custody
pursuant to an lAD request made by Indiana officials. Reed was
tried in October of that year, following postponements made and
explained in his presence in open court. Reed's petition raises the
question whether a state prisoner, asserting a violation of lAD
Article IV(c)'s 120-day limitation, may enforce that speedy trial
prescription in a federal habeas corpus action under 28 U. S. C. §
2254.
We hold that a state court's failure to observe the 120-day rule
of lAD Article IV(c) is not cognizable under § 2254 when the
defendant registered no objection to the trial date at the time it
was set, and suffered no prejudice attributable to the delayed
commencement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
I
In December 1982, while petitioner Reed was serving time in a
Terre Haute, Indiana, federal prison, the State of Indiana charged
him with theft and habitual offender status. Indiana authorities
lodged a detainer 1 against Reed and, on April 27, 1983, took
custody of him. The 120-day rule of lAD Article IV(c) thus
instructed that, absent any continuance, Reed's trial was to
commence on or before August 25,1983.
At two pretrial conferences, one on June 27, the other on August
1, the trial judge discussed with Reed (who chose to represent
himself) and the prosecutor the number of days needed for the trial
and the opening date. At the June 27
1 A detainer is "a request filed by a criminal justice agency
with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking
... either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the
agency when release of the prisoner is imminent."
Carchman
v.
Nash, 473
U. S. 716, 719 (1985).
343
conference, the court set a July 18 deadline for submission of
the many threshold motions Reed said he wished to file, and
September 13 as the trial date. That trial date exceeded lAD
Article IV(c)'s 120-day limit, but neither the prosecutor nor Reed
called the lAD limit to the attention of the judge, and neither
asked for a different trial date. Reed did indicate a preference
for trial at a time when he would be out of jail on bond (or on his
own recognizance); he informed the court that he would be released
from federal custody two weeks before September 13, unless federal
authorities revoked his "good days" credits, in which case he would
be paroled on September 14. App. 39; see id., at 76.
At the August 1 pretrial conference, Reed noted his imminent
release from federal custody and asked the court to set bond.
Id., at 76-79. In response, the court set bond at $25,000.
Also, because of a calendar conflict, the court reset the trial
date to September 19.
Id., at 79-81.2 Reed inquired about
witness subpoenas and requested books on procedure, but again, he
said nothing at the conference to alert the judge to Article
IV(c)'s 120-day limit, nor did he express any other objection to
the September 19 trial date.
Interspersed in Reed's many written and oral pretrial motions
are references to lAD provisions other than Article IV(c). See id.,
at 28-31, 44 (alleging illegality of transfer from federal to state
custody without a pretransfer hearing); id., at 46 (asserting
failure to provide hygienic care in violation of lAD Article V).
Reed did refer to the lAD prescription on trial commencement in
three of the written motions he filed during the 120-day period;
indeed, one of these motions was filed on the very day of the
August 1 pretrial conference.3 In none of the three motions,
however, did Reed
2 Reed posted bond by corporate surety on September 28 and was
thereupon released from pretrial incarceration. See App. 148.
3 See Petition for Relief of Violations (filed July 25, 1983),
id., at 56 (requesting that "trial be held within the legal
guidelines of the [lAD]" and asserting that the State was "forcing
[him] to be tried beyond the limits
344
mention Article IV(c) or the September 13 trial date previously
set. In contrast, on August 29, four days after the 120-day period
expired, Reed presented a clear statement and citation. In a
"Petition for Discharge," he alleged that Indiana had failed to try
him within 120 days of his transfer to state custody, and therefore
had violated Article IV(c); 4 consequently, he urged, the lAD
mandated his immediate release.5 The trial judge denied the
petition, explaining:
"Today is the first day I was aware that there was a 120 day
limitation on the Detainer Act. The Court made its setting and
while there has been a request for moving the trial forward, there
has not been any speedy trial request filed, nor has there been
anything in the nature of an objection to the trial setting, but
only an urging that it be done within the guidelines that have been
set out." Id., at 113-114.
The morning trial was to commence, September 19, Reed filed a
motion for continuance, saying he needed additional time for trial
preparation.
Id., at 128. A newspaper article published two
days earlier had listed the names of persons
as set forth in the [lAD]"); Petition for Revision of Pre-trial
Procedure and Relief of Violations (filed Aug. 1, 1983), id., at 88
(seeking dismissal of charges, referring,
inter alia, to
"the limited time left for trial within the laws"); Petition for
Subpoena for Depositions upon Oral Examination, and for Production
of Documentary Evidence (filed Aug. 11, 1983), id., at 91
(requesting action "as soon as possible due to approaching trial
date and Detainer Act time limits").
4
Id., at 94. Specifically, Reed wrote: "That petitioner
is being detained contrary to Indiana law and procedure:
35-33-10-4, Article 4(c) ... trial shall be commenced within one
hundred twenty (120) days of arrival of the prisoner in the
receiving state .... "
5 The prosecutor, in response, pointed out that Article IV(c)
permits "any necessary or reasonable continuance," and that Reed
had not objected at the time the trial court set the date.
Id., at 113. He also expressed confusion about the effect of
the 120-day rule and its relationship to the 180-day time limit
prescribed by a different lAD provision.
Id., at 114; see n.
6,
infra.
345
called for jury duty and the 1954 to 1980 time frame of Reed's
alleged prior felony convictions. Concerned that the article might
jeopardize the fairness of the trial, the judge offered Reed three
options: (1) start the trial on schedule; (2) postpone it for one
week; or (3) continue it to a late October date. Reed chose the
third option, id., at 134, 142, and the trial began on October 18;
the jury convicted Reed of theft, and found him a habitual
offender. He received a sentence of 4 years in prison on the theft
conviction, and 30 years on the habitual offender conviction, the
terms to run consecutively.
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
Reed v.
State, 491 N. E. 2d 182 (1986). Concerning
Reed's objection that the trial commenced after the 120-day period
specified in lAD Article IV(c), the Indiana Supreme Court stressed
the timing of Reed's pleas in court: Reed had vigorously urged at
the August 1 pretrial conference other alleged lAD violations
(particularly, his asserted right to a hearing in advance of the
federal transfer to state custody), but he did not then object to
the trial date.
Id., at 184-185; see App. 67-74. "The
relevant times when [Reed] should have objected were on June 27,
1983, the date the trial was set, and August 1, 1983, the date the
trial was reset," the Indiana Supreme Court concluded. 491 N. E.
2d, at 185.
Reed unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in the Indiana
courts, and then petitioned under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 for a federal
writ of habeas corpus. The District Court denied the petition.
Examining the record, that court concluded that "a significant
amount of the delay of trial is attributable to the many motions
filed ... by [Reed] or filed on [Reed's] behalf"; delay chargeable
to Reed, the court held, was excludable from the 120-day period.
Reed v.
Clark, Civ. No. S 90-226 (ND Ind., Sept. 21,
1990), App. 195-196.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Reed v.
Clark, 984 F.2d
209 (1993). Preliminarily, the Court of Appeals recognized that
the lAD, although state law, is also a "law of the United States"
within the meaning of
346
§ 2254(a).
Id., at 210. Nonetheless, that court held
collateral relief unavailable because Reed's lAD speedy trial
arguments and remedial contentions had been considered and rejected
by the Indiana courts.
Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the
Court of Appeals concluded, "establishes the proper framework for
evaluating claims under the lAD." 984 F. 2d, at 213. In
Stone, this Court held that the exclusionary rule, devised
to promote police respect for the Fourth Amendment rights of
suspects, should not be applied on collateral review unless the
state court failed to consider the defendant's arguments. We
granted certiorari, 510 U. s. 963 (1993), to resolve a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals on the availability of habeas review of
lAD speedy trial claims.6
6 The lAD's other speedy trial provision, Article III (a),
requires that a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged be
tried within 180 days of the prosecuting State's receipt of the
prisoner's notice requesting speedy disposition of the charges.
Fex v.
Michigan, 507 U. S. 43 (1993).
The Seventh Circuit's rationale is one of several approaches
taken by Courts of Appeals addressing the availability of habeas
review for violations of Articles IV(c) and lII(a). Some courts
have denied relief without regard to whether the petitioner alerted
the trial court to the lAD's speedy trial provisions. In this
category, some decisions state that lAD speedy trial claims are
never cognizable under § 2254, because lAD speedy trial violations
do not constitute a "fundamental defect which inherently results in
a complete miscarriage of justice," under
Hill v.
United
States, 368 U. S.
424, 428 (1962). See,
e. g., Reilly v.
Warden, FC!
Petersburg, 947 F.2d
43, 44-45 (CA2 1991)
(per curiam); Fasano v.
Hall, 615 F.2d
555, 558-559 (CA1 1980). Other courts applying the
Hill
standard have said § 2254 is not available for failure to meet lAD
speedy trial specifications unless the petitioner shows actual
prejudice. See,
e. g., Seymore v.
Alabama, 846 F.2d
1355, 1359-1360 (CA111988);
Kerr v.
Finkbeiner,
757 F. 2d 604, 607 (CA4 1985). Still other courts have reached
the merits of lAD speedy trial contentions raised in habeas actions
under § 2254. See,
e. g., Birdwell v.
Skeen,
983 F.2d
1332 (CA5 1993) (affirming District Court's grant of the writ,
where state court failed to comply with lAD Article III(a) in spite
of petitioner's repeated request for compliance with the 180-day
rule);
Cody v.
Morris, 623 F.2d
101, 103 (CA9 1980) (remanding to District Court for resolution
of factual dispute over whether habeas
347
II
A state prisoner may obtain federal habeas corpus relief "only
on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or
laws or treaties
of the United States."
28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Respondent Indiana
initially argues that the lAD is a voluntary interstate agreement,
not a "la[w] ... of the United States" within the meaning of §
2254(a). Our precedent, however, has settled that issue: While the
lAD is indeed state law, it is a law of the United States as well.
See
Carchman v.
Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985)
(§ 2254 case, holding that the lAD "is a congressionally sanctioned
interstate compact within the Compact Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I,
§ 10, cl. 3, and thus is a federal law subject to federal
construction");
Cuyler v.
Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 438-442
(1981) ("congressional consent transforms an interstate compact ...
into a law of the United States").
The Court of Appeals recognized that the lAD is both a law of
Indiana and a federal statute. 984 F. 2d, at 210. Adopting
Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), as
its framework, however, that court held relief under § 2254
unavailable to Reed. 984 F. 2d, at 213.
Stone holds that a
federal court may not, under § 2254, consider a claim that evidence
from an unconstitutional search was introduced at a state
prisoner's trial if the prisoner had "an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of [the] claim in the state courts." 428 U. S., at
469. Our opinion in
Stone concentrated on "the nature and
purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule."
Id., at
481. The Court emphasized that its decision confined the
exclusionary rule, not the scope of § 2254 generally:
petitioner had been tried within Article rV(c)'s 120-day limit);
United States ex rel. Esola v.
Groomes, 520 F.2d
830, 839
(CA3 1975) (remanding to District Court for
determination on whether state trial court had granted continuance
for good cause pursuant to Article rV(c)).
348
Opinion of GINSBURG, J.
"Our decision today is not concerned with the scope of
the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating
constitutional claims generally. We do reaffirm that the
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a
personal constitutional right, ... and we emphasize the minimal
utility of the rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment
claims in a habeas corpus proceeding." Id., at 495, n. 37
(emphasis in original).
We have "repeatedly declined to extend the rule in
Stone
beyond its original bounds."
Withrow v.
Williams,
507 U. S. 680,
687 (1993) (holding that
Stone does not apply to a state
prisoner's claim that his conviction rests on statements obtained
in violation of the safeguards set out in
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966)).7 Because precedent already in place suffices
to resolve Reed's case, we do not adopt the Seventh Circuit's
Stone-based rationale.
We have stated that habeas review is available to check
violations of federal laws when the error qualifies as "a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure."
Hill v.
United
States, 368 U. S.
424, 428 (1962); accord,
United States v.
Timmreck, 441
U. S. 780, 783 (1979);
Davis v.
United States,
417 U. S. 333,
346 (1974). The lAD's purpose-providing a nationally uniform means
of transferring prisoners between jurisdictions-can be effectuated
only by nationally uniform interpretation. See 984 F. 2d, at 214
(Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing in bane).
Therefore, the argument that
7See also
Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U. S. 365, 375-377
(1986)
(Stone does not bar habeas review of claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to
file a timely suppression motion);
Rose v.
Mitchell,
443 U. S. 545,
559-564 (1979) (refusing to extend
Stone to equal protection
claim of racial discrimination in selection of state grand jury
foreman);
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 321-324
(1979)
(Stone does not bar habeas review of due process
claim of insufficiency of evidence supporting conviction).
349
the compact would be undermined if a State's courts resisted
steadfast enforcement, with total insulation from § 2254 review, is
not without force. Cf.
Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S., at
526 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (institutional constraints preclude
Supreme Court from overseeing adequately whether state courts have
properly applied federal law). This case, however, gives us no
cause to consider whether we would confront an omission of the kind
contemplated in
Hill, Timmreck, or
Davis, if a state
court, presented with a timely request to set a trial date within
the lAD's 120-day period, nonetheless refused to comply with
Article IV(c).
