OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
RAYGOR ET AL. v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA ET
AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA
No. 00-1514. Argued November 26, 200l-Decided February 27,
2002
Petitioners each filed complaints in Federal District Court
against respondent university (hereinafter respondent), an arm of
the State of Minnesota, alleging a federal cause of action under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a state law
discrimination action under the federal supplemental jurisdiction
statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, which purports to toll the limitations
period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal
court and for 30 days after they are dismissed, § 1367(d).
Respondent's answers included the affirmative defense that the
suits were barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
District Court subsequently dismissed the claims, and petitioners
withdrew their federal appeal after this Court held that the ADEA
does not abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, see Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U. S. 62, 92. In the
meantime, petitioners had refiled their state law claims in state
court. Respondent contended that the claims were barred by the
applicable state statute of limitations and that the federal
supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the limitations
period on those claims because the Federal District Court never had
subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. Agreeing, the
State District Court dismissed the suit, but the Minnesota Appeals
Court reversed. Reversing, in turn, the State Supreme Court held §
1367(d) unconstitutional when applied to claims against
nonconsenting state defendants, such as respondent.
Held: Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for
state law claims asserted against non consenting state defendants
that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Pp. 539-548.
(a) Petitioners sought to have their state law claims heard in
federal court as supplemental claims under § 1367(a). That grant of
jurisdiction does not extend to claims against non consenting state
defendants, see Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U. S. 775, but the
question remains whether § 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for
state law claims asserted under § 1367(a) but subsequently
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Pp. 539-542.
(b) Because § 1367(d), on its face, purports to apply to
dismissals of "any claim asserted under subsection (a)," it could
be broadly read to apply to any such claim regardless of the reason
for dismissal. But
534
reading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims are
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds raises serious doubts about
the provision's constitutionality given state sovereign immunity
principles. Such a reading would require a State to defend against
a claim in state court that had never been filed in that court
until some indeterminate time after the original limitations period
had elapsed. There is a rebuttable presumption that equitable
tolling under federal law applies to waivers of the United States'
immunity. However, this Court has never held that waivers of a
State's immunity presumptively include federal tolling rules, nor
is it obvious that such a presumption would be a realistic
assessment of legislative intent. Moreover, a state sovereign
prescribes the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued
in its own courts, Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529, and only
the sovereign's consent can qualify the absolute character of its
immunity from suit in those courts, Nevada v. Hall,
440 U. S. 410, 414. The
notion that federal tolling of a state limitations period
constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity as to claims
against state defendants at least raises a serious constitutional
doubt. Thus, this Court has good reason to rely on the statutory
construction principle that Congress must make its intention to
alter the constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government unmistakably clear in the statute's language, Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U. S. 58, 65. Section
1367(d)'s lack of clarity is apparent in two respects. With respect
to the claims covered, § 1367(d) reflects no specific or
unequivocal intent to toll the limitations period for claims
asserted against nonconsenting States, especially considering that
such claims do not fall within § 1367(a)'s scope. With respect to
the dismissals covered, § 1367(d) occurs in the context of a
statute that specifically contemplates only a few grounds for
dismissal, none based on the Eleventh Amendment. Section 1367(d)
may not clearly exclude tolling for claims against nonconsenting
States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but this Court is
looking for a clear statement of what the rule includes, not what
it excludes. Pp. 542-546.
(c) Petitioners argue that the tolling provision should be
interpreted to apply to their claims because it was enacted to
prevent due process violations caused by state claim preclusion and
anti-claim-splitting laws. However, since it is far from clear
whether Congress intended tolling to apply when claims against non
consenting States were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, it
is not relevant whether Congress acted pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. And there is no merit to petitioners' claim
that respondent consented to suit in federal court, since it raised
its Eleventh Amendment defense at the earliest
535
opportunity by including that defense in its answers to the
complaints. Pp.546-547.
620 N. W. 2d 680, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, post, p. 548. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which SOUTER and BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 549.
Howard L. Bolter argued the cause for petitioners. With him on
the briefs was Eric Schnapper.
Mark B. Rotenberg argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Lorie S. Gildea and Tracy M.
Smith.
Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for intervenor
United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson,
Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Barbara McDowell, Mark B.
Stern, and Alisa B. Klein. *
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In federal court, petitioners asserted state law claims under
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
State of Maryland et al. by
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney
General of Maryland, Andrew Baida, Solicitor General, Robert H.
Kono, Acting Attorney General of Guam, and Dan Schweitzer, and by
the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce
M. Botelho of Alaska, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal
of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of
Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas
J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Thomas F.
Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W
(Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del
Papa of Nevada, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Betty D.
Montgomery of Ohio, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, John
Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of
Vermont, and Randolph Beales of Virginia; and for the National
Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James
I. Crowley.
536
§ 1367 (1994 ed.), against respondent university, an arm of the
State of Minnesota. Those claims were dismissed on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, and petitioners refiled them in state court past
the period of limitations. The supplemental jurisdiction statute
purports to toll the period of limitations for supplemental claims
while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they
are dismissed. § 1367(d). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
provision unconstitutional when applied to claims against
nonconsenting state defendants, such as respondent university, and
dismissed petitioners' claims. We affirm the judgment on the
alternative ground that the tolling provision does not apply to
claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting States.
I
In August 1995, petitioners Lance Raygor and James Goodchild
filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). The charges alleged that their employer, the University of
Minnesota, discriminated against them on the basis of age in
December 1994 by attempting to compel them to accept early
retirement at the age of 52. After petitioners refused to retire,
the university allegedly reclassified petitioners' jobs so as to
reduce their salaries. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45; Brief for
Petitioners 3.
The EEOC cross-filed petitioners' charges with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and later issued a right-to-sue
letter on June 6, 1996, advising that petitioners could file a
lawsuit within 90 days under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et
seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Brief for United States 5. The MDHR
likewise issued right-to-sue letters on July 17, 1996, advising
petitioners that they could file suit within 45 days under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat., ch. 363 (1991). 620
N. W. 2d 680, 681 (Minn. 2001); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46 to
A-47.
537
On or about August 29, 1996, each petitioner filed a separate
complaint against respondent Board of Regents of the University of
Minnesota (hereinafter respondent), in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota. 620 N. W. 2d, at 681; App. to
Pet. for Cert. A-41. Each complaint alleged a federal cause of
action under the ADEA and a state cause of action under the MHRA.
The suits were subsequently consolidated. 604 N. W. 2d 128, 130
(Minn. App. 2000). Respondent filed answers to these complaints in
September 1996, setting forth eight affirmative defenses, including
that the suits were "'barred in whole or in part by Defendant's
Eleventh Amendment immunity.'" Brief for Petitioners 4. The
District Court entered a scheduling plan that the parties agreed
upon. According to the plan, discovery would finish by May 30,
1997, and dispositive motions would be filed by July 15, 1997.
Ibid. The parties then engaged in discovery as well as mediation.
Ibid.
In early July 1997, respondent filed its motion to dismiss
petitioners' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). Brief for Petitioners 5, n. 5. The motion argued that the
federal and state law claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Brief for Respondent Regents of the University of Minnesota 5.
Petitioners' response acknowledged respondent's " 'potential
Eleventh Amendment immunity from state discrimination claims in
Federal Court,'" but urged the District Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims if the federal
claims were upheld. Brief for Petitioners 5-6. On July 11, 1997,
the District Court granted respondent's Rule 12(b)(1) motion and
dismissed all of petitioners' claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-39.
Petitioners appealed, but the appeal was stayed pending this
Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U. S. 62 (2000). 620
N. W. 2d, at 682. Kimel held that the "ADEA does not validly
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity." 528 U. S., at 92. Given
that result, petitioners moved to withdraw their appeal, and it
538
was dismissed in January 2000. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682; Brief for
Petitioners 6-7.
In the meantime, approximately three weeks after the Federal
District Court had dismissed their state law claims, petitioners
refiled their state law claims in Hennepin County District Court.
620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent's answer asserted that
"'plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the
applicable statute of limitations.'" Brief for Petitioners 7. The
state court initially stayed the lawsuit because of the pending
federal appeal, but lifted the stay in December 1998 for the
purpose of allowing respondent to move for dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent moved for
summary judgment in February 1999, arguing that petitioners' state
claims were barred by the applicable 45 day statute of limitations.
See Minn. Stat. §§ 363.06, subd. 3, 363.14, subd. l(a)(l) (2000).
Respondent also argued that the tolling provision of the federal
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, did not
apply to toll the limitations period on the state law claims while
they were pending in federal court because the Federal District
Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners' ADEA
claims. Petitioners argued that the tolling provision of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute applied because their state law
claims had been dismissed without prejudice. App. to Brief for
Petitioners B-3, B-4. The State District Court treated respondent's
motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and granted it,
holding that § 1367(d) did "not apply ... because the federal
district court never had 'original jurisdiction' over the
controversy" since "both the state and federal claims were
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id., at B-5,
B-6.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court first decided
that the Federal District Court had original jurisdiction over the
case before respondent's Eleventh Amendment defense was
"successfully asserted." 604 N. W.
