OCTOBER TERM, 1997
Syllabus
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ET AL.
v.
YESKEY
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT
No. 97-634. Argued April 28, 1998-Decided June 15, 1998
Respondent Yeskey was sentenced to 18 to 36 months in a
Pennsylvania correctional facility, but was recommended for
placement in a Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders, the
successful completion of which would have led to his parole in just
six months. When he was refused admission because of his medical
history of hypertension, he sued petitioners, Pennsylvania's
Department of Corrections and several officials, alleging that the
exclusion violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), Title II of which prohibits a "public entity" from
discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability"
on account of that disability, 42 U. S. C. § 12132. The District
Court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding the ADA
inapplicable to state prison inmates, but the Third Circuit
reversed.
Held: State prisons fall squarely within Title II's
statutory definition of "public entity," which includes "any ...
instrumentality of a State ... or local government." § 12131(1)(B).
Unlike the situation that obtained in
Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501
U. S. 452, there is no ambiguous exception that renders the
coverage uncertain. For that reason the plain-statement requirement
articulated in
Gregory, if applicable to federal intrusion
upon the administration of state prisons, has been met.
Petitioners' attempts to derive an intent not to cover prisons from
the statutory references to the "benefits" of programs and to
"qualified individual" are rejected; some prison programs, such as
this one, have benefits and are restricted to qualified inmates.
The statute's lack of ambiguity also requires rejection of
petitioners' appeal to the doctrine of constitutional doubt. The
Court does not address the issue whether applying the ADA to state
prisons is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under
either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment because it
was addressed by neither of the lower courts. pp. 208-213.
118 F.3d
168, affirmed.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
207
Paul A. Tufano argued the cause for petitioners. With him
on the briefs was
Syndi L. Guido.
Donald Specter argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were
Eve H. Cervantez and
Arlene B.
Mayerson.
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor
General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy
Solicitor General Underwood, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Jessica Dunsay
Silver, Linda F. Thome, and Seth M. Galanter. *
*Briefs of
amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Nevada et al. by
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney
General of Nevada, and
Anne B. Cathcart, Senior Deputy
Attorney General,
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of
Ohio,
Jeffrey S.
Sutton, State Solicitor, and
Elise Porter and
Todd R. Marti, Assistant Attorneys
General,
John M. Ferren, Corporation Counsel of the District
of Columbia, and
Gus F.
Diaz, Acting Attorney General
of Guam, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
jurisdictions as follows:
William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama,
Grant Woods of Arizona,
Winston Bryant of Arkansas,
Daniel E. Lungren of California,
Gale A. Norton of
Colorado,
Robert A. Butterworth of Florida,
Thurbert E.
Baker of Georgia,
Margery S.
Bronster of Hawaii,
Alan G.
Lance of Idaho,
Thomas J.
Miller of Iowa,
Carla J.
Stovall of Kansas,
Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J.
Joseph Curran,
Jr., of Maryland,
Frank J.
Kelley of Michigan,
Mike Moore of Mississippi,
Joseph P. Mazurek of
Montana,
Don Stenberg of Nebraska,
Philip T.
McLaughlin of New Hampshire,
Peter Verniero of New
Jersey,
Tom Udall of New Mexico,
Dennis C.
Vacco of New York,
Michael F.
Easley of North
Carolina,
Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota,
Jeffrey B.
Pine of Rhode Island,
Charles Molony Condon of South
Carolina,
Mark W Barnett of South Dakota,
John Knox
Walkup of Tennessee,
Dan Morales of Texas,
Jan
Graham of Utah,
Mark L. Earley of Virginia,
Julio A.
Brady of the Virgin Islands, and
William U. Hill of
Wyoming; for the Council of State Governments et al. by
Richard
Ruda and
James I. Crowley; for the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation by
Kent S.
Scheidegger; and for the
Republican Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives by
John P. Krill, Jr., and
David R. Fine.
Briefs of
amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al.
by
Steven J.
Schwartz, James R. Pingeon, and
Stephen F.
Hanlon; and for the N a-
208
208 PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
v. YESKEY
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 337, 42 U. S. C. § 12131
et seq., which prohibits a "public entity" from
discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability"
on account of that individual's disability, see § 12132, covers
inmates in state prisons. Respondent Ronald Yeskey was such an
inmate, sentenced in May 1994 to serve 18 to 36 months in a
Pennsylvania correctional facility. The sentencing court
recommended that he be placed in Pennsylvania's Motivational Boot
Camp for first-time offenders, the successful completion of which
would have led to his release on parole in just six months. See Pa.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 61, § 1121
et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1998).
Because of his medical history of hypertension, however, he was
refused admission. He filed this suit against petitioners, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections and
several department officials, alleging that his exclusion from the
Boot Camp violated the ADA. The District Court dismissed for
failure to state a claim, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), holding
the ADA inapplicable to inmates in state prisons; the Third Circuit
reversed,
118 F.3d
168 (1997); we granted certiorari, 522 U. S. 1086 (1998).
Petitioners argue that state prisoners are not covered by the
ADA for the same reason we held in
Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501
U. S. 452 (1991), that state judges were not covered by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 621
et seq. Gregory relied on the canon of construction that
absent an "unmistakably clear" expression of intent to "alter the
usual constitutional balance between the
tional Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation et al. by Steven R.
Shapiro, David M. Porter, Marjorie Rifkin, and Elizabeth
Alexander.
Briefs of
amici curiae were filed for Adapt et al. by
Stephen F.
Gold; and for the National Advisory Group
for Justice et al. by
Michael Churchill.
209
States and the Federal Government," we will interpret a statute
to preserve rather than destroy the States' "substantial sovereign
powers." 501 U. S., at 460-461 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). It may well be that exercising ultimate control
over the management of state prisons, like establishing the
qualifications of state government officials, is a traditional and
essential state function subject to the plain-statement rule of
Gregory. "One of the primary functions of government," we
have said, "is the preservation of societal order through
enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of penal
institutions is an essential part of that task."
Procunier
v.
Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 412
(1974), overruled on other grounds,
Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.
S. 401, 414 (1989). "It is difficult to imagine an activity in
which a State has a stronger interest,"
Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411
U. S. 475, 491 (1973).
Assuming, without deciding, that the plain-statement rule does
govern application of the ADA to the administration of state
prisons, we think the requirement of the rule is amply met: the
statute's language unmistakably includes State prisons and
prisoners within its coverage. The situation here is not comparable
to that in
Gregory. There, although the ADEA plainly covered
state employees, it contained an exception for "'appointee[s] on
the policymaking level''' which made it impossible for us to
"conclude that the statute plainly cover[ed] appointed state
judges." 501 U. S., at 467. Here, the ADA plainly covers state
institutions
without any exception that could cast the
coverage of prisons into doubt. Title II of the ADA provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U. S. C. §
12132.
210
210 PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
v. YESKEY
State prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of
"public entity," which includes "any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or
local government." § 12131(1)(B).
Petitioners contend that the phrase "benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity," § 12132, creates an
ambiguity, because state prisons do not provide prisoners with
"benefits" of "programs, services, or activities" as those terms
are ordinarily understood. We disagree. Modern prisons provide
inmates with many recreational "activities," medical "services,"
and educational and vocational "programs," all of which at least
theoretically "benefit" the prisoners (and any of which disabled
prisoners could be "excluded from participation in"). See
Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576, 580 (1984)
(referring to "contact visitation program");
Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.
S. 517, 552 (1984) (discussing "rehabilitative programs and
services");
Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 246 (1983)
(referring to "appropriate correctional programs for all
offenders"). Indeed, the statute establishing the Motivational Boot
Camp at issue in this very case refers to it as a "program." Pa.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 61, § 1123 (Purdon Supp. 1998). The text of the
ADA provides no basis for distinguishing these programs, services,
and activities from those provided by public entities that are not
prisons.
We also disagree with petitioners' contention that the term
"qualified individual with a disability" is ambiguous insofar as
concerns its application to state prisoners. The statute defines
the term to include anyone with a disability
"who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U. S. C. §
12131(2).
211
Petitioners argue that the words "eligibility" and
"participation" imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who
seeks a benefit from the State, and thus do not connote prisoners
who are being held against their will. This is wrong on two counts:
First, because the words do not connote voluntariness. See,
e. g., Webster's New International Dictionary 831 (2d ed.
1949) ("eligible": "Fitted or qualified to be chosen or elected;
legally or morally suitable; as, an
eligible candidate");
id., at 1782 ("participate": "To have a share in common with
others; to partake; share, as in a debate"). While "eligible"
individuals "participate" voluntarily in many programs, services,
and activities, there are others for which they are "eligible" in
which "participation" is mandatory. A drug addict convicted of drug
possession, for example, might, as part of his sentence, be
required to "participate" in a drug treatment program for which
only addicts are "eligible." And secondly, even if the words did
connote voluntariness, it would still not be true that all prison
"services," "programs," and "activities" are excluded from the ADA
because participation in them is not voluntary. The prison law
library, for example, is a service (and the use of it an activity),
which prisoners are free to take or leave. Cf.
Gabel v.
Lynaugh, 835 F.2d
124, 125, n. 1 (CAS 1988)
(per curiam) ("pro se civil
rights litigation has become a recreational activity for state
prisoners"). In the very case at hand, the governing law makes it
clear that participation in the Boot Camp program is voluntary. See
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 61, § 1126(a) (Purdon Supp. 1998) ("An
eligible inmate may make an application to the motivational boot
camp selection committee for permission to participate in the
motivational boot camp program"); § 1126(c) ("[c]onditio[n]" of
"participa[tion]" is that applicant "agree to be bound by" certain
"terms and conditions").
Finally, petitioners point out that the statute's statement of
findings and purpose, 42 U. S. C. § 12101, does not mention prisons
and prisoners. That is perhaps questionable, since the provision's
reference to discrimination "in such critical
212
212 PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
v. YESKEY
areas as ... institutionalization," § 12101(a)(3), can be
thought to include penal institutions. But assuming it to be true,
and assuming further that it proves, as petitioners contend, that
Congress did not "envisio[n] that the ADA would be applied to state
prisoners," Brief for Petitioners 13-14, in the context of an
unambiguous statutory text that is irrelevant. As we have said
before, the fact that a statute can be "'applied in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.
It demonstrates breadth.'"
Sedima, S.
P. R. L. v.
Imrex Co., 473
U. S. 479, 499 (1985) (citation omitted).
Our conclusion that the text of the ADA is not ambiguous causes
us also to reject petitioners' appeal to the doctrine of
constitutional doubt, which requires that we interpret statutes to
avoid "grave and doubtful constitutional questions,"
United
States ex rel. Attorney General v.
Delaware &
Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408
(1909). That doctrine enters in only "where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions,"
ibid. And for the same
reason we disregard petitioners' invocation of the statute's title,
"Public Services," 104 Stat. 337. "[T]he title of a statute ...
cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For interpretive
purposes, [it is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some
ambiguous word or phrase."
Trainmen v.
Baltimore
&
Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528529
(1947).
We do not address another issue presented by petitioners:
whether application of the ADA to state prisons is a constitutional
exercise of Congress's power under either the Commerce Clause,
compare
Printz v.
United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997),
with
Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.
S. 528 (1985), or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
City
of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997).
Petitioners raise this question in their brief, see Brief for
Petitioners 22-23, but it was addressed by neither the District
Court nor the Court of Appeals, where petitioners raised only the
Gregory plain-statement issue. "Where
213
issues are neither raised before nor considered by the Court of
Appeals, this Court will not ordinarily consider them."
Adickes v. S.
H. Kress &
Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147, n. 2
(1970) (citations omitted). See also
Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433
U. S. 321, 323, n. 1 (1977);
Duignan v.
United
States, 274 U. S.
195, 200 (1927). We decline to do so here.
***
Because the plain text of Title II of the ADA unambiguously
extends to state prison inmates, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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