NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the United States Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme
Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal
errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 22–324
_________________
MICHELLE O’CONNOR-RATCLIFF, et al.,
PETITIONERS
v. CHRISTOPHER GARNIER, et ux.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 15, 2024]
Per Curiam.
In 2014, Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and
T. J. Zane created public Facebook pages to promote their
campaigns for election to the Poway Unified School District (PUSD)
Board of Trustees. While O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane (whom we will
call the Trustees) both had personal Facebook pages that they
shared with friends and family, they used their public pages for
campaigning and issues related to PUSD. After they won election,
the Trustees continued to use their public pages to post
PUSD-related content, including board-meeting recaps, application
solicitations for board positions, local budget plans and surveys,
and public safety updates. They also used their pages to solicit
feedback and communicate with constituents. Their Facebook pages
described them as “Government Official[s]” and noted their official
positions. O’Connor-Ratcliff also created a public Twitter page,
which she used in much the same way.
Christopher and Kimberly Garnier, who have
children attending PUSD schools, often criticized the board of
trustees. They began posting lengthy and repetitive comments on the
Trustees’ social-media posts—for instance, nearly identical
comments on 42 separate posts on O’Connor-Ratcliff ’s Facebook
page and 226 identical replies within a 10-minute span to every
tweet on her Twitter feed. The Trustees initially deleted the
Garniers’ comments before blocking them from commenting
altogether.
The Garniers sued the Trustees under 42
U. S. C. §1983, seeking damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief for the alleged violation of their First
Amendment rights. At summary judgment, the District Court granted
the Trustees qualified immunity as to the damages claims but
allowed the case to proceed on the merits on the ground that the
Trustees acted “under color of ” state law when they blocked
the Garniers. §1983.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that §1983’s
state-action requirement was satisfied because there was a “close
nexus between the Trustees’ use of their social media pages and
their official positions.” 41 F. 4th 1158, 1170 (2022). The court
cited its own state-action precedent, which holds that an off-duty
state employee acts under color of law if she (1) “purports to or
pretends to act under color of law”; (2) her “pretense of acting in
the performance of [her] duties had the purpose and effect of
influencing the behavior of others”; and (3) the “harm inflicted on
plaintiff related in some meaningful way either to the officer’s
governmental status or to the performance of [her] duties.”
Ibid. (citing
Naffe v.
Frey, 789 F.3d 1030,
1037 (CA9 2015); internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Applying that framework, the court found state action based largely
on the official “appearance and content” of the Trustees’ pages. 41
F. 4th, at 1171.
We granted certiorari in this case and in
Lindke v.
Freed, ___ U. S. ___ (2024), to
resolve a Circuit split about how to identify state action in the
context of public officials using social media. 598 U. S. ___
(2023). Because the approach that the Ninth Circuit applied is
different from the one we have elaborated in
Lindke, we
vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in that
case.
It is so ordered.
Comments
Be the first to comment
Leave a Comment