539
2d, at 132 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht,
524 U. S. 381
(1998)). The court then held that § 1367(d) applied to toll the
statute of limitations for petitioners' state law claims because
that provision "allows tolling of any claim dismissed by a federal
district court, whether dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds or
at the discretion of the federal district court under [§ 1367](c)."
604 N. W. 2d, at 132-133.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The court noted that
respondent was an arm of the State, and found that the federal
tolling provision facially applied to petitioners' state law
claims. 620 N. W. 2d, at 684, 687. The court concluded, however,
"that application of section 1367(d) to toll the statute of
limitations applicable to state law claims against an unconsenting
state defendant first filed in federal court but then dismissed and
brought in state court is an impermissible denigration of
[respondent's] Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id., at 687. The court
thus concluded that § 1367(d) could not constitutionally apply to
toll the statute of limitations for petitioners' state law claims,
and it dismissed those claims. We granted certiorari, 532 U. S.
1065 (2001), on the question whether 28 U. S. C. § 1367(d) is
unconstitutional as applied to a state defendant.
II
In Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U. S. 715 (1966),
this Court held that federal courts deciding claims within their
federalquestion subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331,
may decide state law claims not within their subject matter
jurisdiction if the federal and state law claims "derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact" and comprise "but one
constitutional 'case.'" Mine Workers, supra, at 725. Jurisdiction
over state law claims in such instances was known as "pendent
jurisdiction." This Court later made clear that, absent
authorization from Congress, a district court could not exercise
pendent jurisdiction over claims involving par-
540
ties who were not already parties to a claim independently
within the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Finley
In the wake of Finley, the Federal Courts Study Committee
recommended that "Congress expressly authorize federal courts to
hear any claim arising out of the same 'transaction or occurrence'
as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including claims, within
federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of
additional parties." Report of Federal Courts Study Committee 47
(Apr. 2, 1990). Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, as part of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990. Subsection (a) of § 1367 states that
"[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties."
Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when
the district court's original jurisdiction is based only on
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332
(1994 ed. and Supp. V). Subsection (c) allows district courts to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain
situations, such as when a "claim raises a novel or complex issue
of State law." § 1367(c)(1) (1994 ed.).
Petitioners originally sought to have their state law claims
heard in federal court as supplemental claims falling under §
1367(a). App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3. Prior to the enactment
of § 1367, however, this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
bars the adjudication of pendent state law
541
claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal court.
See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
465 U. S. 89, 120 (1984).
In that context, the Eleventh Amendment was found to be an
"explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction." Id., at 118.
Consequently, an express grant of jurisdiction over such claims
would be an abrogation of the sovereign immunity guaranteed by the
Eleventh Amendment. Before Congress could attempt to do that, it
must make its intention to abrogate "'unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.''' Dellmuth v. Muth,
491 U. S. 223, 228 (1989)
(quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U. S. 234, 242
(1985)).
The most that can be said about subsection (a), however, is that
it is a general grant of jurisdiction, no more specific to claims
against nonconsenting States than the one at issue in Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak,
501 U. S. 775 (1991).
There, we considered whether 28 U. S. C. § 1362 contained a clear
statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. That
grant of jurisdiction provides that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing
body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the
matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." (Emphasis added.)
Such a facially broad grant of jurisdiction over "all civil
actions" could be read to include claims by Indian tribes against
nonconsenting States, but we held that such language was
insufficient to constitute a clear statement of an intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. Blatchford, supra, at 786.
Likewise, we cannot read § 1367(a) to authorize district courts to
exercise jurisdiction over claims against nonconsenting States,
even though nothing in the statute expressly excludes such claims.
Thus, consistent with Blatch-
542
ford, we hold that § 1367(a)'s grant of jurisdiction does not
extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants.
Even so, there remains the question whether § 1367(d) tolls the
statute of limitations for claims against nonconsenting States that
are asserted under § 1367(a) but subsequently dismissed on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. Subsection (d) of § 1367 provides that
"[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under
subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is
voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of
the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is
pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless
State law provides for a longer tolling period."
On its face, subsection (d) purports to apply to dismissals of
"any claim asserted under subsection (a)." Ibid. (emphasis added).
