OCTOBER TERM, 1998
Syllabus
PEGUERO
v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT
No. 97-9217. Argued January 11, 1999-Decided March 2,1999
After petitioner pleaded guilty to federal drug charges, the
District Court sentenced him to prison, but failed to inform him at
the sentencing hearing of his right to appeal the sentence. In a
later motion for habeas relief, petitioner alleged that that
failure violated the express terms of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32(a)(2). The District Court rejected petitioner's claim
that any Rule 32 violation, without regard to prejudice, is enough
to vacate a sentence, and held that petitioner was not entitled to
relief because he actually knew of his right to appeal when he was
sentenced. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Rule
32(a)(2) violation was subject to harmless-error review and that,
because petitioner was aware of his right to appeal, the Rule's
purpose had been served.
Held: A district court's failure to advise a defendant of
his right to appeal does not entitle him to habeas relief if he
knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the
omission. Because Rule 32(a)(2) requires a district court to advise
a defendant of any right to appeal his sentence, it is undisputed
that the court's failure to give the required advice was error in
this case. However, as a general rule, a court's failure to give a
defendant advice required by the Federal Rules is a sufficient
basis for collateral relief only when the defendant is prejudiced
by the error. See,
e. g., United States v.
Timmreck,
441 U. S. 780.
Because petitioner had full knowledge of his right to appeal, the
fact that the court violated the Rule, standing alone, does not
entitle him to collateral relief. The narrow holding in
Rodriquez v.
United States, 395 U. S. 327-that when
counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a defendant is entitled
to resentencing and an appeal without showing that his appeal would
likely have merit-is not implicated here because the District Court
found that petitioner did not request an appeal. Pp.26-30.
142 F.3d
430, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STEVENS,
GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined,
post, p. 30.
24
Daniel Isaiah Siegel argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs was
James Vincent Wade.
Roy W McLeese III argued the cause for the United States. With
him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney
General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Louis M.
Fischer. *
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted
certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict over whether a district
court's failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal as
required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a
basis for collateral relief even when the defendant was aware of
his right to appeal when the trial court omitted to give the
advice. Compare,
e. g., Thompson v.
United States,
111 F.3d
109 (CAll 1997) (defendant entitled to relief even if he knew
of his right to appeal through other sources);
United States
v.
Sanchez, 88 F.3d
1243 (CADC 1996) (same);
Reid v.
United States,
69 F.3d
688 (CA2 1995)
(per curiam) (same), with
Tress v.
United States, 87 F.3d
188 (CA7 1996) (defendant not entitled to relief if he knew of
his right to appeal);
United States v.
Drummond,
903 F.2d
1171 (CA8 1990) (same). We hold that a district court's failure
to advise the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him
to habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no
prejudice from the omission.
Petitioner Manuel Peguero pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. At a
sentencing hearing held on April 22, 1992, the District Court
sentenced petitioner to 274 months' imprisonment. The court did not
inform petitioner of his right to appeal his sentence.
In December 1996, more than four years after he was sentenced,
petitioner filed a
pro se motion to set aside his
*John J.
Gibbons, Lawrence S.
Lustberg, Kevin
McNulty, and
David M. Porter filed a brief for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
amicus
curiae urging reversal.
25
conviction and sentence. See 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1994 ed., Supp.
II). He alleged his counsel was ineffective for various reasons,
including the failure to file a notice of appeal pursuant to
petitioner's request. App. 63, 65. The District Court appointed new
counsel, who filed an amended motion adding a claim that at the
sentencing proceeding the trial court violated Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) by failing to advise petitioner of his
right to appeal his sentence. This last claim gives rise to the
question before us.
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner
testified that, upon being sentenced, he at once asked his lawyer
to file an appeal. App. 139. Consistent with petitioner's
testimony, the District Court found that, although the sentencing
court had failed to advise petitioner of his right to appeal the
sentence, petitioner knew of his right to appeal when the
sentencing hearing occurred. No. 1:CR-90-97-01 (MD Pa., July 1,
1997), App. 168, 184. The court also credited the testimony of
petitioner's trial counsel that petitioner told counsel he did not
want to take an appeal because he hoped to cooperate with the
Government and earn a sentence reduction.