When a defendant obscures Article IV(c)'s time prescription and
avoids clear objection until the clock has run, cause for
collateral review scarcely exists. An unwitting judicial slip of
the kind involved here ranks with the nonconstitutionallapses we
have held not cognizable in a postconviction proceeding. In
Hill, for example, a federal prisoner sought collateral
relief, under 28 U. S. C. § 2255,8 based on the trial court's
failure at sentencing to afford him an opportunity to make a
statement and present information in mitigation of punishment, as
required by Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The petitioner, however, had not sought to assert his Rule 32(a)
rights at the time of sentencing, a point we stressed:
"[WJe are not dealing here with a case where the defendant was
affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing at
which his sentence was imposed. Nor is it suggested that in
imposing the sentence the District Judge was either misinformed or
uninformed as to any relevant circumstances. Indeed, there is no
claim that the defendant would have had anything at all to say if
he had been formally invited to speak." 368 U. S., at 429.
8 The text of § 2255, in relevant part, is set out at n. 12,
infra.
350
Opinion of GINSBURG, J.
"[W]hen all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal
requirements" of Rule 32(a), we held, "collateral relief is not
available."
Ibid. But we left open the question whether
"[collateral] relief would be available if a violation of Rule
32(a) occurred in the context of other aggravating circumstances."
Ibid.
Hill controlled our decision in
United States v.
Timmreck, 441
U. S. 780 (1979), where a federal prisoner sought collateral
review, under § 2255, to set aside a conviction based on a guilty
plea. The complainant in
Timmreck alleged that the judge who
accepted his plea failed to inform him, in violation of Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that he faced a mandatory
postincarceration special parole term. We rejected the collateral
attack, observing that the violation of Rule 11 was technical, and
did not "resul[t] in a 'complete miscarriage of justice' or in a
proceeding 'inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure.'"
Id., at 784, quoting
Hill, 368 U. S., at
428. "As in
Hill," we found it unnecessary to consider
whether "[postconviction] relief would be available if a violation
of Rule 11 occurred in the context of other aggravating
circumstances." 441 U. S., at 784-785.
Reed's case similarly lacks "aggravating circumstances"
rendering" 'the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of
habeas corpus ... apparent.'"
Hill, 368 U. S., at
428, quoting
Bowen v.
Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 27 (1939).
Reed had two clear chances to alert the trial judge in open court
if he indeed wanted his trial to start on or before August 25,
1993. He let both opportunities pass by. At the pretrial hearings
at which the trial date was set and rescheduled, on June 27 and
August 1, Reed not only failed to mention the 120-day limit; he
indicated a preference for holding the trial after his release from
federal imprisonment, which was due to occur after the 120 days
expired. See
supra, at 342. Then, on the 12J"th day, when it
was no longer possible to meet Article
351
IV(c)'s deadline, Reed produced his meticulously precise
"Petition for Discharge." See
supra, at 344, and n. 4.9
As the Court of Appeals observed, had Reed objected to the trial
date on June 27 or August 1 "instead of burying his demand in a
flood of other documents, the [trial] court could have complied
with the lAD's requirements." 984 F. 2d, at 209-210. The Court of
Appeals further elaborated:
"During the pretrial conference of August 1, 1983, Reed
presented several arguments based on the lAD, including claims that
the federal government should have held a hearing before turning
him over to the state and that his treatment in Indiana fell short
of the state's obligations under Art. V(d) and (h). Reed did not
mention the fact that the date set for trial would fall outside the
120 days allowed by Art. IV(c). Courts often require litigants to
flag important issues orally rather than bury vital (and easily
addressed) problems in reams of paper, as Reed did. E. g., Fed. R.
Crim. P. 30 (requiring a distinct objection to jury instructions);
cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (a district judge may require motions to
be made orally). It would not have been difficult for the judge to
advance the date of the trial or make a finding on the record of
good cause, either of which would have satisfied Art. IV(c).
Because the subject never came up, however, the trial judge
overlooked the problem." Id., at 213.
Reed regards the Court of Appeals' description of his litigation
conduct, even if true, as irrelevant. He maintains
9 In contrast, the defendant in
United States v.
Ford, 550 F.2d
732 (CA2 1977), aff'd
sub nom. United States v.
Mauro, 436 U.
S. 340 (1978), made "[timely and] vigorous protests," to
several Government-requested continuances, yet was tried 13 months
after Article IV(c)'s 120-day period expired. 550 F. 2d, at 735.
Reed's trial occurred within two months of the period's expiration.
See
infra, at 353.
352
that the lAD dictates the result we must reach, for Article V(c)
directs dismissal with prejudice when Article IV(c)'s time limit
has passed.lO Article V(c) instructs only that "the appropriate
court of the jurisdiction where the indictment ... has been
pending" -i.
e., the original trial court-shall dismiss the
charges if trial does not commence within the time Article IV(c)
prescribes. Article V(c) does not address the discrete question
whether relief for violations of the lAD's speedy trial provisions
is available on collateral review. That matter is governed instead
by the principles and precedent generally controlling availability
of the great writ. See id., at 212. Referring to those guides, and
particularly the Hill and Timmreck decisions, we conclude that a
state court's failure to observe the 120-day rule of lAD Article
IV(c) is not cognizable under § 2254 when the defendant registered
no objection to the trial date at the time it was set, and suffered
no prejudice attributable to the delayed commencement.
III
Reed argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the
lAD's speedy trial provision "effectuates a constitutional right,"
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial. Brief for
Petitioner 26. Accordingly, he maintains, the alleged lAD violation
should be treated as a constitutional violation or as a
"fundamental defect" satisfying the Hill standard, not as a mere
technical error. Reed's argument is insubstantial for, as he
concedes, his constitutional right to a speedy trial was in no way
violated. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
10 Article V(c) provides in relevant part:
"[I]n the event that an action on the indictment, information,
or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is
not brought to trial within the period provided in article III or
article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where
the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer
based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect."
353
Reed's trial commenced 54 days after the 120-day period expired.
He does not suggest that his ability to present a defense was
prejudiced by the delay. Nor could he plausibly make such a
claim.ll Indeed, asserting a need for more time to prepare for a
trial that would be "fair and meaningful," App. 128, Reed himself
requested a delay beyond the scheduled September 19 opening.
A showing of prejudice is required to establish a violation of the
Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause, and that necessary ingredient
is entirely missing here. See
Barker v.
Wingo,
407 U. S. 514,
530 (1972) (four factors figure in the determination of Sixth
Amendment speedy trial claims; one of the four is "prejudice to the
defendant").
IV
More strenuously, Reed argues that
Hill and similar
decisions establish a standard for
federal prisoners seeking
relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255,12 not for
state prisoners
seeking relief under § 2254. But it is scarcely doubted that, at
least where mere statutory violations are at issue, "§ 2255 was
intended to mirror § 2254 in operative effect."
Davis v.