Thus, it could be broadly read to apply to any claim technically
"asserted" under subsection (a) as long as it was later dismissed,
regardless of the reason for dismissal. But reading subsection (d)
to apply when state law claims against nonconsenting States are
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds raises serious doubts about
the constitutionality of the provision given principles of state
sovereign immunity. If subsection (d) applied in such
circumstances, it would toll the state statute of limitations for
30 days in addition to however long the claim had been pending in
federal court. This would require a State to defend against a claim
in state court that had never been filed in state court until some
indeterminate time after the original limitations period had
elapsed.
When the sovereign at issue is the United States, we have
recognized that a limitations period may be "a central condition"
of the sovereign's waiver of immunity. United States v. M ottaz,
476 U. S. 834,
843 (1986); see also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ.
and School Lands,
461
U. S. 273, 287 (1983) ("When waiver legislation contains a
statute
543
of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a
condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity"). In suits against
the United States, however, there is a rebuttable presumption that
equitable tolling under federal law applies to waivers of the
United States' immunity. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs,
498 U. S.
89, 95 (1990). From this, the dissent argues that any
broadening of a State's waiver of immunity through tolling under §
1367(d) presumptively does not violate the State's sovereign
immunity. Post, at 552-553, and n. 11 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). But
this Court has never held that waivers of a State's immunity
presumptively include all federal tolling rules, nor is it obvious
that such a presumption would be "a realistic assessment of
legislative intent." Irwin, supra, at 95.
Moreover, with respect to suits against a state sovereign in its
own courts, we have explained that a State "may prescribe the terms
and conditions on which it consents to be sued," Beers v. Arkansas,
20 How. 527, 529 (1858), and that "[o]nly the sovereign's own
consent could qualify the absolute character of [its] immunity"
from suit in its own courts, Nevada v. Hall,
440 U. S. 410, 414
(1979). Thus, although we have not directly addressed whether
federal tolling of a state statute of limitations constitutes an
abrogation of state sovereign immunity with respect to claims
against state defendants, we can say that the notion at least
raises a serious constitutional doubt.
Consequently, we have good reason to rely on a clear statement
principle of statutory construction. When "Congress intends to
alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so
'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.'" Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989)
(quoting Atascadero, supra, at 242). This principle applies when
Congress "intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States" or
when it legislates in "'traditionally sensitive areas'" that"
'affec[t] the federal balance.'"
544
Will, supra, at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U. S. 336,349
(1971)). In such cases, the clear statement principle reflects "an
acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers
under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does
not readily interfere." Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U. S. 452, 461, 464
(1991).
Here, allowing federal law to extend the time period in which a
state sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least
affects the federal balance in an area that has been a historic
power of the States, whether or not it constitutes an abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. Thus, applying the clear statement
principle helps" 'assur[e] that the legislature has in fact faced,
and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in
the judicial decision.''' Will, supra, at 65 (quoting Bass, supra,
at 349). This is obviously important when the underlying issue
raises a serious constitutional doubt or problem. See Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U. S. 765,
787 (2000) (relying in part on clear statement principle to decide
the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994 ed.), did not
authorize "an action in federal court by a qui tam relator against
a State" and avoiding whether such a suit would violate the
Eleventh Amendment, an issue raising a serious constitutional
doubt); Gregory, supra, at 464 (relying on clear statement
principle to determine that state judges were excluded from the
ADEA in order to "avoid a potential constitutional problem" given
the constraints on the Court's "ability to consider the limits that
the state-federal balance places on Congress' powers under the
Commerce Clause").
The question then is whether § 1367(d) states a clear intent to
toll the limitations period for claims against nonconsenting States
that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Here the lack of
clarity is apparent in two respects. With respect to the claims the
tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) to cover any
claim "asserted" under subsec-
545
tion (a), but we have previously found similarly general
language insufficient to satisfy clear statement requirements. For
example, we have held that a statute providing civil remedies for
violations committed by "'any recipient of Federal assistance'" was
"not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment" even when it was undisputed that a
state defendant was a recipient of federal aid. Atascadero, 473 U.
S., at 245-246 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982 ed.)
(emphasis in original)). Instead, we held that "[w]hen Congress
chooses to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do
so specifically." 473 U. S., at 246. Likewise, § 1367(d) reflects
no specific or unequivocal intent to toll the statute of
limitations for claims asserted against nonconsenting States,
especially considering that such claims do not fall within the
proper scope of § 1367(a) as explained above.
