BREYER, J., DISSENTING
PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V.SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO.
1
551 U. S. ____ (2007)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOS. 05-908 AND 05-915
PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS,
PETITIONER
05–908
v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next
friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER
05–915
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[June 28, 2007]
Justice Breyer, with
whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join,
dissenting.
These cases consider the
longstanding efforts of two local school boards to integrate their
public schools. The school board plans before us resemble many
others adopted in the last 50 years by primary and secondary
schools throughout the Nation. All of those plans represent local
efforts to bring about the kind of racially integrated education
that
Brown v.
Board of Education,
347
U. S. 483 (1954), long ago promised—efforts that this Court has
repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to
undertake. This Court has recognized that the public interests at
stake in such cases are “compelling.” We have approved of “narrowly
tailored” plans that are no less race-conscious than the plans
before us. And we have understood that the Constitution
permits local communities to adopt desegregation plans
even where it does not
require them to do so.
The plurality pays inadequate attention to
this law, to past opinions’ rationales, their language, and the
contexts in which they arise. As a result, it reverses course and
reaches the wrong conclusion. In doing so, it distorts precedent,
it misapplies the relevant constitutional principles, it announces
legal rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local
governments to deal effectively with the growing resegregation of
public schools, it threatens to substitute for present calm a
disruptive round of race-related litigation, and it undermines
Brown’s promise of integrated primary and secondary
education that local communities have sought to make a reality.
This cannot be justified in the name of the Equal Protection
Clause.
I
Facts
The historical and factual
context in which these cases arise is critical. In Brown, this
Court held that the government’s segregation of schoolchildren by
race violates the Constitution’s promise of equal protection. The
Court emphasized that “education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.” 347 U. S., at 493. And it
thereby set the Nation on a path toward pub-lic school
integration.
In dozens of subsequent cases,
this Court told school districts previously segregated by law what
they must do at a minimum to comply with
Brown’s
constitutional holding. The measures required by those cases often
included race-conscious practices, such as mandatory busing and
race-based restrictions on voluntary transfers. See,
e.g.,
Columbus Bd. of Ed. v.
Penick,
443 U. S. 449, 455,
n. 3 (1979);
Davis v.
Board of School Comm’rs of
Mobile Cty.,
402
U. S. 33, 37–38 (1971);
Green v.
School Bd. of New
Kent Cty.,
391
U. S. 430, 441–442 (1968).
Beyond those minimum
requirements, the Court left much of the determination of how to
achieve integration to the judgment of local communities. Thus, in
respect to race-conscious desegregation measures that the
Constitution
permitted, but did not
require
(measures similar to those at issue here), this Court unanimously
stated:
“School authorities are traditionally charged with
broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might
well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to
live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed
ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the
district as a whole.
To do this as an educational policy is
within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities.”
Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed.,
402 U. S. 1, 16
(1971) (emphasis added).
As a result, different
districts—some acting under court decree, some acting in order to
avoid threatened lawsuits, some seeking to comply with federal
administrative orders, some acting purely voluntarily, some acting
after federal courts had dissolved earlier orders—adopted,
modified, and experimented with hosts of different kinds of plans,
including race-conscious plans, all with a similar objective:
greater racial integration of public schools. See F. Welch & A.
Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation v (1987) (hereinafter
Welch) (prepared for the Commission on Civil Rights) (reviewing a
sample of 125 school districts, constituting 20% of national public
school enrollment, that had experimented with nearly 300 different
plans over 18 years). The techniques that different districts have
employed range “from voluntary transfer programs to mandatory
reassignment.”
Id., at 21. And the design of particular
plans has been “dictated by both the law and the specific needs of
the district.”
Ibid.
Overall these efforts brought
about considerable racial integration. More recently, however,
progress has stalled. Between 1968 and 1980, the number of black
children attending a school where minority children constituted
more than half of the school fell from 77% to 63% in the Nation
(from 81% to 57% in the South) but then reversed direction by the
year 2000, rising from 63% to 72% in the Nation (from 57% to 69% in
the South). Similarly, between 1968 and 1980, the number of black
children attending schools that were more than 90% minority fell
from 64% to 33% in the Nation (from 78% to 23% in the South), but
that too reversed direction, rising by the year 2000 from 33% to
37% in the Nation (from 23% to 31% in the South). As of 2002,
almost 2.4 million students, or over 5% of all public school
enrollment, attended schools with a white population of less than
1%. Of these, 2.3 million were black and Latino students, and only
72,000 were white. Today, more than one in six black children
attend a school that is 99–100% minority. See Appendix A,
infra. In light of the evident risk of a return to school
systems that are in fact (though not in law) resegregated, many
school districts have felt a need to maintain or to extend their
integration efforts.
The upshot is that myriad school districts
operating in myriad circumstances have devised myriad plans, often
with race-conscious elements, all for the sake of eradicating
earlier school segregation, bringing about integration, or
preventing retrogression. Seattle and Louisville are two such
districts, and the histories of their present plans set forth
typical school integration stories.
I describe those histories at length in order
to highlight three important features of these cases. First, the
school districts’ plans serve “compelling interests” and are
“narrowly tailored” on any reasonable definition of those terms.
Second, the distinction between
de jure segregation
(caused by school systems) and
de facto segregation
(caused,
e.g., by housing patterns or generalized societal
discrimination) is meaningless in the present context, thereby
dooming the plurality’s endeavor to find support for its views in
that distinction. Third, real-world efforts to substitute racially
diverse for racially segregated schools (however caused) are
complex, to the point where the Constitution cannot plausibly be
interpreted to rule out categorically all local efforts to use
means that are “conscious” of the race of individuals.
In both Seattle and Louisville, the local
school districts began with schools that were highly segregated in
fact. In both cities plaintiffs filed lawsuits claiming
unconstitutional segregation. In Louisville, a federal district
court found that school segregation reflected pre-
Brown
state laws separating the races. In Seattle, the plaintiffs alleged
that school segregation unconstitutionally reflected not only
generalized societal discrimination and residential housing
patterns, but also
school board policies and actions that
had helped to create, maintain, and aggravate racial segregation.
In Louisville, a federal court entered a remedial decree. In
Seattle, the parties settled after the school district pledged to
undertake a desegregation plan. In both cities, the school boards
adopted plans designed to achieve integration by bringing about
more racially diverse schools. In each city the school board
modified its plan several times in light of, for example, hostility
to busing, the threat of resegregation, and the desirability of
introducing greater student choice. And in each city, the school
boards’ plans have evolved over time in ways that progressively
diminish the plans’ use of explicit race-conscious
criteria.
The histories that follow set forth these
basic facts. They are based upon numerous sources, which for ease
of exposition I have cataloged, along with their corresponding
citations, at Appendix B,
infra.
A
Seattle
1. Segregation, 1945 to
1956. During and just after World War II, significant numbers
of black Americans began to make Seattle their home. Few black
residents lived outside the central section of the city. Most
worked at unskilled jobs. Although black students made up about 3%
of the total Seattle population in the mid-1950’s, nearly all black
children attended schools where a majority of the population was
minority. Elementary schools in central Seattle were between 60%
and 80% black; Garfield, the central district high school, was more
than 50% minority; schools outside the central and southeastern
sections of Seattle were virtually all white.
2. Preliminary Challenges,
1956 to 1969. In 1956, a memo for the Seattle School Board
reported that school segregation reflected not only segregated
housing patterns but also school board policies that permitted
white students to transfer out of black schools while restricting
the transfer of black students into white schools. In 1958, black
parents whose children attended Harrison Elementary School (with a
black student population of over 75%) wrote the Seattle board,
complaining that the “ ‘boundaries for the Harrison Elementary
School were not set in accordance with the long-established
standards of the School District … but were arbitrarily set with an
end to excluding colored children from McGilvra School, which is
adjacent to the Harrison school district.’ ”
In 1963, at the insistence of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
and other community groups, the school board adopted a new
race-based transfer policy. The new policy added an explicitly
racial criterion: If a place exists in a school, then, irrespective
of other transfer criteria, a white student may transfer to a
predominantly black school, and a black student may transfer to a
predominantly white school.
At that time one high school, Garfield, was
about two-thirds minority; eight high schools were virtually all
white. In 1963, the transfer program’s first year, 239 black
students and 8 white students transferred. In 1969, about 2,200 (of
10,383 total) of the district’s black students and about 400 of the
district’s white students took advantage of the plan. For the next
decade, annual program transfers remained at approximately this
level.
3. The NAACP’s First Legal Challenge and
Seattle’s Response, 1969 to 1977. In 1969 the NAACP filed a
federal lawsuit against the school board, claiming that the board
had “unlawfully and unconstitutionally” “establish[ed]” and
“maintain[ed]” a system of “racially segregated public schools.”
The complaint said that 77% of black public elementary school
students in Seattle attended 9 of the city’s 86 elementary schools
and that 23 of the remaining schools had no black students at all.
Similarly, of the 1,461 black students enrolled in the 12 senior
high schools in Seattle, 1,151 (or 78.8%) attended 3 senior high
schools, and 900 (61.6%) attended a single school, Garfield.
The complaint charged that the school board
had brought about this segregated system in part by “mak[ing] and
enforc[ing]” certain “rules and regulations,” in part by “drawing .
. . boundary lines” and “executing school attendance policies” that
would create and maintain “predominantly Negro or non-white
schools,” and in part by building schools “in such a manner as to
restrict the Negro plaintiffs and the class they represent to
predominantly negro or non-white schools.” The complaint also
charged that the board discriminated in assigning teachers.
The board responded to the lawsuit by
introducing a plan that required race-based transfers and mandatory
busing. The plan created three new middle schools at three school
buildings in the predominantly white north end. It then created a
“mixed” student body by assigning to those schools students who
would otherwise attend predominantly white, or predominantly black,
schools elsewhere. It used explicitly racial criteria in making
these assignments (
i.e., it deliberately assigned to the
new middle schools black students, not white students, from the
black schools and white students, not black students, from the
white schools). And it used busing to transport the students to
their new assignments. The plan provoked considerable local
opposition. Opponents brought a lawsuit. But eventually a state
court found that the mandatory busing was lawful.
In 1976–1977, the plan involved
the busing of about 500 middle school students (300 black students
and 200 white students). Another 1,200 black students and 400 white
students participated in the previously adopted voluntary transfer
program. Thus about 2,000 students out of a total district
population of about 60,000 students were involved in one or the
other transfer program. At that time, about 20% or 12,000 of the
district’s students were black. And the board continued to describe
26 of its 112 schools as “segregated.”
4. The NAACP’s
Second Legal Challenge, 1977. In 1977, the NAACP filed another
legal complaint, this time with the federal Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The
complaint alleged that the Seattle School Board had created or
perpetuated unlawful racial segregation through,
e.g.,
certain school-transfer criteria, a construction program that
needlessly built new schools in white areas, district line-drawing
criteria, the maintenance of inferior facilities at black schools,
the use of explicit racial criteria in the assignment of teachers
and other staff, and a general pattern of delay in respect to the
implementation of promised desegregation efforts.
The OCR and the school board entered into a
formal settlement agreement. The agreement required the board to
implement what became known as the “Seattle Plan.”
5. The Seattle Plan: Mandatory Busing,
1978 to 1988. The board began to implement the Seattle Plan in
1978. This plan labeled “racially imbalanced” any school at which
the percentage of black students exceeded by more than 20% the
minority population of the school district as a whole. It applied
that label to 26 schools, including 4 high schools—Cleveland (72.8%
minority), Franklin (76.6% minority), Garfield (78.4% minority),
and Rainier Beach (58.9% minority). The plan paired (or “triaded”)
“imbalanced” black schools with “imbalanced” white schools. It then
placed some grades (say, third and fourth grades) at one school
building and other grades (say, fifth and sixth grades) at the
other school building. And it thereby required, for example, all
fourth grade students from the previously black and previously
white schools first to attend together what would now be a “mixed”
fourth grade at one of the school buildings and then the next year
to attend what would now be a “mixed” fifth grade at the other
school building.
At the same time, the plan provided that a
previous “black” school would remain about 50% black, while a
previous “white” school would remain about two-thirds white. It was
consequently necessary to decide with some care
which
students would attend the new “mixed” grade. For this purpose,
administrators cataloged the racial makeup of each neighborhood
housing block. The school district met its percentage goals by
assigning to the new “mixed” school an appropriate number of
“black” housing blocks and “white” housing blocks. At the same
time, transport from house to school involved extensive busing,
with about half of all students attending a school other than the
one closest to their home.
The Seattle Plan achieved the school
integration that it sought. Just prior to the plan’s
implementation, for example, 4 of Seattle’s 11 high schools were
“imbalanced,”
i.e., almost exclusively “black” or almost
exclusively “white.” By 1979, only two were out of “balance.” By
1980 only Cleveland remained out of “balance” (as the board defined
it) and that by a mere two students.
Nonetheless, the Seattle Plan, due to its
busing, provoked serious opposition within the State. See generally
Washington v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
458
U. S. 457, 461–466 (1982). Thus, Washington state voters
enacted an initiative that amended state law to require students to
be assigned to the schools closest to their homes.
Id., at
462. The Seattle School Board challenged the constitutionality of
the initiative.
Id., at 464. This Court then held that the
initiative—which would have prevented the Seattle Plan from taking
effect—violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id., at 470.
6. Student Choice, 1988 to 1998. By
1988, many white families had left the school district, and many
Asian families had moved in. The public school population had
fallen from about 100,000 to less than 50,000. The racial makeup of
the school population amounted to 43% white, 24% black, and 23%
Asian or Pacific Islander, with Hispanics and Native Americans
making up the rest. The cost of busing, the harm that members of
all racial communities feared that the Seattle Plan caused, the
desire to attract white families back to the public schools, and
the interest in providing greater school choice led the board to
abandon busing and to substitute a new student assignment policy
that resembles the plan now before us.