Id., at 180-181;
cf. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 35(b) ("The court, on motion of the
Government made within one year after the imposition of the
sentence, may reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant's
subsequent, substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense").
Relying on our holding in
United States v.
Timmreck, 441
U. S. 780 (1979), the District Court rejected petitioner's
claim that any violation of Rule 32, without regard to prejudice,
is enough to vacate a sentence under § 2255. The court held that
petitioner was not entitled to relief because he was actually aware
of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. No.
1:CR-90-97-01, App. 184. The court also rejected petitioner's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on its finding that
petitioner did not request an appeal.
Id., at 180.
26
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling.
It held that the Rule 32(a)(2) violation was subject to
harmless-error review and that, because petitioner was aware of his
right to appeal, the purpose of the Rule had been served and
petitioner was not entitled to relief. Judgt. order reported at
142 F.3d
430 (1998), App. 192, 194-195. We granted certiorari. 524 U. S.
982 (1998).
In 1992, when petitioner was sentenced, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) provided:
"Notification of Right To Appeal.-After imposing sentence
in a case which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the
court shall advise the defendant of the defendant's right to
appeal, including any right to appeal the sentence, and of the
right of a person who is unable to pay the cost of an appeal to
apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. There shall be no duty
on the court to advise the defendant of any right of appeal after
sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
except that the court shall advise the defendant of any right to
appeal the sentence. If the defendant so requests, the clerk of the
court shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf
of the defendant."
Current Rule 32(c)(5) likewise imposes on the district court the
duty to advise the defendant at sentencing of any right to
appeal.
The requirement that the district court inform a defendant of
his right to appeal serves important functions. It will often be
the case that, as soon as sentence is imposed, the defendant will
be taken into custody and transported elsewhere, making it
difficult for the defendant to maintain contact with his attorney.
The relationship between the defendant and the attorney may also be
strained after sentencing, in any event, because of the defendant's
disappointment over the outcome of the case or the terms of the
sentence. The attorney, moreover, concentrating on
27
other matters, may fail to tell the defendant of the right to
appeal, though months later the attorney may think that he in fact
gave the advice because it was standard practice to do so. In
addition, if the defendant is advised of the right by the judge who
imposes sentence, the defendant will realize that the appeal may be
taken as of right and without affront to the trial judge, who may
later rule upon a motion to modify or reduce the sentence. See Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 35. Advising the defendant of his right at
sentencing also gives him a clear opportunity to announce his
intention to appeal and request the court clerk to file the notice
of appeal, well before the 10-day filing period runs. See Rule
32(c)(5) ("If the defendant so requests, the clerk of the court
must immediately prepare and file a notice of appeal on behalf of
the defendant"); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(b) (establishing 10-day
period for filing appeal, which may be extended for 30 days by
district court for "excusable neglect").
These considerations underscore the importance of the advice
which comes from the court itself. Trial judges must be meticulous
and precise in following each of the requirements of Rule 32 in
every case. It is undisputed, then, that the court's failure to
give the required advice was error.
A violation of Rule 32(a)(2), however, does not entitle a
defendant to collateral relief in all circumstances. Our precedents
establish, as a general rule, that a court's failure to give a
defendant advice required by the Federal Rules is a sufficient
basis for collateral relief only when the defendant is prejudiced
by the court's error. In
Hill v.
United States,
368 U. S. 424
(1962), for example, the District Court violated the
then-applicable version of Rule 32(a) by failing to make explicit
that the defendant had an opportunity to speak in his own behalf.
The defendant did not allege that he had been "affirmatively denied
an opportunity to speak," that the District Judge had been deprived
of any relevant information, or that the defendant "would have had
anything at all to say if he had been formally invited to speak."
Id., at 429.
28
The defendant established only "a failure to comply with the
formal requirements of the Rule,"
ibid., and alleged no
prejudice; on these premises, the Court held the defendant was not
entitled to collateral relief, id., at 428-429.
So, also, in
United States v.
Timmreck, collateral
relief was unavailable to a defendant who alleged only that the
District Court "'fail[ed] to comply with the formal requirements'"
of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not
advising him of a mandatory special parole term to which he was
subject. 441 U. S., at 785. The defendant did not argue "that he
was actually unaware of the special parole term or that, if he had
been properly advised by the trial judge, he would not have pleaded
guilty."
