OPINION OF THE COURT
PRESTON V. FERRER
552 U. S. ____ (2008)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 06-1463
ARNOLD M. PRESTON, PETITIONER
v. ALEX E.
FERRER
on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of
california, second appellate district
[February 20, 2008]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the
opinion of the Court.
As this Court recognized in
Southland Corp. v.
Keating,
465 U. S. 1 (1984), the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act), 9 U. S. C. §1
et
seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), establishes a national policy
favoring arbitration when the parties contract for that mode of
dispute resolution. The Act, which rests on Congress’ authority
under the Commerce Clause, supplies not simply a procedural
framework applicable in federal courts; it also calls for the
application, in state as well as federal courts, of federal
substantive law regarding arbitration. 465 U. S., at 16. More
recently, in
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna,
546 U. S. 440 (2006),
the Court clarified that, when parties agree to arbitrate all
disputes arising under their contract, questions concerning the
validity of the entire contract are to be resolved by the
arbitrator in the first instance, not by a federal or state
court.
The instant petition presents the following
question: Does the FAA override not only state statutes that refer
certain state-law controversies initially to a judicial forum, but
also state statutes that refer certain disputes initially to an
administrative agency? We hold today that, when parties agree to
arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws
lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or
administrative, are superseded by the FAA.
I
This case concerns a contract
between respondent Alex E. Ferrer, a former Florida trial court
judge who currently appears as “Judge Alex” on a Fox television
network program, and petitioner Arnold M. Preston, a California
attorney who renders services to persons in the entertainment
industry. Seeking fees allegedly due under the contract, Preston
invoked the parties’ agreement to arbitrate “any dispute … relating
to the terms of [the contract] or the breach, validity, or legality
thereof … in accordance with the rules [of the American Arbitration
Association].” App. 18.
Preston’s demand for arbitration,
made in June 2005, was countered a month later by Ferrer’s petition
to the California Labor Commissioner charging that the contract was
invalid and unenforceable under the California Talent Agencies Act
(TAA), Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §1700
et seq. (West 2003 and
Supp. 2008). Ferrer asserted that Preston acted as a talent agent
without the license required by the TAA, and that Preston’s
unlicensed status rendered the entire contract void.[
Footnote 1]
The Labor Commissioner’s hearing officer, in
November 2005, determined that Ferrer had stated a “colorable basis
for exercise of the Labor Commissioner’s jurisdiction.” App. 33.
The officer denied Ferrer’s motion to stay the arbitration,
however, on the ground that the Labor Commissioner lacked authority
to order such relief. Ferrer then filed suit in the Los Angeles
Superior Court, seeking a declaration that the controversy between
the parties “arising from the [c]ontract, including in particular
the issue of the validity of the [c]ontract, is not subject to
arbitration.”
Id., at 29. As interim relief, Ferrer sought
an injunction restraining Preston from proceeding before the
arbitrator. Preston responded by moving to compel arbitration.
In December 2005, the Superior Court denied
Preston’s motion to compel arbitration and enjoined Preston from
proceeding before the arbitrator “unless and until the Labor
Commissioner determines that … she is without jurisdiction over the
disputes between Preston and Ferrer.” No. BC342454 (Dec. 7, 2005),
App. C to Pet. for Cert. 18a, 26a–27a. During the pendency of
Preston’s appeal from the Superior Court’s decision, this Court
reaffirmed, in
Buckeye, that challenges to the validity of
a contract providing for arbitration ordinarily “should … be
considered by an arbitrator, not a court.” 546 U. S., at 446.
In a 2-to-1 decision issued in November 2006,
the California Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s
judgment. The appeals court held that the relevant provision of the
TAA, Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §1700.44(a) (West 2003), vests “exclusive
original jurisdiction” over the dispute in the Labor Commissioner.