The new plan permitted each student to choose
the school he or she wished to attend, subject to race-based
constraints. In respect to high schools, for example, a student was
given a list of a subset of schools, carefully selected by the
board to balance racial distribution in the district by including
neighborhood schools and schools in racially different
neighborhoods elsewhere in the city. The student could then choose
among those schools, indicating a first choice, and other choices
the student found acceptable. In making an assignment to a
particular high school, the district would give first preference to
a student with a sibling already at the school. It gave second
preference to a student whose race differed from a race that was
“over-represented” at the school (
i.e., a race that
accounted for a higher percentage of the school population than of
the total district population). It gave third preference to
students residing in the neighborhood. It gave fourth preference to
students who received child care in the neighborhood. In a typical
year, say, 1995, about 20,000 potential high school students
participated. About 68% received their first choice. Another 16%
received an “acceptable” choice. A further 16% were assigned to a
school they had not listed.
7. The Current Plan, 1999 to the
Present. In 1996, the school board adopted the present plan,
which began in 1999. In doing so, it sought to deemphasize the use
of racial criteria and to increase the likelihood that a student
would receive an assignment at his first or second choice high
school. The district retained a racial tiebreaker for
oversubscribed schools, which takes effect only if the school’s
minority or majority enrollment falls outside of a 30% range
centered on the minority/majority population ratio within the
district. At the same time, all students were free subsequently to
transfer from the school at which they were initially placed to a
different school of their choice without regard to race. Thus, at
worst, a student would have to spend one year at a high school he
did not pick as a first or second choice.
The new plan worked roughly as expected for
the two school years during which it was in effect (1999–2000 and
2000–2001). In the 2000–2001 school year, for example, with the
racial tiebreaker, the entering ninth grade class at Franklin High
School had a 60% minority population; without the racial tiebreaker
that same class at Franklin would have had an almost 80% minority
population. (We consider only the ninth grade since only students
entering that class were subject to the tiebreaker, and because the
plan was not in place long enough to change the composition of an
entire school.) In the year 2005–2006, by which time the racial
tiebreaker had not been used for several years, Franklin’s overall
minority enrollment had risen to 90%. During the period the
tiebreaker applied, it typically affected about 300 students per
year. Between 80% and 90% of all students received their first
choice assignment; between 89% and 97% received their first or
second choice assignment.
Petitioner Parents Involved in
Community Schools objected to Seattle’s most recent plan under the
State and Federal Constitutions. In due course, the Washington
Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (sitting en banc) rejected the challenge and
found Seattle’s plan lawful.
B
Louisville
1. Before the Lawsuit, 1954
to 1972. In 1956, two years after
Brown made clear
that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law,
the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student
assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. At the
same time it adopted an open transfer policy under which
approximately 3,000 of Louisville’s 46,000 students applied for
transfer. By 1972, however, the Louisville School District remained
highly segregated. Approximately half the district’s public school
enrollment was black; about half was white. Fourteen of the
district’s nineteen non-vocational middle and high schools were
close to totally black or totally white. Nineteen of the district’s
forty-six elementary schools were between 80% and 100% black.
Twenty-one elementary schools were between roughly 90% and 100%
white.
2. Court-Imposed Guidelines
and Busing, 1972 to 1991. In 1972, civil rights groups and
parents, claiming unconstitutional segregation, sued the Louisville
Board of Education in federal court. The original litigation
eventually became a lawsuit against the Jefferson County School
System, which in April 1975 absorbed Louisville’s schools and
combined them with those of the surrounding suburbs. (For ease of
exposition, I shall still use “Louisville” to refer to what is now
the combined districts.) After preliminary rulings and an eventual
victory for the plaintiffs in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the District Court in July 1975 entered an order requiring
desegregation.
The order’s requirements reflected a (newly
enlarged) school district student population of about 135,000,
approximately 20% of whom were black. The order required the school
board to create and to maintain schools with student populations
that ranged, for elementary schools, between 12% and 40% black, and
for secondary schools (with one exception), between 12.5% and 35%
black.
The District Court also adopted a
complex desegregation plan designed to achieve the order’s targets.
The plan required redrawing school attendance zones, closing 12
schools, and busing groups of students, selected by race and the
first letter of their last names, to schools outside their
immediate neighborhoods. The plan’s initial busing requirements
were extensive, involving the busing of 23,000 students and a
transportation fleet that had to “operate from early in the morning
until late in the evening.” For typical students, the plan meant
busing for several years (several more years for typical black
students than for typical white students). The following notice,
published in a Louisville newspaper in 1976, gives a sense of how
the district’s race-based busing plan operated in practice:
[Graphic omitted; see printed opinion]
Louisville Courier Journal, June 18, 1976
(reproduced in J. Wilkinson, From
Brown to
Bakke:
The Supreme Court and School Integration 1954–1978, p. 176
(1979)).
The District Court monitored implementation of
the plan. In 1978, it found that the plan had brought all of
Louisville’s schools within its “ ‘guidelines’ for racial
composition” for “at least a substantial portion of the [previous]
three years.” It removed the case from its active docket while
stating that it expected the board “to continue to implement those
portions of the desegregation order which are by their nature of a
continuing effect.”
By 1984, after several schools had fallen out
of compliance with the order’s racial percentages due to shifting
demographics in the community, the school board revised its
desegregation plan. In doing so, the board created a new racial
“guideline,” namely a “floating range of 10% above and 10% below
the countywide average for the different grade levels.” The board
simultaneously redrew district boundaries so that middle school
students could attend the same school for three years and high
school students for four years. It added “magnet” programs at two
high schools. And it adjusted its alphabet-based system for
grouping and busing students. The board estimated that its new plan
would lead to annual reassignment (with busing) of about 8,500
black students and about 8,000 white students.
3. Student Choice and Project Renaissance,
1991 to 1996. By 1991, the board had concluded that assigning
elementary school students to two or more schools during their
elementary school years had proved educationally unsound and, if
continued, would undermine Kentucky’s newly adopted Education
Reform Act. It consequently conducted a nearly year-long review of
its plan. In doing so, it consulted widely with parents and other
members of the local community, using public presentations, public
meetings, and various other methods to obtain the public’s input.
At the conclusion of this review, the board adopted a new plan,
called “Project Renaissance,” that emphasized student choice.
Project Renaissance again revised the board’s
racial guidelines. It provided that each elementary school would
have a black student population of between 15% and 50%; each middle
and high school would have a black population and a white
population that fell within a range, the boundaries of which were
set at 15% above and 15% below the general student population
percentages in the county at that grade level. The plan then drew
new geographical school assignment zones designed to satisfy these
guidelines; the district could reassign students if particular
schools failed to meet the guidelines and was required to do so if
a school repeatedly missed these targets.
In respect to elementary schools, the plan
first drew a neighborhood line around each elementary school, and
it then drew a second line around groups of elementary schools
(called “clusters”). It initially assigned each student to his or
her neighborhood school, but it permitted each student freely to
transfer between elementary schools within each cluster
provided that the transferring student (a) was black if
transferring from a predominantly black school to a predominantly
white school, or (b) was white if transferring from a predominantly
white school to a predominantly black school. Students could also
apply to attend magnet elementary schools or programs.
The plan required each middle school student
to be assigned to his or her neighborhood school unless the student
applied for, and was accepted by, a magnet middle school. The plan
provided for “open” high school enrollment. Every 9th or 10th
grader could apply to any high school in the system, and the high
school would accept applicants according to set criteria—one of
which consisted of the need to attain or remain in compliance with
the plan’s racial guidelines. Finally, the plan created two new
magnet schools, one each at the elementary and middle school
levels.
4. The Current Plan: Project Renaissance
Modified, 1996 to 2003. In 1995 and 1996, the Louisville
School Board, with the help of a special “Planning Team,” community
meetings, and other official and unofficial study groups, monitored
the effects of Project Renaissance and considered proposals for
improvement. Consequently, in 1996, the board modified Project
Renaissance, thereby creating the present plan.
At the time, the district’s public school
population was approximately 30% black. The plan consequently
redrew the racial “guidelines,” setting the boundaries at 15% to
50% black for
all schools. It again redrew school
assignment boundaries. And it expanded the transfer opportunities
available to elementary and middle school pupils. The plan forbade
transfers, however, if the transfer would lead to a school
population outside the guideline range,
i.e., if it would
create a school where fewer than 15% or more than 50% of the
students were black.
The plan also established “Parent Assistance
Centers” to help parents and students navigate the school selection
and assignment process. It pledged the use of other resources in
order to “encourage all schools to achieve an African-American
enrollment equivalent to the average district-wide African-American
enrollment at the school’s respective elementary, middle or high
school level.” And the plan continued use of magnet schools.
In 1999, several parents brought a lawsuit in
federal court attacking the plan’s use of racial guidelines at one
of the district’s magnet schools. They asked the court to dissolve
the desegregation order and to hold the use of
magnet
school racial guidelines unconstitutional. The board opposed
dissolution, arguing that “the old dual system” had left a
“demographic imbalance” that “prevent[ed] dissolution.” In 2000,
after reviewing the present plan, the District Court dissolved the
1975 order. It wrote that there was “overwhelming evidence of the
Board’s good faith compliance with the desegregation Decree and its
underlying purposes.” It added that the Louisville School Board had
“treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a
legal obligation—they consider it a positive, desirable policy and
an essential element of any well-rounded public school
education.”
The Court also found that the magnet programs
available at the high school in question were “not available at
other high schools” in the school district. It consequently held
unconstitutional the use of race-based “targets” to govern
admission to
magnet schools. And it ordered the board not
to control access to those scarce programs through the use of
racial targets.
5. The Current Lawsuit, 2003
to the Present. Subsequent to the District Court’s dissolution
of the desegregation order (in 2000) the board simply continued to
implement its 1996 plan as modified to reflect the court’s magnet
school determination. In 2003, the petitioner now before us,
Crystal Meredith, brought this lawsuit challenging the plan’s
unmodified portions,
i.e., those portions that dealt with
ordinary, not magnet, schools. Both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected Meredith’s
challenge and held the unmodified aspects of the plan
constitutional.
C
The histories I have set forth
describe the extensive and ongoing efforts of two school districts
to bring about greater racial integration of their public schools.
In both cases the efforts were in part remedial. Louisville began
its integration efforts in earnest when a federal court in 1975
entered a school desegregation order. Seattle undertook its
integration efforts in response to the filing of a federal lawsuit
and as a result of its settlement of a segregation complaint filed
with the federal OCR.
The plans in both Louisville and
Seattle grow out of these earlier remedial efforts. Both districts
faced problems that reflected initial periods of severe racial
segregation, followed by such remedial efforts as busing, followed
by evidence of resegregation, followed by a need to end busing and
encourage the return of,
e.g., suburban students through
increased student choice. When formulating the plans under review,
both districts drew upon their considerable experience with earlier
plans, having revised their policies periodically in light of that
experience. Both districts rethought their methods over time and
explored a wide range of other means, including non-race-conscious
policies. Both districts also considered elaborate studies and
consulted widely within their communities.
Both districts sought greater racial
integration for educational and democratic, as well as for
remedial, reasons. Both sought to achieve these objectives while
preserving their commitment to other educational goals,
e.g., districtwide commitment to high quality public
schools, increased pupil assignment to neighborhood schools,
diminished use of busing, greater student choice, reduced risk of
white flight, and so forth. Consequently, the present plans expand
student choice; they limit the burdens (including busing) that
earlier plans had imposed upon students and their families; and
they use race-conscious criteria in limited and gradually
diminishing ways. In particular, they use race-conscious criteria
only to mark the outer bounds of broad population-related
ranges.
The histories also make clear the futility of
looking simply to whether earlier school segregation was
de
jure or
de facto in order to draw firm lines
separating the constitutionally permissible from the
constitutionally forbidden use of “race-conscious” criteria.
Justice Thomas suggests that it will be easy to identify
de
jure segregation because “[i]n most cases, there either will
or will not have been a state constitutional amendment, state
statute, local ordinance, or local administrative policy explicitly
requiring separation of the races.”
Ante, at 6, n. 4
(concurring opinion). But our precedent has recognized that
de
jure discrimination can be present even in the absence of
racially explicit laws. See
Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356, 373–374 (1886).
No one here disputes that Louisville’s
segregation was
de jure. But what about Seattle’s? Was it
de facto? De jure? A mixture? Opinions differed.
Or is it that a prior federal court had not adjudicated the matter?
Does that make a difference? Is Seattle free on remand to say that
its schools were
de jure segregated, just as in 1956 a
memo for the School Board admitted? The plurality does not seem
confident as to the answer. Compare
ante, at 12 (opinion
of the Court) (“[T]he Seattle public schools
have never
shown that they were ever segregated by law” (emphasis
added)), with
ante at 29–30 (plurality opinion) (assuming
“the Seattle school district was never segregated by law,” but
seeming to concede that a school district with
de jure
segregation need not be subject to a court order to be allowed to
engage in race-based remedial measures).
A court finding of
de
jure segregation cannot be the crucial variable. After all, a
number of school districts in the South that the Government or
private plaintiffs challenged as segregated
by law
voluntarily desegregated their schools
without a court
order—just as Seattle did. See,
e.g., Coleman,
Desegregation of the Public Schools in Kentucky—The Second Year
After the Supreme Court’s Decision, 25 J. Negro Educ. 254, 256, 261
(1956) (40 of Kentucky’s 180 school districts began desegre- gation
without court orders); Branton, Little Rock Revisited:
Desegregation to Resegregation, 52 J. Negro Educ. 250, 251 (1983)
(similar in Arkansas); Bullock & Rodgers, Coercion to
Compliance: Southern School Districts and School Desegregation
Guidelines, 38 J. Politics 987, 991 (1976) (similar in Georgia);
McDaniel v.
Barresi,
402 U. S. 39, 40, n. 1
(1971) (Clarke County, Georgia). See also Letter from Robert F.
Kennedy, Attorney General, to John F. Kennedy, President (Jan. 24,
1963) (hereinafter Kennedy Report), available at
http://www.gilderlehrman.org/search/collection_pdfs/05/63/0/05630.pdf
(all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in
Clerk of Court’s case file) (reporting successful efforts by the
Government to induce voluntary desegregation).
