On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice WHITE, with whom Justice POWELL and Justice REHNQUIST
join, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
Every state in the Union maintains an unemployment compensation
system which provides partial wage replacement for the unemployed.
The federal government credits employer contributions to state
unemployment programs meeting certain federal requirements against
the amount owing under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.
3301 et seq. One of the requirements which state plans
Page 459 U.S.
1150 , 1151
must meet is that "no person shall be denied [unemployment]
compensation under . . . State law solely on the basis of pregnancy
or termination of pregnancy." 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(12). The Fourth
Circuit, in the opinion below, Brown v. Porcher,
660 F.2d
1001 (1981), held that the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation System did not meet the requirements of 3304(a)(12),
and upheld a district court order requiring the South Carolina
Employment Security Commission ("the Commission") to make
retroactive payments to claimants that had been denied compensation
since January 1, 1978. In so doing, the Fourth Circuit decided
three issues that merit this Court's attention.
The most important issue now presented for this Court's
consideration involves the meaning of 3304(a)(12). South Carolina
Code 41-35-120 provides that a person will not be eligible for
unemployment benefits "if the [South Carolina Employment Security]
Commission finds that he has left voluntarily without good cause
his most recent work." The Commission has determined that
resignation due to pregnancy or to an illness unrelated to the
claimant's job makes the claimant ineligible for unemployment
benefits . The Fourth Circuit held that 41-35-120, as interpreted,
did not satisfy the dictates of 3304(a)(12). It said, "[r]egardless
of how the Commission treats employees with other disabilities, the
mandate of [ 3304(a)(12) ] is clear: the Commission cannot deny
compensation 'solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of
pregnancy.' " Brown v. Porcher, supra, at 1004.
It is by no means clear, however, that 3304(a)(12) does not
simply provide that pregnancy must be treated like all other
disabilities-that pregnancy simply cannot be singled out for
unfavorable treatment. The Department of Labor adheres to such an
interpretation, and thus disagrees with the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of 3304(a)(12). The Department of Labor is
responsible for annually determining whether state unemployment
compensation programs meet the requirements set out in federal law.
26 U.S.C.
Page 459 U.S.
1150 , 1152
3304(c). Moreover, the Department played a role in the
development of the 1976 legislation that added 3304(a)(12) to the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Unemployment Compensation Amendments
of 1976 312(a), 90 Stat. 2679. The Department of Labor has
repeatedly certified that South Carolina's program, as well as the
programs of eight other states with provisions similar to that of
South Carolina,* meet the requirements of 3304(a)(12). In addition,
the Administrator of the Department's Unemployment Insurance
Service submitted, on the Department's behalf, a letter to the
district court reiterating the Department's position with respect
to South Carolina's program. The Administrator explained that the
South Carolina program was consistent with 3304(a)(12) because "
'it does not distinguish between pregnant claimants or any other
unemployed individuals whose separation is due to illness.' " Brief
of the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 13 (quoting
Administrator's letter).
At the very least then, 3304(a)(12) is the subject of
substantial uncertainty, given the clear and direct conflict
between the Fourth Circuit and the Department of Labor-the agency
to whom Congress entrusted administration of the statute. The
conflict the Court now leaves unresolved makes it difficult for
conscientious administrators of unemployment compensation programs
to determine what is required of them by the federal government.
The position of the unemployment insurance administrators in the
eight states, in addition to South Carolina, that deny benefits
both to those who resigned because of pregnancy and to those who
resigned because of some non-job-related illness is clearly
perplexing . The question presented is of obvious importance to the
states; South Carolina is paying additional benefits at a rate of
almost $1.5 million per year as a result of
Page 459 U.S.
1150 , 1153
the decision below. See Application for Stay of Enforcement of
Judgment 7. The question is also surely important to large numbers
of pregnant women for whom unemployment compensation may constitute
a substantial portion of their financial resources. Apparently the
question is one of " substantial concern" to the Department of
Labor as well. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, at 7.
The second issue of significance relates to the Eleventh
Amendment. This Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment prevents
federal courts from entering judgments that are to be satisfied out
of the state's general revenues, Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651d 662 (1974),
or out of state segregated tax revenues, Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
State Tax Commission,
327 U.S. 573 ( 1946), and
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47 (1944). In the
decision below the Fourth Circuit concluded that it could award a
judgment against the South Carolina unemployment compensation fund
because: (1) the fund is "a special fund administered separate and
apart from all public moneys and funds of the State," (2) the fund
consists of employer contributions, federal funding, investment
income, and other receipts, and (3) neither the State nor the
Commission is liable for any excess in obligations on the fund over
its resources. Reliance on these distinctions is certainly
questionable under this Court's previous cases. The question of
whether there are some state funds that do not enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity is important, and this case presents the Court
with an opportunity to address the issue.
The third issue of significance is whether 1983 provides a cause
of action to redress a state's failure to meet the standard set out
in 3304( a)(12). In Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1 ( 1980), the
Court held that a plaintiff could sue to enforce a federal statute
under 1983. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981),
we held that a plaintiff could not use 1983 to enforce provisions
of the Developmental
Page 459 U.S.
1150 , 1154
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C.
6000 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). We explained that a federal
statute may be enforced by a 1983 suit only if Congress has not
foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment
itself and if the statute created enforceable "rights" under 1983.
Id., at 28 . In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association,
453 U.S. 1 (1981), we
reaffirmed our holding in Pennhurst, supra, refusing to allow a
1983 suit to ensure provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U. S.C. 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV) and
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Consideration of the
difficult and unanswered question of whether the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act is enforceable by way of 1983 would provide
guidance to the lower federal courts on the application of
Thiboutot, Pennhurst, and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority.
I would grant certiorari to consider these issues.
Footnotes
[
Footnote *] The District of
Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, West
Virginia, and, to a lesser extent, Vermont. Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, at 18 and n. 21.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment