Where the record does not disclose whether the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in denying appellants' mandamus petition seeking
access by the press and public to pretrial suppression hearings in
state criminal proceedings, passed on appellants' federal
constitutional claims or based denial on an adequate and
independent state ground, the judgment is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
Vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
The proceedings below were brought to gain access by the press
and public to pretrial suppression hearings in three separate state
criminal proceedings. Access was denied and the trial judges closed
all pretrial hearings and sealed and impounded all papers,
documents, and records filed in the cases. The judges also
prohibited the parties, their attorneys, public officials, and
certain others from disseminating information concerning the
hearings. Appellants then filed petitions for writs of mandamus
with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. However, these were denied
without opinion. Appellants, arguing that they have been denied
their federal constitutional rights, now urge us to take appellate
jurisdiction of these matters under 28 U.S.C. 1257(2).
As matters now stand, the record does not disclose whether the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania passed on appellants' federal claims
or whether it denied mandamus on an adequate
Page 434 U. S. 242
and independent state ground. For this reason, we vacate the
judgments of the Supreme Court, and remand the cause to that court
for such further proceedings as it nay deem appropriate to clarify
the record.
See California v. Krivda, 409 U. S.
33 (1972).
So ordered.
* Together with
Equitable Publishing Co., Inc., et al. v.
Honeyman, Judge; Montgomery Publishing Co. v. Honeyman, Judge;
Equitable Publishing Co., Inc., et al. v. Brown, Judge; and
Montgomery Publishing Co. v. Brown, Judge, also on appeal
from the same court (
see this Court's Rule 15(3)).
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
dissenting.
The Court today summarily vacates the judgments of the State
Supreme Court and remands for further proceedings. Neither past
decisions of this Court nor policy considerations support this
unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction and imposition on the state
courts.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure permit a trial
judge to close pretrial suppression hearings from the press and
public at the request of the criminal defendant, mandate that all
records of such hearings be sealed, and allow the judge in a
"widely publicized or sensational case" to prohibit parties and
witnesses from making extrajudicial statements. This appeal stems
from the entry of such orders in three Pennsylvania murder trials.
In the first trial, appellants filed a petition to vacate the
orders with the trial judge; on the same day, appellants also filed
petitions for writ of mandamus and prohibition and for plenary
jurisdiction with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The petition to
vacate was denied by the trial judge after the suppression hearing
on the ground, according to appellants, that "he was obligated to
accord
prima facie validity to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's Rules." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court two weeks later
denied the petitions for mandamus and for plenary jurisdiction
without opinion. Appellants filed similar petitions to vacate with
the Common Pleas judges presiding over the other two trials; these
petitions were denied on the ground that appellants lacked standing
to challenge the orders. Appellants thereafter again
Page 434 U. S. 243
filed petitions for mandamus and prohibition and for plenary
jurisdiction with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which were denied
without opinion.
We do not know why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
appellants' petitions for writ of mandamus and prohibition and for
plenary jurisdiction. [
Footnote
1] There is no reason to presume that the petitions were
rejected because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with
appellants' constitutional claims. The petitions were for
extraordinary relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized that such petitions are
"to be used only with great caution and forbearance and as an
extraordinary remedy in cases of extreme necessity, to secure order
and regularity in judicial proceedings if none of the ordinary
remedies provided by law is applicable or adequate to afford
relief."
Such relief
"is not of absolute right, but rests largely in the sound
discretion of the court. It will never be granted where there is a
complete and effective remedy by appeal, certiorari, writ of error,
injunction, or otherwise."
Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94,
102, 61 A.2d 426, 430 (1948).
See also Commonwealth ex rel.
Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 320 A.2d 134 (1974);
In
re Specter, 455 Pa. 518, 317 A.2d 286 (1974);
Francis v.
Corleto, 418 Pa. 417, 211 A.2d 503 (1965).
While appellants claim that their petitions to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court drew into question the constitutional validity of the
sections of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure described
above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
Page 434 U. S. 244
denials of their petitions did not on its face decide in favor
of the Rules' validity. Thus, it would not appear that we have
jurisdiction to note the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).
[
Footnote 2]
Of course, the denials may have been grounded on a decision by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the Rules do not violate the
Federal Constitution. But this does not require that we vacate a
presumably valid judgment of a state supreme court and remand for
further proceedings. A less intrusive alternative, and one
supported by past precedents of this Court, is to postpone
consideration of jurisdiction until appellants have had an
opportunity to demonstrate that the judgment appealed from does not
rest on an independent and adequate state ground.
See, e.g.,
Lynum v. Illinois, 368 U. S. 908
(1961) (consideration of certiorari deferred "to accord counsel for
petitioner opportunity to secure a certificate from the Supreme
Court of Illinois as to whether the judgment herein was intended to
rest on an adequate and independent state ground");
Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117
(1945). By vacating the judgment below, this Court is taking from
appellants the normal burden of demonstrating that we have
jurisdiction and placing it on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
We deny extraordinary relief regularly without typically expressing
our reasons for so doing. We should not place a higher requirement
on state supreme courts under penalty of this Court's vacating
their judgment.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not affirm the orders of
the trial judges. If it had and if there were reasonable doubt as
to whether the affirmance were on state or federal grounds, the
precedential and
res judicata effects of the affirmance
might call for vacating the judgment below.
Cf.
Page 434 U. S. 245
California v. Krivda, 409 U. S. 33 (1972)
(judgment affirming a suppression order vacated when it was unclear
whether judgment rested on state or federal constitutional
grounds). However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has merely
denied extraordinary and discretionary relief without indicating
any opinion on appellants' constitutional challenge. Appellants are
thus presumably free to pursue their challenge through state and
federal actions still open to them. Under similar circumstances,
where it was unclear whether the lower court denied relief on the
merits or because the wrong remedy had been chosen, this Court has
dismissed the appeal or petition for certiorari.
See, e.g.,
Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S. 431
(1948);
Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.
S. 211 (1946);
White v. Ragen, 324 U.
S. 760 (1945). I would do that here unless appellants
carry their burden of establishing that the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not rest on an adequate state
ground.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 17 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 211.201 (Purdon Supp. 1977) gives the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania "original but not exclusive
jurisdiction" to issue writs of mandamus or prohibition to courts
of inferior jurisdiction. Title 17 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 211.205 (Purdon
Supp. 1977), entitled "Extraordinary Jurisdiction," permits the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to assume plenary jurisdiction
"on its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter
pending before any court or justice of the peace of this
Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public
importance."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 1257(2) provides for Supreme Court review of final
judgments rendered by the highest court of a State
"[b]y appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a
statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the
decision is in favor of its validity."
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