United States, 417 U. S. 333, 344
(1974). Far from suggesting that the
Hill standard is
inapplicable to § 2254 cases, our decisions assume that
Hill
controls collateral review-under both §§ 2254 and 2255-when a
federal statute, but not the
11 As the Court of Appeals noted:
"Had Indiana put Reed to trial within 120 days of his transfer
from federal prison, everything would have proceeded as it did.
Reed does not contend that vital evidence fell into the
prosecutor's hands (or slipped through his own fingers) between
August 26 and September 19, 1983." 984 F. 2d, at 212.
12 Section 2255 provides in pertinent part:
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, ... may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
354
Constitution, is the basis for the postconviction attack. For
example, in
Stone v.
Powell, a § 2254 case, we
recalled "the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional
claims" as follows: "[N]onconstitutional claims ... can be raised
on collateral review only if the alleged error constituted a
'''fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice." ", 428 U. S., at 477, n. 10, quoting
Davis, 417 U. S., at 346, quoting
Hill, 368 U. S., at
428.13
Reed nevertheless suggests that we invoked the fundamental
defect standard in
Hill and
Timmreck for this sole
reason:
"So far as convictions obtained in the federal courts
are concerned, the general rule is that the writ of
habeas
corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v.
Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947)
(emphasis added). The same "general rule," however, applies to §
2254. Where the petitioner-whether a state or federal
prisoner-failed properly to raise his claim on direct review, the
writ is available only if the petitioner establishes "cause" for
the waiver and shows "actual prejudice resulting from the alleged
... violation."
Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 84 (1977);
id., at 87.
We see no reason to afford habeas review to a state prisoner
like Reed, who let a time clock run without alerting the trial
court, yet deny collateral review to a federal prisoner similarly
situated. See
Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U. S. 536, 542 (1976)
(" 'Plainly the interest in finality is the same with regard to
both federal and state prisoners .... There is no
13 See also
United States v.
Addonizio, 442 U. S. 178 (1979), in
which we reiterated that the Hill standard governs habeas review of
all claims of federal statutory error, citing
Stone:
"[U]nless the claim alleges a lack of jurisdiction or
constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack has remained
far more limited.
Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 477, n.
10. The Court has held that an error of law does not provide a
basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted 'a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice.'" 442 U. S., at 185, quoting Hill, 368 U.
S., at 428.
355
reason to ... give greater preclusive effect to procedural
defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by state
defendants.''') (quoting
Kaufman v.
United States,
394 U. S. 217, 228 (1969)); see also
United States v.
Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 167-168 (1982) (collateral review of
procedurally defaulted claims is subject to same "cause and actual
prejudice" standard, whether the claim is brought by a state
prisoner under § 2254 or a federal prisoner under § 2255).
Reed contends that the scope of review should be broader under §
2254 than under § 2255, because state prisoners, unlike their
federal counterparts, have "had no meaningful opportunity to have a
federal court consider any federal claim." Brief for Petitioner 34.
But concern that state courts might be hostile to the federal law
here at stake is muted by two considerations. First, we have
reserved the question whether federal habeas review is available to
check violations of the lAD's speedy trial prescriptions when the
state court disregards timely pleas for their application. See
supra, at 349. Second, the lAD is both federal law and the
law of Indiana. Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4 (1993). As the Court of
Appeals noted: "We have no more reason to suppose that the Supreme
Court of Indiana seeks to undermine the lAD than we have to suppose
that it seeks to undermine any other law of Indiana." 984 F. 2d, at
211.
***
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all the Court's opinion except Part II, and the last
paragraph of Part IV (which incorporates some of the analysis of
Part II). I thus agree that the "fundamental defect" test of
Hill v.
United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428
(1962), is the
356
Opinion of SCALIA, J.
appropriate standard for evaluating alleged statutory violations
under both §§ 2254 and 2255, see
ante, at 352-354, but I
disagree with what seems to me (in Part II) too parsimonious an
application of that standard.
I
This Court has long applied equitable limitations to narrow the
broad sweep of federal habeas jurisdiction. See
Withrow v.
Williams, 507
U. S. 680, 715-721 (1993) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). One class of those limitations consists of
substantive restrictions upon the type of claim that will be
entertained.
Hill, for example, holds that the claim of a
federal statutory violation will not be reviewed unless it alleges
"a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice [o]r an omission inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure." 368 U. S., at 428. Most
statutory violations, at least when they do not occur "in the
context of other aggravating circumstances," are simply not
important enough to invoke the extraordinary habeas jurisdiction.
Id., at 429. See also
United States v.
Timmreck, 441
U. S. 780, 783-785 (1979).
Although JUSTICE GINSBURG concludes that an unobjected-to
violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (lAD), 18 U.
S. C. App. § 2, is not" 'a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure,'" she
declines to decide whether that judgment would be altered "if a
state court, presented with a timely request to set a trial date
within the lAD's 120-day period, nonetheless refused to comply with
Article IV(c),"
ante, at 348, 349. To avoid the latter
question, she conducts an analysis of how petitioner waived his lAD
rights. See
ante, at 350-351. The issue thus avoided is not
a constitutional one, and the avoiding of it (when the answer is so
obvious) may invite a misunderstanding of the
Hill test.
357
The class of procedural rights that are
not guaranteed by
the Constitution (which includes the Due Process Clauses), but that
nonetheless
are inherently necessary to avoid "a complete
miscarriage of justice," or numbered among "the rudimentary demands
of fair procedure," is no doubt a small one, if it is indeed not a
null set. The guarantee of trial within 120 days of
interjurisdictional transfer unless good cause is shown-a provision
with no application to prisoners involved with only a single
jurisdiction or incarcerated in one of the two States that do not
participate in the voluntary lAD compact-simply cannot be among
that select class of statutory rights.
As for
Hill and
Timmreck's reservation of the
question whether habeas would be available "in the context of other
aggravating circumstances," that seems to me clearly a reference to
circumstances
that cause additional prejudice to the
defendant, thereby elevating the error to a fundamental defect
or a denial of rudimentary procedural requirements
not a
reference to circumstances that make the trial judge's behavior
more willful or egregious. I thus think it wrong to suggest that if
only petitioner had not waived his lAD speedy trial rights by
failing to assert them in a timely fashion, "aggravating
circumstances" might exist. See
ante, at 349, 350-351. That
says, in effect, that "aggravating circumstances" which can entitle
a mere statutory violation to habeas review may consist of the mere
fact that the statutory violation
was not waived. Surely
that sucks the life out of
Hill.* Nor do I accept JUSTICE
GINSBURG'S suggestion that an interest in uniform interpretation of
the lAD might
*Many courts, including the Indiana Supreme Court in evaluating
this petitioner's claim, see
Reed v.
State, 491 N. E.
2d 182, 185 (Ind. 1986), have held that a prisoner's waiver of the
120-day limit will prevent violation of the lAD, or will preclude
the remedy of dismissal with prejudice. See,
e. g.,
United States v.
Odom, 674 F.2d
228 (CA4 1982). Perhaps, therefore, JUSTICE GINSBURG'S
effort to decide the jurisdictional issue on as narrow a ground as
possible has caused her to decide the merits.
358
Opinion of SCALIA, J.
counsel in favor of habeas review in a nonwaiver situation. See
ante, at 348-349. I see no reason why this Court's direct
review of state and federal decisions will not suffice for that
purpose, as it does in most other contexts. Cf.
Cuyler v.
Adams, 449 U.
S. 433, 442 (1981). More importantly, however, federal habeas
jurisdiction was not created with the intent, nor should we seek to
give it the effect, of altering the fundamental disposition that
this Court, and not individual federal district judges, has
appellate jurisdiction, as to federal questions, over the supreme
courts of the States.
If there was ever a technical rule, the lAD's 120-day limit is
one. I think we produce confusion by declining to state the
obvious: that violation of that technicality, intentional or
unintentional, neither produces nor is analogous to (1) lack of
jurisdiction of the convicting court, (2) constitutional violation,
or (3) miscarriage of justice or denial of rudimentary procedures.
It is no basis for federal habeas relief.
II
In addition to substantive limitations on the equitable exercise
of habeas jurisdiction, the Court has imposed procedural
restrictions. For example, a habeas claim cognizable under § 2255
(the correlative of § 2254 for federal prisoners), such as a
constitutional claim, will not be heard if it was procedurally
defaulted below, absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice.
See
United States v.
Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 167-168
(1982). And claims will ordinarily not be entertained under § 2255
that have already been rejected on direct review. See
Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 217, 227, n.8
(1969); see also
Withrow, 507 U. S., at 720-721 (SCALIA, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting cases
showing that lower courts have uniformly followed the
Kaufman dictum). Together, these two rules mean that "a
prior opportunity for full and fair litigation is normally
dispositive of a federal prisoner's habeas claim." 507 U. S., at
721.
359
Although this procedural limitation has not been raised as a
defense in the present case, I note my view that, at least where
mere statutory violations are at issue, a prior opportunity for
full and fair litigation precludes a state-prisoner petition no
less than a federal-prisoner petition. As the Court today
reaffirms, " '§ 2255 was intended to mirror § 2254 in operative
effect.'"
Ante, at 353, quoting
Davis v.
United
States, 417 U. S.
333, 344 (1974). Cf.
Frady, supra, at 166. Otherwise a
prisoner, like petitioner, transferred from federal to state prison
under the lAD would have three chances to raise his claim (state
direct, state habeas, and § 2254) while a prisoner transferred from
state to federal prison under the lAD would have only one. Since
the present petitioner raised his lAD claim on direct appeal in the
Indiana courts and on state habeas review, his federal habeas claim
could have been rejected on the ground that the writ ordinarily
will not be used to readjudicate fully litigated statutory
claims.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JusTICE KENNEDY,
and JUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting.
The federal habeas corpus statute allows a state prisoner to
challenge his conviction on the ground that he is "in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a). The Court acknowledges, as it must,
that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (lAD) is a "la[w] ... of
the United States" under this statute. See
Carchman v.
Nash, 473 U.
S. 716, 719
(1985); Cuyler v.
Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 438-442
(1981). In addition, respondents concede that a defendant tried in
clear violation of the lAD's 120-day limit would be held in custody
in violation of a law of the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37.
Nevertheless, the Court appears to conclude that a violation of the
lAD is simply not serious enough to warrant collateral relief, at
least where the defendant fails to invoke
360
his lAD rights according to the precise rules the Court
announces for the first time today.
The Court purports to resolve this case by relying on "precedent
already in place,"
ante, at 348, referring to "principles
and precedent generally controlling availability of the great
writ,"
ante, at 352. Our precedent, on its face, does not
reach nearly so far, and its extension to this case is unwarranted
under general habeas corpus principles. Most seriously, the Court
disregards Congress' unambiguous judgment about the severity of,
and the necessary remedy for, a violation of the lAD time limits. I
respectfully dissent.
I
The Court purports to resolve this issue by relying on the
Hill-Timmreck line of cases. See
Hill v.
United
States, 368 U. S. 424 (1962);
Davis v.
United
States, 417 U. S.
333 (1974);
United States v.
Timmreck, 441 U. S. 780 (1979); see
also
Sunal v.
Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947);
United States v.
Frady, 456 U. S. 152 (1982).
Despite the professed narrowness of the Court's ultimate holding,
however, its decision reflects certain assumptions about the nature
of habeas review of state court judgments that do not withstand
close analysis. Each of the cases relied on by the majority-Hill,
Timmreck, and
Davis-concerned a
federal
prisoner's request under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 for collateral relief
from alleged defects in his federal trial. Before today, this Court
never had applied those precedents to bar review of a § 2254
petition.1 It does so now without a full discussion of, or
appreciation for, the different policy concerns that should shape
the exercise of federal courts' discretion in § 2254 cases.
1 The majority notes,
ante, at 354, that the Court cited
Hill in
Stone v.
Powell, 428
U. S. 465,477, n. 10 (1976), a §2254 case. The decision in that
case, however, rested not on
Hill, but on considerations
unique to the exclusionary rule.
361
A
While there are stray remarks in our opinions suggesting that
this Court has treated §§ 2254 and 2255 as equivalents,2 there are
other indications to the contrary, see,
e. g.,
Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 715 (1993)
(SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In any
event, there are sound reasons to refrain from treating the two as
identical. Primary among them is the importance under § 2254 of
providing a federal forum for review of state prisoners' federal
claims, not only in order to ensure the enforcement of federal
rights, but also to promote uniformity in the state courts'
interpretation and application of federallaw.3
We recognized in
United States v.
Frady, 456 U.
S., at 166, that the "federal prisoner ... , unlike his state
counterparts, has already had an opportunity to present his federal
claims in federal trial and appellate forums." For the federal
pris-
2 The Court relies, for instance, on the remark in
Davis
that "'§ 2255 was intended to mirror § 2254 in operative effect.'"
Ante, at 353, quoting
Davis v.
United States,
417 U. S. 333,
344 (1974). That statement, however, did no more than parry the
suggestion that federal prisoners, unlike state prisoners, were
restricted to bringing claims "of constitutional dimension," and
not those grounded in statutes.
Ibid. The
Davis Court
was addressing only the threshold statutory basis for
relief-specifically whether relief was available to federal
prisoners for violations of "laws" of the United States. It said
nothing about the equitable considerations that might guide the
Court's exercise of its discretion to grant or deny relief. In
other words,
Davis concerned jurisdictional, not prudential,
limits on habeas review. See
Withrow v.
Williams,
507 U. S. 680,
716 (1993) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(the "sweeping" breadth of habeas jurisdiction is "tempered by the
restraints that accompany the exercise of equitable
discretion").
3 As a practical matter, this Court's direct review of state
court decisions cannot adequately ensure uniformity. See id., at
721, n. (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Of course a federal forum is theoretically available in this
Court, by writ of certiorari. Quite obviously, however, this mode
of review cannot be generally applied due to practical
limitations") (citation omitted).
362
oner claiming statutory violations, habeas courts serve less to
guarantee uniformity of federal law or to satisfy a threshold need
for a federal forum than to provide a backstop to catch and correct
certain nonconstitutional errors that evaded the trial and
appellate courts.4 Thus, this Court has determined that "where the
trial or appellate court has had a 'say' on a federal prisoner's
claim, it may be open to the § 2255 court to determine that ...
'the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'"
Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 217, 227, n. 8
(1969) (citation omitted). Under
Hill and
Timmreck,
relief may be limited to the correction of "fundamental defect[s]"
or "omission[s] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure."
Hill, 368 U. S., at 428. The
Hill
principle, in short, is that where the error is not egregious, the
habeas court need not cover the ground already covered by other
federal courts.
For the state prisoner, by contrast, a primary purpose of § 2254
is to provide a federal forum to review a state prisoner's claimed
violations of federal law, claims that were, of necessity,
addressed to the state courts. See
Brown v.
Allen,
344 U. S. 443,
508 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (§ 2254 collateral review
is necessary to permit a federal court to have the "last say" with
respect to questions of federallaw);
Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474
U. S. 254 (1986) (requiring exhaustion of federal claims in
state courts). Thus, § 2254 motions anticipate that the federal
court will undertake an independent review of the work of the state
courts, even where the federal claim was fully and fairly
litigated.
Wright v.
West, 505 U. S. 277 (1992)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (affirming that a state
court's determina-
4 In fact, § 2255 requires a prisoner to file his motion in the
court that imposed his sentence as a further step in his criminal
case, not as a separate civil action. Advisory Committee's Note on
Habeas Corpus Rule 1, 28 U. S. C., p. 416 (governing § 2255
proceedings).
363
tion of federal law and of mixed questions of federal law and
fact are entitled to
de novo review by federal habeas
court).5 Even if we recognize valid reasons for limiting this
review to claims of serious or substantial error, where no federal
court previously has addressed the § 2254 petitioner's federal
claims, there is less reason to sift these claims through so fine a
screen as Hill and Timmreck provide.
Similarly, prudential justifications for Hill's "fundamental
error" standard may differ from state to federal proceedings. In a
federal trial and appeal, virtually any procedural error, however
minor, will violate a "law" of the United States. In this context,
it is both impracticable and unnecessary to allow collateral review
of all claims of error, particularly since the defendant has had
the opportunity both to raise them in and to appeal them to a
federal forum. I t is hardly surprising, therefore, that the
Hill-Timmreck screening device, which sorts the substantial errors
from the mere technical violations, was developed in § 2255. A
state trial, by contrast, implicates few federal laws outside the
Constitution. On the extraordinary occasions when Congress does
consider a federal law to be so important as to warrant its
application in state proceedings, this alone counsels an approach
other
5 JUSTICE SCALIA proposes to foreclose § 2254 review of federal
nonconstitutional claims where the state prisoner was afforded a
full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims in state court.
This proposal fails for obvious reasons. To hold that full and fair
litigation in state courts is a substitute for a federal forum
would be, to borrow a phrase, to "suc[k] the life out of [§2254]."
See
ante, at 357 (concurring opinion). At the heart of §
2254 is federal court review of state court decisions on federal
law. With one notable exception, see
Stone v.
Powell,
428 U. S. 465,
486-496 (1976), this Court uniformly has rejected a "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" as a bar to § 2254 review. See
Withrow v.
Williams, supra; Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477
U. S. 365 (1986);
Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979);
Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979); see
also
Wright v.
West, 505 U. S. 277, 299 (1992)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (disputing that a "full and
fair hearing in the state courts" required deferential review in
habeas).
364
than Hill-Timmreck to determine whether a violation of that law
warrants federal court review and enforcement.6
The difference in the roles that federal statutes play in state
and federal criminal proceedings points to another danger attendant
to the uncritical application of the Hill standard in § 2254. Hill
has been read to disfavor habeas review of federal statutory
violations as a class. See,
e. g.,
ante, at 356
(concurring opinion) (reading Hill for the proposition that "[m]ost
statutory violations ... are simply not important enough to invoke
the extraordinary habeas jurisdiction"). This distinction between
statutory and constitutional violations, exaggerated even in the
context of § 2255,7 has even less justification under § 2254.
6 There is an additional reason to question the application of
the HillTimmreck "fundamental error" or "miscarriage of justice"
standard to Reed's § 2254 claim. In both Hill and Timmreck, a
federal prisoner bypassed an available federal appeal, and this
Court endorsed the rule of Sunal v. Large,
332 U. S. 174, 178
(1947), that collateral attack cannot "do service for an appeal."
See Hill, 368 U. S., at 428-429 (finding "apposite" the reasoning
in Sunal, 332 U. S., at 178, that" '[w]ise judicial administration
of the federal courts' " counseled against permitting a collateral
attack to supplant appeals); Timmreck, 441 U. S., at 784 (seeing
"no basis here for allowing collateral attack 'to do service for an
appeal''') (quoting Sunal, 332 U. S., at 178); see also Hill, 368
U. S., at 428-429 (noting that Congress "'provided a regular,
orderly method for correction'" of errors by " 'granting an appeal
to the Circuit Court of Appeals and by vesting us with certiorari
jurisdiction'" and that if defendants were permitted to bypass this
orderly method, "'[e]rror which was not deemed sufficiently
adequate to warrant an appeal would acquire new implications''')
(quoting Sunal, 332 U. S., at 181-182). Thus, this standard appears
to have been based in part on principles of default. Our habeas
jurisprudence subsequently has imposed a procedural default bar in
§ 2254 cases, Wainwright
7 Hill and Timmreck can be read for the proposition that at
least some nonconstitutional violations "are simply not important
enough" to warrant habeas relief. In Hill, for example, a federal
prisoner who did not appeal his conviction was not permitted to
obtain collateral relief based on the sentencing court's "failure
to comply with the formal requirements" of
365
The language of § 2254 itself permits a state prisoner to seek
relief for a violation "of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States." By its own terms, then, § 2254 applies equally
to claims of statutory or constitutional violations. When
construing the similar language of Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. §
1983, which permits civil actions against state actors for
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws" of the United States, we concluded that
"the phrase 'and laws,' as used in § 1983, means what it says."
Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U. S.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a), which commands that
every defendant be allowed to make a statement before he is
sentenced. 368 U. S., at 429. Similarly, in
Timmreck, the
Court held that a federal prisoner who did not appeal the validity
of his guilty plea could not obtain collateral relief under § 2255
for technical violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11,
which requires the court to ask a defendant represented by an
attorney whether he wishes to say anything on his own behalf. 441
U. S., at 784.
These cases could also be read narrowly as relying on the habeas
petitioner's default on direct review, see n. 6,
supra, or
as encompassing only violations of procedural rules. But even if
read to establish a line between "important" and "merely technical"
violations, this line is not identical to the line between
statutory and constitutional violations. We made this point clear
in
Davis v.
United States, 417 U. S., at 345-346:
"[T]here is no support in the prior holdings of this Court for
the proposition that a claim is not cognizable under § 2255 merely
because it is grounded in the 'laws of the United States' rather
than the Constitution. It is true, of course, that in
Sunal
v.
Large, 332
U. S. 174 (1947), the Court held that the nonconstitutional
claim in that case could not be asserted to set aside a conviction
on collateral attack. But
Sunal was merely an example of
'the general rule ... that the writ of
habeas corpus will
not be allowed to do service for an appeal.' ... Thus,
Sunal
cannot be read to stand for the broad proposition that
nonconstitutional claims can never be asserted in collateral
attacks upon criminal convictions. Rather, the implication would
seem to be that, absent the particular considerations regarded as
dispositive in that case, the fact that a contention is grounded
not in the Constitution, but in the 'laws of the United States'
would not preclude its assertion in a § 2255 proceeding."
366
1,4 (1980) (refusing to construe "and laws" as limited to civil
rights or equal protection laws);
Hague v.
CIO,
307 U. S. 496,
525-526 (1939) (§ 1983 "include[s] rights, privileges and
immunities secured by the laws of the United States as well as by
the Constitution"). Section 1983 was enacted contemporaneously with
§ 2254, and it shares the common purpose of making the federal
courts available for the uniform interpretation and enforcement of
federal rights in state settings. There is no reason to read § 1983
as placing statutes on a par with the Constitution, but to read §
2254 as largely indifferent to violations of statutes.
Moreover, at least until today, this Court never had held that a
properly preserved claim of a violation of a federal statute should
be treated differently in a § 2254 proceeding from a claim of a
violation of the Constitution. Nor is there any reason to do so.
Congress' decision to apply a federal statute to state criminal
proceedings, which ordinarily are the exclusive province of state
legislatures, generally should be read to reflect the congressional
determination that important national interests are at stake. Where
Congress has made this determination, the federal courts should be
open to ensure the uniform enforcement and interpretation of these
interests.
It should be clear, then, that the distinction drawn in § 2255
between fundamental errors and "omission[s] of the kind
contemplated in
Hill, Timmreck, or
Davis," ante, at
349, simply does not support a distinction in § 2254 between
constitutional and statutory violations.
II
Even putting aside any misgivings about the general extension of
Hill to § 2254 proceedings, there is a specific, and I
believe insurmountable, obstacle to applying this standard to
violations of the lAD. In concluding that an "unwitting judicial
slip of the kind involved here ranks with the
nonconstitutionallapses we have held not cognizable,"
ante,
at 349,
367
in Hill and Timmreck, the majority overlooks Congress' own
determination about the seriousness of such a "slip" and its
consequences.
Congress spoke with unmistakable clarity when it prescribed both
the time limits for trying a prisoner whose custody was obtained
under the lAD and the remedy for a violation of those limits.
Article IV(c) of the lAD provides that the trial of a transferred
prisoner "shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days" of
his arrival in the receiving jurisdiction.8 The lAD is equally
clear about the consequences of a failure to bring a defendant to
trial within the prescribed time limits. Article V(c) states:
"[I]n the event that an action on the indictment, information,
or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is
not brought to trial within the period provided in article III or
article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where
the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer
based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect."
Quite simply, Congress has determined that a reCeIVIng State
must try the defendant within 120 days or not at all. This
determination undermines the majority's approach for two
reasons.
8 This command is subject to only two qualifications. First,
Article IV(c) itself provides that "for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having
jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance." Second, Article VI(a) provides: "In determining the
duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in
articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the matter." The majority relies on neither
qualification, nor did the Indiana state courts.
368
First, the congressional imposition of the drastic sanction of
dismissal forecloses any argument that a violation of the lAD time
limits is somehow a mere "technical" violation too trivial to
warrant habeas review. The dismissal with prejudice of criminal
charges is a remedy rarely seen in criminal law, even for
constitutional violations. See,
e. g., Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.
S. 514 (1972) (violation of Sixth Amendment speedy trial
right);
Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667 (1982)
(violation of Double Jeopardy Clause). In fact, there are countless
constitutional violations for which habeas review is allowed, but
dismissal is not required. However this Court might have assessed
the "fundamentality" of a violation of the lAD time limits in the
absence of this sanction, this congressional directive does not
leave us free to determine that violating the lAD time limits is no
more serious than failure to comply with the technical requirements
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11,
United States v.
Timmreck, 441
U. S. 780 (1979), or the formal requirements of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(a), Hill, 368 U. S., at 428.
Surely, a violation that Congress found troubling enough to
warrant the severe remedy of dismissal cannot become trivial simply
because the defendant did not utter what this Court later
determines to be the magic words at the magic moment, particularly
in the absence of any congressional requirement that the defendant
either invoke his right to a timely trial or object to the setting
of an untimely trial date. In the absence of any suggestion that
Reed procedurally defaulted on his lAD claim so as to deprive him
of relief on direct review, it is curious, to say the least, to
deny habeas relief based largely on a sort of "quasi-default"
standard. Such a two-tiered "default" standard is unwarranted, and
to my knowledge, unprecedented.9 Cf.
Davis v.
United
States,
9 Sunal, Hill, and Timmreck, in which the defendant took no
appeal from a federal conviction, provide no support for this
quasi-waiver standard. None of these cases presents a situation in
which the defendant's
369
411 U. S. 233,
239, n. 6 (1973) (finding it "difficult to conceptualize the
application of one waiver rule for purposes of federal appeal and
another for purposes of federal habeas corpus").
Second, Congress' clear mandate of the remedy of dismissal can
be read to constrain this Court's equitable or supervisory powers
to determine an appropriate remedy, either on direct review or on
habeas.lO Nothing in our case law even suggests that, where
Congress has mandated a remedy for the violation of a federal law,
a habeas court is free to cast about for a different remedy. The
remedy prescribed by the statute must be the remedy that "law and
justice require." 28 U. S. C. § 2243. In other words, the
prerogative writ of habeas corpus should be exercised in accord
with an express legislative command. See lAD, Art. IX, § 5
(directing "[a]ll courts ... of the United States ... to enforce
the agreement on detainers and to cooperate ... with all party
States in enforcing the agreement and effectuating its purpose").
At the very least, the drastic remedy of dismissal saves the lAD
from falling below the Hill fundamentality line.
conduct was sufficient to present and preserve an issue for
appeal, but was found somehow wanting for habeas purposes.
10 McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U. S. 459, 464,
468-472 (1969), and
Timmreck, 441 U. S., at 784, are not to
the contrary. In
McCarthy, the Court looked to the language
and purposes of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and to the
lower courts' varying responses to noncompliance before requiring,
as an exercise of the Court's supervisory powers, relief for Rule
11 violations raised on direct review. In
Timmreck, the
Court denied relief on collateral review for a comparable Rule 11
violation, in part because, under
McCarthy, the defendant
could have challenged it on direct appeal, but did not. In these
cases, of course, the remedy for a violation was left to the Court.
In requiring relief on direct review, but not on habeas, the Court
was at most differing with itself. It was not disregarding a
congressional directive.
370
In sum, under a faithful reading of the lAD, the state trial
court was required to dismiss with prejudice all charges against
Reed because his trial did not commence within 120 days of his
transfer to Indiana state custody. Faced with the state courts'
failure to impose this remedy, the federal habeas court should have
done so.
III
A final word is in order about the Court's emphasis on Reed's
conduct and its suggestion that relief might be in order if only
Reed had objected at the "relevant" moments. Under one reading of
the majority opinion, the Court concludes that Reed's failure to
make oral objections at the pretrial hearings somehow mitigates the
seriousness of the failure to bring him to trial within the lAD
time limits. In other words, the majority suggests that it is the
"unobjected-to" nature of the violation,
ante, at 356
(concurring opinion), that reduces it to the level of a
Hill-Timmreck error, one with which the habeas court should not
concern itself. But as already explained, the statute itself does
not permit this Court to denigrate the significance of the
violation.
It is also possible, however, to read the majority opinion as
relying on a theory of waiver or procedural default. This theory is
equally untenable, particularly when due consideration is given not
only to the language of the lAD, but also to Reed's repeated
attempts to invoke its protections. The lAD itself does not require
dismissal for a violation of its 120-day limit only "upon motion of
the defendant," much less "upon defendant's timely oral objection
to the setting of the trial date." Instead, the statute
unambiguously directs courts to dismiss charges when the time
limits are breached. This arguably puts the responsibility on
courts and States to police the applicable time limits. This is a
reasonable choice for Congress to make. Judges and prosecutors are
players who can be expected to know the lAD's straightforward
re-
371
quirements and to make a simple time calculation at the outset
of the proceedings against a transferred defendant.
Indeed, in this case, the trial court and prosecutor both had
constructive notice of the lAD time limits. The Fulton County
Circuit Court signed and certified that the request for temporary
custody was transmitted "for action in accordance with its terms
and the provisions of the Agreement on Detainers." App. 5-6
(emphasis added). The State's request stated: "I propose to bring
this person to trial on this [information] within the time period
specified in Article IV(c) of the [lAD]."
Id., at 5.
Even assuming, however, that a defendant must invoke the lAD's
time limits in order to obtain its protections, Reed clearly did so
here. In
United States v.
Mauro, 436 U. S. 340 (1978),
this Court agreed that the defendant's "failure to invoke the [lAD]
in specific terms in his speedy trial motions before the
District Court did not result in a waiver" of his claim that the
Government violated the lAD.
Id., at 364 (emphasis added).
We concluded, instead, that the prosecution and the court were "on
notice of the substance" of an inmate's lAD claims when he
"persistently requested that he be given a speedy trial" and
"sought the dismissal of his indictment on the ground that the
delay in bringing him to trial while the detainer remained lodged
against him was causing him to be denied certain privileges at the
state prison."
Id., at 364, 365. Reed did no less.
On May 9, 1983, at his first appearance before the court, Reed,
appearing without counsel, informed the court that he would be in a
halfway house but for the detainer. App. 12. The court acknowledged
that there is a "world of difference" between a halfway house and
the Fulton County jail.
Id., at 14. The court later observed
that Reed's incarceration rendered him incapable of preparing his
defense.
Id., at 54.
At the June 27 pretrial conference, Reed asked the court if it
would prefer future motions orally or in writing. The court
responded, "I want it in writing," and "I read better
372
than I listen."
Id., at 39-40; see also
id., at
123 (noting preference for written motions). Conforming to this
request, Reed filed a motion on July 25, requesting that "trial be
held within the legal guidelines of the Agreement on Detainer Act."
Id., at 56. Clarifying his concerns, Reed complained that
the State of Indiana was "forcing [him] to be tried beyond the
limits as set forth in the Agreement on Detainer Act," and
specifically "request[ed that] no extension of time be granted
beyond those guidelines."
Ibid. This
pro se motion
was filed 31 days before the 120-day period expired.
Three days later, Reed filed a motion stating that there was
"limited time left for trial within the laws."
Id., at 88.
This
pro se motion was filed 28 days before the lAD clock
ran out. Finally, on August 11, he filed a motion for subpoenas
that sought prompt relief because the "Detainer Act time limits"
were "approaching."
Id., at 91. This
pro se motion
was filed 15 days before the 120-day lAD time limit expired.
Thus, after being instructed that the court wanted all motions
in writing, Reed filed three timely written motions indicating his
desire to be tried within the lAD time limits. The Supreme Court of
Indiana concluded that Reed's July 26 motion constituted "a general
demand that trial be held within the time limits of the lAD." 491
N. E. 2d 182, 185 (1993). Under Mauro, this was enough to put the
court on notice of his demands. Even as an original matter, when a
trial court instructs a
pro se defendant to put his motions
in writing, and the defendant does so, not once, but three times,
it is wholly unwarranted then to penalize him for failing to object
orally at what this Court later singles out as the magic
moment.ll
11 The Court, referring to the "clarity" of Reed's August 29
motion seeking discharge of the indictment, suggests that he
deliberately obscured his request until after the clock had run.
Ante, at 344, 349. The Court fails to mention, however, that
Reed prepared his earlier motions both without counsel and without
adequate access to legal materials. It was only at the August 1
pretrial conference that the court ordered the sheriff to pro-
373
This should be a simple matter. Reed invoked, and the trial
court denied, his right to be tried within the lAD's 120day time
limit. Section 2254 authorizes federal courts to grant for such a
violation whatever relief law and justice require. The lAD requires
dismissal of the indictment. Nothing in the lAD, in § 2254, or in
our precedent requires or even suggests that federal courts should
refrain from entertaining a state prisoner's claims of a violation
of the lAD. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
vide Reed with access to legal materials. App. 85. On August 9,
Reed was given two lawbooks, including one on Indiana criminal
procedure, and thereafter his draftsmanship improved.
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