145 Cal. App. 4th 440, 447, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 634.
Buckeye is “inapposite,” the court said, because that case
“did not involve an administrative agency with exclusive
jurisdiction over a disputed issue.” 145 Cal. App. 4th, at 447, 51
Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 634. The dissenting judge, in contrast, viewed
Buckeye as controlling; she reasoned that the FAA called
for immediate recognition and enforcement of the parties’ agreement
to arbitrate and afforded no basis for distinguishing prior resort
to a state administrative agency from prior resort to a state
court. 145 Cal. App. 4th, at 450–451, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 636–637
(Vogel, J., dissenting).
The California Supreme Court denied Preston’s
petition for review. No. S149190 (Feb. 14, 2007), 2007 Cal. LEXIS
1539, App. A to Pet. for Cert. 1a. We granted certiorari to
determine whether the FAA overrides a state law vesting initial
adjudicatory authority in an administrative agency. 551 U. S. ___
(2007).
II
An easily stated question
underlies this controversy. Ferrer claims that Preston was a talent
agent who operated without a license in violation of the TAA.
Accordingly, he urges, the contract between the parties,
purportedly for “personal management,” is void and Preston is
entitled to no compensation for any services he rendered. Preston,
on the other hand, maintains that he acted as a personal manager,
not as a talent agent, hence his contract with Ferrer is not
governed by the TAA and is both lawful and fully binding on the
parties.
Because the contract between
Ferrer and Preston provides that “any dispute … relating to the …
validity, or legality” of the agreement “shall be submitted to
arbitration,” App. 18, Preston urges that Ferrer must litigate “his
TAA defense in the arbitral forum,” Reply Brief 31. Ferrer insists,
however, that the “personal manager” or “talent agent” inquiry
falls, under California law, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner, and that the FAA does not
displace the Commissioner’s primary jurisdiction. Brief for
Respondent 14, 30, 40–44.
The dispositive issue, then, contrary to
Ferrer’s suggestion, is not whether the FAA preempts the TAA
wholesale. See
id., at 44–48. The FAA plainly has no such
destructive aim or effect. Instead, the question is simply who
decides whether Preston acted as personal manager or as talent
agent.
III
Section 2 of the FAA states:
“A written provision in any … contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction
… shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2.
Section 2 “declare[s] a national policy favoring
arbitration” of claims that parties contract to settle in that
manner.
Southland Corp., 465 U. S., at 10. That
national policy, we held in
Southland, “appli[es] in state
as well as federal courts” and “foreclose[s] state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”
Id., at 16. The FAA’s displacement of conflicting state
law is “now well-established,”
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v.
Dobson,
513 U. S. 265, 272 (1995), and has
been repeatedly reaffirmed, see,
e.g., Buckeye,
546 U. S., at 445–446;
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto,
517 U. S. 681, 684–685
(1996);
Perry v.
Thomas,
482 U. S. 483, 489
(1987).[
Footnote 2]
A recurring question under §2 is who should
decide whether “grounds … exist at law or in equity” to invalidate
an arbitration agreement. In
Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U. S. 395, 403–404
(1967), we held that attacks on the validity of an entire contract,
as distinct from attacks aimed at the arbitration clause, are
within the arbitrator’s ken.
The litigation in
Prima Paint
originated in federal court, but the same rule
, we held in
Buckeye, applies in state court. 546 U. S.,
at 447–448. The plaintiffs in
Buckeye alleged that
the contracts they signed, which contained arbitration clauses,
were illegal under state law and void
ab initio.
Id., at 443. Relying on
Southland, we held that
the plaintiffs’ challenge was within the province of the arbitrator
to decide. See 546 U. S., at 446.
Buckeye largely, if not entirely,
resolves the dispute before us. The contract between Preston and
Ferrer clearly “evidenc[ed] a transaction involving commerce,” 9 U.
S. C. §2, and Ferrer has never disputed that the written
arbitration provision in the contract falls within the purview of
§2. Moreover, Ferrer sought invalidation of the contract as a
whole. In the proceedings below, he made no discrete challenge to
the validity of the arbitration clause. See 145 Cal. App. 4th,
at 449, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 635 (Vogel, J.,
dissenting).[
Footnote 3] Ferrer
thus urged the Labor Commissioner and California courts to override
the contract’s arbitration clause on a ground that
Buckeye
requires the arbitrator to decide in the first instance.