Moreover, Louisville’s history makes clear
that a community under a court order to desegregate might submit a
race-conscious remedial plan
before the court dissolved
the order, but with every intention of following that plan even
after dissolution. How could such a plan be lawful the day
before dissolution but then become unlawful the very next day? On
what legal ground can the majority rest its contrary view? But see
ante, at 12–13, 17, n. 12.
Are courts really to treat as
merely
de facto segregated those school districts that
avoided a federal order by voluntarily complying with
Brown’s requirements? See
id., at 12, 29–30. This
Court has previously done just the opposite, permitting a
race-conscious remedy without any kind of court decree. See
McDaniel,
supra, at 41. Because the Constitution
emphatically does not forbid the use of race-conscious measures by
districts in the South that voluntarily desegregated their schools,
on what basis does the plurality claim that the law forbids Seattle
to do the same? But see
ante, at 29.
The histories also indicate the complexity of
the tasks and the practical difficulties that local school boards
face when they seek to achieve greater racial integration. The
boards work in communities where demographic patterns change, where
they must meet traditional learning goals, where they must attract
and retain effective teachers, where they should (and will) take
account of parents’ views and maintain
their commitment to
public school education, where they must adapt to court
intervention, where they must encourage voluntary student and
parent action—where they will find that their own good faith, their
knowledge, and their understanding of local circumstances are
always necessary but often insufficient to solve the problems at
hand.
These facts and circumstances
help explain why in this context, as to means, the law often leaves
legislatures, city councils, school boards, and voters with a broad
range of choice, thereby giving “different communities” the
opportunity to “try different solutions to common problems and
gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them
best to suit their individual needs.”
Comfort v.
Lynn
School Comm., 418 F. 3d 1, 28 (CA1 2005) (Boudin,
C. J., concurring) (citing
United States v.
Lopez,
514
U. S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)), cert. denied,
546 U. S. 1061
(2005).
With this factual background in mind, I turn
to the legal question: Does the United States Constitution prohibit
these school boards from using race-conscious criteria in the
limited ways at issue here?
II
The Legal Standard
A longstanding and unbroken
line of legal authority tells us that the Equal Protection Clause
permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to
achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution
does not compel it. Because of its importance, I shall repeat what
this Court said about the matter in Swann. Chief Justice
Burger, on behalf of a unanimous Court in a case of exceptional
importance, wrote:
“School authorities are
traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement
educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in
order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this
as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers
of school authorities.” 402 U. S., at 16.
The statement was not a technical holding in the
case. But the Court set forth in
Swann a basic principle
of constitutional law—a principle of law that has found “wide
acceptance in the legal culture.”
Dickerson v.
United
States,
530 U.
S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Mitchell v.
United States,
526 U. S. 314, 330
(1999);
id., at 331, 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
“ ‘wide acceptance in the legal culture’ ” as “adequate
reason not to overrule” prior cases).
Thus, in
North Carolina Bd.
of Ed. v.
Swann,
402 U. S. 43, 45 (1971), this Court,
citing
Swann, restated the point. “[S]chool authorities,”
the Court said, “have wide discretion in formulating school policy,
and . . . as a matter of educational policy school authorities may
well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is
desirable quite apart from any constitutional requirements.”
Then-Justice Rehnquist echoed this view in
Bustop, Inc. v.
Los Angeles Bd. of Ed.,
439 U. S. 1380, 1383
(1978) (opinion in chambers), making clear that he too believed
that
Swann’s statement reflected settled law: “While I
have the gravest doubts that [a state supreme court] was
required by the United States Constitution to take the
[desegregation] action that it has taken in this case, I have very
little doubt that it was
permitted by that Constitution to
take such action.” (Emphasis in original.)
These statements nowhere suggest that this
freedom is limited to school districts where court-ordered
desegregation measures are also in effect. Indeed, in
McDaniel, a case decided the same day as
Swann, a
group of parents challenged a race-conscious student assignment
plan that the Clarke County School Board had
voluntarily
adopted as a remedy without a court order (though under federal
agency pressure—pressure Seattle also encountered). The plan
required that each elementary school in the district maintain 20%
to 40% enrollment of African-American students, corresponding to
the racial composition of the district. See
Barresi v.
Browne, 226 Ga. 456, 456–459, 175 S. E. 2d 649,
650–651 (1970). This Court upheld the plan, see
McDaniel,
402 U. S., at 41, rejecting the parents’ argument that “a person
may not be
included or
excluded solely because he
is a Negro or because he is white.” Brief for Respondents in
McDaniel, O. T. 1970, No. 420, p. 25.
Federal authorities had claimed—as the NAACP
and the OCR did in Seattle—that Clarke County schools were
segregated in law, not just in fact. The plurality’s claim that
Seattle was “never segregated by law” is simply not accurate.
Compare
ante, at 29, with
supra, at 6–9. The
plurality could validly claim that
no court ever found
that Seattle schools were segregated in law. But that is also true
of the Clarke County schools in
McDaniel. Unless we
believe that the Constitution enforces one legal standard for the
South and another for the North, this Court should grant Seattle
the permission it granted Clarke County, Georgia. See
McDaniel, 402 U. S., at 41 (“[S]teps will almost
invariably require that students be assigned ‘differently because
of their race.’ . . . Any other approach would freeze the status
quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes.”).
This Court has also held that school districts
may be required by federal statute to undertake race-conscious
desegregation efforts even when there is no likelihood that
de
jure segregation can be shown. In
Board of Ed. of City
School Dist. of New York v.
Harris,
444 U. S. 130, 148–149
(1979), the Court concluded that a federal statute required school
districts receiving certain federal funds to remedy faculty
segregation, even though in this Court’s view the racial
disparities in the affected schools were purely
de facto
and would not have been actionable under the Equal Protection
Clause. Not even the dissenters thought the race-conscious remedial
program posed a
constitutional problem. See
id.,
at 152 (opinion of Stewart, J.). See also,
e.g.,
Crawford v.
Board of Ed. of Los Angeles,
458 U. S. 527, 535–536
(1982) (“[S]tate courts of California continue to have an
obligation under state law to order segregated school districts to
use voluntary desegregation techniques,
whether or not there
has been a finding of intentional segregation. . . . [S]chool
districts themselves retain a state-law obligation to take
reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and
they remain free
to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectuate
desegregation” (emphasis added));
School Comm. of
Boston v.
Board of Education,
389 U. S. 572 (1968)
(per curiam) (dismissing for want of a federal question a
challenge to a voluntary statewide integration plan using express
racial criteria).
Lower state and federal courts had considered
the matter settled and uncontroversial even before this Court
decided
Swann. Indeed, in 1968, the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected an equal protection challenge to a race-conscious state
law seeking to undo
de facto segregation:
“To support [their] claim, the
defendants heavily rely on three Federal cases, each of which held,
no State law being involved, that a local school board does not
have an affirmative constitutional duty to act to alleviate racial
imbalance in the schools that it did not cause. However, the
question as to whether the constitution requires a local school
board, or a State, to act to undo
de facto school
segregation is simply not here concerned. The issue here is whether
the constitution permits, rather than prohibits, voluntary State
action aimed toward reducing and eventually eliminating
de
facto school segregation.
“State laws or administrative policies,
directed toward the reduction and eventual elimination of
de
facto segregation of children in the schools and racial
imbalance, have been approved by every high State court which has
considered the issue. Similarly, the Federal courts which have
considered the issue . . . have recognized that voluntary programs
of local school authorities designed to alleviate
de facto
segregation and racial imbalance in the schools are not
constitutionally forbidden.”
Tometz v.
Board of Ed.,
Waukegan School Dist. No. 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 597–598, 237
N. E. 2d 498, 501 (1968) (citations omitted) (citing decisions
from the high courts of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
California, New York, and Connecticut, and from the Courts of
Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits).
See also,
e.g.,
Offerman v.
Nitkowski, 378 F. 2d 22, 24 (CA2 1967);
Deal
v.
Cincinnati Bd. of Ed., 369 F. 2d 55, 61 (CA6
1966), cert. denied,
389 U. S. 847 (1967);
Springfield School Comm. v.
Barksdale, 348
F. 2d 261, 266 (CA1 1965);
Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm’n v.
Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 164, 233
A. 2d 290, 294 (1967);
Booker v.
Board of Ed. of
Plainfield, Union Cty., 45 N. J. 161, 170, 212 A. 2d
1, 5 (1965);
Jackson v.
Pasadena City School
Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881–882, 382 P. 2d 878, 881–882
(1963) (in bank).
I quote the Illinois Supreme
Court at length to illustrate the prevailing legal assumption at
the time
Swann was decided. In this respect,
Swann was not a sharp or unexpected departure from prior
rulings; it reflected a consensus that had already emerged among
state and lower federal courts.
If there were doubts before
Swann was decided, they did not survive this Court’s
decision. Numerous state and federal courts explicitly relied upon
Swann’s guidance for decades to follow. For instance, a
Texas appeals court in 1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to a voluntary integration plan by explaining:
“[T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does
not mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum requirements in
order to promote school integration. School authorities are
traditionally given broad discretionary powers to formulate and
implement educational policy and may properly decide to ensure to
their students the value of an integrated school experience.”
Citizens for Better Ed. v.
Goose Creek Consol.
Independent School Dist., 719 S. W. 2d 350, 352-353 (Ct.
App. Tex. 1986) (citing
Swann and
North Carolina Bd.
of Ed.), appeal dism’d for want of a substantial federal
question,
484 U. S.
804 (1987).
Similarly, in
Zaslawsky v.
Bd. of Ed.
of Los Angeles City Unified School Dist., 610 F. 2d 661,
662–664 (1979), the Ninth Circuit rejected a federal constitutional
challenge to a school district’s use of mandatory faculty transfers
to ensure that each school’s faculty makeup would fall within 10%
of the districtwide racial composition. Like the Texas court, the
Ninth Circuit relied upon
Swann and
North Carolina Bd.
of Ed. to reject the argument that “a race-conscious plan is
permissible only when there has been a judicial finding of
de
jure segregation.” 610 F. 2d, at 663–664. See also,
e.g.,
Darville v.
Dade County School
Bd., 497 F. 2d 1002, 1004–1006 (CA5 1974);
State ex
rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v.
Brooks, 80
Wash. 2d 121, 128–129, 492 P. 2d 536, 541–542 (1972) (en
banc), overruled on other grounds,
Cole v.
Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P. 2d 799 (1984) (en
banc);
School Comm. of Springfield v.
Board of
Ed., 362 Mass. 417, 428–429 287 N. E. 2d 438, 447–448
(1972). These decisions illustrate well how lower courts understood
and followed
Swann’s enunciation of the relevant legal
principle.
Courts are not alone in accepting
as constitutionally valid the legal principle that
Swann
enunciated—
i.e., that the government may voluntarily adopt
race-conscious measures to improve conditions of race even when it
is not under a constitutional obligation to do so. That principle
has been accepted by every branch of government and is rooted in
the history of the Equal Protection Clause itself. Thus, Congress
has enacted numerous race-conscious statutes that illustrate that
principle or rely upon its validity. See,
e.g., 20 U. S.
C. §6311(b)(2)(C)(v) (No Child Left Behind Act); §1067
et
seq. (authorizing aid to minority institutions). In fact,
without being exhaustive, I have counted 51 federal statutes that
use racial classifications. I have counted well over 100 state
statutes that similarly employ racial classifications. Presidential
administrations for the past half-century have used and supported
various race-conscious measures. See,
e.g., Exec. Order
No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (President Kennedy); Exec.
Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) (President Johnson);
Sugrue, Breaking Through: The Troubled Origins of Affirmative
Action in the Workplace, in Colorlines: Affirmative Action,
Immigration, and Civil Rights Options for America 31 (Skretny ed.
2001) (describing President Nixon’s lobbying for affirmative action
plans,
e.g., the Philadelphia Plan); White, Affirmative
Action’s Alamo: Gerald Ford Returns to Fight Once More for
Michigan, Time, Aug. 23, 1999, p. 48 (reporting on President Ford’s
support for affirmative action); Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past,
Present, and Future, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 50 (2002)
(describing President Carter’s support for affirmation action). And
during the same time, hundreds of local school districts have
adopted student assignment plans that use race-conscious criteria.
See Welch 83–91.
That
Swann’s legal statement should
find such broad acceptance is not surprising. For
Swann is
predicated upon a well-established legal view of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That view understands the basic objective of those who
wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead
to racial exclusion. The Amendment sought to bring into American
society as full members those whom the Nation had previously held
in slavery. See
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71
(1872) (“[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in [all the Reconstruction amendments] . . . we mean
the freedom of the slave race”);
Strauder v.
West
Virginia,
100 U. S. 303, 306 (1879) (“[The
Fourteenth Amendment] is one of a series of constitutional
provisions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race
recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights that the superior
race enjoy”).
There is reason to believe that those who
drafted an Amendment with this basic purpose in mind would have
understood the legal and practical difference between the use of
race-conscious criteria in defiance of that purpose, namely to keep
the races apart, and the use of race-conscious criteria to further
that purpose, namely to bring the races together. See generally R.
Sears, A Utopian Experiment in Kentucky: Integration and Social
Equality at Berea, 1866–1904 (1996) (describing federal funding,
through the Freedman’s Bureau, of race-conscious school integration
programs). See also R. Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in
Louisiana 1862–77, p. 51 (1974) (describing the use of
race-conscious remedies); Harlan, Desegregation in New Orleans
Public Schools During Reconstruction, 67 Am. Hist. Rev. 663, 664
(1962) (same); W. Vaughn, Schools for All: The Blacks and Public
Education in the South, 1865–1877, pp. 111–116 (1974) (same).
Although the Constitution almost always forbids the former, it is
significantly more lenient in respect to the latter. See
Gratz v.
Bollinger,
539 U. S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peńa,
515 U. S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Sometimes Members of this Court have disagreed
about the degree of leniency that the Clause affords to programs
designed to include. See
Wygant v.
Jackson Board of
Education,
476
U. S. 267, 274 (1986);
Fullilove v.
Klutznick,
448 U. S. 448, 507
(1980). But I can find no case in which this Court has followed
Justice Thomas’ “colorblind” approach. And I have found no case
that otherwise repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between
that which seeks to
exclude and that which seeks to
include members of minority races.
What does the plurality say in response?
First, it seeks to distinguish
Swann and other similar
cases on the ground that those cases involved remedial plans in
response to
judicial findings of
de jure
segregation. As
McDaniel and
Harris show, that is
historically untrue. See
supra, at 22–24. Many school
districts in the South adopted segregation remedies (to which
Swann clearly applies) without any such federal
order
, see
supra, at 19–20. See also Kennedy
Report. Seattle’s circumstances are not meaningfully different from
those in, say,
McDaniel, where this Court approved
race-conscious remedies. Louisville’s plan was created and
initially adopted when a compulsory district court order was in
place. And, in any event, the histories of Seattle and Louisville
make clear that this distinction—between court-ordered and
voluntary desegregation—seeks a line that sensibly cannot be
drawn.
Second, the plurality downplays the importance
of
Swann and related cases by frequently describing their
relevant statements as “dicta.” These criticisms,
however, miss the main point.
Swann did not hide its
understanding of the law in a corner of an obscure opinion or in a
footnote, unread but by experts. It set forth its view prominently
in an important opinion joined by all nine Justices, knowing that
it would be read and followed throughout the Nation. The basic
problem with the plurality’s technical “dicta”-based response lies
in its overly theoretical approach to case law, an approach that
emphasizes rigid distinctions between holdings and dicta in a way
that serves to mask the radical nature of today’s decision. Law is
not an exercise in mathematical logic. And statements of a legal
rule set forth in a judicial opinion do not always divide neatly
into “holdings” and “dicta.” (Consider the legal “status” of
Justice Powell’s separate opinion in
Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v.
Bakke,
438 U. S. 265 (1978).) The
constitutional principle enunciated in
Swann, reiterated
in subsequent cases, and relied upon over many years, provides, and
has widely been thought to provide, authoritative legal guidance.
And if the plurality now chooses to reject that principle, it
cannot adequately justify its retreat simply by affixing the label
“dicta” to reasoning with which it disagrees. Rather, it must
explain to the courts and to the Nation
why it would
abandon guidance set forth many years before, guidance that
countless others have built upon over time, and which the law has
continuously embodied.
Third, a more important response is the
plurality’s claim that later cases—in particular
Johnson,
Adarand, and
Grutter—supplanted
Swann.
See
ante, at 11–12, 31–32, n. 16, 34–35 (citing
Adarand,
supra, at 227;
Johnson v.
California,
543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005);
Grutter v.
Bollinger,
539 U. S. 306, 326
(2003)). The plurality says that cases such as
Swann and
the others I have described all “were decided before this Court
definitively determined that ‘all racial classifications . . . must
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’ ”
Ante, at 31, n. 16 (quoting
Adarand, 515 U.
S., at 227). This Court in
Adarand added that “such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”
Ibid. And the Court repeated this same statement in
Grutter. See 539 U. S., at 326.
Several of these cases were significantly more
restrictive than
Swann in respect to the degree of
leniency the Fourteenth Amendment grants to programs designed to
include people of all races. See,
e.g.,
Adarand,
supra; Gratz,
supra;
Grutter,
supra. But that legal circumstance
cannot make a critical difference here for two separate
reasons.
First, no case—not
Adarand,
Gratz,
Grutter, or any other—has ever held that
the test of “strict scrutiny” means that all racial
classifications—no matter whether they seek to include or
exclude—must in practice be treated the same. The Court did not say
in
Adarand or in
Johnson or in
Grutter
that it was overturning
Swann or its central
constitutional principle.
Indeed, in its more recent opinions, the Court
recognized that the “fundamental purpose” of strict scrutiny review
is to “take relevant differences” between “fundamentally different
situations . . . into account.”
Adarand,
supra,
at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court made clear
that “[s]trict scrutiny does not trea[t] dissimilar race-based
decisions as though they were equally objectionable.”
Ibid. It added that the fact that a law “treats [a person]
unequally because of his or her race . . . says nothing about the
ultimate validity of any particular law.”
Id., at 229–230
(internal quotation marks omitted). And the Court, using the very
phrase that Justice Marshall had used to describe strict scrutiny’s
application to any
exclusionary use of racial criteria,
sought to “
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny” is as
likely to condemn
inclusive uses of “race-conscious”
criteria as it is to invalidate
exclusionary uses. That
is, it is
not in all circumstances “ ‘strict in
theory, but fatal in fact.’ ”
Id., at 237 (quoting
Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U. S., at 519
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)).
The Court in
Grutter elaborated:
“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict
in theory, but fatal in fact.’ . . . Although all governmental uses
of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by
it. . . .
“Context matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause. See
Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,
364 U. S. 339, 343–344 (1960)
(admonishing that, ‘in dealing with claims under broad provisions
of the Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive
process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that
generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations
that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in
disregard of variant controlling facts’). . . . Not every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular
context.” 539 U. S., at 326–327.
The Court’s holding in
Grutter
demonstrates that the Court meant what it said, for the Court
upheld an elite law school’s race-conscious admissions program.
The upshot is that the cases to which the
plurality refers, though all applying strict scrutiny, do not treat
exclusive and inclusive uses the same. Rather, they apply the
strict scrutiny test in a manner that is “fatal in fact” only to
racial classifications that harmfully
exclude; they apply
the test in a manner that is
not fatal in fact to racial
classifications that seek to
include.
The plurality cannot avoid this simple fact.
See
ante, at 34–36. Today’s opinion reveals that the
plurality would rewrite this Court’s prior jurisprudence, at least
in practical application, transforming the “strict scrutiny” test
into a rule that is fatal in fact across the board. In doing so,
the plurality parts company from this Court’s prior cases, and it
takes from local government the longstanding legal right to use
race-conscious criteria for inclusive purposes in limited ways.
Second, as
Grutter specified,
“[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action
under the Equal Protection Clause.” 539 U. S., at 327 (citing
Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 343–344 (1960)). And
contexts differ dramatically one from the other. Governmental use
of race-based criteria can arise in the context of, for example,
census forms, research expenditures for diseases, assignments of
police officers patrolling predominantly minority-race
neighborhoods, efforts to desegregate racially segregated schools,
policies that favor minorities when distributing goods or services
in short supply, actions that create majority-minority electoral
districts, peremptory strikes that remove potential jurors on the
basis of race, and others. Given the significant differences among
these contexts, it would be surprising if the law required an
identically strict legal test for evaluating the constitutionality
of race-based criteria as to each of them.
Here, the context is one in which school
districts seek to advance or to maintain racial integration in
primary and secondary schools. It is a context, as
Swann
makes clear, where history has required special administrative
remedies. And it is a context in which the school boards’ plans
simply set race-conscious limits at the outer boundaries of a broad
range.
This context is
not a context that
involves the use of race to decide who will receive goods or
services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit and
which are in short supply. It is not one in which race-conscious
limits stigmatize or exclude; the limits at issue do not pit the
races against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate
racial tensions. They do not impose burdens unfairly upon members
of one race alone but instead seek benefits for members of all
races alike. The context here is one of racial limits that seek,
not to keep the races apart, but to bring them together.
The importance of these differences is clear
once one compares the present circumstances with other cases where
one or more of these negative features are present. See,
e.g.,
Strauder v.
West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303 (1880);
Yick Wo
v.
Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356 (1886);
Brown,
347
U. S. 483;
Loving v.
Virginia,
388 U. S. 1 (1967);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke,
438 U. S. 265 (1978);
Batson
v.
Kentucky,
476 U. S. 79 (1986);
Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co.,
488 U. S. 469 (1989);
Shaw v.
Reno,
509 U. S. 630 (1993);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peńa,
515 U. S. 200 (1995);
Grutter,
supra; Gratz v.
Bollinger,
539 U. S. 244 (2003);
Johnson
v.
California,
543 U. S. 499 (2005).
If one examines the context more specifically,
one finds that the districts’ plans reflect efforts to overcome a
history of segregation, embody the results of broad experience and
community consultation, seek to expand student choice while
reducing the need for mandatory busing, and use race-conscious
criteria in highly limited ways that diminish the use of race
compared to preceding integration efforts. Compare
Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F. 3d 790, 809–810
(CA1 1998) (Boudin, J., concurring), with
Comfort, 418 F.
3d, at 28–29 (Boudin, C. J., concurring). They do not seek to
award a scarce commodity on the basis of merit, for they are not
magnet schools; rather, by design and in practice, they offer
substantially equivalent academic programs and electives. Although
some parents or children prefer some schools over others, school
popularity has varied significantly over the years. In 2000, for
example, Roosevelt was the most popular first choice high school in
Seattle; in 2001, Ballard was the most popular; in 2000, West
Seattle was one of the least popular; by 2003, it was one of the
more popular. See Research, Evaluation and Assessment, Student
Information Serv- ices Office, District Summaries 1999–2005,
available at http:
//www.seattleschools.org /area /siso /disprof /2005 /DP05
all.pdf. In a word, the school plans under review do not involve
the kind of race-based harm that has led this Court, in other
contexts, to find the use of race-conscious criteria
unconstitutional.
These and related considerations convinced one
Ninth Circuit judge in the Seattle case to apply a standard of
constitutionality review that is less than “strict,” and to
conclude that this Court’s precedents do not require the contrary.
See 426 F. 3d 1162, 1193–1194 (2005) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (“That a student is denied the school of his choice may
be disappointing, but it carries no racial stigma and says nothing
at all about that individual’s aptitude or ability”). That judge is
not alone. Cf.
Gratz,
supra, at 301 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting);
Adarand,
supra, at 243 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 Yale
L. J. 420, 433–434 (1988).
The view that a more lenient standard than
“strict scrutiny” should apply in the present context would not
imply abandonment of judicial efforts carefully to determine the
need for race-conscious criteria and the criteria’s tailoring in
light of the need. And the present context requires a court to
examine carefully the race-conscious program at issue. In doing so,
a reviewing judge must be fully aware of the potential dangers and
pitfalls that Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy mention. See
ante, at 11–12 (Thomas, J., concurring);
ante, at
3, 17 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
But unlike the plurality, such a judge would
also be aware that a legislature or school administrators,
ultimately accountable to the electorate, could
nonetheless properly conclude that a racial classification
sometimes serves a purpose important enough to overcome the risks
they mention, for example, helping to end racial isolation or to
achieve a diverse student body in public schools. Cf.
ante, at 17–18 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Where that is so,
the judge would carefully examine the program’s details to
determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is
proportionate to the important ends it serves.
In my view, this contextual approach to
scrutiny is altogether fitting. I believe that the law requires
application here of a standard of review that is not “strict” in
the traditional sense of that word, although it does require the
careful review I have just described. See
Gratz,
supra, at 301 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J.,
dissenting);
Adarand,
supra, at 242–249 (Stevens,
J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 426 F. 3d, at
1193–1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Apparently Justice Kennedy
also agrees that strict scrutiny would not apply in respect to
certain “race-conscious” school board policies. See
ante,
at 9 (“Executive and legislative branches, which for generations
now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should
be permitted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a
constitutional violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker
considers the impact a given approach might have on students of
different races”).
Nonetheless, in light of
Grutter and
other precedents, see,
e.g.,
Bakke, 438 U. S., at
290 (opinion of Powell, J.), I shall adopt the first alternative. I
shall apply the version of strict scrutiny that those cases embody.
I shall consequently ask whether the school boards in Seattle and
Louisville adopted these plans to serve a “compelling governmental
interest” and, if so, whether the plans are “narrowly tailored” to
achieve that interest. If the plans survive this strict review,
they would survive less exacting review
a fortiori. Hence,
I conclude that the plans before us pass both parts of the strict
scrutiny test. Consequently I must conclude that the plans here are
permitted under the Constitution.
III
Applying the Legal Standard
A
Compelling Interest
The principal interest
advanced in these cases to justify the use of race-based criteria
goes by various names. Sometimes a court refers to it as an
interest in achieving racial “diversity.” Other times a court, like
the plurality here, refers to it as an interest in racial
“balancing.” I have used more general terms to signify that
interest, describing it, for example, as an interest in promoting
or preserving greater racial “integration” of public schools. By
this term, I mean the school districts’ interest in eliminating
school-by-school racial isolation and increasing the degree to
which racial mixture characterizes each of the district’s schools
and each individual student’s public school experience.
Regardless of its name,
however, the interest at stake possesses three essential elements.
First, there is a historical and remedial element: an interest in
setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation.
This refers back to a time when public schools were highly
segregated, often as a result of legal or administrative policies
that facilitated racial segregation in public schools. It is an
interest in continuing to combat the remnants of segregation caused
in whole or in part by these school-related policies, which have
often affected not only schools, but also housing patterns,
employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes. It
is an interest in maintaining hard-won gains. And it has its roots
in preventing what gradually may become the de facto
resegregation of America’s public schools. See Part I,
supra, at 4; Appendix A,
infra. See also
ante, at 17 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“This Nation has a
moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to
creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for
all of its children”).
Second, there is an educational element: an
interest in overcoming the adverse educational effects produced by
and associated with highly segregated schools. Cf.
Grutter, 539 U. S.
, at 345 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Studies suggest that children taken from those schools
and placed in integrated settings often show positive academic
gains. See,
e.g., Powell, Living and Learning: Linking
Housing and Education, in Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking
Housing and Education Policy 15, 35 (J. Powell, G. Kearney, &
V. Kay eds. 2001) (hereinafter Powell); Hallinan, Diversity Effects
on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St.
L. J. 733, 741–742 (1998) (hereinafter Hallinan).
Other studies reach different conclusions.
See,
e.g., D. Armor, Forced Justice (1995). See also
ante, at 15–17 (Thomas, J., concurring). But the evidence
supporting an educational interest in racially integrated schools
is well established and strong enough to permit a democratically
elected school board reasonably to determine that this interest is
a compelling one.
Research suggests, for example, that black
children from segregated educational environments significantly
increase their achievement levels once they are placed in a more
integrated setting. Indeed in Louisville itself the achievement gap
between black and white elementary school students grew
substantially smaller (by seven percentage points) after the
integration plan was implemented in 1975. See Powell 35.
Conversely, to take another example, evidence from a district in
Norfolk, Virginia, shows that resegregated schools led to a decline
in the achievement test scores of children of all races.
Ibid.
One commentator, reviewing dozens of studies
of the educational benefits of desegregated schooling, found that
the studies have provided “remarkably consistent” results, showing
that: (1) black students’ educational achievement is improved in
integrated schools as compared to racially isolated schools, (2)
black students’ educational achievement is improved in integrated
classes, and (3) the earlier that black students are removed from
racial isolation, the better their educational outcomes. See
Hallinan 741–742. Multiple studies also indicate that black alumni
of integrated schools are more likely to move into occupations
traditionally closed to African-Americans, and to earn more money
in those fields. See,
e.g., Schofield, Review of Research
on School Desegregation’s Impact on Elementary and Secondary School
Students, in Handbook of Research on Multicultural Education 597,
606–607 (J. Banks & C. Banks eds. 1995). Cf. W. Bowen & D.
Bok, The Shape of the River 118 (1998) (hereinafter Bowen &
Bok).
Third, there is a democratic element: an
interest in producing an educational environment that reflects the
“pluralistic society” in which our children will live.
Swann, 402 U. S., at 16. It is an interest in helping our
children learn to work and play together with children of different
racial backgrounds. It is an interest in teaching children to
engage in the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that
is necessary to make a land of three hundred million people one
Nation.
Again, data support this insight. See,
e.g., Hallinan 745; Quillian & Campbell, Beyond Black
and White: The Present and Future of Multiracial Friendship
Segregation, 68 Am. Sociological Rev. 540, 541 (2003) (hereinafter
Quillian & Campbell); Dawkins & Braddock, The Continuing
Significance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and
African American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. Negro Ed.
394, 401–403 (1994) (hereinafter Dawkins & Braddock); Wells
& Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of
School Desegregation, 64 Rev. Educational Research 531, 550 (1994)
(hereinafter Wells & Crain).
There are again studies that offer contrary
conclusions. See,
e.g., Schofield, School Desegregation
and Intergroup Relations, in 17 Review of Research in Education 356
(G. Grant ed. 1991). See also
ante, at 22–23 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Again, however, the evidence supporting a democratic
interest in racially integrated schools is firmly established and
sufficiently strong to permit a school board to determine, as this
Court has itself often found, that this interest is compelling.
For example, one study documented that “black
and white students in desegregated schools are less racially
prejudiced than those in segregated schools,” and that “interracial
contact in desegregated schools leads to an increase in interracial
sociability and friendship.” Hallinan 745. See also Quillian &
Campbell 541. Cf. Bowen & Bok 155. Other studies have found
that both black and white students who attend integrated schools
are more likely to work in desegregated companies after graduation
than students who attended racially isolated schools. Dawkins &
Braddock 401–403; Wells & Crain 550. Further research has shown
that the desegregation of schools can help bring adult communities
together by reducing segregated housing. Cities that have
implemented successful school desegregation plans have witnessed
increased interracial contact and neighborhoods that tend to become
less racially segregated. Dawkins & Braddock 403. These effects
not only reinforce the prior gains of integrated primary and
secondary education; they also foresee a time when there is less
need to use race-conscious criteria.
Moreover, this Court from
Swann to
Grutter has treated these civic effects as an important
virtue of racially diverse education. See,
e.g.,
Swann,
supra, at 16;
Seattle School Dist. No.
1, 458 U. S., at 472–473. In
Grutter, in the context
of law school admissions, we found that these types of interests
were, constitutionally speaking, “compelling.” See 539 U. S., at
330 (recognizing that Michigan Law School’s race-conscious
admissions policy “promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to
break down racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races,” and pointing out that “the
skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only
be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints” (internal quotation marks omitted;
alteration in original)).
In light of this Court’s conclusions in
Grutter, the “compelling” nature of these interests in the
context of primary and secondary public education follows here
a fortiori. Primary and secondary schools are where the
education of this Nation’s children begins, where each of us begins
to absorb those values we carry with us to the end of our days. As
Justice Marshall said, “unless our children begin to learn
together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to
live together.”
Milliken v.
Bradley,
418 U. S. 717, 783
(1974) (dissenting opinion).
And it was
Brown, after all, focusing
upon primary and secondary schools, not
Sweatt v.
Painter,
339 U. S. 629 (1950),
focusing on law schools, or
McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State
Regents for Higher Ed.,
339 U. S. 637 (1950),
focusing on graduate schools, that affected so deeply not only
Americans but the world. R. Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of
Brown v.
Board of Education and Black America’s
Struggle for Equality, p. x (1975) (arguing that perhaps no other
Supreme Court case has “affected more directly the minds, hearts,
and daily lives of so many Americans”); Patterson,
Brown
v.
Board of Education xxvii (2001) (identifying
Brown as “the most eagerly awaited and dramatic judicial
decision of modern times”). See also
Parents Involved VII,
426 F. 3d, at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring); Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 935, 937 (1989) (calling
Brown “the Supreme
Court’s greatest anti-discrimination decision”); Brief for United
States as
Amicus Curiae in
Brown, 347
U. S. 483; Dudziak,
Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J.
Am. Hist. 32 (2004); A Great Decision, Hindustan Times (New Dehli,
May 20, 1954), p. 5; USA Takes Positive Step, West African
Pilot (Lagos, May 22, 1954), p. 2 (stating that
Brown is
an acknowledgment that the “United States should set an example for
all other nations by taking the lead in removing from its national
life all signs and traces of racial intolerance, arrogance or
discrimination”). Hence, I am not surprised that Justice Kennedy
finds that, “a district may consider it a compelling interest to
achieve a diverse student population,” including a
racially diverse population.
Ante, at 17–18.
The compelling interest at issue here, then,
includes an effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general
“societal discrimination,”
ante, at 23 (plurality
opinion), but of primary and secondary school segregation, see
supra, at 7, 14; it includes an effort to create school
environments that provide better educational opportunities for all
children; it includes an effort to help create citizens better
prepared to know, to understand, and to work with people of all
races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of democratic
government our Constitution foresees. If an educational interest
that combines these three elements is not “compelling,” what
is?
The majority acknowledges that in prior cases
this Court has recognized at least two interests as compelling: an
interest in “remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination,” and an interest in “diversity in higher
education.”
Ante, at 12, 13. But the plurality does not
convincingly explain why those interests do not constitute a
“compelling interest” here. How do the remedial interests here
differ in kind from those at issue in the voluntary desegregation
efforts that Attorney General Kennedy many years ago described in
his letter to the President?
Supra, at 19–20. How do the
educational and civic interests differ in kind from those that
underlie and justify the racial “diversity” that the law school
sought in
Grutter, where this Court found a compelling
interest?
The plurality tries to draw a distinction by
reference to the well-established conceptual difference between
de jure segregation (“segregation by state action”) and
de facto segregation (“racial imbalance caused by other
factors”).
Ante, at 28. But that distinction concerns what
the Constitution
requires school boards to do, not what it
permits them to do. Compare,
e.g.,
Green, 391 U. S., at 437–438 (“School boards … operating
state-compelled dual systems” have an “affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch”),
with,
e.g.,
Milliken, 418 U. S., at 745 (the
Constitution does not impose a duty to desegregate upon districts
that have not been “shown to have committed any constitutional
violation”).
The opinions cited by the plurality to justify
its reliance upon the
de jure/de facto distinction only
address what remedial measures a school district may be
constitutionally
required to undertake. See,
e.g.,
Freeman v.
Pitts,
503 U. S. 467, 495
(1992). As to what is
permitted, nothing in our equal
protection law suggests that a State may right only those wrongs
that it committed. No case of this Court has ever relied upon the
de jure/de facto distinction in order to limit what a
school district is voluntarily allowed to do. That is what is at
issue here. And
Swann,
McDaniel, Crawford,
North Carolina Bd. of Ed.,
Harris, and
Bustop made one thing clear: significant as the difference
between
de jure and
de facto segregation may be
to the question of what a school district
must do, that
distinction is not germane to the question of what a school
district
may do.
Nor does any precedent indicate, as the
plurality suggests with respect to Louisville,
ante, at
29, that remedial interests vanish the day after a federal court
declares that a district is “unitary.” Of course, Louisville
adopted those portions of the plan at issue here
before a
court declared Louisville “unitary.” Moreover, in
Freeman,
this Court pointed out that in “one sense of the term, vestiges of
past segregation by state decree do remain in our society and in
our schools. Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the
State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history. And stubborn
facts of history linger and persist.” 503 U. S., at 495. See also
ante, at 15 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). I do not understand
why this Court’s cases, which rest the significance of a “unitary”
finding in part upon the wisdom and desirability of returning
schools to local control, should deprive those local officials of
legal
permission to use means they once found necessary to
combat persisting injustices.
For his part, Justice Thomas faults my
citation of various studies supporting the view that school
districts can find compelling educational and civic interests in
integrating their public schools. See
ante, at 15–17, 23
(concurring opinion). He is entitled of course to his own opinion
as to which studies he finds convincing—although it bears mention
that even the author of some of Justice Thomas’ preferred studies
has found
some evidence linking integrated learning
environments to increased academic achievement. Cf.
ante,
at 15–17 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (citing Armor & Rossell,
Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in Beyond
the Color Line 239 (A. Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom eds. 2002);
Brief for Armor
et al. as
Amici Curiae, with
Rosen, Perhaps Not All Affirmative Action is Created Equal,
N. Y. Times, June 11, 2006 (quoting David Armor as commenting
“ ‘[w]e did find the [racial] achievement gap changing
significantly’ ” and acknowledging that he
“ ‘did find a modest association for math but not reading in
terms of racial composition and achievement, but there’s a big
state variation’ ” (emphasis added)). If we are to insist upon
unanimity in the social science literature before finding a
compelling interest, we might never find one. I believe only that
the Constitution allows democratically elected school boards to
make up their own minds as to how best to include people of all
races in one America.
B
Narrow Tailoring
I next ask whether the plans
before us are “narrowly tailored” to achieve these “compelling”
objectives. I shall not accept the school board’s assurances on
faith, cf. Miller v.
Johnson,
515 U. S. 900, 920
(1995), and I shall subject the “tailoring” of their plans to
“rigorous judicial review.”
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 388
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Several factors, taken together,
nonetheless lead me to conclude that the boards’ use of
race-conscious criteria in these plans passes even the strictest
“tailoring” test.
First, the race-conscious
criteria at issue only help set the outer bounds of
broad
ranges. Cf.
id., at 390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern about “narrow fluctuation band[s]”). They
constitute but one part of plans that depend primarily upon other,
nonracial elements. To use race in this way is not to set a
forbidden “quota.” See
id., at 335 (“Properly understood,
a ‘quota’ is a program in which a certain fixed number or
proportion of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively for certain
minority groups’ ” (quoting
Croson, 488 U. S., at
496)).
In fact, the defining feature of both plans is
greater emphasis upon student choice. In Seattle, for example, in
more than 80% of all cases, that choice alone determines which high
schools Seattle’s ninth graders will attend. After ninth grade,
students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred district
high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria).
Choice, therefore, is the “predominant factor” in these
plans.
Race is not. See
Grutter,
supra,
at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (allowing consideration of race
only if it does “not become a predominant factor”).
Indeed, the race-conscious ranges at issue in
these cases often have no effect, either because the particular
school is not oversubscribed in the year in question, or because
the racial makeup of the school falls within the broad range, or
because the student is a transfer applicant or has a sibling at the
school. In these respects, the broad ranges are less like a quota
and more like the kinds of “useful starting points” that this Court
has consistently found permissible, even when they set boundaries
upon voluntary transfers, and even when they are based upon a
community’s general population. See,
e.g.,
North
Carolina Bd. of Ed. v.
Swann,
402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971) (no “absolute
prohibition against [the] use” of mathematical ratios as a
“starting point”);
Swann, 402 U. S., at 24–25 (approving
the use of a ratio reflecting “the racial composition of the whole
school system” as a “useful starting point,” but not as an
“inflexible requirement”). Cf.
United States v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Ed.,
395 U. S. 225, 232
(1969) (approving a lower court desegregation order that “provided
that the [school] board must move toward a goal under which ‘in
each school the ratio of white to Negro faculty members is
substantially the same as it is throughout the system,’ ” and
“immediately” requiring “[t]he ratio of Negro to white teachers” in
each school to be equal to “the ratio of Negro to white teachers in
… the system as a whole”).
Second, broad-range limits on voluntary school
choice plans are less burdensome, and hence more narrowly tailored,
see
Grutter, supra, at 341, than other race-conscious
restrictions this Court has previously approved. See,
e.g.,
Swann,
supra, at 26–27;
Montgomery Co. Bd. of Ed.,
supra, at 232. Indeed,
the plans before us are
more narrowly tailored than the
race-conscious admission plans that this Court approved in
Grutter. Here, race becomes a factor only in a fraction of
students’ non-merit-based assignments—not in large numbers of
students’ merit-based applications. Moreover, the effect of
applying race-conscious criteria here affects potentially
disadvantaged students
less severely, not more
severely, than the criteria at issue in
Grutter.
Disappointed students are not rejected from a State’s flagship
graduate program; they simply attend a different one of the
district’s many public schools, which in aspiration and in fact are
substantially equal. Cf.
Wygant, 476 U. S., at 283. And,
in Seattle, the disadvantaged student loses at most one year at the
high school of his choice. One will search
Grutter in vain
for similarly persuasive evidence of narrow tailoring as the school
districts have presented here.
Third, the manner in which the school boards
developed these plans itself reflects “narrow tailoring.” Each plan
was devised to overcome a history of segregated public schools.
Each plan embodies the results of local experience and community
consultation. Each plan is the product of a process that has sought
to enhance student choice, while diminishing the need for mandatory
busing. And each plan’s use of race-conscious elements is
diminished compared to the use of race in preceding
integration plans.
The school boards’ widespread consultation,
their experimentation with numerous other plans, indeed, the
40-year history that Part I sets forth, make clear that plans that
are less explicitly race-based are unlikely to achieve the board’s
“compelling” objectives. The history of each school system reveals
highly segregated schools, followed by remedial plans that involved
forced busing, followed by efforts to attract or retain students
through the use of plans that abandoned busing and replaced it with
greater student choice. Both cities once tried to achieve more
integrated schools by relying solely upon measures such as redrawn
district boundaries, new school building construction, and
unrestricted voluntary transfers. In neither city did these prior
attempts prove sufficient to achieve the city’s integration goals.
See Parts I–A and I–B,
supra, at 6–18
.
Moreover, giving some degree of weight to a
local school board’s knowledge, expertise, and concerns in these
particular matters is not inconsistent with rigorous judicial
scrutiny. It simply recognizes that judges are not well suited to
act as school administrators. Indeed, in the context of school
desegregation, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
acknowledging that local school boards better understand their own
communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will
best meet the educational needs of their pupils. See
Milliken, 418 U. S., at 741–42 (“No single tradition in
public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support
for public schools and to quality of the educational process”). See
also
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez,
411 U. S. 1, 49–50 (1973)
(extolling local control for “the opportunity it offers for
participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how . .
. local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor
local programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence”);
Epperson v.
Arkansas,
393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968)
(“Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school
system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint.
. . . By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to
the control of state and local authorities”);
Brown v.
Board of Education,
349 U. S. 294, 299
(1955)
(Brown II) (“Full implementation of these
constitutional principles may require solution of varied local
school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will
have to consider whether the action of school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles”).
Experience in Seattle and Louisville is
consistent with experience elsewhere. In 1987, the U. S. Commission
on Civil Rights studied 125 large school districts seeking
integration. It reported that most districts—92 of them, in
fact—adopted desegregation policies that combined two or more
highly race-conscious strategies, for example, rezoning or pairing.
See Welch 83–91.
Having looked at dozens of
amicus
briefs, public reports, news stories, and the records in many of
this Court’s prior cases, which together span 50 years of
desegregation history in school districts across the Nation, I have
discovered many examples of districts that sought integration
through explicitly race-conscious methods, including mandatory
busing. Yet, I have found
no example or model that would
permit this Court to say to Seattle and to Louisville: “Here is an
instance of a desegregation plan that is likely to achieve your
objectives and also makes less use of race-conscious criteria than
your plans.” And, if the plurality cannot suggest such a model—and
it cannot—then it seeks to impose a “narrow tailoring” requirement
that in practice would never be met.
Indeed, if there is no such plan, or if such
plans are purely imagined, it is understandable why, as the
plurality notes,
ante, at 27, Seattle school officials
concentrated on diminishing the racial component of their
districts’ plan, but did not pursue eliminating that element
entirely. For the plurality now to insist as it does,
ante, at 27–28, that these school districts ought to have
said so officially is either to ask for the superfluous (if they
need only make explicit what is implicit) or to demand the
impossible (if they must somehow provide more proof that there is
no hypothetical
other plan that could work as well as
theirs). I am not aware of any case in which this Court has read
the “narrow tailoring” test to impose such a requirement. Cf.
People Who Care v.
Rockford Bd. of Ed. School Dist.
No. 205, 961 F. 2d 1335, 1338 (CA7 1992) (Easterbrook,
J.) (“Would it be necessary to adjudicate the obvious before
adopting (or permitting the parties to agree on) a remedy . . .
?”).
The plurality also points to the school
districts’ use of numerical goals based upon the racial breakdown
of the general school population, and it faults the districts for
failing to prove that
no other set of numbers will work.
See
ante, at 18–20. The plurality refers to no case in
support of its demand. Nor is it likely to find such a case. After
all, this Court has in many cases explicitly permitted districts to
use target ratios based upon the district’s underlying population.
See,
e.g.,
Swann, 402 U. S., at 24–25;
North
Carolina Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S., at 46;
Montgomery County
Bd. of Ed., 395 U. S., at 232. The reason is obvious: In
Seattle, where the overall student population is 41% white,
permitting 85% white enrollment at a single school would make it
much more likely that other schools would have very few white
students, whereas in Jefferson County, with a 60% white enrollment,
one school with 85% white students would be less likely to skew
enrollments elsewhere.
Moreover, there is research-based evidence
supporting, for example, that a ratio no greater than 50%
minority—which is Louisville’s starting point, and as close as
feasible to Seattle’s starting point—is helpful in limiting the
risk of “white flight.” See Orfield, Metropolitan School
Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, in Pursuit of a
Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy 121, 125.
Federal law also assumes that a similar target percentage will help
avoid detrimental “minority group isolation.” See No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, Title V, Part C, 115 Stat. 1806, 20 U.
S. C. §7231
et seq. (2000 ed., Supp. IV); 34 CFR
§§280.2, 280.4 (2006) (implementing regulations). What other
numbers are the boards to use as a “starting point”? Are they to
spend days, weeks, or months seeking independently to validate the
use of ratios that this Court has repeatedly authorized in prior
cases? Are they to draw numbers out of thin air? These districts
have followed this Court’s holdings and advice in “tailoring” their
plans. That, too, strongly supports the lawfulness of their
methods.
Nor could the school districts have
accomplished their desired aims (
e.g., avoiding forced
busing, countering white flight, maintaining racial diversity) by
other means. Nothing in the extensive history of desegregation
efforts over the past 50 years gives the districts, or this Court,
any reason to believe that another method is possible to accomplish
these goals. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy suggests that school
boards:
“may pursue the goal of bringing together students
of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods;
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and
faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments,
performance, and other statistics by race.”
Ante, at
8.
But, as to “strategic site selection,” Seattle has
built one new high school in the last 44 years (and that
specialized school serves only 300 students). In fact, six of the
Seattle high schools involved in this case were built by the
1920’s; the other four were open by the early 1960’s. See generally
N. Thompson & C. Marr, Building for Learning: Seattle Public
Schools Histories, 1862–2000 (2002). As to “drawing” neighborhood
“attendance zones” on a racial basis, Louisville tried it, and it
worked only when forced busing was also part of the plan. See
supra, at 12–14. As to “allocating resources for special
programs,” Seattle and Louisville have both experimented with this;
indeed, these programs are often referred to as “magnet schools,”
but the limited desegregation effect of these efforts extends at
most to those few schools to which additional resources are
granted. In addition, there is no evidence from the experience of
these school districts that it will make any meaningful impact. See
Brief for Respondents in No. 05–908, p. 42. As to “recruiting
faculty” on the basis of race, both cities have tried, but only as
one part of a broader program. As to “tracking enrollments,
performance and other statistics by race,” tracking
reveals the problem; it does not cure it.
Justice Kennedy sets forth two
additional concerns related to “narrow tailoring.” In respect to
Louisville, he says first that officials stated (1) that
kindergarten assignments are not subject to the race-conscious
guidelines, and (2) that the child at issue here was denied
permission to attend the kindergarten he wanted because of those
guidelines. Both, he explains, cannot be true. He adds that this
confusion illustrates that Louisville’s assignment plan (or its
explanation of it to this Court) is insufficiently precise in
respect to “who makes the decisions,” “oversight,” “the precise
circumstances in which an assignment decision” will be made; and
“which of two similarly situated children will be subjected to a
given race-based decision.”
Ante, at 4.
The record suggests, however, that the child
in question was not assigned to the school he preferred because he
missed the kindergarten application deadline. See App. in 05–915,
p. 20. After he had enrolled and after the academic year had begun,
he then applied to transfer to his preferred school after the
kindergarten assignment deadline had passed,
id., at 21,
possibly causing school officials to treat his late request as an
application to transfer to the first grade, in respect to which the
guidelines apply. I am not certain just how the remainder of
Justice Kennedy’s concerns affect the lawfulness of the Louisville
program, for they seem to be failures of explanation, not of
administration. But Louisville should be able to answer the
relevant questions on remand.
Justice Kennedy’s second concern is directly
related to the merits of Seattle’s plan: Why does Seattle’s plan
group Asian-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans, and
African-Americans together, treating all as similar minorities?
Ante, at 6–7. The majority suggests that Seattle’s
classification system could permit a school to be labeled “diverse”
with a 50% Asian-American and 50% white student body, and no
African-American students, Hispanic students, or students of other
ethnicity.
Ante, at 6;
ante, at 15–16 (opinion of
the Court).
The 50/50 hypothetical has no support in the
record here; it is conjured from the imagination. In fact, Seattle
apparently began to treat these different minority groups alike in
response to the federal Emergency School Aid Act’s requirement that
it do so. Siqueland 116–117. See also Hanawalt 31; Pub. L. 95–561,
Tit. VI (1978) (prescribing percentage enrollment requirements for
“minority” students); Siqueland 55 (discussing HEW definition of
“minority”). Moreover, maintaining this federally mandated system
of classification makes sense insofar as Seattle’s experience
indicates that the relevant circumstances in respect to each of
these different minority groups are roughly similar,
e.g.,
in terms of residential patterns, and call for roughly similar
responses. This is confirmed by the fact that Seattle has been able
to achieve a desirable degree of diversity without the
greater emphasis on race that drawing fine lines among
minority groups would require. Does the plurality’s view of the
Equal Protection Clause mean that courts must give no weight to
such a board determination? Does it insist upon especially strong
evidence supporting inclusion of multiple minority groups in an
otherwise lawful government minority-assistance program? If so, its
interpretation threatens to produce divisiveness among minority
groups that is incompatible with the basic objectives of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Regardless, the plurality cannot object that
the constitutional defect is the individualized use of race and
simultaneously object that not enough account of individuals’ race
has been taken.
Finally, I recognize that the Court seeks to
distinguish
Grutter from these cases by claiming that
Grutter arose in “ ‘the context of higher
education.’ ”
Ante, at 16. But that is not a
meaningful legal distinction. I have explained why I do not believe
the Constitution could possibly find “compelling” the provision of
a racially diverse education for a 23-year-old law student but not
for a 13-year-old high school pupil. See
supra, at 46–48.
And I have explained how the plans before us are more narrowly
tailored than those in
Grutter. See
supra, at 45.
I add that one cannot find a relevant distinction in the fact that
these school districts did not examine the merits of applications
“individual[ly].” See
ante, at 13–15. The context here
does not involve admission by merit; a child’s academic, artistic,
and athletic “merits” are not at all relevant to the child’s
placement. These are not affirmative action plans, and hence
“individualized scrutiny” is simply beside the point.
The upshot is that these plans’ specific
features—(1) their limited and historically-diminishing use of
race, (2) their strong reliance upon other non-race-conscious
elements, (3) their history and the manner in which the districts
developed and modified their approach, (4) the comparison with
prior plans, and (5) the lack of reasonably evident
alternatives—together show that the districts’ plans are “narrowly
tailored” to achieve their “compelling” goals. In sum, the
districts’ race-conscious plans satisfy “strict scrutiny” and are
therefore lawful.
IV
Direct Precedent
Two additional precedents
more directly related to the plans here at issue reinforce my
conclusion. The first consists of the District Court determination
in the Louisville case when it dissolved its desegregation order
that there was “overwhelming evidence of the Board’s good faith
compliance with the desegregation Decree and its underlying
purposes,” indeed that the Board had “treated the ideal of an
integrated system as much more than a legal obligation—they
consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element
of any well-rounded public school education.” Hampton II, 102
F. Supp. 2d, at 370. When the court made this determination in
2000, it did so in the context of the Louisville desegregation plan
that the board had adopted in 1996. That plan, which took effect
before 1996, is the very plan that in all relevant respects is in
effect now and is the subject of the present challenge.
No one claims that (the relevant
portion of) Louisville’s plan was unlawful in 1996 when Louisville
adopted it. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that
it represented part of an effort to implement the 1978
desegregation order. But if the plan was lawful when it was first
adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District Court
dissolved its order, how can the plurality now suggest that it
became
unlawful the following day? Is it conceivable that
the Constitution, implemented through a court desegregation order,
could permit (perhaps
require) the district to make use of
a race-conscious plan the day before the order was dissolved and
then
forbid the district to use the identical plan the day
after? See
id., at 380 (“The very analysis for dissolving
desegregation decrees supports continued maintenance of a
desegregated system as a compelling state interest”). The Equal
Protection Clause is not incoherent. And federal courts would
rightly hesitate to find unitary status if the consequences of the
ruling were so dramatically disruptive.
Second,
Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
458
U. S. 457, is directly on point. That case involves the
original Seattle Plan, a
more heavily race-conscious
predecessor of the very plan now before us. In
Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, this Court struck down a state referendum
that effectively barred implementation of Seattle’s desegregation
plan and “burden[ed] all future attempts to integrate Washington
schools in districts throughout the State.”
Id., at
462–463, 483. Because the referendum would have prohibited the
adoption of a school-integration plan that involved mandatory
busing, and because it would have imposed a special burden on
school integration plans (plans that sought to integrate previously
segregated schools), the Court found it unconstitutional.
Id., at 483–487.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not
directly address the constitutional merits of the underlying
Seattle plan. But it explicitly cited
Swann’s statement
that the Constitution permitted a local district to adopt such a
plan. 458 U. S., at 472, n. 15. It also cited to Justice
Powell’s opinion in
Bakke,
approving of the
limited use of race-conscious criteria in a university-admissions
“affirmative action” case. 458 U. S., at 472, n. 15
. In
addition, the Court stated that “[a]ttending an ethnically diverse
school,”
id., at 473, could help prepare “minority
children for citizenship in our pluralistic society,” hopefully
“teaching members of the racial majority to live in harmony and
mutual respect with children of minority heritage.”
Ibid.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is difficult to believe that the Court that
held unconstitutional a referendum that would have interfered with
the implementation of this plan thought that the integration plan
it sought to preserve was itself an
unconstitutional plan.
And if
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 is premised upon the
constitutionality of the original Seattle Plan, it is equally
premised upon the constitutionality of the present plan, for the
present plan
is the Seattle Plan, modified only insofar as
it places even
less emphasis on race-conscious elements
than its predecessors.
It is even more difficult to accept the
plurality’s contrary view, namely that the underlying plan was
unconstitutional. If that is so, then
all of Seattle’s
earlier (even more race-conscious) plans must also have been
unconstitutional. That necessary implication of the plurality’s
position strikes the 13th chime of the clock. How could the
plurality adopt a constitutional standard that would hold
unconstitutional large numbers of race-conscious integration plans
adopted by numerous school boards over the past 50 years while
remaining true to this Court’s desegregation precedent?
V
Consequences
The Founders meant the
Constitution as a practical document that would transmit its basic
values to future generations through principles that remained
workable over time. Hence it is important to consider the potential
consequences of the plurality’s approach, as measured against the
Constitution’s objectives. To do so provides
further reason to believe that the plurality’s approach is legally
unsound.
For one thing, consider the
effect of the plurality’s views on the parties before us and on
similar school districts throughout the Nation. Will Louisville and
all similar school districts have to return to systems like
Louisville’s initial 1956 plan, which did not consider race at all?
See supra, at 12. That initial 1956 plan proved ineffective.
Sixteen years into the plan, 14 of 19 middle and high schools
remained almost totally white or almost totally black.
Ibid.
The districts’ past and current plans are not
unique. They resemble other plans, promulgated by hundreds of local
school boards, which have attempted a variety of desegregation
methods that have evolved over time in light of experience. A 1987
Civil Rights Commission Study of 125 school districts in the Nation
demonstrated the breadth and variety of desegregation plans:
“The [study] documents almost 300
desegregation plans that were implemented between 1961 and 1985.
The degree of heterogeneity within these districts is immediately
apparent. They are located in every region of the country and range
in size from Las Cruces, New Mexico, with barely over 15,000
students attending 23 schools in 1968, to New York City, with more
than one million students in 853 schools. The sample includes
districts in urban areas of all sizes, suburbs (
e.g.,
Arlington County, Virginia) and rural areas (
e.g.,
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and Raleigh County, West Virginia). It
contains 34 countywide districts with central cities (the 11
Florida districts fit this description, plus Clark County, Nevada
and others) and a small number of consolidated districts (New
Castle County, Delaware and Jefferson County, Kentucky).
“The districts also vary in their racial
compositions and levels of segregation. Initial plans were
implemented in Mobile, Alabama and Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina, and in a number of other southern districts in the face
of total racial segregation. At the other extreme, Santa Clara,
California had a relatively even racial distribution prior to its
1979 desegregation plan. When the 1965 plan was designed for
Harford County, Maryland, the district was 92 percent white.
Compton, California, on the other hand, became over 99 percent
black in the 1980s, while Buffalo, New York had a virtual 50–50
split between white and minority students prior to its 1977
plan.
“It is not surprising to find a large number
of different desegregation strategies in a sample with this much
variation.” Welch 23 (footnotes omitted).
A majority of these desegregation techniques
explicitly considered a student’s race. See
id., at 24–28.
Transfer plans, for example, allowed students to shift from a
school in which they were in the racial majority to a school in
which they would be in a racial minority. Some districts, such as
Richmond, California, and Buffalo, New York, permitted only
“one-way” transfers, in which only black students attending
predominantly black schools were permitted to transfer to
designated receiver schools.
Id., at 25. Fifty-three of
the 125 studied districts used transfers as a component of their
plans.
Id., at 83–91.
At the state level, 46 States and
Puerto Rico have adopted policies that encourage or require local
school districts to enact interdistrict or intradistrict open
choice plans. Eight of those States condition approval of transfers
to another school or district on whether the transfer will produce
increased racial integration. Eleven other States require local
boards to deny transfers that are not in compliance with the local
school board’s desegre- gation plans. See Education Commission of
the States, Open Enrollment: 50-State Report (2007), online at
http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=268.
Arkansas, for example, provides by statute
that “[n]o student may transfer to a nonresident district where the
percentage of enrollment for the student’s race exceeds that
percentage in the student’s resident district.” Ark. Code Ann.
§6–18–206(f)(1), as amended 2007 Ark. Gen. Acts 552 (2007). An Ohio
statute provides, in respect to student choice, that each school
district must establish “[p]rocedures to ensure that an appropriate
racial balance is maintained in the district schools.” Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §3313.98(B)(2)(b)(iii) (Lexis Supp. 2006). Ohio adds that
a “district may object to the enrollment of a native student in an
adjacent or other district in order to maintain an appropriate
racial balance.” §3313.98 (F)(1)(a).
A Connecticut statute states that its student
choice program will seek to “preserve racial and ethnic balance.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. §10–266aa(b)(2) (2007). Connecticut law requires
each school district to submit racial group population figures to
the State Board of Education. §10–226a. Another Connecticut
regulation provides that “[a]ny school in which the Proportion for
the School falls outside of a range from 25 percentage points less
to 25 percentage points more than the Comparable Proportion for the
School District, shall be determined to be racially imbalanced.”
Conn. Agencies Regs. §10–226e–3(b) (1999). A “racial imbalance”
determination requires the district to submit a plan to correct the
racial imbalance, which plan may include “mandatory pupil
reassignment.” §§10–226e–5(a) and (c)(4).
Interpreting that State’s Constitution, the
Connecticut Supreme Court has held legally inadequate the reliance
by a local school district solely upon some of the techniques
Justice Kennedy today recommends (
e.g., reallocating
resources, etc.). See
Sheff v.
O’Neill, 238 Conn.
1, 678 A. 2d 1267 (1996). The State Supreme Court wrote:
“Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate
the severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts,
and despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to create
or maintain these disparities, the disparities that continue to
burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their
fundamental state constitutional right to a substantially equal
educational opportunity.”
Id., at 42, 678 A. 2d, at
1289.
At a minimum, the plurality’s views would
threaten a surge of race-based litigation. Hundreds of state and
federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications for
educational or other purposes. See
supra, at 27. In many
such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges to these
classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier
calm.
The wide variety of different integration
plans that school districts use throughout the Nation suggests that
the problem of racial segregation in schools, including
de
facto segregation, is difficult to solve. The fact that many
such plans have used explicitly racial criteria suggests that such
criteria have an important, sometimes necessary, role to play. The
fact that the controlling opinion would make a school district’s
use of such criteria often unlawful (and the plurality’s
“colorblind” view would make such use always unlawful) suggests
that today’s opinion will require setting aside the laws of several
States and many local communities.
As I have pointed out,
supra, at 4,
de facto resegregation is on the rise. See Appendix A,
infra. It is reasonable to conclude that such
resegregation can create serious educational, social, and civic
problems. See
supra, at 37–45. Given the conditions in
which school boards work to set policy, see
supra, at
20–21, they may need all of the means presently at their disposal
to combat those problems. Yet the plurality would deprive them of
at least one tool that some districts now consider vital—the
limited use of broad race-conscious student population ranges.
I use the words “may need” here deliberately.
The plurality, or at least those who follow Justice Thomas’
“ ‘color-blind’ ” approach, see
ante, at 26–27
(Thomas, J., concurring);
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 353–354
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), may feel
confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end
all governmental use of race-conscious criteria including
those with inclusive objectives. See
ante, at 40–41
(plurality opinion); see also
ante, at 26 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how best to
stop harmful discrimination; how best to create a society that
includes all Americans; how best to overcome our serious problems
of increasing
de facto segregation, troubled inner city
schooling, and poverty correlated with race. But, as a judge, I do
know that the Constitution does not authorize judges to dictate
solutions to these problems. Rather, the Constitution creates a
democratic political system through which the people themselves
must together find answers. And it is for them to debate how best
to educate the Nation’s children and how best to administer
America’s schools to achieve that aim. The Court should leave them
to their work. And it is for them to decide, to quote the
plurality’s slogan, whether the best “way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”
Ante, at 40–41. See also
Parents Involved VII,
426 F. 3d, at 1222 (Bea, J., dissenting) (“The way to end
racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by race”). That is
why the Equal Protection Clause outlaws invidious discrimination,
but does not similarly forbid all use of race-conscious
criteria.
Until today, this Court understood the
Constitution as affording the people, acting through their elected
representatives, freedom to select the use of “race-conscious”
criteria from among their available options. See
Adarand
Constructors, Inc., 515 U. S., at 237 (“[S]trict scrutiny” in
this context is “[not] ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’ ”
(quoting
Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 519 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment))). Today, however, the Court restricts (and
some Members would eliminate) that leeway. I fear the consequences
of doing so for the law, for the schools, for the democratic
process, and for America’s efforts to create, out of its diversity,
one Nation.
VI
Conclusions
To show that the school
assignment plans here meet the requirements of the Constitution, I
have written at exceptional length. But that length is necessary. I
cannot refer to the history of the plans in these cases to justify
the use of race-conscious criteria without describing that history
in full. I cannot rely upon Swann’s statement that the use of
race-conscious limits is permissible without showing, rather than
simply asserting, that the statement represents a constitutional
principle firmly rooted in federal and state law. Nor can I explain
my disagreement with the Court’s holding and the plurality’s
opinion, without offering a detailed account of the arguments they
propound and the consequences they risk.
Thus, the opinion’s reasoning is
long. But its conclusion is short: The plans before us satisfy the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. And it is the
plurality’s opinion, not this dissent that “fails to ground the
result it would reach in law.”
Ante, at 28.
Four basic considerations have led me to this
view.
First, the histories of Louisville and Seattle
reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious
efforts by local school boards to resist racial segregation in
public schools. Segregation at the time of
Brown gave way
to expansive remedies that included busing, which in turn gave rise
to fears of white flight and resegregation. For decades now, these
school boards have considered and adopted and revised assignment
plans that sought to rely less upon race, to emphasize greater
student choice, and to improve the conditions of all schools for
all students, no matter the color of their skin, no matter where
they happen to reside. The plans under review—which are less
burdensome, more egalitarian, and more effective than prior
plans—continue in that tradition. And their history reveals school
district goals whose remedial, educational, and democratic elements
are inextricably intertwined each with the others. See Part I,
supra, at 2–21.
Second, since this Court’s decision in
Brown, the law has consistently and unequivocally approved
of both voluntary and compulsory race-conscious measures to combat
segregated schools. The Equal Protection Clause, ratified following
the Civil War, has always distinguished in practice between state
action that excludes and thereby subordinates racial minorities and
state action that seeks to bring together people of all races. From
Swann to
Grutter, this Court’s decisions have
emphasized this distinction, recognizing that the fate of race
relations in this country depends upon unity among our children,
“for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little
hope that our people will ever learn to live together.”
Milliken, 418 U. S., at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also C. Sumner, Equality Before the Law: Unconstitutionality of
Separate Colored Schools in Massachusetts, in 2 The Works of
Charles Sumner 327, 371 (1849) (“The law contemplates not only that
all be taught, but that all shall be taught together”). See Part
II,
supra, at 21–37.
Third, the plans before
us, subjected to rigorous judicial review, are supported by
compelling state interests and are narrowly tailored to accomplish
those goals. Just as diversity in higher education was deemed
compelling in
Grutter, diversity in public primary and
secondary schools—where there is even more to gain—must be,
a
fortiori, a compelling state interest. Even apart from
Grutter, five Members of this Court agree that “avoiding
racial isolation” and “achiev[ing] a diverse student population”
remain today compelling interests.
Ante, at 17–18 (opinion
of Kennedy, J.). These interests combine remedial, educational, and
democratic objectives. For the reasons discussed above, however, I
disagree with Justice Kennedy that Seattle and Louisville have not
done enough to demonstrate that their present plans are necessary
to continue upon the path set by
Brown. These plans are
more “narrowly tailored” than the race-conscious law
school admissions criteria at issue in
Grutter. Hence,
their lawfulness follows
a fortiori from this Court’s
prior decisions. See Parts III–IV,
supra, at 37–57.
Fourth, the plurality’s approach
risks serious harm to the law and for the Nation. Its view of the
law rests either upon a denial of the distinction between
exclusionary and inclusive use of race-conscious criteria in the
context of the Equal Protection Clause, or upon such a rigid
application of its “test” that the distinction loses practical
significance. Consequently, the Court’s decision today slows down
and sets back the work of local school boards to bring about
racially diverse schools. See Part V,
supra, at 57–63.
Indeed, the consequences of the approach the
Court takes today are serious. Yesterday, the plans under review
were lawful. Today, they are not. Yesterday, the citizens of this
Nation could look for guidance to this Court’s unanimous
pronouncements concerning desegregation. Today, they cannot.
Yesterday, school boards had available to them a full range of
means to combat segregated schools. Today, they do not.
The Court’s decision undermines other basic
institutional principles as well. What has happened to
stare
decisis? The history of the plans before us, their educational
importance, their highly limited use of race—all these and
more—make clear that the compelling interest here is stronger than
in
Grutter. The plans here are more narrowly tailored than
the law school admissions program there at issue. Hence, applying
Grutter’s strict test, their lawfulness follows
a
fortiori. To hold to the contrary is to transform that test
from “strict” to “fatal in fact”—the very opposite of what
Grutter said. And what has happened to
Swann? To
McDaniel? To
Crawford? To
Harris? To
School Committee of Boston? To
Seattle School Dist.
No. 1? After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under
the plurality’s logic, be written out of the law.
And what of respect for democratic local
decisionmaking by States and school boards? For several decades
this Court has rested its public school decisions upon
Swann’s basic view that the Constitution grants local
school districts a significant degree of leeway where the inclusive
use of race-conscious criteria is at issue. Now localities will
have to cope with the difficult problems they face (including
resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary.
And what of law’s concern to diminish and
peacefully settle conflict among the Nation’s people? Instead of
accommodating different good-faith visions of our country and our
Constitution, today’s holding upsets settled expectations, creates
legal uncertainty, and threatens to produce considerable further
litigation, aggravating race-related conflict.