With respect to the dismissals the tolling provision covers, one
could read § 1367(d) in isolation to authorize tolling regardless
of the reason for dismissal, but § 1367(d) occurs in the context of
a statute that specifically contemplates only a few grounds for
dismissal. The requirements of § 1367(a) make clear that a claim
will be subject to dismissal if it fails to "form part of the same
case or controversy" as a claim within the district court's
original jurisdiction. Likewise, § 1367(b) entails that certain
claims will be subject to dismissal if exercising jurisdiction over
them would be "inconsistent" with 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and
Supp. V). Finally, § 1367(c) (1994 ed.) lists four specific
situations in which a district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a particular claim. Given that
particular context, it is unclear if the tolling provision was
meant to apply to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the
statute, such as dismissals on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See
Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury,
489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989)
("It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
546
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme"). In
sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims
against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, we are looking for a clear statement of what the rule
includes, not a clear statement of what it excludes. See Gregory,
supra, at 467. Section 1367(d) fails this test. As such, we will
not read § 1367(d) to apply to dismissals of claims against
nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
In anticipation of this result, petitioners argue that the
tolling provision should be interpreted to apply to their claims
because Congress enacted it to prevent due process violations
caused by state claim preclusion and anti-claimsplitting laws.
Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief for Petitioners 5-12. In
other words, petitioners contend that Congress enacted the tolling
provision to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against perceived state violations. We have previously
addressed the argument that if a statute were passed pursuant to
Congress' § 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, federalism
concerns "might carry less weight." Gregory, 501 U. S., at 468. We
concluded, however, that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not
override all principles of federalism,"
id., at 469, and
held that insofar as statutory intent was ambiguous, we would "not
attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental
functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to ... § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 470. That same rule applies
here. As already demonstrated, it is far from clear whether
Congress intended tolling to apply when claims against
nonconsenting States were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
Thus, it is not relevant whether Congress acted pursuant to §
5.
Petitioners also argue that our construction of the statute does
not resolve their case because respondent consented to
547
suit in federal court. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2-4. We have
stated that "[a] sovereign's immunity may be waived" and have "held
that a State may consent to suit against it in federal court."
Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 99 (citing Clark v. Barnard,
108 U. S. 436, 447
(1883)). Petitioners claim that respondent consented to suit by not
moving to dismiss petitioners' state law claims on Eleventh
Amendment grounds until July 1997, some 10 months after the federal
lawsuits were filed in August 1996. Yet respondent raised its
Eleventh Amendment defense at the earliest possible opportunity by
including that defense in its answers that were filed in September
1996. Given that, we cannot say that respondent "unequivocally
expressed" a consent to be sued in federal court. Pennhurst, supra,
at 99 (citing Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U. S. 651, 673
(1974)). The fact that respondent filed its motion in July 1997 is
as consistent with adherence to the pretrial schedule as it is with
anything else.
Indeed, such circumstances are readily distinguishable from the
limited situations where this Court has found a State consented to
suit, such as when a State voluntarily invoked federal court
jurisdiction or otherwise "ma[de] a 'clear declaration' that it
intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction." College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd.,
527 U. S. 666, 676
(1999). And even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that
consent could be inferred "from the failure to raise the objection
at the outset of the proceedings," Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections
v. Schacht, 524 U. S., at 395 (KENNEDY, J., concurring)-a standard
this Court has not adopted-consent would still not be found here
since respondent raised the issue in its answer. Thus, we find no
merit to petitioners' argument that respondent was a consenting
state defendant during the federal court proceedings. We express no
view on the application or constitutionality of § 1367(d) when a
State consents to suit or when a defendant is not a State.
548
III
We hold that respondent never consented to suit in federal court
on petitioners' state law claims and that § 1367(d) does not toll
the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against
nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. Therefore, § 1367(d) did not operate to toll the
period of limitations for petitioners' claims, and we affirm the
judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissing those
claims.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
I join the Court's judgment and its opinion in principal part. I
agree with the decision's twin rulings. First, prevailing precedent
supports the view that, in the absence of a clear statement of
congressional intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, 28 U. S. C. § 1367(a)'s extension of federal jurisdiction
does not reach claims against nonconsenting state defendants. See
ante, at 540-542. Second, absent "affirmative indicatio[nJ" by
Congress, see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States
ex rel. Stevens,
529
U. S. 765, 787 (2000), § 1367(d)'s tolling provision does not
reach claims "asserted," but not maintainable, under § 1367(a)
against nonconsenting state defendants. See ante, at 542-545.
The pathmarking decision, it appears to me, is Vermont Agency. 1
There, the Court declined to read the word "person," for purposes
of qui tam liability, to include a nonconsenting State. Bolstering
the Court's conclusion in Vermont Agency were the two
reinforcements pivotal here:
1 This Court's majority, in contrast to the Minnesota Supreme
Court, does not invoke Alden v. Maine,
527 U. S. 706 (1999), in
support of today's decision. I joined the dissent in Alden and, in
a suitable case, would join a call to reexamine that decision. Cf.
post, at 554-555 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
549
first, "'the ordinary rule of statutory construction' that 'if
Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between
States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do
so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,'" 529 U. S.,
at 787 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989));
and second, "the doctrine that statutes should be construed so as
to avoid difficult constitutional questions," 529 U. S., at 787. I
would not venture further into the mist surrounding § 1367 to
inquire, generally, whether § 1367(d) "appl[ies] to dismissals for
reasons unmentioned by the statute," ante, at 545.2
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER
join, dissenting.
The federal interest in the fair and efficient administration of
justice is both legitimate and important. To vindicate that
interest federal rulemakers and judges have occasionally imposed
burdens on the States and their judiciaries. Thus, for example,
Congress may provide for the adjudication of federal claims in
state courts, Testa v. Katt,
330 U. S. 386 (1947), and
may direct that state litigation be stayed during the pendency of
bankruptcy proceedings, 11 U. S. C. § 362(a). In appropriate cases
federal judges may enjoin the prosecution of state judicial
proceedings.1 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of
the Constitution, in all such cases the federal rules prevail "and
the Judges in every
2 The supplemental jurisdiction statute, well-reasoned
commentary indicates, "is clearly flawed and needs repair." Oakley,
Prospectus for the American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code
Revision Project, 31 U. C. D. L. Rev. 855, 936 (1998); see
generally
id., at 936-945 (canvassing problems with 28 U. S.
C. § 1367). For a proposed repair of § 1367, see ALl, Federal
Judicial Code Revision Project (Tent. Draft No.2, Apr. 14,
1998).
1 The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. §2283 (1994 ed.),
provides:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments."
550
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding."
The "supplemental jurisdiction" provisions of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1994 ed.), impose a
lesser burden on the States than each of these examples, and do so
only in a relatively narrow category of casesthose in which both
federal- and state-law claims are so related "that they form part
of the same case or controversy." Adopting a recommendation of the
Federal Courts Committee, Congress in § 1367(a) overruled our
misguided decision in Finley v. United States,
490 U. S. 545 (1989), and
expressly authorized federal courts to entertain such cases even
when the state-law claim is against a party over whom there is no
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.2
Subsection (d) of § 1367 responds to the risk that the
plaintiff's state-law claim, even though timely when filed as a
part of the federal lawsuit, may be dismissed after the state
period of limitations has expired. To avoid the necessity of
duplicate filings, it provides that the state statute shall be
tolled while the claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days
thereafter.3 The impact of this provision on the defendant is
minimal, because the timely filing in federal court provides it
with the same notice as if a duplicate complaint had also been
filed in state court.
2 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1367(a) provides:
"Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties."
3 Section 1367(d) provides:
"The period of limitations for any claim asserted under
subsection (a) ... shall be tolled while the claim is pending and
for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law
provides for a longer tolling period."
551
The tolling of statutes of limitations is, of course, an ancient
4 and widespread practice.5 Some federal tolling statutes apply
only to federal limitations periods,6 but others apply to state
statutes as well. 7 All of these statutes are broadly worded, and
none of them excludes any special category of defendants. The plain
text of all these statutes, in-
4 When an equity bill was dismissed to permit the commencement
of an action at law, it was the practice of the English courts to
consider the statute of limitations tolled during the pendency of
the suit in equity. See, e. g., Anonimous, 1 Verno 73, 73-74,23
Eng. Rep. 320, 320-321 (Ch. 1682) ("[I]f a man sued in Chancery,
and pending the suit here, the statute of limitations attached on
his demand, and his bill was afterwards dismissed, as being a
matter properly determinable at common law: in such case ... [the
court] would not suffer the statute to be pleaded in bar to his
demand"); see also Sturt V. Mellish, 2 Atk. 610, 615, 26 Eng. Rep.
765, 767 (Ch. 1743); MacKenzie V. Marquis of Powis, 7 Brown 282,
288, 3 Eng. Rep. 183, 187 (H. L. 1737).
5 Equitable tolling is a background rule that informs our
construction of federal statutes of limitations, Holmberg V.
Armbrecht,
327 U. S.
392, 397 (1946), including those statutes conditioning the
Federal Government's waiver of immunity to suit, Irwin V.
Department of Veterans Affairs,
498 U. S. 89, 95-96 (1990)
("[T]he same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable
to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits
against the United States"). The rule also is generally applied by
state courts, such as the Minnesota courts adjudicating claims
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). See, e. g., Ochs V.
Streater, Inc., 568 N. W. 2d 858, 860 (Minn. App. 1997).
6 See, e.
g., 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iv) (tolling an
alien's period of unlawful presence in the United States during
certain immigration proceedings); 28 U. S. C. § 2263(b) (1994 ed.,
Supp. V) (tolling the statute of limitations on filing for habeas
corpus relief); 29 U. S. C. § 1854(f) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (tolling
the statute of limitations on actions for bodily injury or death to
a migrant farmworker).
7See, e.
g., 11 U. S. C. § 108 (tolling during
bankruptcy); 50 U. S. C. App. § 525 (1994 ed.) (Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940) (tolling during military
service); 15 U. S. C. § 6606(e)(4) (Y2K Act) (tolling during notice
and remediation period for Year 2000 related claims); cf. 42 U. S.
C. § 9658 (1994 ed.) (Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) (setting uniform
limitations-period commencement date in suits under state law for
damages due to hazardous release exposure).
552
eluding § 1367, applies to cases in which a State, or an arm of
a State, is named as a defendant. Thus, as the Minnesota Court of
Appeals correctly held, "the plain language of subsection (d)
allows tolling of any elaim dismissed by a federal district court,
whether dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds or at the
discretion of the federal district court under subsection
(C)."8
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, because it considered this
Court's holding in Alden v. Maine,
527 U. S. 706 (1999), to
compel the view that § 1367(d) was an invalid attempt by Congress
to make the State of Minnesota subject to suit in state court
without its consent.9 Unlike the State in Alden, however, Minnesota
has given its consent to be sued in its own courts for alleged
violations of the MHRA within 45 days of receipt of a notice letter
from the State Department of Human Rights. The question whether
that timeliness condition may be tolled during the pendency of an
action filed in federal court within the 45-day period is quite
different from the question whether Congress can entirely abrogate
the State's sovereign immunity defense. For the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence concerns the question whether an
unconsenting sovereign may be sued, rather than when a consenting
sovereign may be sued.
The Court recognized this crucial distinction in Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs,
498 U. S. 89 (1990), a
case in which the application of equitable tolling to a waiver of
federal sovereign immunity was at issue. Although the Court
required the Government's assent as to whether it may be sued to be
"unequivocally expressed," it presumed the rule of equitable
tolling applied once assent was established because tolling would
"amoun[t] to little, if any, broadening of the congressional
waiver." Id., at 95. The Court
8604 N. W. 2d 128, 132-133 (2000).
9 See 620 N. W. 2d 680, 686 (2001) ("[W]e read Alden to require
that the University's waiver of immunity be limited to the [45-day
limitations period]").
553
reached this holding despite the inclusion in the waiver
provision of a limitations period shorter than the one for suits
against private parties.
The waiver at issue in this case is more unequivocally expressed
than the one in Irwin. Minnesota has consented to suit under the
MHRA by agreeing to be treated in the same manner as a private
employer.1o The 45-day limitations period is thus applicable to any
suit under the MHRA, not only those against state entities. In
light of such a clear consent to suit, unencumbered by any special
limitations period, it is evident that tolling under § 1367(d)
similarly "amounts to little, if any, broadening of the
[legislature's] waiver." 11 Ibid. Given the fact that the timely
filing in Federal Court served the purposes of the 45-day period,12
it
10 See Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subds. 17 and 28 (2000) (defining
"employer" to include private entities and "the state and its
departments, agencies, and political subdivisions").
11 It is true enough that we "ha[ve] never held that waivers of
a State's immunity presumptively include all federal tolling
rules," ante, at 543. Of course, we have never held to the
contrary, either. But surely our federal sovereign immunity cases
shed great light on the question, given our similarly strict
analyses of waivers in federal and state sovereign immunity cases.
See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd.,
527 U.
S. 666, 682 (1999) ("[I]n the context offederal sovereign
immunity-obviously the closest analogy to the present caseit is
well established that waivers are not implied .... We see no reason
why the rule should be different with respect to state sovereign
immunity" (citation omitted)).
As the Court observes, ante, at 542-543, our federal sovereign
immunity cases recognize that a limitations period may serve as a
central condition of waiver. The teaching of Irwin, however, is
that even when a limitations period is a "condition to the waiver
of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed," 498 U.
S., at 94, application of tolling to that period is presumptively
permissible. I can "see no reason why the rule should be different
with respect to state sovereign immunity." College Savings Bank,
527 U. S., at 682.
12 The university received notice of the claim and was able to
take part fully in the prosecution of the litigation by engaging in
extensive discovery and participating in mediation.
554
seems to me quite clear that the application of the tolling rule
does not raise a serious constitutional issue.13
It is true, of course, that the federal tolling provision, like
any other federal statute that pre-empts state law, "affects the
federal balance" even though it does not "constitut[e] an
abrogation of state sovereign immunity." Ante, at 544. But that
consequence is surely not sufficient to exclude state parties from
the coverage of statutes of general applicability like the
Bankruptcy Code, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940, or any other federal statute whose general language creates a
conflict with a pre-existing rule of state law. 14 In my judgment,
the specific holding in Alden v. Maine represented a serious
distortion of the federal balance intended by the Framers of our
Constitution. If that case is now to provide the basis for a rule
of construction that will exempt state parties from the coverage of
federal statutes of general applicability, whether or not
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity is at stake, it will
foster unintended and unjust consequences and impose serious
burdens on an already-overworked Congress.15 Indeed, that risk
provides
13 Indeed, as an alternative basis for its decision, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that equitable tolling was
appropriate. See 604 N. W. 2d, at 133-134. The Minnesota Supreme
Court did not disagree with the conclusion that equitable tolling
was permissible, but rather found no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's refusal of such tolling. See 620 N. W. 2d, at
687.
14 See, e. g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
529 U. S. 861 (2000)
(finding pre-emption of common-law tort action by National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966); Boggs v. Boggs,
520 U. S. 833 (1997)
(finding pre-emption of state community property laws by Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
15 It may also impose serious burdens on already-overworked
state courts. Claims brought under state antidiscrimination
statutes such as the MHRA, for example, will often be bound up with
claims under similar federal statutes, such as 42 U. S. C. § 1983
(1994 ed., Supp. V); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V); and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq.
(1994 ed. and Supp. V). The state courts have concurrent
555
an additional reason for reexamining that misguided decision at
the earliest opportunity.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
jurisdiction over these federal statutes. Felder v. Casey,
487 U. S. 131,
139 (1988) (§ 1983); Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly,
494 U. S. 820
(1990) (Title VII); 29 U. S. C. § 626(c)(I) (ADEA). As a result of
the Court's reading of § 1367(d), many litigants with such mixed
claims against state entities may decide to file their entire suits
in state court. By doing so, they avoid the cost and confusion of
duplicate filings. They also eliminate the risk that a time bar
will attach to a claim dismissed from federal court on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, which might occur even when, as in this case,
Eleventh Amendment immunity was not evident at the time the suit
was filed. Thus, in attempting to preserve the "balance between the
States and the Federal Government," ante, at 543, the Court risks
upending that balance by removing from the state courts the
assistance of the federal courts in adjudicating many claims.
556
The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 555
and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to
publish the orders with
permanent page numbers, thus making
the official citations available upon publication of the
preliminary prints of the United States Reports.
557
OCTOBER 1, 2001 Appointment of Marshal
It is ordered that Pamela Talkin be, and she hereby is,
appointed Marshal of this Court, effective July 16, 2001.
Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded
No. 00-1649. COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT ET AL.
V. HEADWATERS
FOREST DEFENSE ET AL. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of
Saucier v. Katz,
533
U. S. 194 (2001). Reported below:
240 F.3d
1185.
No. 00-1875. TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT CO. ET AL.
V.
SIX FLAGS OVER GEORGIA ET AL. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari granted,
judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in
light of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
532 U. S. 424
(2001). Reported below: 245 Ga. App. 334, 537 S. E. 2d 397.
No. 00-9044. JACKSON
V. MASSANARI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of
the position presently asserted by the Solicitor General in his
brief for the Acting Commissioner of Social Security filed June 20,
2001. Reported below:
234 F.3d
246.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 00-9762. PETERSON
V. GULF CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE.
Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8.
No. 00-9763. PETERSON
V. FLORIDA. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
1st Dist. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pau801
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