Id., at 784. Having alleged no prejudice,
defendant's "only claim [was] of a technical violation of the Rule"
insufficient to justify habeas relief.
Ibid.
In this case, petitioner had full knowledge of his right to
appeal, hence the District Court's violation of Rule 32(a)(2) by
failing to inform him of that right did not prejudice him. The fact
of the violation, standing alone,
Hill and
Timmreck
instruct, does not entitle petitioner to collateral relief.
Our decision in
Rodriquez v.
United States,
395 U. S. 327
(1969), does not hold otherwise. In
Rodriquez, the Court
held that when counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a
defendant is entitled to resentencing and to an appeal without
showing that his appeal would likely have had merit.
I d.,
at 329-330. Without questioning the rule in
Rodriquez, we
conclude its holding is not implicated here because of the District
Court's factual finding that petitioner did not request an appeal.
While
Rodriquez did note the sentencing court's failure to
advise the defendant of his right to appeal, it did so only in the
course of rejecting the Government's belated argument that the case
should be remanded for factfinding to determine the reason counsel
had not filed the appeal. The court's failure to advise the
defendant of his right
29
was simply one factor-in combination with the untimeliness of
the Government's request and the lengthy proceedings and delay the
defendant had already endured-that led the Court to conclude that
it was "just under the circumstances" to accord the petitioner
final relief at that time without further proceedings.
Id.,
at 331-332. This limited and factspecific conclusion does not
support a general rule that a court's failure to advise a defendant
of the right to appeal automatically requires resentencing to allow
an appeal.
Petitioner and his
amicus would distinguish
Timmreck (and, presumably,
Hill) on the ground that
the defendant in
Timmreck had the opportunity to raise his
claim on direct appeal but failed to do so, whereas the absence of
the "judicial warning [required by Rule 32(a)(2)] may effectively
undermine the defendant's ability to take a direct appeal." Brief
for Petitioner 20. This argument, however, provides no basis for
holding that a Rule 32(a)(2) oversight, though nonprejudicial,
automatically entitles the defendant to habeas relief. Even errors
raised on direct appeal are subject to harmless-error review. Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits federal
courts from granting relief based on errors that "d[o] not affect
substantial rights." See Rule 52(a) ("Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded"); see also
Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States, 487 U. S. 250, 254-255 (1988) ("[A] federal
court may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent the
harmless-error inquiry prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(a) .... Rule 52 is, in every pertinent respect, as
binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts
have no more discretion to disregard the Rule's mandate than they
do to disregard constitutional or statutory provisions").
Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to habeas
relief based on a Rule 32(a)(2) violation when he had independent
knowledge of the right to appeal and so
30
was not prejudiced by the trial court's omission. The judgment
of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is
Affirmed.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JusTICE GINSBURG,
and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write separately to
express my views about the meaning of prejudice in this context.
When, as here, a district court fails to advise a defendant of his
right to appeal, there are two ways in which this error could be
said not to have prejudiced the defendant. First, a defendant might
not be prejudiced by the error because he already knew about his
right to appeal. That is the case here, and the Court properly
concludes that under these circumstances, the defendant has not
shown that he is entitled to collateral relief.
Second, a defendant might not be prejudiced by the district
court's failure to advise him of his right to appeal because he had
no meritorious grounds for appeal in any event. In my opinion,
there is no reason why a defendant should have to demonstrate that
he had meritorious grounds for an appeal when he is attempting to
show that he was harmed by the district court's error. To require
defendants to specify the grounds for their appeal and show that
they have some merit would impose a heavy burden on defendants who
are often proceeding
pro se in an initial 28 U. S. C. § 2255
motion. If the district judge had fulfilled his obligation to
advise the defendant of his right to appeal, and the defendant had
wanted to appeal, he would have had a lawyer to identify and
develop his arguments on appeal. The defendant should not be
penalized for failing to appeal in the first instance when his
failure to appeal is attributable to the errors of a district court
judge. This result is consistent with our resolution of
Rodriquez v.
United States, 395 U. S. 327 (1969). In
Rodriquez, we held that when a defendant's failure to
31
appeal a conviction is attributable to an error by his lawyer,
the defendant is entitled to collateral relief without requiring
him to show that his appeal would have had merit. In my view, there
is no reason to adopt a different rule when the failure to appeal
results from a district judge's error.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment