PER CURIAM
NELSON V. UNITED STATES
555 U. S. ____ (2009)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LAWRENCE W. NELSON, aka ZIKEE
v. UNITED
STATES
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 08–5657. Decided January 26, 2009
Per Curiam.
Lawrence Nelson was convicted of
one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to
distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base. See 21 U. S. C.
§846. The District Court calculated Nelson’s sentencing range under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and imposed a sentence of
360 months in prison (the bottom of the range). During sentencing,
the judge explained that under Fourth Circuit precedent,
“ ‘the Guidelines are considered presumptively
reasonable,’ ” so that “ ‘unless there’s a good reason in
the [statutory sentencing] fac- tors … , the Guideline sentence is
the reasonable sentence.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 10.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed Nelson’s conviction and sentence.
United States v.
Nelson, 237 Fed. Appx. 819
(2007)
(per curiam). It noted that within-Guidelines
sentences are presumptively reasonable, and rejected Nelson’s
argument that the District Court’s reliance on that presumption was
error.
Id., at 821.
Nelson filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari. We granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration
in light of
Rita v.
United States,
551 U. S. 338 (2007).
Nelson v.
United States, 552 U. S. ___
(2008).
On remand and without further briefing, the
Fourth Circuit again affirmed the sentence. 276 Fed. Appx. 331
(2008)
(per curiam). The court acknowledged that under
Rita, while courts of appeals “may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper
application of the Sentencing Guidelines,” 551 U. S., at 347, “the
sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption
that the Guidelines sentence should apply,”
id., at 351.
Instead, the sentencing court must first calculate the Guidelines
range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the
individual defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors,
18 U. S. C. §3553(a), explaining any variance from the former
with reference to the latter. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit
upheld the sentence, finding that the District Court did not treat
the Guidelines as “mandatory” but rather understood that they were
only advisory. 276 Fed. Appx., at 333.
Nelson has again filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari, reasserting,
inter alia, essentially the
same argument he made before us the first time: that the District
Court’s statements clearly indicate that it impermissibly applied a
presumption of reasonableness to his Guidelines range. The United
States admits that the Fourth Circuit erred in rejecting that
argument following our remand; we agree.
Our cases do not allow a sentencing court to
presume that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is
reasonable. In
Rita we said as much, in fairly explicit
terms: “We repeat that the presumption before us is an
appellate court presumption. . . . [T]he sentencing court
does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the
Guidelines sentence should apply.” 551 U. S., at 351. And in
Gall v.
United States, 552 U. S. ___ (2007), we
reiterated that district judges, in considering how the various
statutory sentencing factors apply to an individual defendant, “may
not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.”
Id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 11–12).
In this case, the Court of Appeals quoted the
above language from
Rita but affirmed the sentence anyway
after finding that the District Judge did not treat the Guidelines
as mandatory. That is true, but beside the point. The Guidelines
are not only
not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are
also not to be
presumed reasonable. We think it plain from
the comments of the sentencing judge that he did apply a
presumption of reasonableness to Nelson’s Guidelines range. Under
our recent precedents, that constitutes error.
The petition for certiorari and the motion for
leave to proceed
in forma pauperis are granted. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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