IV
Ferrer attempts to distinguish
Buckeye by arguing that the TAA merely requires exhaustion
of administrative remedies before the parties proceed to
arbitration. We reject that argument.
A
The TAA regulates talent agents
and talent agency agreements. “Talent agency” is defined, with
exceptions not relevant here, as “a person or corporation who
engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or
attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or
artists.” Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §1700.4(a) (West 2003). The
definition “does not cover other services for which artists often
contract, such as personal and career management (i.e., advice,
direction, coordination, and oversight with respect to an artist’s
career or personal or financial affairs).”
Styne v.
Stevens, 26 Cal. 4th 42, 51, 26 P. 3d 343, 349 (2001)
(emphasis deleted). The TAA requires talent agents to procure a
license from the Labor Commissioner. §1700.5. “In furtherance of
the [TAA’s] protective aims, an unlicensed person’s contract with
an artist to provide the services of a talent agency is illegal and
void.”
Id., at 51, 26 P. 3d, at 349.[
Footnote 4]
Section 1700.44(a) of the TAA
states:
“In cases of controversy arising under this
chapter, the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to
the Labor Commissioner, who shall hear and determine the same,
subject to an appeal within 10 days after determination, to the
superior court where the same shall be heard de novo.”
Absent a notice of appeal filed within ten days,
the Labor Commissioner’s determination becomes final and binding on
the parties.
REO Broadcasting Consultants v.
Martin, 69 Cal. App. 4th 489, 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639,
642–643 (1999).[
Footnote 5]
The TAA permits arbitration in lieu of
proceeding before the Labor Commissioner if an arbitration
provision “in a contract between a talent agency and [an artist]”
both “provides for reasonable notice to the Labor Commissioner of
the time and place of all arbitration hearings” and gives the
Commissioner “the right to attend all arbitration hearings.”
§1700.45. This prescription demonstrates that there is no inherent
conflict between the TAA and arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism. But §1700.45 was of no utility to Preston. He has
consistently maintained that he is
not a talent agent as
that term is defined in §1700.4(a), but is, instead, a personal
manager not subject to the TAA’s regulatory regime. 145 Cal. App.
4th, at 444, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 631. To invoke §1700.45,
Preston would have been required to concede a point fatal to his
claim for compensation—
i.e., that he is a talent agent,
albeit an unlicensed one—and to have drafted his contract in
compliance with a statute that he maintains is inapplicable.
Procedural prescriptions of the TAA thus
conflict with the FAA’s dispute resolution regime in two basic
respects: First, the TAA, in §1700.44(a), grants the Labor
Commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide an issue that the
parties agreed to arbitrate, see
Buckeye, 546 U. S.,
at 446; second, the TAA, in §1700.45, imposes prerequisites to
enforcement of an arbitration agreement that are not applicable to
contracts generally, see
Doctor’s Associates, Inc., 517 U.
S., at 687.
B
Ferrer contends that the TAA is
nevertheless compatible with the FAA because §1700.44(a) merely
postpones arbitration until after the Labor Commissioner has
exercised her primary jurisdiction. Brief for Respondent 14, 40.
The party that loses before the Labor Commissioner may file for
de novo review in Superior Court. See §1700.44(a). At that
point, Ferrer asserts, either party could move to compel
arbitration under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §1281.2 (West 2007),
and thereby obtain an arbitrator’s determination prior to judicial
review. See Brief for Respondent 13.
That is not the position Ferrer
took in the California courts. In his complaint, he urged the
Superior Court to declare that “the [c]ontract, including in
particular the issue of the validity of the [c]ontract,
is not
subject to arbitration,” and he sought an injunction stopping
arbitration “unless and until,
if ever, the Labor
Commissioner determines that he/she has no jurisdiction over the
parties’ dispute.” App. 29 (emphasis added). Ferrer also told the
Superior Court: “[I]f … the Commissioner rules that the [c]ontract
is void, Preston may appeal that ruling and have a hearing de novo
before this Court.” Appellant’s App. in No. B188997 (Cal.
App.), p. 157, n. 1 (emphasis added).
Nor does Ferrer’s current argument—that
§1700.44(a) merely postpones arbitration—withstand examination.
Section 1700.44(a) provides for
de novo review in Superior
Court, not elsewhere.[
Footnote
6] Arbitration, if it ever occurred following the Labor
Commissioner’s decision, would likely be long delayed, in
contravention of Congress’ intent “to move the parties to an
arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and
easily as possible.”
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U. S. 1, 22 (1983). If
Ferrer prevailed in the California courts, moreover, he would no
doubt argue that judicial findings of fact and conclusions of law,
made after a full and fair
de novo hearing in court, are
binding on the parties and preclude the arbitrator from making any
contrary rulings.
A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate
is to achieve “streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.”
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.,
473 U. S.
614, 633 (1985). See also
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.,
513 U. S., at 278;
Southland Corp., 465 U. S.,
at 7. That objective would be frustrated even if Preston could
compel arbitration in lieu of
de novo Superior Court
review. Requiring initial reference of the parties’ dispute to the
Labor Commissioner would, at the least, hinder speedy resolution of
the controversy.
Ferrer asks us to overlook the apparent
conflict between the arbitration clause and §1700.44(a) because
proceedings before the Labor Commissioner are administrative rather
than judicial. Brief for Respondent 40–48. Allowing parties to
proceed directly to arbitration, Ferrer contends, would undermine
the Labor Commissioner’s ability to stay informed of potentially
illegal activity,
id., at 43, and would deprive artists
protected by the TAA of the Labor Commissioner’s expertise,
id., at 41–43.
In
Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,
500
U. S. 20 (1991), we considered and rejected a similar argument,
namely, that arbitration of age discrimination claims would
undermine the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in enforcing federal law. The “mere involvement of an
administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute,” we held,
does not limit private parties’ obligation to comply with their
arbitration agreements.
Id., at 28–29.
Ferrer points to our holding in
EEOC
v.
Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U. S. 279, 293–294
(2002), that an arbitration agreement signed by an employee who
becomes a discrimination complainant does not bar the EEOC from
filing an enforcement suit in its own name. He further emphasizes
our observation in
Gilmer that individuals who agreed to
arbitrate their discrimination claims would “still be free to file
a charge with the EEOC.” 500 U. S., at 28. Consistent with
these decisions, Ferrer argues, the arbitration clause in his
contract with Preston leaves undisturbed the Labor Commissioner’s
independent authority to enforce the TAA. See Brief for Respondent
44–48. And so it may.[
Footnote
7] But in proceedings under §1700.44(a), the Labor Commissioner
functions not as an advocate advancing a cause before a tribunal
authorized to find the facts and apply the law; instead, the
Commissioner serves as impartial arbiter. That role is just what
the FAA-governed agreement between Ferrer and Preston reserves for
the arbitrator. In contrast, in
Waffle House and in the
Gilmer aside Ferrer quotes, the Court addressed the role
of an agency, not as adjudicator but as prosecutor, pursuing an
enforcement action in its own name or reviewing a discrimination
charge to determine whether to initiate judicial proceedings.
Finally, it bears repeating that Preston’s
petition presents precisely and only a question concerning the
forum in which the parties’ dispute will be heard. See
supra, at 4. “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral …
forum.”
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U. S., at 628.
So here, Ferrer relinquishes no substantive rights the TAA or other
California law may accord him. But under the contract he signed, he
cannot escape resolution of those rights in an arbitral forum.
In sum, we disapprove the distinction between
judicial and administrative proceedings drawn by Ferrer and adopted
by the appeals court. When parties agree to arbitrate all questions
arising under a contract, the FAA supersedes state laws lodging
primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or
administrative.
V
Ferrer’s final attempt to
distinguish
Buckeye relies on
Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ.,
489 U. S. 468 (1989).
Volt involved a California statute dealing with cases in
which “[a] party to [an] arbitration agreement is also a party to a
pending court action … [involving] a third party [not bound by the
arbitration agreement], arising out of the same transaction or
series of related transactions.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann.
