Statute limiting benefits of the "Assistance to Families of the
Working Poor" program to those households in which the parents are
ceremonially married and have at least one minor child of both, the
natural child of one and adopted by the other, or a child adopted
by both, denies equal protection to illegitimate children.
349 F.
Supp. 491, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
This case presents the question of the constitutionality under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the New
Jersey "Assistance to Families of the Working Poor" program,
N.J.Stat.Ann. § 44:13-1
et seq., that allegedly
discriminates against illegitimate children in the provision of
financial assistance and other services. Specifically, appellants
challenge that aspect of the program that limits benefits to only
those otherwise qualified families
"which consist of a household composed of two adults of the
opposite sex ceremonially married to each other who have at least
one minor child . . . of both, the natural child of one and adopted
by the other, or a child adopted by both. . . ."
N.J.Stat.Ann. § 44:13-3(a). Appellants do not challenge the
statute's "household" requirement. Rather, they argue that,
although the challenged classification turns upon the marital
status of the parents as well as upon the parent-child
relationship, in practical effect, it operates almost invariably to
deny benefits to illegitimate children while granting benefits to
those children who
Page 411 U. S. 620
are legitimate. Although apparently conceding the correctness of
this position, the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, sitting as a three-judge court,
* upheld the
statutory scheme on the ground that it was designed "to preserve
and strengthen family life."
349 F.
Supp. 491, 496 (1972).
Confronted with similar arguments in the past, we have
specifically declared that:
"The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds
of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an
infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth, and penalizing the illegitimate child is
an ineffectual -- as well as an unjust -- way of deterring the
parent."
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164,
406 U. S. 175
(1972).
Thus, in
Weber, we held that, under the Equal
Protection Clause, a State may not exclude illegitimate children
from sharing equally with other children in the recovery of
workmen's compensation benefits for the death of their parent.
Similarly, in
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
68 (1968), we held that a State may not create a
right
Page 411 U. S. 621
of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a
parent and exclude illegitimate children from the benefit of such a
right. And only this Term -- in
Gomez v. Perez,
409 U. S. 535
(1973), we held that, once a State posits a judicially enforceable
right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural
father, there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for
denying such an essential right to illegitimate children.
See
also Davis v. Richardson, 342 F.
Supp. 588 (Conn.),
aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972);
Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 1226 (Md.),
aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
Those decisions compel the conclusion that appellants' claim of
the denial of equal protection must be sustained, for there can be
no doubt that the benefits extended under the challenged program
are as indispensable to the health and wellbeing of illegitimate
children as to those who are legitimate. Accordingly, we grant the
motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, reverse the
judgment of the District Court, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs in the result.
* In prior proceedings in this case, a single judge of the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, in an
unreported opinion, denied appellants' petition to convene a
three-judge court on the ground that no substantial constitutional
question was presented, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a
substantial constitutional claim had been presented, and therefore
remanded the case with directions to convene a three-judge court.
448 F.2d 1247, 1248 (1971).
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The New Jersey Legislature has enacted a statute entitled
"Assistance to Families of the Working Poor," which is designed to
provide grants to supplement the income of a discrete class of
families with children when independent sources of income are
inadequate to support the family unit. The program is completely
financed by the State, and therefore need not conform to any of the
strictures of the Social Security Act. The New Jersey program for
assistance to the working poor does not provide financial grants to
classes of children as such, as is the case under various federal
plans. Instead, it provides grants to classes of families as units.
The Court
Page 411 U. S. 622
holds that, because benefits are limited to families
"which consist of a household composed of two adults of the
opposite sex ceremonially married to each other who have at least
one minor child . . . of both, the natural child of one and adopted
by the other, or a child adopted by both,"
the legislative scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court relies on
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U. S. 164
(1972), where a Louisiana statute that denied workmen's
compensation benefits to an illegitimate child was invalidated. But
the very language that the Court quotes from
Weber shows
how different this case is from that. There, a disability was
visited solely on an illegitimate child. Here, the statute
distinguishes among types of families. While the classification
adopted by the New Jersey Legislature undoubtedly results in
denying benefits to "families" consisting of a mother and father
not ceremonially married who are living with natural children,
whatever denial of benefits the classification makes is imposed
equally on the parents, as well as the children
Here, the New Jersey Legislature has determined that special
financial assistance should be given to family units that meet the
statutory definition of "working poor." It does not seem to me
irrational, in establishing such a special program, to condition
the receipt of such grants on the sort of ceremonial marriage that
could quite reasonably be found to be an essential ingredient of
the family unit that the New Jersey Legislature is trying to
protect from dissolution due to the economic vicissitudes of modern
life. The Constitution does not require that special financial
assistance designed by the legislature to help poor families be
extended to "communes" as well.
In the area of economics and social welfare, the Equal
Protection Clause does not prohibit a State from taking one step at
a time in attempting to overcome a social ill, provided only that
the classifications made by
Page 411 U. S. 623
the State are rational. Here, the classification is based on a
particular type of family unit, one of, if not the, core units of
our social system. There being a rational basis for the legislative
classification, the constitutionality of the law is governed by
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
(1970), rather than by
Weber.
I would affirm the Judgment of the District Court.
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