And what of the long history and moral vision
that the Fourteenth Amendment itself embodies? The plurality cites
in support those who argued in
Brown against segregation,
and Justice Thomas likens the approach that I have taken to that of
segregation’s defenders. See
ante, at 39–41 (plurality
opinion) (comparing Jim Crow segregation to Seattle and
Louisville’s integration polices);
ante, at 28–32 (Thomas,
J., concurring). But segregation policies did not simply tell
schoolchildren “where they could and could not go to school based
on the color of their skin,”
ante, at 40 (plurality
opinion); they perpetuated a caste system rooted in the
institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination.
The lesson of history, see
ante, at 39 (plurality
opinion), is not that efforts to continue racial segregation are
constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to achieve racial
integration. Indeed, it is a cruel distortion of history to compare
Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950’s to Louisville and Seattle in the
modern day—to equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to
attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald
(whose request to transfer to a school closer to home was initially
declined). This is not to deny that there is a cost in applying “a
state-mandated racial label.”
Ante, at 17 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But that cost does
not approach, in degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery,
the resulting caste system, and 80 years of legal racial
segregation.
* * *
Finally, what of the hope and
promise of
Brown? For much of this Nation’s history, the
races remained divided. It was not long ago that people of
different races drank from separate fountains, rode on separate
buses, and studied in separate schools. In this Court’s finest
hour,
Brown v.
Board of Education challenged this
history and helped to change it. For
Brown held out a
promise. It was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to
make citizens of slaves. It was the promise of true racial
equality—not as a matter of fine words on paper, but as a matter of
everyday life in the Nation’s cities and schools. It was about the
nature of a democracy that must work for all Americans. It sought
one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a matter of legal
principle but in terms of how we actually live.
Not everyone welcomed this
Court’s decision in
Brown. Three years after that decision
was handed down, the Governor of Arkansas ordered state militia to
block the doors of a white schoolhouse so that black children could
not enter. The President of the United States dispatched the 101st
Airborne Division to Little Rock, Arkansas, and federal troops were
needed to enforce a desegregation decree. See
Cooper v.
Aaron,
358 U.
S. 1 (1958). Today, almost 50 years later, attitudes toward
race in this Nation have changed dramatically. Many parents, white
and black alike, want their children to attend schools with
children of different races. Indeed, the very school districts that
once spurned integration now strive for it. The long history of
their efforts reveals the complexities and difficulties they have
faced. And in light of those challenges, they have asked us not to
take from their hands the instruments they have used to rid their
schools of racial segregation, instruments that they believe are
needed to overcome the problems of cities divided by race and
poverty. The plurality would decline their modest request.
The plurality is wrong to do so. The last
half-century has witnessed great strides toward racial equality,
but we have not yet realized the promise of
Brown. To
invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of
Brown. The plurality’s position, I fear, would break that
promise. This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come
to regret.
I must dissent.
APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF
Breyer, J.
A
Resegregation
Trends
Percentage of Black Students in
90–100 Percent Nonwhite and Majority Nonwhite Public Schools by
Region, 1950–1954 to 2000, Fall Enrollment
Region
1950–1954
1960–1961
1968
1972
1976
1980
1989
1999
2000
Percentage in 90–100%
Nonwhite Schools
Northeast
—
40
42.7
46.9
51.4
48.7
49.8
50.2
51.2
Border
100
59
60.2
54.7
42.5
37.0
33.7
39.7
39.6
South
100
100
77.8
24.7
22.4
23.0
26.0
31.1
30.9
Midwest
53
56
58.0
57.4
51.1
43.6
40.1
45.0
46.3
West
—
27
50.8
42.7
36.3
33.7
26.7
29.9
29.5
U.
S.
64.3
38.7
35.9
33.2
33.8
37.4
37.4
Percentage in
50–100% Nonwhite Schools
Northeast
—
62
66.8
69.9
72.5
79.9
75.4
77.5
78.3
Border
100
69
71.6
67.2
60.1
59.2
58.0
64.8
67.0
South
100
100
80.9
55.3
54.9
57.1
59.3
67.3
69.0
Midwest
78
80
77.3
75.3
70.3
69.5
69.4
67.9
73.3
West
—
69
72.2
68.1
67.4
66.8
67.4
76.7
75.3
U. S.
76.6
63.6
62.4
62.9
64.9
70.1
71.6
Source: C. Clotfelter, After Brown: The
Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation 56 (2004) (Table
2.1).
Changes in the Percentage of White Students in
Schools Attended by the Average Black Student by State, 1970–2003
(includes States with 5% or greater enrollment of black students in
1970 and 1980)
%
White
% White Students in School of Average
Black Student
Change
2003
1970
1980
1991
2003
1970–1980
1980–1991
1991–2003
Alabama
60
33
38
35
30
5
-3
-5
Arkansas
70
43
47
44
36
4
-3
-8
California
33
26
28
27
22
2
-1
-5
Connecticut
68
44
40
35
32
-4
-5
-3
Delaware
57
47
69
65
49
22
-4
-16
Florida
51
43
51
43
34
8
-8
-9
Georgia
52
35
38
35
30
3
-3
-5
Illinois
57
15
19
20
19
4
1
-1
Indiana
82
32
39
47
41
7
8
-6
Kansas
76
52
59
58
51
7
-1
-7
Kentucky
87
49
74
42
65
25
-2
-7
Louisiana
48
31
33
32
27
2
-1
-5
Maryland
50
30
35
29
23
5
-6
-6
Massachusetts
75
48
50
45
38
2
-5
-7
Michigan
73
22
23
22
22
1
-1
0
Mississippi
47
30
29
30
26
-1
1
-4
Missouri
78
21
34
40
33
13
6
-7
Nebraska
80
33
66
62
49
33
-4
-13
New
Jersey
58
32
26
26
25
-6
0
-1
New
York
54
29
23
20
18
-6
-3
-2
Nevada
51
56
68
62
38
12
-6
-24
N.
Carolina
58
49
54
51
40
5
-3
-11
Ohio
79
28
43
41
32
15
-2
-9
Oklahoma
61
42
58
51
42
16
-7
-9
Pennsylvania
76
28
29
31
30
1
2
-1
S.
Carolina
54
41
43
42
39
2
-1
-3
Tennessee
73
29
38
36
32
9
-2
-4
Texas
39
31
35
35
27
4
0
-8
Virginia
61
42
47
46
41
5
-1
-5
Wisconsin
79
26
45
39
29
19
-6
-10
Source: G. Orfield & C.
Lee, Racial Transformation and the Changing Nature of Segregation
18 (Table 8) (Jan. 2006), (Civil Rights Project), online at
http://www.civilrightspro
ject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf.
Percentage of
White Students in Schools Attended by the Average Black Student,
1968–2000
[Graphic omitted; see
printed
opinion]
Source:
Modified from E. Frankenberg, C. Lee, & G. Orfield, A
Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the
Dream?, p. 30, fig. 5 (Jan. 2003), online at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/ research / reseg03 /Are WeLosingtheDream.pdf
(Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield) (using U. S. Dept. of Education
and National Center for Education Statistics Common Core
data).
Percentage of Students in Minority Schools by Race,
2000–2001
[Graphic
omitted; see printed opinion] Source: Id., at 28, fig.
4.
B
Sources for Parts I–A and
I–B
Part I–A:
Seattle
Section 1.
Segregation
¶1
C. Schmid & W. McVey, Growth and Distribution of Minority Races
in Seattle, Washington, 3, 7–9 (1964); F. Hanawalt & R.
Williams, The History of Desegregation in Seattle Public Schools,
1954–1981, pp. 1–7 (1981) (hereinafter Hanawalt); Taylor, The
Civil Rights Movement in the American West: Black Protest in
Seattle, 1960–1970, 80 J. Negro Hist. 1, 2–3 (1995); A. Siqueland,
Without A Court Order: The Desegregation of Seattle’s Schools 10
(1981) (hereinafter Siqueland); D. Pieroth, Desegregating the
Public Schools, Seattle, Washington, 1954–1968, p. 6
(Dissertation Draft 1979) (hereinafter
Pieroth).
Section 2. Preliminary Challenges, 1956 to
1969
¶1
Pieroth 32, 41; Hanawalt
4.
¶2
Hanawalt
11–13.
¶3
Id., at 5, 13,
27.
Section 3. The NAACP’s First Legal Challenge and Seattle’s
Response, 1969 to
1977
¶1
Complaint in Adams v. Forbes Bottomly, Civ. No.
6704 (WD Wash., 1969),
pp. 10–11.
¶2
Id., at 10,
14–15.
¶3
Planning and Evaluation Dept., Seattle Public Schools, The Plan
Adopted by the Seattle School Board to Desegregate Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Grade Pupils in the Garfield, Lincoln, and
Roosevelt High School Districts by September, 1971, pp. 6, 11
(on file with the University of Washington Library); see generally
Siqueland 12–15; Hanawalt
18–20.
¶4
Siqueland 5, 7,
21.
Section 4. The NAACP’s Second Legal Challenge,
1977
¶1
Administrative Complaint in Seattle Branch, NAACP v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, pp. 2–3 (OCR, Apr. 22,
1977) (OCR Complaint) (filed with Court as Exhibit in Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 458
U. S. 457); see generally Siqueland
23–24.
¶2
Memorandum of Agreement between Seattle School District No. 1 of
King Cty., Washington, and the OCR (June 9, 1978) (filed with the
Court as Exh. A to Kiner Affidavit in Seattle School Dist. No.
1,
supra.
Section 5. The Seattle Plan: Mandatory Busing,
1978 to
1988
¶1
See generally Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra,
at 461; Seattle Public Schools Desegregation Planning Office,
Proposed Alternative Desegregation Plans: Options for Eliminating
Racial Imbalance by the 1979-80 School Year (Sept. 1977) (filed
with the Court as Exh. B to Roe Affidavit in Seattle School
Dist. No. 1, supra); Hanawalt 36–38, 40; Siqueland 3,
184, Table
4.
¶2
Id., at 151–152; Hanawalt 37–38; Seattle School Dist.
No. 1, supra, at 461; Complaint and Motion to Dismiss
or Affirm in Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
supra.
¶3
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra, at 461; Hanawalt
40.
¶4
See generally Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
supra.
Section 6. Student Choice, 1988 to
1998
¶1
L. Kohn, Priority Shift: The Fate of Mandatory Busing for School
Desegregation in Seattle and the Nation 27–30, 32 (Mar.
1996).
¶2
Id., at
32–34.
Section 7. The Current Plan, 1999 to the
Present
¶1
App. in No. 05–908, p. 84a; Brief for Respondents in No.
05–908, pp. 5–7; 426 F. 3d 1162, 1169–1170 (CA9 2005) (en
banc) (Parents Involved
VII).
¶2
App. in No. 05–908, at 39–42; Research, Evaluation and Assessment,
Student Information Services Office, Seattle Public Schools Data
Profile: DistrictSummary December 2005, online at
http://www.seattleschools.org/ area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05all.pdf;
Brief for Respond- ents in No. 05–908, at 9–10, 47; App. in No.
05–908, at 309a; School Board Report, School Choices and
Assignments 2005–2006 School Year (Apr. 2005), online at
http:// www.seattleschools.org/ area/ facilties&nbhyph;plan/ Choice/ 05&nbhyph;
06AppsChoicesBoardApril2005final.pdf.
¶3
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School Dist., No. 1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 72 P. 3d 151
(2003); 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (2001); 426 F. 3d 1162 (CA9
2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved
VII).
Part I–B:
Louisville
Section 1. Before the Lawsuit, 1954 to
1972
¶1
Hampton v. Jefferson Cty., Bd. of Ed., 72
F. Supp. 2d 753, 756, and nn. 2, 4, 5 (WD Ky. 1999)
(Hampton
I).
Section 2. Court-Imposed Guidelines and Busing, 1972 to
1991
¶1
Hampton I, supra, at 757–758, 762; Newburg
Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson Cty.,
489 F. 2d 925 (CA6 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U. S. 918 (1974),
reinstated with modifications, 510 F. 2d 1358 (CA6 1974)
(per curiam); Judgment and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Ed., of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291 (WD
Ky., July 30, 1975) (1975 Judgment and
Findings).
¶2
Id., at 2, 3, and Attachment
1.
¶3
Id., at
4–16.
¶4
Memorandum Opinion and Order in Haycraft v. Board of
Ed. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291, (WD Ky., June 16,
1978), pp. 1, 2, 4, 18 (1978 Memo &
Order).
¶5
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Haycraft v. Board of Ed.
of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., Sept. 24,
1985), p. 3; Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson,
Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. Public
School Dist., pp. 1, 3, 5 (Apr. 4, 1984) (1984 Memorandum);
Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson, Superintendent, to the Board
of Education, Jefferson County Public School District, pp. 4–5
(Dec. 19, 1991) (1991
Memorandum).
Section 3. Student Choice and Project Renaissance,
1991 to
1996
¶1
1991 Memorandum 1–4, 7–11 (Stipulated Exh. 72); Brief for
Respondents in No. 05–915, P. 12,
n. 13.
¶2
1991 Memorandum
14–16.
¶3
Id., at 11,
14–15.
¶4
Id., at 15–16; Memorandum from Stephen W. Daeschner,
Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. Public
School Dist., p. 2 (Aug. 6, 1996) (1996
Memorandum).
Section 4. The Current Plan: Project Renaissance
Modified, 1996 to
2003
¶1
1996 Memorandum 1–4; Brief for Respondents in No. 05–915, at 12,
and
n. 13.
¶2
1996 Memorandum 4–7, and Attachment 2; Hampton I,
supra, at
768.
¶3
1996 Memorandum 5–8; Hampton I, supra, at 768,
n. 30.
¶4
Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102
F. Supp. 2d 358, 359, 363, 370, 377 (WD Ky. 2000) (Hampton
II).
¶5
Id., at
380–381.
Section 5. The Current Lawsuit, 2003 to the
Present
¶1
McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 330
F. Supp. 2d 834 (WD Ky. 2004); McFarland v.
Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 416 F. 3d 513 (2005);
Memorandum from Stephen W. Daeschner, Superintendent, to the Board
of Education, Jefferson Cty. Public School Dist., 3–4 (Apr. 2,
2001).
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