§1281.2(c) (West 2007). To avoid the “possibility of conflicting
rulings on a common issue of law or fact,” the statute gives the
Superior Court authority,
inter alia, to stay the court
proceeding “pending the outcome of the arbitration” or to stay the
arbitration “pending the outcome of the court action.”
Ibid.
Volt Information Sciences and
Stanford University were parties to a construction contract
containing an arbitration clause. When a dispute arose and Volt
demanded arbitration, Stanford sued Volt and two other companies
involved in the construction project. Those other companies were
not parties to the arbitration agreement; Stanford sought
indemnification from them in the event that Volt prevailed against
Stanford. At Stanford’s request, the Superior Court stayed the
arbitration. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the stay
order. Volt and Stanford incorporated §1281.2(c) into their
agreement, the appeals court held. They did so by stipulating that
the contract—otherwise silent on the priority of suits drawing in
parties not subject to arbitration—would be governed by California
law.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v.
Volt Information Sciences, Inc., 240 Cal. Rptr. 558, 561
(1987) (officially depublished). Relying on the Court of Appeal’s
interpretation of the contract, we held that the FAA did not bar a
stay of arbitration pending the resolution of Stanford’s Superior
Court suit against Volt and the two companies not bound by the
arbitration agreement.
Preston and Ferrer’s contract also contains a
choice-of-law clause, which states that the “agreement shall be
governed by the laws of the state of California.” App. 17. A
separate saving clause provides: “If there is any conflict between
this agreement and any present or future law,” the law prevails
over the contract “to the extent necessary to bring [the contract]
within the requirements of said law.”
Id., at 18. Those
contractual terms, according to Ferrer, call for the application of
California procedural law, including §1700.44(a)’s grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Commissioner.
Ferrer’s reliance on
Volt is
misplaced for two discrete reasons. First, arbitration was stayed
in
Volt to accommodate litigation involving third parties
who were strangers to the arbitration agreement. Nothing in the
arbitration agreement addressed the order of proceedings when
pending litigation with third parties presented the prospect of
inconsistent rulings. We thought it proper, in those circumstances,
to recognize state law as the gap filler.
Here, in contrast, the arbitration clause
speaks to the matter in controversy; it states that “any dispute …
relating to … the breach, validity, or legality” of the contract
should be arbitrated in accordance with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) rules. App. 18. Both parties are bound by the
arbitration agreement; the question of Preston’s status as a talent
agent relates to the validity or legality of the contract; there is
no risk that related litigation will yield conflicting rulings on
common issues; and there is no other procedural void for the
choice-of-law clause to fill.
Second, we are guided by our more recent
decision in
Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc.,
514 U. S. 52 (1995). Although the
contract in
Volt provided for “arbitration in accordance
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association,” 489 U. S., at 470, n. 1
(internal quotation marks omitted), Volt never argued that
incorporation of those rules trumped the choice-of-law clause
contained in the contract, see Brief for Appellant, and Reply
Brief, in
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., O. T. 1987, No.
87–1318. Therefore, neither our decision in
Volt nor the
decision of the California appeals court in that case addressed the
import of the contract’s incorporation by reference of privately
promulgated arbitration rules.
In
Mastrobuono, we reached that open
question while interpreting a contract with both a New York
choice-of-law clause and a clause providing for arbitration in
accordance with the rules of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD). 514 U. S., at 58–59.[
Footnote 8] The “best way to harmonize” the two
clauses, we held, was to read the choice-of-law clause “to
encompass substantive principles that New York courts would apply,
but not to include [New York’s] special rules limiting the
authority of arbitrators.”
Id., at 63–64.
Preston and Ferrer’s contract, as noted,
provides for arbi- tration in accordance with the AAA rules. App.
18. One of those rules states that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the
power to determine the existence or validity of a contract of which
an arbitration clause forms a part.” AAA, Commercial Arbitration
Rules ¶R–7(b) (2007), online at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440
(as visited Feb. 15, 2008, and in Clerk of Court’s case file). The
incorporation of the AAA rules, and in particular Rule 7(b), weighs
against inferring from the choice-of-law clause an understanding
shared by Ferrer and Preston that their disputes would be heard, in
the first instance, by the Labor Commissioner. Following the guide
Mastrobuono provides, the “best way to harmonize” the
parties’ adoption of the AAA rules and their selection of
California law is to read the latter to encompass prescriptions
governing the substantive rights and obligations of the parties,
but not the State’s “special rules limiting the authority of
arbitrators.” 514 U. S., at 63–64.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the
judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Footnote 1
The TAA uses the term “talent agency” to
describe both corporations and individual talent agents. We use the
terms “talent agent” and “talent agency” interchangeably.
Footnote 2
Although Ferrer urges us to overrule
Southland, he relies on the same arguments we considered
and rejected in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson,
513 U. S. 265 (1995). Compare Brief
for Respondent 55–59, with Brief for Attorney General of Alabama
et al. as
Amici Curiae in
Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v.
Dobson, O. T. 1993, No. 93–1001,
pp. 11–19. Adhering to precedent, we do not take up Ferrer’s
invitation to overrule
Southland.
Footnote 3
Ferrer’s petition to the Labor Commissioner
sought a declaration that the contract “is void under the [TAA].”
App. 23. His complaint in Superior Court seeking to enjoin
arbitration asserted: “[T]he [c]ontract is void by reason of
[Preston’s] attempt to procure employment for [Ferrer] in violation
of the [TAA],” and “the [c]ontract’s arbitration clause does not
vest authority in an arbitrator to determine whether the contract
is void.”
Id., at 27. His brief in the appeals court
stated: “Ferrer does not contend that the arbitration clause in the
[c]ontract was procured by fraud. Ferrer contends that Preston
unlawfully acted as an unlicensed talent agent and hence cannot
enforce the [c]ontract.” Brief for Respondent in No. B188997,
p. 18.
Footnote 4
Courts “may void the entire contract” where
talent agency services regulated by the TAA are “inseparable from
[unregulated] managerial services.”
Marathon Entertainment,
Inc. v.
Blasi, No. S145428, 2008 WL 216532, *13
(Cal., Jan. 28, 2008). If the contractual terms are severable,
however, “an isolated instance” of unlicensed conduct “does not
automatically bar recovery for services that could lawfully be
provided without a license.”
Ibid.
Footnote 5
To appeal the Labor Commissioner’s
decision, an aggrieved party must post a bond of at least $1,000
and up to twice the amount of any judgment approved by the
Commissioner. §1700.44(a).
Footnote 6
From Superior Court an appeal lies in the
Court of Appeal. Cal. Civ. Proc. Ann. §904.1(a) (West 2007); Cal.
Rule of Court 8.100(a) (Appellate Rules) (West 2007 rev. ed.).
Thereafter, the losing party may seek review in the California
Supreme Court, Rule 8.500(a)(1) (Appellate Rules), perhaps followed
by a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, 28 U.
S. C. §1257. Ferrer has not identified a single case holding
that California law permits interruption of this chain of appeals
to allow the arbitrator to review the Labor Commissioner’s
decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35.
Footnote 7
Enforcement of the parties’ arbitration
agreement in this case does not displace any independent authority
the Labor Commissioner may have to investigate and rectify
violations of the TAA. See Brief for Respondent 47 (“[T]he
Commissioner has independent investigatory authority and may
receive information concerning alleged violations of the TAA from
any source.” (citation omitted)). See also Tr. of Oral Arg.
13–14.
Footnote 8
The question in Mastrobuono was
whether the arbitrator could award punitive damages. See
Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U. S. 52, 53–54 (1995). New York
law prohibited arbitrators, but not courts, from awarding such
damages.
Id., at 55. The NASD rules, in contrast,
authorized “damages and other relief,” which, according to a NASD
arbitration manual, included punitive damages.
Id., at 61
(internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on
Volt,
respondents argued that the choice-of-law clause incorporated into
the parties’ arbitration agreement New York’s ban on arbitral
awards of punitive damages. Opposing that argument, petitioners
successfully urged that the agreement to arbitrate in accordance
with the NASD rules controlled.
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